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MODERN HISTORY

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MODERN HISTORY

1750-1925

BY

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PREFACE

Our history is continually living and growing, and since the time at our disposal for its study cannot proportionately increase, but is, in fact, somewhat severely limited, we cannot cover all the ground *fully*. The use of a microscope is the privilege of the specialist; most of us must be content with the thin end of a telescope.

Shall we devote our time to one special historical subject, or try to cover as wide a period as possible? We should be able to do both if provided with a book and a teacher.

The object of the present work is to put before the student the main features of a long and all-important period in a comparatively short space. The book is intended for his own reading, while further subjects for discussion and additional books for special study should be suggested by the teacher.

The space at disposal forbids the inclusion of any detailed colonial history. It has not been possible to deal with South Africa, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

Opportunity is thus given for the student to write his history *for himself* under the guidance of his teacher, provided that he has ready access to books of reference. Work so done must be of high educational value when carefully criticized and revised. The author strongly urges that the experiment be given a fair trial. To this end a

series of paragraph headings for "home-made history" has been inserted in an Appendix.

Modern History, 1750–1925, is an expansion of my already-published *Survey of Modern History*, and has been produced in response to a demand for a volume which shall include a study of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic periods as preliminary to that of the nineteenth century subsequent to 1815. In the new chapters some space is devoted to the Expansion of Britain, the Industrial Revolution, and the American War of Independence. Some notes on China and South America are included, with a summary of the Peace Conference and a Diary of the War. A short Bibliography is added for the use of teachers.

The author is deeply indebted to his colleague, Mr. E. A. Hughes, M.A., for much careful criticism and many fruitful suggestions.

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Shetland Is.
Orkney Is.
ATLANTIC OCEAN
BRITISH
ISLES
North Sea
Christiania
Stockholm
G. of Bothnia
Baltic Sea
Edinbg
Dublin
London
Hamburg
Berlin
Warsaw
English Channel
Brussels
Paris
Bay of Biscay
C Finisterre
French System
Alpine System
Berne
Vienna
Buda Pest
Carpathian
Plain of Hungary
Plain of Lombardy
Iberian Plateau
Pyrenees
Lisbon
Madrid
Corsica
Rome
Italian Plateau
Adriatic Sea
Balkan
Sardinia
Straits of Gibraltar
Mediterranean Sea
Sicily
AFRICA

MODERN HISTORY

CHAPTER I

Expansion of Britain

The History of our own times has become World History. Past History shows the continent of Europe and the Mediterranean Sea as the centres of power and civilization. The times in which we live are concerned with all the continents, and with the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The war of 1914 became a world war, and to the Peace Conference twenty-seven states sent representatives. To the progress of a *League of Nations* as a working fact and not an unattainable ideal the world looks wistfully.

We can best understand how and why the historical circles have widened in this way beyond the confines of Europe by some study of the general features of the eighteenth century. In that century we shall find that the seeds had been sown for the crops we have reaped and are still reaping.

No study of the nineteenth century can be satisfactory without a previous survey of the French Revolution, its causes, and its heir, Napoleon Bonaparte. In the eighteenth century, too, we shall find many examples of selfish aggression, the denial of rights to the small and weak nation; and the assertion that might is right.

We find, again, the sincere attempt and failure of absolute monarchs to satisfy the crying needs of their people. Thus the latter half of the century has been called the Age of the Enlightened Despots, of whom Catherine of Russia and Joseph II of Austria are fair examples.

It was essentially an age of reason and of awakening scientific interest. It was the age of discoveries and inventions which were destined to triumph over space, to substitute the machine for the man, and so to revolutionize industrial processes. In all these ways it was leading towards the Revolution that heralded the nineteenth century.

Lastly, it witnessed the struggle for colonies and commerce which her sea-power brought to so triumphant a conclusion for Great Britain.

When, therefore, we are seeking for the origins of modern international, political, and social problems, with this eighteenth century we must begin.

The Age of Discovery.

At the latter end of the fifteenth century—the age of the voyages of discovery—the world may be said to have become definitely larger, for it was not until then that the Western Hemisphere was discovered in any effective sense by Europeans. The discoveries then made were destined to shift the centre of gravity of World History. The discovery of America meant that the seafarers and traders of the future must transfer their outlook and their interests from their old centre, the inland Mediterranean Sea, to the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

Portugal and Spain.

The voyages of Cabot, Columbus, Diaz, and Magellan cannot here be retold, but, in effect, they bestowed the monopoly of empire upon Portugal and Spain at the expense of the old Italian Republics. Between these two nations in 1494 Pope Alexander Borgia divided all lands newly discovered or yet to be discovered by a line drawn 370 leagues west of the Cape Verde Islands. But Spain soon smothered the Portuguese rivalry, only in her turn, towards the end of the sixteenth century, to find her monopoly of sea-power and overseas possessions challenged by the Dutch.

Holland.

England.

At this same period, too, the Elizabethan sea-rovers in the school of Hawkins, Gilbert, and Drake were learning—by the employment of a new weapon, the ship with the broadside of heavy guns—to despise the ponderous power of Spain.

With the opening of the seventeenth century yet another

competitor, France, entered the race for colonial empire, and, as will presently be seen, the struggle for the richest spoils resolved itself in the eighteenth century into a world-wide war between Britain and France. By then the strength of Holland was exhausted and the power of Spain, though vast on the map, was in reality declining.

France.

Anglo-French rivalry in eighteenth century.

To understand the issues at stake during this eighteenth-century struggle, a brief summary is necessary of the respective positions of the British and French rivals in India and North America.

A. British and French in North America

The French were ahead of the British in the colonization of North America. The first true colony had been planted in 1540 by Jacques Cartier, who had already, in 1534, explored the river St. Lawrence. In 1608 Champlain founded Quebec. As a set-off to this the English had little to show at the beginning of the seventeenth century. The settlements of Gilbert in Newfoundland and of Ralegh in Virginia had proved failures. There was no permanently established colony until the Virginia Company was founded by Captain John Smith in 1606.

North America.

In the light of subsequent events it is important to mark the motives which underlay the early explorations and settlements.

Motives for colonization.

Primarily, the New World was discovered because the Turks, by their conquests, had blocked the flow of trade along the old land routes from the East Indies. Eastern commodities—above all, the spices then so indispensable to the western world—became unobtainable in European markets except at ruinous cost. Desire therefore for free access to East Indian trade impelled Columbus to sail westward in the *Santa Maria*, and all unconsciously to discover a new continent. As the vast extent of the New World became gradually known, desire for the lion's share of its riches was still the predominant motive.

Quest of the Indies: Motives.

But, together with this desire for wealth, there went the missionary zeal which aimed at converting the native inhabitants

to Christianity. Thus Prince Henry the Navigator had sent expeditions down the west coast of Africa in the fifteenth century. The same mixed motives—commercial and Christian—were seen in the Spanish conquests of Peru and Mexico. There is no trace at this stage of a fixed design to found colonies in the modern sense—states which should reproduce the life, manners, government, and traditions of the mother-country.

Missionary zeal.

In the seventeenth century, there arises the definite notion of rival colonial empires, as contrasted with competing commercial depots and trading outposts. Henri IV, Richelieu, and, above all, Colbert embarked on the conscious policy of creating a New France in the New World, which should be administered strictly by and for the home government, i.e. by the despotic system of the *ancien régime*. The aim was to establish French supremacy in North America. Why did this ambition fail?

French colonization.

To understand this we must turn to the fortunes of the British colonists. In 1620 occurred an event of tremendous importance. This was the sailing of the *Mayflower* from Southampton and Plymouth, which more than any other single event explains why Great Britain, and not France, became supreme in the New World. The Pilgrim Fathers, who left England to escape religious and political persecution, had no intention of returning. They were not simply explorers nor yet adventurers greedy for gold. They were not swayed by imperial sentiment. Their quest was that political and religious independence which was denied to them at home.

British colonization.

Sailing of the "Mayflower".

The pioneers of 1620 were followed by 20,000 colonists during the reign of Charles I alone, and the states of Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Maine were founded.

Here was a contrast with the settlements so deliberately designed by France. Like most of the British Empire these New England states grew naturally without a conscious preordained plan. Their growth was on the whole ignored by the mother-country. They were left to face their own dangers and to solve their own problems, and for that very reason they have given to the world such a notable example of self-government.[1]

[1] Though not of course at first democratic in form. Rather, an oligarchy based on church membership.

The colonists of the seventeenth century created real wealth in their new homes by the sweat of their brows in the tilling of the land and the development of its rich natural resources. Thus they built up prosperity on sure foundations. They were the first to show to the world the true value of a colony, and their method stands in sharpest contrast with that of the Portuguese, the Spanish, and the Dutch. Their numbers increased rapidly. By the opening of the eighteenth century twelve states had been founded (Georgia in 1733), and when the critical struggle came with France they had a population of about $1\frac{1}{4}$ millions as against 80,000 of their rivals.

The first true colonists.

Rapid increase of population.

The British and French had but one serious competitor—the Dutch, who had founded a great commercial empire and monopolized the world's carrying-trade in the first half of the seventeenth century. But this they were not strong enough to hold against the increasing sea-power of Britain and the danger to their land frontiers contained in the aggressive policy of Louis XIV. At the close of their second war with England (1667) they gave up the New Netherlands, which had driven a wedge between the British colonies lying north and south of the Hudson River, and which now became the states of New York, New Jersey, and Delaware.

So the British colonies slowly developed, occupying a long and continuous, if comparatively narrow, strip of territory between the Alleghany and Appalachian Mountains and the Atlantic coast. Meanwhile the French *voyageurs* pushed far into the Hinterland and explored the valleys of the Mississippi and Missouri, naming the whole of that vast territory Louisiana. From the Great Lakes to New Orleans (soon to be founded, 1718) the land was claimed for France. Should this claim become effective by real military occupation there could be no future for the thirteen British colonies hemmed in between the mountains and the sea. Under such conditions, whatever might be the official relations between the governments at home, there could be no lasting peace in North America.

Danger from the French.

The last great war of the reign of Louis XIV, the war of

Marlborough's triumphs, closed with the Treaty of Utrecht (in 1713) by which France was forced to cede Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and the Hudson Bay territory (Rupert's Land). It had now become clear that British national interests lay not in European politics, but in overseas expansion gained and defended by naval supremacy. It was otherwise with our French rivals, who had always too many irons in the fire, and who looked on colonial gains as of secondary importance to victories won on European battlefields.

Treaty of Utrecht, 1713.

The war of Austrian succession (1740–48) saw the capture of Louisburg, the key to the St. Lawrence, but the place was restored to France in exchange for Madras at the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748).

By the middle of the eighteenth century, the colonial situation had become so acute that true statesmen like William Pitt saw that the imperial issue must stand first for Great Britain, above and beyond all fears for the safety of Hanover and the support of Frederick the Great. When, in 1756, the great Seven Years' War broke out, the man emerged by whose genius the French menace was destroyed for ever. Coming into office in 1757 in command of the most successful coalition known in our history, William Pitt became solely responsible for the strategy, conduct, and triumphant issue of the war. In clearness of vision, adaptation of means to ends, grasp of details, and, above all, in choice of subordinates, he proved himself the greatest war minister the country has ever possessed. To him more than any other single man belongs the title of preserver and promoter of the British Empire. Apart from his tremendous personality, he won the war because he recognized in the navy his most formidable weapon and wielded it with consummate skill. It is easy in our own times to realize that a supreme navy alone can secure and maintain our colonies, but, fortunately for us, in the eighteenth century the French could not or would not grasp this obvious fact.

The great struggle of eighteenth century.

William Pitt and the Seven Years' War.

Fighting had begun in America long before the official declaration of war in Europe. Determined, once and for all, to make good their claim to the Hinterland from New Orleans to the

Great Lakes and Canada, the French began busily to fortify the line of the Ohio, intending from that base to attack Virginia and Pennsylvania. The strongest post thus established was Fort Duquesne. In the north the French did their utmost to win back Nova Scotia. Even the Duke of Newcastle was alive to

the danger, so that in January, 1755, two British regiments were sent out under Braddock to co-operate with colonial troops against the French. This expedition, inexperienced and ill-equipped for frontier fighting, while marching through the forests to attack Fort Duquesne was cut to pieces by a force of French and Indians greatly inferior in numbers. In 1756 there were fresh disasters, for Montcalm, a commander

Braddock's failure, 1755.

of first-rate ability, was far superior to the second-rate men sent out from England. His capture of Oswego was a serious blow, as it deprived us of a strong forward post cutting into the French lines. No serious effort was yet made to use our naval power to prevent men, money, and supplies from reaching French Canada, which would have been the surest and shortest means of winning the war. The period of the French successes is significantly bounded by the emergence of Pitt, who knew full well what command of the sea meant and what must follow from it.

Pitt's method.

In 1757, assured by his union with Newcastle of full Parliamentary support, Pitt had a free hand, and the war, which had opened so disastrously with the loss of Minorca, began speedily to turn in our favour. The essence of Pitt's plan lay in the close watching of the French ports, carried out for the first time systematically by Hawke off Brest. The French squadrons could not get out and concentrate without being brought to battle: they had to choose between fighting and immobility.

By this means Great Britain was secured from the invasion so often threatened, and the French colonies and possessions in America and India were cut off from Europe and so deprived of the armies and supplies, the lack of which must mean the loss of empire.

Capture of Quebec, 1759.

In his conduct of the Canadian campaign Pitt's mastery is most conspicuous. His choice of leaders was peculiarly happy. He had Amherst and Wolfe to command in the land campaign. Boscawen, Saunders, and Holmes had charge of the chief naval operations. In 1758, as a preliminary, Louisburg was taken, and the way opened for the great Quebec campaign of 1759. The threefold attack, the glorious victory and death of Wolfe on the heights of Abraham, the unfailing devotion and intrepid seamanship of the fleet, and the fall of the city in 1759 need no description here. That great year of victory[1] stands as a model of what a combined expedition should be. It affords, too, a classical example of the influence of sea-power. Well might Pitt have claimed that by the blockade of

Sea-power.

[1] The prevailing toast was: "The British colours on every port, fort, and garrison in America".

the French ports, by the victories of Lagos (August) and Quiberon Bay (November), and by the bombardment of Havre he had won Canada and India. We remember his resolve to conquer Canada on the plains of Germany; we are apt to forget that the victory was gained far more decisively by the work of our navy in the Bay of Biscay and in the Mediterranean.

With the return of the campaigning season in 1760, Montreal shared the fate of Quebec, and Canada became British.

B. British and French in India

We often speak loosely of India as if the word connoted one State under one form of government. It is truer to think of India as a sub-continent containing a number of peoples widely differing in race, customs, language, and religion, comprising every kind of climate and an infinite variety of physical features. Taken together, the British possessions and the native States cover an area of about 1,800,000 square miles, and contain a population of 315 millions.

It is our aim, in this chapter, to explain how and why British rule in India was established. The facts have been too often misinterpreted even by our own historians; for too many people knowledge of the facts themselves is still limited to the study of Lord Macaulay's essays on Clive and Warren Hastings.[1] Aim of the chapter.

Our enemies, of course, accuse us of deliberately absorbing a continent piecemeal at the expense of the guileless native princes.[2] Reasonably enough, those who held this view looked for a tremendous "national" rising at the beginning of the recent war, which would end in the final expulsion of the British from India. Just as, over a century ago, Napoleon had beguiled the Indian princes with the prospect of liberty, equality, and fraternity, so in 1914 did the German agents, prodigal of gold and promises, seek to stir up rebellion. Others, while they did not believe that India was ripe for rebellion, went so far as to declare that British rule

[1] These essays are still used in India. It were surely better to have no opinion of Warren Hastings than one that does him so much injustice and dishonour.

[2] This was the attitude of Burke at Warren Hastings's trial.

in India was a "gigantic machine for managing the entire public business of one-fifth of the inhabitants of the earth without their leave and without their help".

To correct these various impressions it is necessary to have constantly before our eyes a clear outline of the main historical facts. It is necessary to understand the state of India when the British Company first acquired territorial authority, the circumstances under which that Company was compelled to extend its political power and responsibility in a fight for existence against the French, the necessity which dictated a forward policy resulting in British suzerainty over the whole continent, the end of the Company's rule and the assumption of direct control by the Home Government. Finally, the nature and magnitude of the present problems of Indian government must be summarized.

While the main interest must lie in the story of the rise of British rule, for the proper understanding of that story it is necessary to refer to the previous fortunes of the country and its peoples. It is a puzzling story, a story of the rapid rise and fall of kings, of "old, unhappy far-off things"—battle, murder, pestilence, and famine.

A grasp of the main features of Indian geography will simplify this early history. Let us examine the great northern frontier of the Himalaya. It is the greatest mountain-barrier in the world. A series of tremendous ranges is backed on the north by a great plateau—the table-land of Tibet, itself higher than Mont Blanc. Here is no path practicable for an invading army. Only on the east and west, where the Brahmaputra and Indus respectively flow into India, is there any access from Central Asia to the plains. The eastern break in the mountain-barrier is the gorge of the Brahmaputra, comprising country so wild and difficult as to make big military operations impossible. Sir Francis Younghusband tells us that the route by which he reached Lhasa, though by far the easiest, is quite impracticable for the passage of a big campaigning army. There is little danger of serious invasion from this quarter.

Main geographical factor.

At the western end of the Himalaya it is different. Beyond the Indus, in Afghanistan, the mountain region of the Hindu Kush is broken by four or five series of passes, through which the

successive waves of invaders have reached India. No Empire of India could rest secure unless it controlled these passes. The hill tribes and Afghan rulers must be either permanently conquered or forced into close alliance, for upon their friendly attitude the whole safety of India depends. It is the first duty, then, of the rulers of India to hold the keys of these north-west passes. The map will show that the two most important passes into India from the north-west are the Bolan Pass and the Khaibar Pass. These are the gates of India, and they are commanded by military bases and fortifications at Quetta and Peshawar. It is here that the main strength of our Indian army is concentrated. Through these gates marched many Asiatic invaders, who, previous to the coming of the European settlers from oversea, strove to create an Empire of India.

The north-west passes.

Indian history may be divided into three periods. The first of these, the Hindu, extends roughly from 2000 B.C. to A.D. 1000; the Mohammedan extends from A.D. 1000 to 1750. The third, with which we are most directly concerned, may be named the British period, dating from the days of Plassey and Wandewash, when the genius of Clive ensured that the future of India should be in the hands, not of France but of Great Britain.

Three periods of Indian history.

Nothing is clearly known of the history of the inhabitants of India prior to the migrations of the Aryans from Persia and Central Asia into Northern India. Doubtless they fled for shelter to the hills and to the extreme south of the peninsula, where their modern representatives are probably found in the dark-skinned Dravidian peoples, whose race and language has no kinship with the Aryan. There can be no doubt that the marked distinction of colour between the Aryans and the aborigines first gave rise to the institution of *caste*. There is no record of the first coming of the Aryans. We must suppose that at least 4000 years ago they began to occupy the land between the Indus and the Sutlej, and that in the course of centuries they advanced and settled in the vast plains of the Ganges. Clans or tribes probably clung together under chieftains and military leaders. Success in war would gradually lead to the fusion of these smaller units and the formation of large States under successful war-lords.

The Aryans.

Alexander the Great, who invaded India in 326 B.C., was opposed by a king who could muster a powerful and numerous army. From Alexander's day until the sixteenth century of our era no native dynasty nor any of the numerous northern invaders—Scythians and Turks from Central Asia—succeeded in establishing a permanent and widespread empire. Thus for about 500 years (A.D. 500–1000) Northern India entirely lacked political unity. There were, indeed, powerful chieftains who carved out for themselves independent kingdoms—such were the Rajput chiefs—but there was no great central Power capable of resisting foreign invaders.

Roughly, then, from A.D. 1000 to 1500 India became the battle-field of fierce tribes who descended through the passes from Central Asia, and, like devouring locusts, spread over the rich plains. By the opening of the thirteenth century raiders of Turkish origin had carried fire and sword far into Hindustan and to the borders of Bengal. Their success was due to their physical hardiness, their love of fighting, and, above all, to their creed. They were Mohammedans, and they believed that their happiness in the next world depended on their ability to convert or to destroy the heathen in this world. This fighting religion gave to them the unity which would always overcome with ease the passive, tolerant, and unwarlike creeds of Hindustan.

Mohammedan dynasties.

We must imagine the rapid rise and fall of rival Mohammedan dynasties. Afghans or Pathans wrestled with the Turks. Both in turn succeeded in setting up sultans at Delhi. There was no peace, and the north-west passes were not secured. Thus, about 1398, when Timur the Mongol, with his hordes of heathen savages, swept down like the Huns of old from Central Asia, he carried all before him and departed, leaving India a prey to pestilence and famine. The Mohammedan kingdoms of the north had no more spirit left in them.

Babur, founder of the Mughal Empire, 1526–9.

Thus the way was cleared for a new conqueror, destined to found an empire that endured for two hundred years—a conqueror strong enough to shut the northern doors against all comers, and to establish a vigorous line of despots. This new invader was Babur, the Turkish founder of the Mughal Empire. Between 1526 and 1529 he won


INDIA
under the Great Mughals
English Miles
0 50 100 200 300 400 500
Boundary of Mughal Empire under Akbar, c.1600
Boundary of Mughal Empire at its greatest extent under Aurangzeb, c.1700
70°
80°
90°
30°
20°
10°
Kabul
KASHMIR
LAHORE
PUNJAB
Kandahar
MULTAN
R. Indus
SIND
Delhi
RAJPUTANA
AJMIR
Agra
R. Jumna
Fatehpur Sikri
Lucknow
Jaunpur
R. Ganges
BIHAR
BENGAL
Gwalior
Allahabad
Chitor
MALWA
GUJARAT
KHANDESH
BERAR
Ft. William (Br. 1690)
ORISSA
Bombay (British 1662)
Konkan
R. Godavari
Golconda
Bijapur
R. Kistna
Masulipatam
Goa (Portuguese)
MYSORE
COROMANDEL COAST
Madras (British 1639)
CEYLON (Portuguese to 1658) (Dutch after 1658)
Longitude East 80° of Greenwich

India by three great battles. In 1530 he died of fever, leaving in his famous *Memoirs* a most attractive picture of his own strength and weakness. He had no love for the enervating plain-country, and after a campaign would always retire to his hill capital at Kabul, regarding India as a convenient, though disagreeable, plundering-ground, to be visited strictly for business and not for pleasure. He played the conqueror's part, but did not live long enough to organize his conquests. To his grandson, Akbar (1556–1605), it fell to extend and consolidate his empire. Akbar was a most enlightened despot, who aimed at a united Empire of India based upon toleration of Hinduism, and indeed of all religions, justice and equity for all races. He, indeed, approached more nearly to the principles of the British raj than any rulers who preceded or came after him. His idea of a united empire governed in the interest of subjects as well as sovereign did not survive his death in 1605. His successors were wildly extravagant, and spent millions on southern wars of conquest and on the adornment of palaces and the maintenance of their Court. To this period, the seventeenth century, belong the Taj Mahal at Agra and the Peacock Throne at Delhi. When an emperor died there was nearly always a disputed succession. For the monarch's sons "there was no choice between a kingdom and a death". In this fashion, during the second half of the seventeenth century, Aurangzeb, the last and perhaps best-known of the Mughal emperors, gained his throne. The most ambitious ruler of his line, he spent most of his reign in war. His aim was to conquer the whole of South India. In this he never succeeded, since he was confronted by the rise of a really formidable native power in the Marathas. Now, unlike Akbar, Aurangzeb was a bigoted and fanatical enemy of all creeds except the Mohammedan. He would trust no subordinates who were not Moslems. Like Philip II, he would sooner die than rule over heretics. Thus, so far from receiving loyal support from his vassal States, he found the latter ready and willing to assist his Maratha foes. Like Louis XIV, he waged war on the grand scale: his camp was described as "a moving city containing five million souls". Small wonder that he made but little impression on the lightly-equipped

Akbar, 1556–1605.

Aurangzeb, 1659–1707.

His bigotry.

mobile Maratha troops. In 1707 he died in his camp, worn out by incessant and unsuccessful warfare. He left India divided, the ideal of Akbar long forgotten. By his own policy Aurangzeb had undermined the foundations of his empire. None of his successors were strong enough to repair them. The empire fell rapidly to pieces. Viceroys and vassals threw off their allegiance to Delhi, and the emperors sank to the position of puppets, shadows of a great past. The usual wars of succession followed, but Aurangzeb's failures could hardly be retrieved, even had a man of genius arisen. But this was not the case. The loss of Afghanistan, as ever, opened the northern gates to fresh invaders—Persian or Afghan. Powerful viceroys or *subahdars* in Bengal, the Deccan, and the Carnatic set the imperial overlordship at defiance. In the west and centre the Marathas held whole provinces in fee. The empire was falling fast to pieces. All was anarchy: each ruler fought for his own aggrandizement. Such was the state of India by the middle of the eighteenth century.

Decline of Mughal Empire.

Thus far, among the diverse peoples, be they northern Aryans of the Punjab or Rajputana, Marathas, or the Dravidian aborigines of the south, there is found little or none of the national spirit characteristic of most European States. If this be true of the constituent peoples, we cannot expect to trace in past Indian history the larger and grander design of an ultimate unification of peoples in one vast nationality. Akbar alone dreamed of a united India. As ever among Eastern peoples the unifying force must be sought in the atmosphere of religion.

Absence of national desire for unity.

In European history great patriots and statesmen arise whose power and influence in no way depends upon their religious beliefs. In the East this would be impossible. There can be no empire-building which is not framed in a religious setting. The leader who advocates Home Rule or the rights of man unfortified by this religious motive will leave most of his Eastern audience cold.

In Indian history not even religion supplied a unifying element, since there were three great religions besides a large number of lesser creeds. Between the Mohammedan and the Hindu, who together form the vast majority of the

Religions.

population, there may be compromise, but there can be no fusion. Again, the very basis of Hinduism, the system of *caste*, makes for infinite division. Of the many conquering armies which have poured through the north-western passes into India, none have permanently succeeded in welding her peoples into a single empire. Oriental empire has meant military occupation by a foreign despot. When of the British people Tennyson wrote: "Saxon or Dane or Norman we, Teuton or Celt", he showed the diverse elements which were blended to form the British nation of to-day. Whatever you think about the Celtic fire of a Welsh statesman or the uncompromising dourness of a man from Ulster, you would be sorry to deny that both are British. And you would have said as much for a Disraeli. Whatever we be by descent, we are consciously members of one empire, enjoying the same rights, subject to the same duties, bound by kindred interests.

Caste.

Now contrast this with India. To label a man an Indian tells you little or nothing. Is he Pathan, Maratha, Rajput, Jain, Bengali, or member of one of half a dozen other breeds? The blending process was arrested very early; physical distinctions, such as colour, features, and shape of head are clearly marked. Since there are some 147 vernacular languages, two "Indians" will often fail to understand one another, though, if educated, both will assuredly speak English. There is no sense of common nationality.

Race and language.

And here we are confronted with a fact of supreme significance. The Power which has succeeded in establishing a *permanent* empire, embracing two-thirds of the continent and about 240 millions of the population, came not overland but by way of the sea. That Power was Great Britain.

In the sixteenth century were laid the foundations of the British Empire in India, for that century saw the ripe development of the Merchant Adventurers and the triumphant assertion of sea-power. The Merchant Adventurers were chiefly concerned to enrich themselves by foreign trade. The all-important point to observe is their dependence upon private enterprise. They were not acting in the name of their Home Government: they were private traders. They were satisfied if left to

Coming of the British.

make or mar their own fortunes. They were contented with the grant of a monopoly by the Crown, and then only asked to be left alone. As the merchant adventurers grew into the Chartered Companies of the Tudor period, this independent spirit was maintained. There was no national policy aimed at empire-building: speaking broadly, our rulers (e.g. Queen Elizabeth) were averse from ambitious schemes of land-snatching which might embroil them with foreign powers.

This freedom to make their own decisions and solve their own problems was peculiar to the British trading enterprises. The Dutch alone appeared to thrive under home control. Rival companies—Portuguese, Spanish, or French—were hampered by the close control of the Home Governments, and for that very reason they were heavily handicapped in their competition with the British. The approach by the long sea route was brought about by the conquests of the Turks in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. With Egypt, the Persian Gulf, and the Red Sea in Ottoman hands there could be no secure passage for trade on the old routes between Europe and the East Indies. Quite naturally, the seafaring Western nations sought for, and found, a trade route which should be unmolested and independent of the good graces of the Sultan. With this end in view the great Portuguese voyages of discovery to the Cape of Good Hope in 1486, and to Calicut in 1498, were undertaken. To this end also Columbus sailed westward to find a new way to the East Indies.

Portugal was first in the field, but her supremacy was short-lived. In 1581 she was conquered by Spain, and the success of England and Holland in war against the latter Power involved the ruin of the Portuguese empire in the East. So, at the close of the great sixteenth century, England and Holland stood forth as rivals for the richest commercial prize in the world.

The English traders, then, were drawn towards the East partly because maritime adventure had an irresistible attraction for them, and partly because they were ill-content to leave in the hands of foreign merchantmen the traffic in the precious silks and spices of the East. Under these circumstances, on the 31st December, 1600, a charter was

Foundation of East India Company, 1600.

granted by Queen Elizabeth to "the Governor and Company of Merchants of London trading into the East Indies". Out of this trading company grew up our Indian Empire.

The first trading station was established at Surat; settlements followed at Madras, Masulipatam, and, by the end of the century, on the Hugli River. In 1669 Charles II handed over Bombay—part of his wife's dowry—to the Company in return for an annual rent of £10. With the exception of Bombay, which is actually our first *territorial* acquisition, these settlements were made by special permission of the Mughal emperor, who made no territorial grants beyond the narrow limits comprised by the Company's trading premises.

This development was viewed by the Dutch with the bitterest jealousy. Fierce attacks and reprisals were the order of the day. No quarter was given. It was not until three great naval wars had been fought in home waters that the English Company began to forge ahead of its rival, and superior sea-power was seen, then as so often afterwards, to be the surest safeguard of oversea possessions. Towards the end of the seventeenth century it had become clear that the Dutch were tending to concentrate the remains of their power more and more upon Ceylon and the East Indian Islands (e.g. Java and Sumatra), while the interests of our Company were centred more and more upon the mainland. Our stations, left to their own devices, had made tremendous strides. This seventeenth-century period of Indian history has been too much neglected. In truth it is of prime importance, for without the progress it records it is hard to see how the Company could have lived to enjoy the triumphs of the succeeding century.

Dutch rivalry.

Development of Company in seventeenth century.

The marked decline of Mughal power was directly responsible for the forward policy of our traders. When the great provinces of the Deccan, Oudh, and Bengal cut themselves free from the degenerate "shadow-kings" of Delhi, the position of foreign traders under the patronage of the Mughal emperor changed for the worse. From the Bengal traders, in particular, semi-independent viceroys levied blackmail at their pleasure; for our factories were far inland, and the way to the sea was easily

blocked. This constant insecurity and dependence on the whim of an irresponsible despot prompted the traders to measures of self-defence. Rough fortifications were erected, though only with great difficulty, for secrecy was essential. The Company were fortunate in possessing chiefs of marked resolution, such as Job Charnock at Calcutta and Thomas Pitt at Madras (described by his own directors as "a roughling and immoral man"), by whose agency the modest settlements grew into rich and flourishing cities. Without this period of unobtrusive but persistent growth the interests of Britain in India at the time of Clive and the French wars would hardly have been worth defending.

When, by the end of the seventeenth century, the three presidencies were established, the value of the stakes was clearly seen. A contemporary authority, Sir C. Davenant, wrote of the East India trade: "Whatever country can be in the full possession of it will give law to all the commercial world". It was an open secret, for Leibnitz in 1672 was suggesting that France, by seizing Egypt, would monopolize Eastern trade, and thereby *become supreme World Power*. By the end of the century the Company's directors could declare: "The increase of our revenue is the subject of our care as much as our trade; 'tis that must maintain our force; 'tis that must make us a *nation in India*". The imperial ring in these words implied that the interests involved were more than those belonging to a petty mercantile concern.

By this time France had entered the lists as a third competitor. The incessant attacks of Louis XIV upon Holland drained the latter's strength and resources, so that by the opening of the eighteenth century the ground was fairly cleared in India for the tremendous struggle between France and Britain. We had much in our favour: we had a good start. The chief French settlement of Pondicherry was not founded until 1674.

The struggle with France begins.

As in the course of the eighteenth century the Mughal Empire sank further into decay, the superior organization and military efficiency of the French and English Companies became more marked. The French bid for supreme control coincides with the career of Dupleix, a man of great genius and unbounded ambition. Appointed Director-General of the French

Dupleix.

Company in 1741, he struggled for thirteen years to crush the English and establish a French Indian Empire. His plan was not obscure. He aimed at throwing disciplined military strength into the ceaseless native wars of succession in Southern India. Both in the Deccan and its subordinate province, the Carnatic, he took sides in these wars. The success of his candidates would make French influence supreme, and the English rivalry would be destroyed. He was at first successful, and in the great European war between Britain and France from 1744 to 1748, British prestige in India sank low with the loss of Madras. In 1748 that city was restored to the Company by the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, but unofficial war continued in India until 1754, when the French Government recalled Dupleix. They were in low financial water, and they were in no condition to challenge British sea-power. Yet this was the only possible means of assisting Dupleix. It is quite clear now that however subtly he might intrigue with the native princes, however brilliant the victories of his troops ashore, his work could not endure against an enemy who cut his sea communications.

Since the French failed to gain control of the sea, it mattered but little whether Dupleix were recalled or not. Meanwhile, from 1748 to 1754, Dupleix persisted in the "unofficial" war, with the firm intention of driving the British into the sea. It was then that another man of genius—greater than Dupleix—arose in the person of Robert Clive. By his capture and defence of Arcot and relief of Trichinopoly he retrieved a desperate situation in the Carnatic, and proved, far more convincingly than Dupleix had ever done, the invincibility of a few white troops in control over disciplined natives. The tide turned in our favour in Southern India at the outbreak of the Seven Years' War, in time to make it possible in 1756 for Clive and Admiral Watson to restore our broken fortunes in Bengal. There Siraj-ud-daula, the new nawab, had cast covetous eyes on the wealth of Calcutta. Hearing that the English were strengthening the fortifications in view of the expected war with France, he made this his excuse for seizing the city and the Company's possessions. Then followed at Fort William the infamous outrage of the "Black Hole". The retribution for this

Robert Clive.

The "Black Hole", 1756.


AFGHANISTAN
Khaibar Pass
R. Indus
KASHMIR
CHINESE EMPIRE
Himalaya Mountains
PUNJAB
Bolan Pass
BALUCHISTAN
R. Sutlej
Panipat
Delhi
MOGUL
Rohilcund
Nepal
Bhutan
R. Indus
Agra
OUDH
Lucknow
RAJPUTANA
SUND
R. Ganges
R. Jumna
Ganges R.
ASSAM
Bundelcund
Buxar
BEHAR
Cutch
MARATHA
Plassey
BENGAL
GUJERAT
R. Nerbudda
Calcutta
TERRITORY
BERAR
ORISSA
Bombay
R. Godavari
CARS
NIZAM
Hyderabad
R. Kistna
Bay of
Bengal
Arabian Sea
CIRCARS
MYSORE
Madras
CARNATICUL
Pondicherry
Fort St. David
Travancore
CEYLON
INDIA
1765
British Possessions
0 100 200 300 Miles 500

crime came at Plassey in 1757, a year which may well be called the birth year of the Indian Empire. The French had already been driven out of Chandernagore, so that Clive was now able safely to return to the Carnatic, where he was urgently needed to cope with the French attacks led by Bussy and Lally. The latter got no support by sea, the French squadron having returned to the "Islands".[1] In January, 1760, the French were badly beaten at Wandewash; just a year later their head-quarters at Pondicherry fell, and the long wrestle for supremacy was ended. The sea-power of Great Britain had prevailed over its greatest rival. That power was challenged again and shaken, but never overcome.

Plassey, 1757.

Wandewash, 1760.

With the Peace of Paris (1763) the Company had breathing-space to take stock of its novel situation. In the first place it had won Bengal, which in wealth and by geographical position was worth more than all its other possessions. Calcutta was henceforward the centre of our government, and the natural way of advance into upper India led up the Ganges valley. "To advance into Bengal was to penetrate India by its soft and unprotected side", while the navigable delta left the approach open to the predominant sea-power.

Acquisition of Bengal.

In Bengal, from 1760 to 1765, we had gained all the real power, but would assume no responsibility for good government. The nawab appointed by the Company was disloyal and intrigued to recover his independence. Since it was impossible to work with him he was deposed. In 1764, in alliance with the Nawab Vizier of Oudh, to whose court the emperor had also fled from Delhi, he met the British forces in battle at Buxar, where he was decisively beaten. The Mughal emperor now sought our protection, and Oudh, invaluable as a buffer State against the Marathas, soon came to terms.

Thus it was that, without design and against its will, but purely by way of self-defence against Dupleix in the Carnatic and Siraj-ud-daula in Bengal, the

Power without responsibility.

[1] Mauritius and Bourbon formed an admirable naval base and stepping-stone towards naval operations in Indian waters. The French, despite Labourdonnais, never made the most of them.

Company was burdened with the administration of a vast territory. For a few years before Clive returned to India (he went home in 1760) we played the part of "dog in the manger". The Company would not enforce good government; its servants used their power solely to enrich themselves. They could set up one native prince and put down another at will, but they worked exclusively in their own interest and not in that of the miserable distracted native provinces. The Company, so far from healing the wounds, was actually inflaming them.

When in 1765 the emperor granted to the Company supreme financial control of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa, responsibility was thereby imposed upon an unwilling Company. In two years Clive showed that he had the qualities of a statesman, and did much, by raising salaries and punishing corruption, to cleanse the Augean stables. But he could not overcome a radically bad system in so short a time. There could be no justice nor security so long as local government, policing, law courts, and revenue collection were left in the hands of native agents. When Clive's strong hand was withdrawn, in 1767, the Company's servants began anew to exploit Bengal for their own profit. It is a transition period of which we are not proud. It was unavoidable so long as the Company refused to govern as well as reign. And, indeed, that a trading company lacked the men, the means, and the experience needed to administer an enormous and newly-acquired tract of territory seething with anarchy is no cause for wonder. Lord Clive himself, who knew that all India was ours for the taking, strongly opposed the extension of our dominions beyond Bengal. He realized that not even his own courage and sagacity could create a stable government on the existing system of divided responsibility.

Evil days fell after the departure of Clive. The old abuses of power without responsibility were redoubled, and the Company was helpless to relieve a terrible famine of 1770, one of the worst on record, which killed off nearly one-third of the population in Bengal. Bankruptcy threatened, and the diminution of dividends hastened the decision of the Home Government to enquire at last into the affairs of this Chartered Company which had grown in a day into a territorial power.

IMPORTANT DATES

1606. Virginia Company founded.
1608. Champlain founded Quebec.
1620. Sailing of *Mayflower*.
1664. New Amsterdam (New York) captured.
1713. Treaty of Utrecht.
1718. New Orleans founded.
1755. Braddock's defeat in Virginia.
1756. French captured Minorca.
1759. (Sept.) Capture of Quebec.
(Nov.) Battle of Quiberon Bay.
1763. Peace of Paris.

For Indian dates see p. 230.
For List of Books for Reference see Appendix I.

CHAPTER II

The Industrial Revolution in Britain

For an intelligent grasp of the social, political, and economic problems of our own times we must know something of the great changes which revolutionized our national life and society in the eighteenth century—changes which continued to operate into the nineteenth century. They may most conveniently be discussed under the title of "The Industrial and Agrarian Revolution".

Birth of modern problems.

It is hardly possible to exaggerate their importance in any scheme of general education, or their value as a special subject to the student of modern history.

We must be content here with a summary of the causes of this revolution, the results of which we have before our eyes in the growth of our great cities, the appearance of our countryside, our daily occupations, and our economic outlook.

Changes in eighteenth century.

Until the eighteenth century, Great Britain was on the whole an agricultural and not a manufacturing country. Her staple

product had been wool, the export of which in the later Middle Ages, and subsequent home manufacture promoted by Dutch and Flemish immigrants, had been the main source of her wealth. Except in Norfolk and some districts in the west of England, the wool-weaving industry was not concentrated in towns; it was essentially a domestic industry, and the work was done by hand in the country cottages and not by machines in town factories. The old-fashioned methods of production by spinning-wheel and hand loom were sufficient to supply the needs of the population at home.

By the end of the long wars with Louis XIV (1713), Great Britain had become undisputed mistress of the seas and had made considerable additions to her colonial empire. Since merchants and traders now felt that the seas were a safe highway, the volume of our trade and commerce began rapidly to increase. The opening of new markets and the growing demand for goods made it worth while to venture capital in a search for new and more rapid methods of production.

This consideration helps to explain why the credit for so many mechanical inventions and the successful application of steam-power belonged first to Great Britain and why she gained so long a start over foreign rivals.

With almost startling suddenness towards the middle of the century came a series of inventions and discoveries which ended by converting Britain into the workshop of the world. Geography and geology help us best to appreciate the change, apart from the fact that all the great inventors of the period were of British origin. First, there was our favoured position on the flank of Europe and our wealth of natural harbours available for the ocean trade routes. London was literally in a central position. Next, mark the compactness of Britain, and that in two senses: no part of the island is more than 60 miles distant from the sea, and the great coal and iron fields in the North and Midlands lie almost side by side. These geographical factors enabled us to take full advantage of our long start over continental competitors.

Geographical advantages.

The changes which began in the eighteenth century are best considered separately under two aspects:

A. The Revolution in Agriculture;
B. The Revolution in Industry;

although it will soon be apparent that these two were acting and reacting continuously upon one another.

A. The Revolution in Agriculture

It will be remembered how in Tudor times the development of the wool trade led to the enclosure for pasture of more and more land which had previously been arable, common, or waste. This process had continued, though not rapidly, so that by 1700 about three-fifths of the land was still cultivated under the old open-field system of the Middle Ages. Farmers were stupid and ignorant, and agricultural implements surprisingly clumsy, and it was not until about 1770 that real progress was apparent. By then Tull, Townshend, and Bakewell had introduced scientific ideas into farming. Successful experiments were made in the growing of roots and artificial grasses, in the rotation of crops, and in the breeding of cattle and sheep. It was soon beyond dispute that by the new methods enormously increased profits would be gained by those farmers who had capital enough to employ them. The establishment of a Board of Agriculture in 1793 shows the increased interest now taken by Government. But if the new methods were to spread, the old open-field system must be abolished. It was impossible for a man to improve his land or stock if he still held the scattered unhedged strips allotted him under the old regime. So it came about that in the course of the eighteenth century over 3000 Enclosure Acts were passed,[1] the broad effect of which was to take in lands which had been common or waste, and to convert small-holdings into large private estates and so to cause the gradual disappearance of the small-holder. The face of the country-side was beginning to take on the chequered and variegated appearance which it wears to-day. Hedges hitherto unknown sprang up everywhere, and it became worth while to make costly experiments. These Enclosure Acts were not, of

The great change in agriculture.

Enclosure Acts.

[1] The General Act was passed in 1800.

course, designed solely to increase pasture at the expense of arable. As we shall presently see, a vast and rapid increase of population made a large increase of corn growing vital for national safety.

The agricultural changes were not themselves made very rapidly. The old conservative spirit died very hard. Even in 1794, 4500 out of 8500 parishes were still adhering to the open-field farming.

Like most radical changes the new methods entailed severe hardships. Scientific farming was meat to the wealthy but poison to the poor man. The latter simply could not compete, since he had not the money wherewith to fence and drain his property, to buy the newest implements or the finest stock. Too often the common land was no longer available for the run of his cattle. So it came about that the small-holder—the yeoman of England—was forced to sell his land to the big owner, and was himself compelled to become a labourer or to seek a livelihood in the rapidly growing towns.

Hardship involved.

B. The Revolution in Industry

As in agriculture scientific methods were changing the face of the country, so in industry an even greater revolution was wrought, which brought into being new classes of society, and filled with a dense population whole areas of the North and Midlands which before had been almost unoccupied. For this change two great discoveries were mainly responsible: the use of coal for smelting iron, and the practical application of steam to the working of machinery. Of all modern inventions the use of steam-power may be coupled with that of the printing press as best deserving the title of epoch-making. Though far the greatest, yet it was only one among a number of mechanical inventions which increased the productive power of the country a thousand-fold.

Inventions that revolutionized industry.

The most important of these inventions were concerned at first with the textile trades and the processes of spinning and weaving. As we have seen (p. 24), the work had been carried on in the villages, and was a very

Spinning and weaving.

valuable source of income to the small-holder, for it provided occupation for every member of his family.

In 1733 the invention of the fly-shuttle by Kay of Bury increased both the pace of weaving and the width of the cloth woven. It now became almost impossible for the spinners to keep the weavers fast enough supplied with yarn. The next inventions therefore were applied to spinning, and three machines were devised: Hargreaves's spinning-jenny, Arkwright's water-frame, and Crompton's mule, which secured the far more rapid production of a finer and stronger yarn. It was now possible for the pure cotton cloths and muslins, hitherto imported, to be produced at home.

The chief inventors.

The next step was to apply power to the new machines. Some of the earliest were worked by horses or bulls, but these served only for the experimental stages, being superseded by the water-wheel. The demand for power thus led to the building of mills beside the running streams in Lancashire and Yorkshire. Water-power had the merit of extreme cheapness, but the remote position of the mills rendered transport of goods costly.

Power.

It was left for the genius of James Watt to inaugurate the age of steam. He did not invent the steam-engine. His work was to improve and transform the earlier models of Savery, and Newcomen of Dartmouth—which were first used for pumping water from mines—so as to provide an engine which would wear well and work accurately and economically.

The coming of steam. James Watt.

This he had done by 1774 in conjunction with Matthew Boulton, whose workmanship and businesslike aptitude ensured immediate commercial success. Once steam-power was given to the world there was no limit to its application in every branch of industry. By 1781 Boulton could write: "the people in London and Manchester are all *steam-mill* mad".[1] For better and worse the day of the cottage industry and the handicraftsman was done; the centre of gravity must shift from country into town.

The coming of the steam-driven machine brought an enormous demand for coal and iron; their juxtaposition enabled Great Britain to make the most of her inventions. The

Coal and iron.

[1] Steam was first used in a cotton mill at Papplewick, Notts, in 1785.

use of coke and then of coal for smelting iron led to the introduction of blast furnaces, and from these it was only a short step to the wholesale output of pig-iron, which up to this time was actually being imported.

Blast furnaces.

At nearly the same time came the casting of steel. In 1779 was built the first iron bridge at Broseley (Salop), and in 1787 the first iron vessel (a canal-barge).

Side by side with the changes wrought by the use of coal and iron and steam came many other notable inventions, all of which had the same effect—to make Britain industrially supreme. Only one or two can be mentioned here. The application of chlorine to the process of bleaching effected in a few days what had been before the work of months. Bell's machine for cylinder printing is also worthy of note, as further increasing the pace of output in the textile trades. Josiah Wedgwood, designer and maker of pottery, established his famous works at Etruria in the same period.

With the gigantic volume of trade which now began to develop, there came an urgent call for improved communications. All contemporary evidence agrees that even the main roads in our island were few and incredibly bad. Rapid and safe transit was a crying need. The work of scientific roadmaking had halted curiously behind in an era of inventive fertility—the problem is unsolved to-day—for, although men like Rennie and Telford made a great advance in bridge and road construction, it was not until 1815 that Macadam taught the world the secret of a "permanent way".

Communications.

Roads.

The problem of transporting heavy goods at a cheap rate was solved by the cutting of canals, a work in which we had lagged sadly behind the Dutch and French. The father of this movement was James Brindley, a man who, lacking all formal education, was possessed of amazing natural ability. His first achievement was the Duke of Bridgewater's canal from Worsley to Manchester, which, like most of the older canals, was projected mainly for the carriage of coal. Gradually the whole country was linked up by canals, which proved invaluable until the railway systems were developed.

Canals.

By 1800 the transformation of Britain into the workshop of the world was complete. A few figures will best show what the

Industrial Revolution had accomplished in the course of the past half-century. In 1720 our exports were short of 8 millions; in 1800 they exceeded 34 millions, while our imports had risen from 6 millions to more than 28 millions. Our National Debt had increased from 130 millions (during the Seven Years' War) to upwards of 861 millions. Our survival of that burden and the drain of revenue involved is the measure of the wealth we had amassed.

Britain the workshop of the world.

More significant still was the increase and changed distribution of our population. Up to about 1750 the greater part of the North and Midlands was poor and sparsely populated. The chief centres of population still lay in and round London, in the home and some of the western counties. After 1770 the balance had entirely shifted, and a teeming population of town-dwellers had sprung up in Lancashire, the West Riding, Durham, Northumberland, South Wales, and the Black Country. With this new race there arose a new set of baffling social problems—problems of poverty, problems arising from the displacement of labour, the abuse of free competition, and the yawning gulf fixed between employer and workman. All these problems were born of the Industrial Revolution, and the twentieth century has not yet discovered their final solution.

Increase and shift of population.

In very truth our commercial and industrial greatness was bought at a high price. The weakest went to the wall. The fittest, financially, survived. The factory "hand" knew no more freedom than the mediæval serf, and the conditions under which he worked were far less wholesome. The factories were too often unventilated and insanitary, the machinery unfenced, the hours of labour cruelly long, and the wages ludicrously low.

Evils of new industrial life.

Economic change had come so quickly that there had been no time to anticipate the new evils, still less to mitigate them.

The coming of machinery was bound at first to cause some unemployment, and riots and machine-breaking ensued. Time must elapse before new markets and industries were sufficiently developed to absorb the unemployed.

Unemployment.

It would be unjust to assume that the employers were entirely indifferent to the condition of their workmen. Many of them

were fully alive to their poor estate, and did their best to improve it. At the beginning of the nineteenth century Robert Owen was showing at New Lanark how mills and factories could be profitably managed without sacrificing the health and happiness of the workers. Others followed his example.[1] It was, in fact, in the small mills that the worst conditions were found, and the parents were to blame for the exploiting of child labour.

We should remember, too, that the social problems created by the Industrial Revolution, while not entirely new in type,[2] were unprecedented in scale. The vast increase of population, accompanied by violent fluctuations in work and wages, was bound to bring hardships for which no legislation could find an immediate remedy.

That remedies were long delayed was due largely to the fashionable economic theory of non-interference by the State. This theory had been enunciated, though with many qualifications, by Adam Smith in his *Wealth of Nations* (1776). In that book he was attacking the old restrictions which stifled the growth of national trade. Lesser and more dogmatic writers who followed him projected his views into a hard and fast theory that all Government interference was vicious. It was not then surprising that employers of labour should believe that Factory Acts and restriction of working hours in relief of women and children were not only useless but mischievous, as tending to destroy the prosperity of the nation.

Excessive hours of labour.

The worker had no power whatever to make a bargain or to resist oppressive terms; to refuse the master's offer was to starve. So he accepted the terms offered; he worked for twelve or fourteen hours a day under the most unhealthy conditions, and his wife and little children did the same. Of home life there was none, nor any education. Disease, vice, and crime were universal. The working classes had no representatives in Parliament. They were dumb before their shearers, and the fear of revolution at home during the life-and-death struggle with France blinded the eyes of the governing classes to the "rights of man", and made them

Want of representation.

[1] Sir Robert Peel, himself a manufacturer, was responsible for the first Factory Act, 1802.

[2] See Bowden's *Industrial Society in England—Eighteenth Century*—for the *bad* old times.

slow to mark the pitiful state of the workers and to remedy it by legislation. At such a cost was the new England brought to birth. A new society had come into being, and the framework of the old Government was not wide enough to include it or even to legislate for it. The newly created cities were entirely unrepresented. The new working class had no stake in the country.

After the great wars which ended in 1815, the cry for reform of Parliament grew insistent, and more insistent still was the cry for social reform — for improved conditions of life and labour. Between 1815 and 1832 political and industrial unrest led to continual riots. This was the period of the Luddite machine-breaking, the so-called Manchester Massacre, and the Cato Street Conspiracy, and the Government had no remedy to apply except coercion.

The working classes had indeed to wait yet a long time before they received power of themselves to help themselves. The Reform Bill of 1832, passed after a fierce struggle, gave votes to the middle classes; the working men in the towns got no votes till 1867, while the country labourers had to wait till 1884. Till then their prospect of relief depended largely on the single-hearted and public-spirited efforts of individual philanthropists.

Parliamentary reform.

The first step towards improvement was the passing of the new Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834. The remedy for distress in the country districts which had previously been tried had only aggravated the evil. The aim had been to eke out insufficient wages by doles proportionate to the size of the distressed family. The result of course had been that the employer had made no attempt to pay a reasonable wage, and the worker was demoralized, having no incentive to steady work or thrift. He lost all self-respect because he was pauperized. The local Poor Rates often rose to 20*s.* in the pound. £7,000,000 came to be spent in poor relief alone, but no relief was forthcoming! By this new Act of 1834 out-door relief to the able-bodied was abolished. Workhouses were built by groups of parishes called Unions. The Poor Law was administered in each Union by elective Boards of Guardians, who granted relief only to paupers who were willing to enter the workhouse.

Poor Law Reform.

By this means the pauperization which was ruining the country began steadily to diminish.

About the same time, in 1833, appeared the first Factory Act, for which Lord Ashley (later Shaftesbury) was responsible. It went far to regulate the hours and conditions of the workers, specially in the interests of the women and children, and Government Inspectors were appointed to enforce the law. Meanwhile the Combination Laws which had forbidden workmen to unite or strike for better conditions had been swept away by 1824–5.

First Factory Act.

Everywhere, in the first forty years of the nineteenth century, we find humanitarian movements. The work of Wilberforce and Clarkson for the emancipation of slaves, the improvement in prisons, already wrought by John Howard and continued by Elizabeth Fry, are perhaps the most conspicuous examples. Romilly laboured unceasingly for the reform of the savage criminal code by which women were flogged and children sentenced to death. In 1800 death was still the penalty for over two hundred "crimes", such as the cutting down of a young tree or pretending to be a Greenwich pensioner.[1]

Humanitarian movements.

With Catholic emancipation in 1829 religious toleration was becoming more of a reality, while religious instruction in Sunday schools was promoted by Raikes and Hannah More.

The work of all these reformers is a subject deserving of special study; it is too often dismissed with perfunctory reference even in the detailed textbooks.

In their own way the great philanthropists saved the country as surely as did our great statesmen, admirals, and generals. It is also noteworthy that their work might never have been so well done or supported but for the previous influence of John Wesley (1703–91), the most remarkable personality in a century that produced such a wealth of distinguished public men. We must regard him as the pioneer of the evangelical revival which produced nothing short of a religious revolution. As a spiritual force

Their importance.

[1] "Mr. Justice Park [after passing sentence of death on two men convicted at Surrey Winter Assizes of housebreaking] said this was an offence which prevailed to a most alarming extent, which must be attributed to the indiscreet humanity of Judges (he took his own share in the blame fully) in offering reasons of mercy to the Crown. . . . He had taken this prompt course in pronouncing sentence of death."—*The Times*, 1824.

the Established Church was at its lowest ebb. "Wesley's movement merits the abused epithet of 'epoch-making'. Methodism and the French Revolution are the two most tremendous phenomena of the century. Wesley swept the dead air with an irresistible cleansing ozone. To thousands of men and women his preaching and gospel revealed a new heaven and a new earth; it brought religion into soulless lives and reconstituted it as a comforter, an inspiration, and a judge. No one was too poor, too humble, too degraded to be born again and share in the privilege of divine grace, to serve the one Master, Christ, and to attain to the blessed fruition of God's peace." [1]

By the preservation and spreading of spiritual and religious influences broadcast over the kingdom, which was the work of Wesley and his followers, the nation was sustained in the dangerous transition stages of the Industrial Revolution.

This spiritual revival, with its reminder that in Christian charity man is concerned with the welfare of his brethren, was the antidote to the poison of material selfishness instilled by the doctrine of *laissez-faire*.

The fierce revolutionary enthusiasm too, which in France was debased into irreligion, anarchy, and crime, was in England largely diverted into these religious and humanitarian channels.

We have now glanced at some of the causes and the early course of the Industrial Revolution. We have no space to follow its succeeding stages through the nineteenth century. But by 1815 it was clear that our triumph over Napoleon was best to be explained by our superior staying power, and that that power was provided by the Industrial Revolution in the form of wealth, which in terms of ships and subsidies Napoleon was powerless to destroy. To Louis XIV we had been a nation of shopkeepers. By 1800 we were not only selling goods to all the world, we were also making them. Mechanical inventions continued to increase industrial output, and a new era dawned with the opening of the first railway in 1829. The Age of Democracy had arrived, bringing with it a host of perplexing problems for Britain and Greater Britain.

[1] *England under the Hanoverians*: E. G. Robertson. (Methuen.)

IMPORTANT DATES

1733. Kay's fly-shuttle.
1761. Brindley's Canal.
1764. Hargreaves's spinning-jenny.
1765. Watt's steam-engine.
1787. The first iron vessel.
1801. General Enclosure Act.
1811. Macadam's scheme for roads.
1829. Catholic Emancipation.
Opening of Liverpool-Manchester Railway.
1832. Great (first) Reform Bill.
1833. First Factory Act.
Abolition of Slavery.
1834. Poor Law Amendment Act.
1867. Second Reform Bill.
1884. Third Reform Bill.

For List of Books for Reference see Appendix I

CHAPTER III

The Disruption of Empire

It had been long foreseen that the conquest of Canada would lead to a crisis in the relations between Great Britain and her American colonies.[1] Discontent with the old colonial system, which meant that "plantations" and settlements oversea existed primarily for the benefit of the mother-country, had long been felt and displayed; but so long as the French possession of Canada menaced the very existence of the colonies there could be no question for the Americans of an open breach with their only protector.

Effect of Seven Years' War.

Now that the danger from France was removed, it was natural that both parties—the Imperial Government at home and the states' assemblies oversea—should wish to define their points of

[1] Vergennes the acute French diplomatist had predicted, before 1763: "England will soon repent of having removed the only check which could keep her colonies in awe. She will call upon them to help in bearing the burdens they have brought upon her, and they will answer by throwing off all dependence."

view. It was the failure to reach agreement or even compromise that led to one of the greatest events in modern history: the foundation of the United States of America.

We saw in the first chapter how the Seven Years' War gained for Great Britain a vast empire based upon her power at sea. That war had made her mistress of the North American continent (with the exception of Mexico) in so far as it was then explored. Within less than twenty years she was to lose the most valuable part of this empire. Had she retained it the British Empire of to-day must have been very differently constituted and balanced.

To understand the causes of the great disruption we must, as always in history, look far back into the past. The origin of British settlement in North America explains a great deal. The men who sailed in the *Mayflower* (1620) left the mother-country because they were resolved to lead *free lives*, unassailed by ecclesiastical and political tyranny. They sought to erect in a new home a system of government which should ensure the freedom to establish their own political and religious institutions. Their sons and grandsons were nourished in the same atmosphere of independence. So there grew up a tradition and practice of *self-government* far in advance of any established system in the Old World. This self-governing spirit—in varying degrees and under varying charters and constitutions—was to be found in all the states, which by 1733, with the foundation of Georgia, were thirteen in number. The feeling of independence had itself been increased by the policy of *laisser-faire* adopted by the home Government. Beyond business relations neither ministry nor people were particularly interested in colonial affairs. Out of sight, 3000 miles across the Atlantic, the colonists were literally out of mind. This attitude, born of ignorance and lack of imagination, goes far to explain why no remedy short of the clash of arms was discovered for divergent views. Throughout the twelve critical years from 1763 to 1775, understanding, sympathy, and above all, statesmanship were conspicuously lacking.

Independent spirit of the colonists.

Indifference of home Government.

The questions at issue are seen most clearly if we take the imperial and the colonial points of view separately. This is the

more necessary at the present time, since opinions on the quarrel have always been extreme and downright: up to a very recent date most American textbooks ignored the existence of British sympathizers both in and out of Parliament, and left the erroneous impression that the struggle was between two peoples.

Divergent points of view.

Again, as a reaction against this extreme pro-American view, books have lately appeared seeking to prove that the deliberate aim of the colonists was, from the first, separation and not the redress of grievances—a claim to which the mother-country could not be expected to agree. As a constitutional question it is difficult to decide which party had the better case. Certain it is that the colonial leaders denied the sovereignty of the British *Parliament* and its power to annul or override their original charters. It must be remembered, too, that the Revolution of 1688 had diminished the King's power and increased that of Parliament. The Americans were prepared to believe that Parliament might prove a greater agent for tyranny than royalty had ever been.

The home Government held with justice that the colonists should share a portion of the enormous costs of the Seven Years' War, by which they had gained complete security.[1] The occasion seemed ripe for imposing a direct tax which would be equally levied throughout the thirteen colonies. The lack of uniform contributions of men, money, and supplies, so severely felt in the late war, had been due to the narrow and jealous outlook of the different state assemblies.

Never before had it seemed worth while to emphasize the sovereignty of Great Britain by the levy of definite and direct taxes for the purposes of revenue. It was the past want of definition as to the rights and duties of colonists that created nearly all the trouble. It did not occur to ministers that their right to levy taxes could be seriously disputed. What they did see clearly was the unsatisfactory results of allowing so much freedom in the past. What they failed utterly to *foresee* was the effect of such a rapid change of policy on men who had grown to regard self-government as a right and not as a privilege. Delicate handling was essential.

[1] Frontier defence was still needed against Indian raids.

Statesmanship might prevent disaster, but great statesmen were far to seek. Chatham, whose force was now spent, uttered his warnings in vain, and Burke had insufficient power to enforce his plea for wise forbearance. For the Americans the struggle could not have come at a more favourable time, since the short-lived ministries which coincided with the efforts of George III to buy a party in the House of Commons rendered a firm and consistent policy impossible. Second-rate statesmen—Grenville, Rockingham, Grafton—were set to preserve an empire.

British lack of statesmanship.

The colonial attitude was sharply defined in 1764 when George Grenville, Chancellor of the Exchequer, introduced his first measure. This was the famous Stamp Act, which ordained that stamps of varying values should be purchased from British officials for all legal documents and newspapers. In so far as it was universal and cheap to collect this was a good tax.

Grenville's Stamp Act.

Up to this date the only revenue derived from America came in the form of customs duties. Its value amounted to less than one-fourth of the expenses of collecting it. But the significant point to remark is that the Americans raised not the slightest objection to indirect or external taxes, and yet the suzerainty of Great Britain was embodied in the Navigation Acts which restricted colonial freedom of trade. The Navigation Acts were designed, in the spirit of the old colonial system, to make profit out of the colonies as producers of raw material and purchasers of the goods manufactured by the mother-country. The colonies were allowed no trade except with or by way of Great Britain.[1] All foreign ships were excluded. It is of course easy to understand why they did not resent the imposition of customs duties, for smuggling was everywhere practised on a huge scale; but it is not so easy to understand *logically* why they endured in principle British dictation in matters of trade, yet rose in hot resentment against the Stamp Act. This inconsistency is only partly explained by Grenville's declared intention to suppress the smuggling, enforce the trade laws, and station British regiments in America, the cost of maintaining which would be partially met by the Stamp Act.

[1] Concessions were sometimes made; e.g. the Carolinas were allowed to ship rice to any port of Europe south of Cape Finisterre.

When this Act was finally passed in March, 1765, a storm of opposition arose to the great surprise of ministers, for Grenville had allowed a year to elapse in order to canvass American opinion and to invite alternative suggestions. A bitter cry was at once raised against the power of Parliament to levy an *internal* tax. Protests soon took violent shape, and, as always, Massachusetts and Virginia took the lead. In the former state the governor's house was sacked, and in many other districts revenue officers were attacked and the stamps destroyed.

Colonial protests.

For the first time the colonies began to draw together, when a Congress representing nine out of thirteen states met at New York and drew up a remonstrance which was sent to King and Parliament. Almost at once the Grenville ministry resigned, though not on account of the American crisis. It was succeeded by the Rockingham ministry, which, influenced largely by Burke and Chatham, brought about the repeal of the Stamp Act in February, 1766, at the same time affirming by a Declaratory Act the right of Parliament "to legislate for the colonies in all cases whatsoever".

Declaratory Act.

This attempt at compromise was fatal, as it settled nothing and left the impression of weakness. Government had yielded to pressure on a particular point but refused to surrender the general principle. In effect the colonial opposition was stiffened. Then another change of ministry added fuel to the flame of disaffection. In 1767 Charles Townshend invented the ingenious device of taxing glass, painters' colours, paper, and tea on entry to America. Such taxation would assert the rights of the home Government, and being external must be admitted as legal by the colonists. But he reckoned without the carefully organized and rapidly increasing rebellion. There can be little doubt that at this stage it was deliberately fomented by certain leaders with a view to complete independence.[1]

Townshend's taxes.

Massachusetts again took the lead, issuing a circular letter to the other states. Its state assembly was formally dissolved, but still continued to sit. The feeling in Boston between the inhabitants and British troops led to the so-called massacre of three citizens in what was little more than a street brawl. Meanwhile,

[1] Cf. progress of French Revolution.

Lord North had taken office as Chancellor of the Exchequer and a conciliatory policy was adopted. All the taxes were remitted with the exception of a duty of 3*d.* per pound on tea. Then North became Prime Minister, but the real dictator of American policy was now the King, whom nothing short of entire submission would satisfy. The crisis was hastened in the autumn of 1773 by the Boston "tea-party". Cargoes of tea were to be sold in America subject to the very trifling tax of 3*d.* per pound, which would enable Americans to buy it considerably cheaper than was possible in Great Britain; at the same time it was hoped that the East India Company, then in very low water, would be benefited by increased sales. But that 3*d.*, says Lord Acton, broke up the British Empire.

The Boston Tea-party, 1773.

The colonists would have none of it. In Boston the whole procedure was taken as an attempt to bribe the colonies into admitting the validity of the tax. To prevent the landing of any tea a party disguised as Indians boarded the three tea-ships and threw the cargo into Boston harbour. This open defiance was answered by severe measures. The port of Boston was declared closed, the Massachusetts charter was cancelled and its rights vested in the Crown.

Such punitive measures were the death-blow to a peaceful settlement. They were not even backed by a vigorous display of armed force. Their effect was to unite colonial opposition and led directly to disastrous war—disastrous even in success, for the colonies could not be held against their will.

In September, 1774, a continental Congress virtually severed all connection with the home Government.

Open fighting quickly followed with a skirmish at Lexington, in which regular troops from Boston under General Gage had the worst of the encounter.

The War opens.

What were the prospects on either side? The struggle at first sight appeared unequal. All resources—wealth, army, and navy (giving them the initiative)—seemed to be on the side of the British. It seemed that they had but little to beat. And yet their advantage was illusory rather than real. No government was less endowed with able administrators. The contrast in conduct between the forceful handling of the late war by Pitt and

the limp and hesitant grip of the King's Friends in 1775 is poignant.

War Office and Admiralty were at the mercy of chiefs whose only claim to office lay in their subservience to the King's will.

British weakness in army and navy.

By the criminal neglect of Lord Sandwich, the navy, on which empire and mother-country depended, had grown alarmingly weak. Ministers were at their wits' ends to find recruits for either service. Commanding officers were unwilling to hazard their reputations in the conduct of campaigns for which the Government provided bad plans and rotten ships. This rapid decline in so few years affords a classic example of the havoc that can be wrought by a corrupt administration. It was the more to be deplored, since unquestioned control of the sea could alone guarantee success against the colonists. As Washington declared, the navy would have a casting vote in the struggle.

The issue should have been short, sharp, and decisive, but on the British side bad strategy and tactics and second-rate generals saved the American cause, until in 1778 their alliance with France converted a local war into a desperate struggle for existence on the part of Great Britain. North's ministry was blind to the danger of foreign intervention, so obvious to Chatham and the opposition.

In spite of the British blunders, the colonists could hardly have survived the years from 1775 to 1778 without the serene courage and matchless endurance of George Washington. He alone sustained the half-starved and ragged forces which kept alight what often seemed the dying flame of resistance. There are few characters to whom their opponents have yielded such ungrudging admiration. In the history of this troubled period, the personality of Washington stands unrivalled, unless it be by that of Warren Hastings.

George Washington.

The turning-point in the first part of the land campaign came in 1777, when the War Secretary made a futile attempt to plan from London a combined operation for a seat of war 3000 miles distant. The plan itself was a good one: the line of the Hudson River from the Lakes to New York was to be held in order to isolate the New England forces and cut

Saratoga.

them off from their reinforcements and supplies in the west and south. General Burgoyne was ordered to march from Canada to join forces with General Howe, who would advance from New York. It was an arduous march for Burgoyne, and, for success, the most definite instructions and accurate timing were essential for both commanders. But by criminal carelessness Burgoyne alone received definite orders to march, and after struggling through most difficult country, hampered the while by his heavy guns, he was surrounded at Saratoga by Gates with an army of 14,000 men. As there was no hope of relief, and his own force was reduced to 3500, he surrendered (Oct., 1777).

This event was more than a local military reverse: it led to the immediate entry of France into the war. While undisturbed by foreign interference, Great Britain had failed to subdue her revolting colonies. She had now, from 1778 onwards, to fight against France, who was joined by Spain in 1779, and against Holland, who declared against her old trade rival in 1780. The northern powers, too, proclaimed an armed neutrality to protest against the British claim to the right of searching neutral ships for contraband goods. Thus all the important maritime states were arrayed against us. It seemed that the faulty strategy of the Admiralty must now lead to disaster, for it involved the lost control of sea-communications. Vain efforts to cover every danger-zone—the Channel, Gibraltar, the Mediterranean, the East and West Indies, and the coast of North America—only frittered away the strength of the navy, which could never be superior at the vital point. The sure and sound defence against invasion, which had proved its worth in 1759, if not forgotten, could not now be employed, for the necessary ships and men were not forthcoming. Many of our ablest admirals, including Howe and Keppel (after 1778), after a brief experience of the slackness at Whitehall, refused to risk reputation and personal honour in the service of Lord Sandwich and the King. It was obvious that large French forces must be prevented from reaching America, and yet the French fleets were allowed to sail, with the result that the British squadrons in the West Indies and North America were no longer able to help the British troops ashore, nor even to protect our own West Indian islands.

The French join the colonists, 1778.

Faulty sea strategy.

In home waters, a Franco-Spanish fleet entered the Channel in 1779, and actual invasion was averted rather by good luck than by good management.

From 1780 to 1782 the defence of Gibraltar was an additional call on the overstrained resources of the navy. In 1781 the Dutch fleet had to be met and fought in the North Sea.

Meanwhile in America it was becoming even clearer that success would fall to the side which could maintain a superior fleet in co-operation with the land armies. Since the surrender of Burgoyne (1777) the British troops in the north had been drawn into New York, and had confined their activity mainly to raids along the coast and into New Jersey. These raids were soon extended to the Southern States, where Lord Cornwallis met with great success in 1780, especially in the Carolinas. The colonial forces made but little progress, as there was no central government with powers to raise the requisite men and money and use them to the best advantage. Each state still thought jealously for itself alone, and not nationally; and such a separatist spirit could never win the war. At this juncture the patient exertions of Washington produced the co-operation with the French fleet by which the defeat of Cornwallis was brought about. Reduced and worn by incessant marching, Cornwallis had brought his force of 8000 men to Yorktown in Virginia, hoping to get in touch with the British fleet. Meanwhile Washington had persuaded the French admiral de Grasse to join in a concerted attack on Yorktown. The movement was well timed. The French and American troops marched from outside New York, where Clinton was himself expecting to be attacked, and surrounded Cornwallis on the land side. The British commander found the French instead of the British fleet entering Chesapeake Bay. The situation called for desperate remedies—a fact that was insufficiently appreciated by Graves, the British admiral, who with an inferior force was expected to dislodge the French fleet. The action itself, like so many naval engagements of the century, was indecisive, because a clear system of signals was still lacking, and admirals were unable to emphasize or modify their plans in the course of an action, but were bound by the old code of Fighting Instructions,

Campaign of Cornwallis in the south.

Action in the Chesapeake, 1781.

which laid the utmost stress on maintaining at all cost the formation of ships in unbroken "line-ahead".

Yet this half-fought action at sea, in which no ship was lost on either side, must be counted among the most significant in all our history. The return of the French fleet within the Chesapeake sealed the doom of Cornwallis. Surrounded by superior forces and without hope of relief, he held on until 17th October, 1781, and then surrendered. This was the end of all serious fighting on land, and hastened the downfall of the North administration (March, 1782).

Surrender of Cornwallis, 1781.

The Whigs on entering office began at once to discuss terms of peace with the colonies, and at the same time to carry on more vigorously the naval war with France, Spain, and Holland.

In January, 1782, the position at sea had improved when Hood, at St. Kitts, outwitted by clever tactics a vastly superior French fleet under de Grasse. On 12th April, off Dominica, Rodney's victory restored to Britain her lost prestige and the control of the sea. In the same year came the famous defence of Gibraltar by Elliot and its brilliant relief by Lord Howe.[1]

Rodney's victory, 1782.

Relief of Gibraltar.

Now that the fighting with the Americans was ended, their allies had but little to gain by continued war. Peace was therefore concluded in January, 1783. Beyond the gain of some West Indian islands, France, who had ensured the independence of the United States, had but little to show for the vast expenses she had incurred. She had only hastened the bankruptcy which was to cause the outbreak of revolution in 1789.

Peace of Versailles, 1783.

Beyond defining the boundaries between Canada and the United States the Anglo-American agreement contained little more than the formal recognition of the accomplished fact of independence. Efforts were made without much success to ensure that some compensation should be paid to loyalists who had suffered total loss of land and property in the war.

It is often said that the revolt of the American colonies was

[1] In this same year, 1782, Kempenfelt went down in the *Royal George*. The court-martial proved that the ship sank because she was rotten, but its finding was suppressed, and the Admiralty dared not raise the ship.

a salutary lesson for the mother-country. Yet this is only half the truth. It must again be recalled that the colonists had groaned under no tyranny or wrong. They were never oppressed, and, in opposing the economic policy of the home Government, they were claiming an independence by which, if admitted, they would cease in any sense to be colonies. Their claim was ultimately nothing short of complete self-government. It should be noted, too, that the cry "no taxation without representation" was highly ambiguous. For Americans it meant that taxes could only be voted by their own state assemblies in which every free man was represented. They denied the possibility of their being represented at all in London, and they did not wish to be. Such representation could be of little value to them, since a handful of American members could have no more influence than the agents who already could and did represent colonial interests in Great Britain. In this matter of representative government the colonies were far more advanced than the Parliament at Westminster. It was the age in Great Britain of rotten and pocket boroughs, and out of a population of some 8,000,000 only about 160,000 had votes. Birmingham was unrepresented, while Old Sarum, though unpopulated, still returned two members. And this condition remained unreformed until 1832.

Ultimately, indeed, the American attitude developed beyond arguments concerning the sovereignty of Parliament, whether representative or no. It developed into the assertion of a higher law than that of Parliaments, overriding all prescription and precedent: a Law of Nature and the Rights of Man.

Thus arose an entirely new situation. The taxes levied might be great or small, the method of collection equitable or burdensome—all this became irrelevant when the principle of freedom was set against the principle of authority.

It is hard to see how the conflict of principle could have been long avoided. Nothing short of complete surrender to the American principle could have averted it, and it is not reasonable to expect that George III and his Government should have recognized and accepted this solution.

For over a century the causes of friction have been distorted and prejudged to the detriment of two great peoples, and to this

unhappy situation the writers of historical textbooks have often contributed. Happily there have been of late many signs that the story is being retold as history should be told—with impartiality and knowledge based on first-hand evidences.

IMPORTANT DATES

1764–5. Grenville's Stamp Act.
1766. Declaratory Act.
1767. Townshend's Taxes.
1773. Boston Tea-party.
1775. Battle at Lexington.
1777. Burgoyne's surrender at Saratoga.
1778. France enters the war.
1781. Cornwallis's surrender at Yorktown.
1782. Rodney's victory at "The Saints". Defence and relief of Gibraltar.
1783. Peace of Versailles.

For List of Books for Reference see Appendix I

CHAPTER IV

French Revolution

The study of nineteenth-century history ought of right to begin with the year 1789.

"How much the greatest event it is that ever happened in the world and how much the best!" Such was the judgment of Fox when he heard of the downfall of the Bastille. His remark was made at the very opening of that gigantic drama which we call the French Revolution. Whether we agree with Fox or no, our opinion can now be sustained by the masses of evidence accumulated during the lapse of over a century.

Precisely six years after the signature of the Treaty of Versailles, in 1783, which ended the war between Great Britain and France and registered the birth of a new nation, the meeting of the States-General at Versailles heralded the dawn of a new era for France.

Causes of French Revolution: ancien régime.

To understand why the Revolution broke out in France at that particular date, it is necessary to remind ourselves of the political, economic, and social conditions known as the *ancien régime*. The strength of France had grown, up to the eighteenth century, as the strength of her kings. To this end Richelieu had striven to reduce the great nobles to the position of courtiers, and had deprived the Huguenots of independent political existence, so that the king's rule should be all in all. There existed no representative council or parliament meeting regularly to advise or criticize the king. The States-General, which had not been summoned for 175 years, was a meeting of the representatives of the three estates—nobles, clergy, and people. It was comparable to an English Parliament of the fourteenth century, in that it was summoned at irregular intervals and stated its grievances without possessing any power to enforce their redress. It afforded no check to the king's power, and as it had last met in 1614, men were naturally hazy as to its procedure and method of sitting.

The States-General.

It is clear then that the people of France had no effective check on royal prerogative. In France there was no tradition, as in England, of freedom broadening slowly down. There were no parliamentary institutions quick to resent infringement of their privileges by the king or to share with him the task of governing the country.

Burdens on the people.

The French people had many grievances. The whole social system was based on privilege and inequality. While the nobles and clergy, numerically an insignificant minority in a population of about 25 millions, were the possessors of the lion's share of the wealth and resources of the country, they contributed nothing towards the expenses of government. The only privilege possessed by the Commons or Third Estate was that of being sole providers of the whole revenue! "The nobles fight, the clergy pray, and the people pay." The burden fell upon the weakest shoulders. Under a king like Henry IV, who was zealous for his subjects' well-being, such a system was illogical enough, but in the eighteenth century—when the ruinous wars and personal ambitions of Louis XIV were succeeded by

the vicious and heartless selfishness of his grandson, Louis XV—the lot of the peasants might well appear intolerable. They groaned under a three-fold burden: taxes to the king, feudal dues in labour and in kind to the landowning nobles, and tithes to the Church. It is calculated that out of every 100 francs earned the small farmer contributed 81 in taxation.

Taxes and feudal dues.

Again, in the eighteenth century France was not yet a unified state. The kingdom had been formed out of great feudal provinces, each with widely differing laws and customs, which the establishment of the absolute monarchy had left untouched. The provinces, too, were fenced off from one another by elaborate internal customs lines, so that no free commercial intercourse was possible. Even the levy of Crown taxes, such as the notorious *gabelle*, which compelled all subjects to buy a certain quantity of salt, was unevenly distributed between different provinces. The collection of such a tax was ludicrously expensive, amounting to about one-quarter of the revenue derived.

There was probably more personal freedom among the French peasants than was to be found in Germany and Eastern Europe, where also serfdom still obtained, but since in France most landlords had long ceased to reside on their estates or interest themselves in the welfare of their dependents, actual misery was equally acute. It was the poignant contrast between the careless luxury of court and city life and the abject poverty of the country districts that impressed the foreign observer, such as the English traveller, Arthur Young, who remarked that "there are no easy transitions from ease to comfort, from comfort to wealth: you pass at once from beggary to profusion".

Now, although the poorer classes were powerless to protest, and all society was based on inequality, there were many able thinkers and writers, mostly of the middle class, who had long felt the *ancien régime* to be intolerable and did not hesitate to publish their views. It was the educated town-dwellers who were stirred by these writings, the class who were to form the majority of the Third Estate in the States-General of 1789. The most influential of these writers were Montesquieu, Voltaire, and Rousseau. The first looked

Influence of great writers.

for salvation to the adoption of a political system modelled on that of Great Britain. Voltaire used his brilliant wit and lucid style to denounce shams and abuses in Church, state, and society, and, though not remarkably original in his views, he said aloud what others were thinking. Rousseau had far greater influence on the lower orders (to which he belonged) simply because he appealed to their emotions rather than to their logical faculties. In his *Social Contract* he advocated a return to a state of nature. Man is born free and yet is now everywhere in chains. The remedy is very simple: all powers, privileges, and laws which are not the offspring of the popular will must be swept away by the People, which alone has sovereign power. When this power, which has been usurped by kings and princes, is again resumed by the People, the Golden Age will return. This in bold outline was Rousseau's gospel. Entirely unhistorical, its apparent simplicity fired the minds of men. No book had so great an influence in promoting revolutionary ideas.

Rousseau's doctrine.

These ideas of liberty and equality had become familiar during the War of American Independence, when, by their intervention, the French had ensured the triumph of a people over a king. In the event the cost of this war hastened the coming of revolution, for the actual outbreak in 1789 was due to bankruptcy. Even before the American War projects of financial reform were in the air, but, unfortunately, the disposition of both king and queen was fatal to the plans of the able economists who were called on for advice. King Louis XVI had the very best intentions; he was virtuous and simple; he wished nothing but well for his people. Yet his qualities were negative; he lacked the decision needed in a leader, and the imagination to realize how acute had grown the crisis in national affairs. He was too indolent to pursue a vigorous policy for himself, too prone to accept the advice of Marie Antoinette. The queen soon lost what popularity her youth and beauty had first won for her. Her Austrian birth, reckless extravagance, and refusal to face the serious side of life led to mistrust and hatred on the part of her subjects. It was felt, too, that her influence with the king was responsible for the frustration of economic reforms.

Bankruptcy.

Ablest of the finance ministers was Turgot (1774–6). Had he been allowed a free hand, his policy of retrenchment, no bankruptcy, no new taxes, no loans, the abolition of class privileges and trade restrictions might have averted the crash, but the king was not strong enough to support him in the face of the outcries of the court party. He was dismissed and succeeded by Necker, a Swiss banker (1777–81), who fully realized the danger, but, warned by Turgot's fate, dared not insist on the remedies. Indeed, he was compelled to raise fresh funds to meet the cost of the war with England. He, too, was dismissed to please the queen's friends. So the debt increased until the revenue no longer sufficed to meet the needs of government. The king was left with no alternative but to summon the States-General. The representatives of the two privileged estates were elected directly, those of the Third Estate indirectly, i.e. nearly every commoner in France could vote for an "elector" in his district, who in turn voted for the actual deputy who would sit in the Assembly. The *cahiers* or instructions drawn up for each member are very illuminating. Nearly all agree that the abuses of the *ancien régime* should be abolished, and that the king should be guided by the advice of an elected Assembly. There was no desire for revolution and the abolition of monarchy, and had the king inspired confidence by taking the lead at this juncture, the subsequent course of events must have been very different.

Turgot attempts reform.

Necker.

States-General summoned.

As it was, serious division arose at once over the manner in which the States-General should sit and vote. The nobles and clergy insisted that the Estates should sit separately and vote *par ordre*, i.e. as Estates, and not *par tête*, i.e. by counting heads. If they could enforce their will, it was obvious that the Third Estate, though numerically equal, would always be outvoted by the other two. On the other hand, if all sat together and voted "by heads", the Third Estate would command a majority, being certain of support from the liberal thinkers in the other orders.

Quarrel over method of voting.

From 5th May, when the States-General assembled at Versailles, for six weeks the question remained unsettled, until on 17th June

the Third Estate boldly declared itself to be the National Assembly of France. The king, in a vain attempt to assert his authority, then announced that a series of royal reforms would be decreed on 22nd June, and meanwhile the Third Estate found themselves excluded from the hall in which they were wont to meet. Their deputies at once proceeded *en masse* to the Tennis Court, where they swore the famous Oath never to separate till they had given a new constitution to France. The king duly delivered his speech, in which he announced certain reforms, and then ordered the Estates to disperse, conveying his command to the Third Estate by his master of ceremonies. But the deputies refused to move, Mirabeau exclaiming that they would not stir from their places save at the bayonet's point. Short of force in the shape of foreign troops, the king was constrained to order the nobles and clergy to sit with the commons. Then followed the dismissal of Necker and the concentration of troops in and round Paris, both of which events caused uneasiness among the already excited population of Paris. The counter-move led to the first conspicuous act of violence in the Revolution.

National Assembly formed.

Tennis Court Oath.

On 14th July the Bastille was stormed. As a military achievement this event was insignificant, for the place was indefensible, having a garrison of only 138 men and its guns dismantled. But for the people of Paris the eight towers of the fortress, frowning over their city, stood for centuries of tyranny, and for them its downfall was the first triumphant witness to their own new power to break their chains and build self-government on the ruins of despotism. The fall of the Bastille was not, of course, the work of the mob alone; a civic militia had already been formed into a National Guard, under the command of Lafayette, to defend Paris against an expected attack by foreign troops. It is important to realize that the Assembly at Versailles had no part or lot in the violent scenes enacted in and round the Bastille, since this violence foreshadowed the whole trend of future events. Moderation itself was soon to become a crime in the eyes of a minority of ruthless extremists, who obtained and held supreme power by the aid of the worst anarchical and criminal elements of the Paris mob.

Fall of Bastille.

Events now moved very rapidly. The king drifted passively with

the current. On 17th July he proceeded to Paris, recognized the Municipality and National Guard, and donned the tricolour cockade. Many of the nobles now began to emigrate in consequence of the peasant risings in the country districts, where châteaux were being sacked and often burned.

On 4th August the nobles voluntarily surrendered all their feudal rights and privileges, while the clergy gave up their tithes. The peasants' incomes were thus increased by sixty per cent. Rioting took place in the towns due to dearness of bread and to wide-spread unemployment (arising specially in the north from the recent commercial Treaty with Britain). Starvation, coupled with the dread of a Court conspiracy to restore despotism, was enough to rouse the lower orders in Paris to excitement which culminated in the March of the Women to Versailles. There, they were persuaded, King and Assembly could remedy the scarcity of food which many believed had been artificially created. Insufficient steps were taken to guard the royal family from the mob of seven or eight thousand women, accompanied by gangs of ruffians which marched first to the Assembly "to hear our little mother Mirabeau speak", and then encamped before the palace. In the early morning of 6th October they found an entry, and only the arrival in the nick of time of Lafayette and the Gardes Français saved the royal family from massacre. In the morning they were escorted in slow procession to the Tuileries in Paris, by a mob which cried "we bring the baker, the baker's wife, and the baker's boy". From that moment the queen realized the imminence of the danger, and embarked on the series of intrigues which redoubled the hatred for herself which already existed, and which in the end sealed her own fate and that of the king.

Abolition of Feudalism.

March of the Women.

The Assembly, too, came to Paris and held its meetings in the Riding-school near the Tuileries—a fact which vastly increased the power of the disorderly sections of the revolutionaries, who lost no opportunity of intimidating the more moderate members by calling in their allies, the Paris mob, to influence the debates.

National Assembly sits in Paris.

The Assembly was roughly divided into three groups. The first of these wished to retain the monarchy shorn of its absolute

powers. Head and shoulders above all its other leaders was Mirabeau, as conspicuous for his brilliant intellect and statesmanlike qualities as he was contemptible in his private life and character. He alone might have saved the monarchy, but he was detested and distrusted alike by the court who counted him a traitor to his order, and by the popular party who regarded him as tainted with all the vices of the old regime. That is why his wise plans for compromise were brought to nought, and he died in April, 1791, prophesying with uncanny exactness the future course of events: "I carry in my heart," he said, "the death-dirge of the monarchy; the dead remains of it will now be the spoil of the factions."

Parties.

The second group was composed of those who believed in the Rights of Man and the root and branch destruction of the old system, and who pinned their faith to the creation of a new constitution. They desired that radical reforms should be made without loss of decency and order. They abhorred violence and mob-rule. Their strength lay in theory rather than practice. We shall recognize in them the Girondists of the new Assembly which was to meet in October, 1791.

The third group stood for immediate revolution and the overthrow by violence, if necessary, of all existing institutions, the return to a "state of nature" where all men should be equal. This group spread its doctrine and gained its power by the institution of numerous political clubs of which the most famous—the Jacobin—gave its name to the whole party. Branches were spread throughout the country, and pamphlets, newspapers, and posters were published broadcast. Of its leaders Danton, Marat, and Robespierre were most prominent in Paris. There is no doubt that within this party there existed from the outset a hidden hand secretly directing the Revolution into ever more violent channels, and by subtle intrigue committing its control to the more ruthless and energetic leaders.

The Jacobins.

During the twenty months from October, 1789, to June, 1791, while the king remained nominally head of the executive but was, in reality, a prisoner at the Tuileries, the Assembly undertook many of the sweeping changes which altered the constitution of France. The country

Reconstitution of Church and State.

was divided into eighty-three departments of nearly equal size and named after geographical features. By the civil constitution the Church became a department of state, an innovation which led to the bitterest form of civil war in Normandy, Brittany, and La Vendée, where the people stood for Church and King.

In these changes the king perforce concurred, while the queen and court party began to correspond with the *émigrés* nobles, the king's brothers and the Austrian court. Plans were discussed for escape from Paris and ultimate return with a foreign army. One of these plans the royal family now adopted. On the night of 20th–21st June their flight was attempted and, despite bad staff-work, slowness, and stupidity, came within an ace of succeeding. The party was arrested at Varennes within a few hundred yards of safety. The episode still further discredited the king and strengthened the hands of those who wished for a Republic. In fact, only the deep-rooted respect for monarchy which still survived saved Louis from immediate deposition. He gave his consent to the newly-framed constitution which left him the royal title devoid of power, and in October, 1791, the National Assembly dissolved itself in favour of a Legislative Assembly, which by a mad act of self-denial was to include none of the men of 1789.

The flight to Varennes.

October, 1791: Dissolution of National Assembly.

From this point it will make for clearness if we divide the narrative of main events into periods corresponding to the rule of successive Revolutionary governments. In this way it will best be seen how all power fell into the hands of the Jacobin party.

A. The Legislative Assembly: October, 1791–21st September, 1792

In the new Assembly the royalist party had shrunk in number and significance. The majority was now strongly Republican, and was split fairly sharply into two groups —the Girondists and the Jacobins. Nearly all were young men, full of enthusiasm, but entirely lacking in political experience.

Legislative Assembly.

Their accession to office almost exactly coincided with the danger of a foreign war. Up to this point Frenchmen had imagined that their Revolution would be worked out in isolation and uninterrupted by forces from without. But such isolation was now impossible for many reasons. The sorry plight of the king and queen, and the open determination of the extreme democrats to spread their doctrine through Europe appeared as a direct challenge to all monarchies. The action of the *émigrés* was a cause of contention between revolutionary France and Austria and Prussia. Again, the rights of private property were infringed by the annexation of the Papal state of Avignon, and the abolition of feudal rights belonging to imperial princes in Alsace.

Intervention of Austria and Prussia.

In February, 1792, therefore, Austria and Prussia agreed to act together in support of Louis, and in April a European war began which was to last unbroken for ten years.

The challenge was taken up with enthusiasm by the French, since both friends and enemies of monarchy hoped to gain strength by the war, although Robespierre, alive to the danger of a revival of the king's power, at first opposed it. Discipline and organization were not to be expected in the French armies, and it seemed that nothing could save the country from invasion and total defeat. The raw French levies fled at their first encounter with professional troops. But with the approach of danger events moved fast in Paris—now more than ever the centre of extreme revolutionary activity. On 20th June, 1792, the Tuileries had been invaded by a huge mob, and the king personally insulted. On 11th July the country was declared to be in danger, and a general levy of men and munitions was ordered. Then came news of the manifesto of the Duke of Brunswick, commander-in-chief of the Austro-Prussian armies, threatening the destruction of Paris if violence were offered to the king. An outburst of fierce patriotism was roused by Danton and his followers, and the course of the Revolution was now marked by ever-increasing bloodshed. The lawless elements of the mob were reinforced by the 800 Marseillais, who marched into Paris singing the famous war-song first composed by Rouget de Lisle for the army. Then followed the insurrection of 10th August, the

Brunswick's Manifesto.

Storming of the Tuileries.

storming of the Tuileries, the massacre of the Swiss guard, and the imprisonment of the king in the Temple.

King and constitution being alike suspended, the real rulers of France were the Jacobin party, headed by Danton, Marat, and Robespierre. To Danton above all was due the driving energy which flung back the invaders from the frontier. When it was known that Verdun, the great fortress covering the main road to Paris, was about to fall, the horrible September massacres were perpetrated. From 2nd September for four days and nights hired bands of ruffians entered the prisons and slaughtered all who were suspected of royalist sympathies. Some 1400 persons, including women and priests, were thus murdered. The pretext for this crime, for which Marat was mainly responsible, was the alleged danger of leaving royalists in the capital while the patriot armies were marching to the front. Its immediate result was a definite breach between the Girondists and the Jacobins.

Danton and National defence.

September massacres.

Far more important than this ghastly crime in Paris was the astonishing battle or rather cannonade of Valmy (20th September) which followed hard upon it. The Prussians had advanced from Verdun to cross the Argonne, a line of low barren hills, the passes of which were held by Dumouriez. They succeeded in breaking through and then turned with their backs to Paris to demolish the French army now to the eastward of them. This they signally failed to do. Weakened by dysentery they gave up all idea of advancing on Paris and quitted French territory. As a battle Valmy was insignificant, but its moral effect is hard to exaggerate. To Goethe, who was there, it meant that "from this place and this day dates a new epoch in the history of the world". A raw force which its enemy despised had beaten back the Prussians, who had the high tradition of Frederick the Great behind them. The French now took the initiative, won a battle against the Austrians at Jemappes, and overran the Austrian Netherlands. These they held till the following March, when Dumouriez was defeated at Neerwinden, and in fear for his own life went over to the enemy. Then France was again in danger from a second and more formidable invasion, her delivery

Valmy.

Jemappes.

from which is best explained by reference to the course of events in Paris.

B. The National Convention: 21st September, 1792–26th October, 1795

September, 1792: National Convention.

On the day that followed Valmy the third Assembly met and named itself the National Convention. Its first act was to abolish the Monarchy and to proclaim the French Republic "one and indivisible". A new Calendar was soon adopted, and the year One started with the birth of the Republic.

21st January, execution of the king.

In December the king was brought to trial, charged with conspiracy against public liberty and the safety of the state. On 21st January he was executed, and from that day it was clear that France would soon have to face the attacks of Great Britain, Holland, and Spain, in addition to those of Austria, Russia, and Prussia. At about the same time the cry of Church and Crown was raised in La Vendée, which broke out into savage rebellion. The Convention was in desperate danger and resorted to desperate means of defence.

Committee of Public Safety.

A levy of 300,000 men was ordered, and the Committee of Public Safety was appointed, with Danton as its inspiration, to carry energetic war measures. At the same time was created the dread Revolutionary Tribunal to deal summarily with all whose loyalty to the Revolution was in doubt. Disputes between the Jacobins and the Girondists were now acute, and increasing danger from abroad hastened the fall of the latter party. This was easily accomplished by the Commune and the Jacobin sections, who insisted on the arrest of the Girondist leaders. All executive power came to reside in the Committee of Public Safety, now reduced to nine members, backed always by the Paris mob. It held that power from June, 1793 to 27th July, 1794, by establishing a Reign of Terror.

Fall of the Gironde.

The dispersal and hunting down of the Girondists had one immediate result: it led to the removal from the stage of Marat—perhaps the most detestable of the many strange abnormal charac-

ters of that period. He met his death by the hand of Charlotte Corday, a Norman girl, aged twenty-four, who died calmly in the conviction that she had done her country service. Throughout the autumn of 1793 the Jacobins continued their bloody work. The queen, who met her death with noble courage, was guillotined in October after a shameful travesty of trial. The king's sister, Elizabeth, and the despicable Duke of Orléans (Philippe Egalité), Madame Roland, and other conspicuous Girondists were condemned without witnesses or advocates to defend them. The Terror spread to the provinces and accounted for some 12,000 victims. The guillotines did their work too slowly. At Lyons Fouché and Collot d'Herbois shot their prisoners wholesale. At Nantes Carrier drowned them by thousands in the Loire.

Death of Marat.

Death of the queen.

"Terror" in the provinces.

By the end of this terrible year of 1793 the colossal energy of Danton and the organizing genius of Carnot had driven all enemies from the soil of France. By his institution of conscription Carnot had set on foot no less than fourteen armies, and in eighteen months 1,100,000 men were mobilized; every able-bodied man was a soldier, and of the generals the Committee of Public Safety made sure that only the fittest should survive. Thus did Hoche, Moreau, Masséna, and Bonaparte embark on their careers. In 1794 France again took the offensive.

Carnot and the armies.

It now remains to see how Robespierre contrived to rid himself of all rivals, and for a few months to rule supreme. First, in conjunction with Danton, he turned against the violent party (*enragés*), which, led by Hébert, had overthrown all religious worship and substituted the blasphemous cult of Reason. Robespierre, as the rigid disciple of Rousseau, was a Deist, and admitted no compromise with atheists. In March, 1794, Hébert and his supporters were guillotined.

The next to fall was Danton, who had sickened of the bloodshed, and was now himself broken in health. Courageous to the end, he neglected all warnings to seek safety by flight, and in April he fell a victim, ironically enough, in the cause of mercy and moderation. With all his crimes, he was a great patriot, and to his courage and titanic

Fall and death of Danton.

force France in desperate case had owed her freedom from invasion.

For nearly four months Robespierre now stood alone as a dictator, and during that period the Terror attained its height. Having restored religion at the Festival of the Supreme Being, in which he played the part of high priest, he passed the Law of Prairial (June), which virtually dispatched a man to the scaffold without hearing or formal trial. By this means Robespierre thought to be rid of all possible opponents. In forty-seven days (from 10th June to 27th July) 1376 persons were guillotined. On 7th and 8th July there were 150 victims.

Dictatorship of Robespierre.

On 26th June the success of the French armies had been crowned by the great victory of Fleurus over the Austrians, so that national danger could not be pleaded as excuse for this butchery. It was quite clear that Robespierre was playing, as he supposed, for his own safety. No man now felt secure, so that moderates and extremists were drawn together in a conspiracy to overthrow him. On the 9th Thermidor (27th July), after a tumultuous session, the Convention outlawed Robespierre and his adherents. At two o'clock on the following morning he was seized at the Hôtel de Ville, where he had taken refuge, and in the evening was dragged to execution. His end was the end of the Reign of Terror. His character was baffling, and history gives no certain verdict on it. High authority has it that he erected hypocrisy into a system of government. Perhaps it is truer to believe him an unconscious hypocrite, convinced of his own infallibility as interpreter of the dogmas of Rousseau. With the passing of Robespierre an immense feeling of relief swept over society. Men tried to forget the Terror by abolishing its instruments, the Revolutionary Tribunal, the Municipality of Paris, and the Jacobin Clubs, and by a return to something approaching Parliamentary government.

Thermidor.

In the National Convention the moderate men began to draw together, and public opinion favoured them. But it was difficult at first to fill the places of men who for all their ruthlessness had shown supreme administrative vigour. Two successes went far to establish a settled government. The first crushed a last

Jacobin conspiracy in Paris; the second crushed a landing of Royalists from British ships on the peninsula of Quiberon. The Convention was then free to set about its final task—the formation of a permanent Republican government.

The Directory, as it was called, was to consist of an executive of five dictators, with two legislative bodies — the Council of Ancients and the Council of the Five Hundred. Before the new constitution could come into force, one more attempt, mainly Royalist, was made to overthrow the Republic. On 5th October, 1795, a mob marched on the Convention, then sitting in the Tuileries. But the Government had warning in time to put General Bonaparte, a gunnery expert then unemployed in Paris, in charge of the defence. The columns of insurgents were swept away by guns skilfully placed to command all the approaches to the palace, and this novel mode of street-fighting took all the heart out of the rebels. For the first time since 1789 the Paris mob was cowed by regular troops, and the reign of order had begun.

The Directory.

Bonaparte crushes insurrection.

The history of the French Revolution is from this event merged in the story of Napoleon Bonaparte's rise to power. The romance of the Revolution was ended. A dictator was needed with the genius and the power to complete and perhaps perpetuate its work. When we look back over the intervening century and try to estimate the results of this tremendous landmark of history, we are no longer dazzled by the colour and swift movement of events. We are in a position to sum up its results, which have been at least as far-reaching as the idealists of 1789 could have predicted.

Results of Revolution.

For Europe the Revolution brought a secular religion—the sovereignty of the people. It is the French Revolution that unlocks the door of modern history. Its principles underlie the political and social evolution of the nineteenth century. With all its extravagance, its unfounded dogmas, and its crimes against liberty, its broad ideals possessed a vitality which was proof alike against the hard pruning of the Napoleonic era and the blighting winds of reaction. It was indeed due, as we shall see, to the military genius of Napoleon that the revolutionary doctrines were

first imposed upon Europe. For France and for Europe the Revolution achieved the destruction of the old ways of government, not of course without a struggle. Events that took place between 1789 and 1815 transformed not only the map, but, ultimately, the state system and the social life of Europe, and brought to birth the republics of South America.

Progress gained by way of revolution may be a doubtful blessing: your view will depend on your definition of progress; yet it would be hard to deny that the world was well rid of the *ancien régime*, even when dispensed by the most enlightened of despots.

The legacy of the Revolution may be summed up in its principles of the Rights of Man, his liberty, equality and brotherhood. These were not at once realized. As in England the great Rebellion produced its Cromwell, so in France the Revolution begot the Committee of Public Safety and Napoleon. Equality, especially in France, was the first to be secured. The abolition of class privileges, of commercial and trading restrictions, and a widely extended franchise, were some of the outward signs of the new equality. Liberty was much harder to attain, and is not the necessary outcome of equality. There is less freedom for the individual in republican France than in monarchical England. Liberty, it is well said, involves taking pains, and man is by nature an indolent animal. The brotherhood of man was promoted by the abolition of slavery, and many subsequent humanitarian movements were outlined by the revolutionary movement.

Broadly, then, the French Revolution gave to the world the doctrine that government should be of the people, by the people, and for the people, and from that doctrine modern democracy has sprung. That democratic government has its flaws is apparent. The tyranny of the many is not easier to bear, and is harder to remedy, than the tyranny of the few.

The most valuable lesson that the French Revolution had to offer to the twentieth century is that the short-cut in politics and the jettisoning of past experience is certain to defeat the end in view—the moral and material welfare of mankind. This lesson has not yet been learned.

IMPORTANT DATES

1774. Accession of Louis XVI.
1774–76. Turgot's attempts at reform.
1789. Summons of States-General.
1789–91. National Assembly.
1789, 14th July. Fall of Bastille.
1791. Death of Mirabeau.
20th June. Flight to Varennes.
1791, October–21st September, 1792. Legislative Assembly.
1792. War with Austria.
September massacres.
20th September. Valmy.
21st September–October, 1795. National Convention.
1793, January. Death of King.
1793, June–July, 1794. Reign of Terror.
1793, October. Death of Queen.
1794, April. Death of Danton.
27th July. Death of Robespierre.
1795. Bonaparte crushes insurrection in Paris.
Establishment of Directory.

For List of Books for Reference see Appendix I

CHAPTER V

Napoleon Bonaparte (1769–1821)

No time could have been more propitious for the advent of a man of military and administrative genius than the years which followed the downfall of Robespierre. France was at war with Great Britain and Austria, the interior vexed with civil strife and brigandage. Every department of State was disorganized. Home and foreign trade had wellnigh ceased to exist. Credit was unobtainable, and the State had declared a partial bankruptcy. The Church was violently hostile to the secular power, which was itself now in the hands of second-rate men. Throughout the country there was no sense of security. Such was the anarchy created by six years of revolution.

Condition of France.

There is here no space to recall the early years of Bonaparte's

career, but it is worthy of note that his Italo-Corsican breeding was a positive advantage to him, since it enabled him to assess French character and to approach French problems with a detached eye. We have already seen how his professional attainments won for him rapid promotion, and marked him out as fitted for high command (p. 59).

In this short sketch an attempt is made to follow the steps by which he attained to absolute power, and by which he created a French Empire and conquered nearly the whole of Europe by force of arms, to record the manner in which he reconstructed the internal life and institutions of France, and, lastly, to review the causes of his ultimate failure.

Rise of Napoleon Bonaparte.

We have seen how in 1794 the tide of war against the first Coalition had turned in favour of France, so that she gained for her frontier the Rhine, the Alps and Pyrenees, and that this success was due in large measure to the energy of Danton and Carnot.

The ineffectiveness of the allies is also explained by the preoccupation of Austria, Prussia, and Russia with the Partitions of Poland (1793–5). Each power mistrusted the others, and was therefore unwilling to absorb itself too deeply in the war with France. By 1795 the Empire, Britain, and the little kingdom of Sardinia remained her sole opponents.

Since the navy was not yet ready,[1] the offensive was directed on land against Austria. A double attack was planned by the Directory in 1796. Moreau and Jourdan were to advance through Germany, while Bonaparte with an inferior army was to invade the Austrian territory in north Italy. He received this command at the age of twenty-seven, and from the first his personal magnetism exercised an extraordinary influence over all ranks, from general officers to private soldiers. Advancing along the Riviera road, he struck between the allied armies, and in sixteen days had forced the Sardinians to accept his terms of peace. He then followed up the Austrians, beat them at Lodi (19th May, 1796), where he gained from his men the title of "petit caporal", and proceeded to invest Mantua,

First Italian campaign, 1796.

[1] In December, 1796, the French fleet reached Bantry Bay.

the great fortress on which depended the Austrian communications with their northern bases.

Four relieving armies superior in force were by him successively repulsed, the last two battles being the desperate fight in the marshes of Arcola (15th–17th November) and the brilliant victory of Rivoli (14th January, 1797). Then Mantua fell, and Bonaparte pursued the beaten Austrians to within some sixty miles of Vienna, where they sued for peace.

With an inferior and ill-supplied army he had struck down the last enemy of France on land in an incredibly short time. This, the first, was in many ways the most brilliant of all his campaigns. Profiting by the mistakes of an enemy who continually divided his forces, he depended on his own rapid movements to beat him in detail, always striking at his weakest point. He fought eighteen pitched battles in North Italy, which now lay entirely at the mercy of the French, who were at first welcomed as deliverers from the tyrannical sway of Emperor or Pope.

The peace made at Campo Formio (October, 1797) with Austria was dictated by General Bonaparte without reference to the Directory. The Emperor recognized the French conquests on the Rhine and in the Netherlands, and the transformation of his Italian provinces together with a part of Venetia into the Cisalpine Republic. As some compensation for his losses, he received Venetian territory east of the Adige and along the Adriatic. Sardinia had already surrendered Savoy and Nice to France. The comparatively mild treatment of Austria was deliberately designed, because Bonaparte desired to isolate Great Britain, and with this end in view he insisted on the annexation of the Ionian Isles as stepping-stones on the way to Egypt. It is here that the first round of his great fight against Britain's sea-power really begins.

Peace of Campo Formio, 1797.

Much as they resented the independent action of their general, the Directors could not afford to quarrel with him. To him indeed at this time they owed their continued existence, which was menaced by a growing Royalist element in the Councils. Only Bonaparte's prompt dispatch of Augereau with troops to effect a Pride's Purge in the Assemblies had saved them (4th September, 1797). It was not surprising that men were beginning to

look to him as a saviour who could quell the factious strife at home as he had quelled the Austrian armies in the field.

Sense of obligation as usual increased the jealousy of the Directors, who gladly assented to his suggested plans for striking at Great Britain by the occupation of Egypt. Successful invasion was obviously the shortest and most decisive means of reducing Britain, but for that the control of the sea was necessary. From the year 1795, the fleets of Spain and Holland had been joined to those of France, only to be beaten in 1797 in the two great sea-fights of Cape St. Vincent and Camperdown. These victories, despite the mutinies which broke out in the summer, saved Britain from the threat of invasion. The situation in the Mediterranean appeared more promising for France, as the British squadrons had been withdrawn from that sea since December, 1796. The way seemed clear in 1798 for the transport of an army from Toulon to Egypt —then a province of the Turkish Empire. The object of the French occupation was to block the main trade routes between Britain and her East Indian possessions, and then by planting a colony and naval bases to advance on India and restore the lost French dominion. In any event, a shrewd blow would be struck at the resources which sustained the British naval power. Such an enterprise, too, ensured to Bonaparte independence of command and opportunity to further his own ambitions.

The Egyptian expedition, 1798.

Object.

In the summer of 1798 the great armada left Toulon, and, taking Malta *en route*, reached Alexandria, having narrowly escaped encounter with Nelson's battle-fleet. Landing on 30th June, Bonaparte was master of Cairo by 21st July, only to find himself a prisoner in Egypt when, on 1st August in Aboukir Bay, the French fleet at anchor was annihilated by Nelson. He was thus deprived of the escort on which his safe return to Europe must depend.

Battle of the Nile.

Learning that Turkey had declared war, he marched into Syria, but got no farther than Acre,[1] which defied all his efforts at capture. With numbers sadly reduced by battle and sickness he retired to Egypt. Then he heard for the first time that a second Coalition had been formed, and that all his

Failure at Acre.

[1] "That wretched hole."

EUROPE
TIME OF NAPOLEON
(1810)
English Miles
100 0 100 200 300
ATLANTIC OCEAN
NORTH SEA
SCOTLAND
Aberdeen
Edinburgh
Glasgow
Belfast
IRELAND
Dublin
Limerick
Cork
R. Shannon
Carlisle
Newcastle
York
Wales
ENGLAND
Birmingham
LONDON
Portsmouth
Plymouth
Torbay
Channel Is.
Cherbourg
Brest
Bay of Biscay
Rochefort
Limoges
Bordeaux
Bayonne
Orthes
Toulouse
Vittoria
Pyrenees
Saragossa
Barcelona
Tarragona
Marseille
Toulon
Frejus
Avignon
Rhone R.
Grenoble
Geneva
Lyon
Alps
Milan
Pavia
Modena
Genoa
Leghorn
Florence
Tuscany
Sienna
Elba
Corsica
Ajaccio
Sardinia
Cagliara
Minorca
Majorca
Iviza
Algiers
Oran
Tunis
Palermo
Gaeta
Civita Vecchia
Papal States
Venice
Bergen
Christiania
The Naze
Gothenburg
DENMARK AND NORWAY
Schleswig
Helgoland
Holstein
Hamburg
Bremen
Amsterdam
The Hague
Holland
Antwerp
Brussels
Boulogne
Waterloo
Liege
Namur
Amiens
Rouen
Laon
Craonne
Mayence
Metz
Rastadt
Strasbourg
Basel
Bern
SWITZERLAND
Tyrol
Munich
Bavaria
Frankfort
Wurtemberg
Danube
Leipzig
Hanover
Cassel
Eisenach
Erfurt
Jena
Wesphalia
CONFEDERATION OF THE RHINE
Paris
Versailles
Orleans
Tours
Nantes
R. Loire
Saone
Montmirail
Fontainebleau
Arcis sur Aube
Lunéville
Rhine R.
Rhone R.
Vienna
Prague
Brest
Bayonne
Vallaulid
Salamanca
Ciudad Rodrigo
Madrid
Talavera
Toledo
Aranjuez
Valencia
Alicante
Murcia
Granada
Malaga
Gibraltar
Ceuta
Cadiz
Barossa
Sevilla
Guadalquivir R.
Badajos
Tagus
Lisbon
Torres Vedras
Oporto
Douro R.
Busaco
Coruña
Astorga
C. Finisterre
PORTUGAL
SPAIN
FRENCH EMPIRE
MEDITERRANEAN
Extent of France 1792
Acquisitions under the Republic and Empire 1793 1810
Kingdom of Italy, under the direct rule of Napoleon
Dependent States
Boundary of Confederation of the Rhine
Longitude

John Bartholomew & Co. Edin.r

Italian conquests were being wrested from the nerveless grip of the Directory. The time was ripe for his own return to France. This he effected in October, 1799, successfully eluding the British cruiser patrols. His deserted army surrendered to the British in 1801.

Return to France.

France was sorely in need of a head and a sword, and Bonaparte was determined to provide both. He schemed to place himself at the head of a strong executive in place of the feeble Directory, and to establish his position by a fresh crop of military triumphs.

Carefully concealing or distorting the story of his disastrous Egyptian venture, he represented for the French people *success*, whereas the Directory represented almost unrelieved failure. This was why, with the aid of Sieyès, ablest of the Directors, and the devotion of his troops, he was able to overthrow the whole government by the *coup d'état* of 18 Brumaire (9th November).

Coup d'état of Brumaire.

The new government, called the Consulate (1799–1804), was carefully designed under republican forms to disguise the fact that the First Consul, Bonaparte, was invested with autocratic power. The two other consuls appointed were but figureheads. The appointment of all ministers and high officials lay in the First Consul's hands, so that he was able to dictate what new measures should be discussed and passed.

The Consulate.

As head of the government he set himself first to win back the ground lost in north Italy. The situation was clearing, since Russia had retired from the Coalition leaving Austria to take the offensive. Bonaparte devised a double attack. Moreau was sent to fight in Germany and along the Danube. The first consul proposed to spring a surprise on the enemy who were on the point of taking Genoa, long besieged and gallantly held by Masséna. Crossing the Alps by the Great St. Bernard and other passes with 40,000 men, and with the guns dragged on improvised sleighs, he fell upon his enemy at Marengo (14th June, 1800). The French were outnumbered, and would have been beaten (Bonaparte had neglected his own maxim of concentration before action) but for the arrival of Desaix, who was killed in the action, and a cavalry charge by Kellermann which

Second Italian campaign.

reversed the fortune of the fight. As a result the Austrians evacuated north Italy. A still more decisive victory won by Moreau at Hohenlinden (3rd December) forced the Austrians to sue for peace. The treaty signed at Lunéville in 1801 restored to France all that she had gained at Campo Formio.

The Armed Neutrality League, 1801.

Once more Great Britain stood alone against France, and Bonaparte, with an army shut up in Egypt, designed a second blow against her naval power by the formation of the Armed Neutrality League. Russia, Denmark, Sweden, and Prussia combined to deny the right of Great Britain to search for contraband or enemy's goods in neutral ships. The hostility of these powers meant for Britain not only the loss of the Baltic trade in timber, hemp, and other materials indispensable to her navy, and the closing of a valuable market for her colonial produce, but also the prospect of a severe struggle against natural sea-fighters. A fleet under Hyde Parker and Nelson was at once sent out to the Baltic to prevent at all costs a junction between the Danish and Russian forces. The death of the Tsar immobilized the latter, and the Danes were beaten by Nelson at Copenhagen after a tremendous close-range battle (2nd April, 1801). Thus, once again, Bonaparte was foiled by Nelson and the power of the sea.

Battle of Copenhagen.

Treaty of Amiens.

A short breathing-space then ensued with the signature of the Treaty of Amiens (1802), and the First Consul was able to turn his mind to the resettlement of France. It is this constructive side of his genius which survives to the present day.

Internal measures.

France had been ruined by a long war, and many of her provinces had been overrun by brigands. The roads were impassable; industry and commerce at a standstill. It was very difficult to raise any revenue. La Vendée was still in insurrection. Public opinion was willing to support any government strong enough to guarantee peace and security.

Central Government.

Bonaparte's first measure was calculated to ensure that his power would be felt throughout the land by his direct appointment of all local officials, prefects, sub-prefects, and mayors, so that the centralization which the men of '89 had sought to destroy was re-established. Then he restored the

finances on a businesslike basis, renewing the credit of the country largely by the creation of the Bank of France in 1800. The judicial system was likewise reorganized. In these reforms again he employed men of talent regardless of their past political record. The new arrangements worked and France at once began to feel the benefit of them.

Finance.

Next he set himself to heal the quarrel with the Church, recognizing that civil war in France had been caused by the persecution of the old religion and clergy, and by the wild attempts of revolutionaries to abolish all old forms of worship. He saw the necessity of religion, and he restored it not merely for its own sake but as an invaluable factor towards his own aggrandisement. In 1801, by the Concordat with the Pope, the Roman faith was formally recognized in France. The state was to nominate the bishops and pay the clergy, while the confiscated Church lands were not restored.

The Concordat.

Greatest, perhaps, of all the work done under the consulate was the issue of the Civil Code of Law, known later as the Code Napoléon. By this the complex and often obsolete laws and customs were reduced to a single system representative of the new society born of the Revolution. The work was done by a committee of experts, over which Bonaparte often presided. This code remains the basis of modern French law, and has had wide influence on the Continent and America.

The Civil Code.

Equal energy was shown in the undertaking of public works both to enrich and strengthen the country. Canals and military roads were made, and a breakwater was built at Cherbourg. Paris itself was in part rebuilt on a splendid scale.

Public Works.

All that the first consul did was planned to enhance his own prestige, and to enlist faithful service. Thus the Legion of Honour instituted in 1802 created a new aristocracy counter to the revolutionary principles of social equality.

Legion of Honour.

In secondary education again, he saw an unrivalled instrument for establishing his authority. Lycées were founded on a semi-military plan, with programmes of study carefully calculated to inspire respect for the government, or rather,

Education.

the real ruler Bonaparte. As emperor he added many special schools and founded the University of Paris.

The success of his policy was seen in 1802 when he was nominated First Consul for life, and assumed the name of Napoleon Bonaparte. From this date, therefore, we may conveniently call him Napoleon. External politics meanwhile promised ill for a lasting peace in Europe. No lasting peace was possible between Britain and France so long as the Netherlands lay in French hands, but Napoleon himself roused fresh suspicions and fears by his continued occupation of Piedmont, Holland, and Switzerland, from which he had undertaken to withdraw at the Peace of Amiens. In these circumstances Great Britain declined to fulfil her promise to evacuate Malta, so that war was renewed in 1803.

First Consul for life.

Creation of the Empire.

Renewal of war with Britain, 1803.

For the third time Napoleon set himself to overthrow British sea-power in a campaign which lasted from 1803 to 1805, and ended with the Battle of Trafalgar. He laid elaborate plans for the invasion of England. A huge army was kept in training at Boulogne; over 1000 flat-bottomed boats were built to convey it across the Channel. All that was needed for successful landing was the presence of the combined French and (in 1805) Spanish squadrons to escort the invaders across the Channel. Here, of course, the scheme broke down, for the enemy fleets had small chance of entering the Channel. Now, as always, Napoleon underrated the prescience of the British Admiralty and the enduring skill of our fleet commanders. He expected without difficulty to disperse the concentration of our squadrons at the critical point, by feints or false reports. But all his efforts were futile against the British plan of defence. The French fleets were shut up and, where possible, closely blockaded in their ports. Cornwallis's ceaseless watch off Brest with our main fleet constituted the closest blockade on record. Here, indeed, was the key-position, for it was impossible for hostile fleets, even if they broke out, to enter the Channel without being brought to battle.

Invasion schemes.

British defence.

Napoleon at length decided that his ships should concentrate unmolested in the West Indies, but quickly found that it was quite

impossible for the fleets at Brest, Rochefort, and Toulon all to break out at nearly the same time. A small squadron from Rochefort did get out and home again; but the Toulon fleet, under Villeneuve, left port only to be followed and marked by Nelson in his wonderful chase to the West Indies in the summer of 1805. Villeneuve brought his ill-equipped fleet back to north-west Spain, and after an indecisive skirmish with Calder's waiting squadron joined the force at Ferrol-Corunna. But feeling quite unequal to the task of sailing north to the very point where the British were strongest, and dreading a meeting with Nelson, he turned southwards for Cadiz. That was the end of the invasion scheme—Napoleon's third attempt to conquer Britain. There was nothing now left for him, but an attempt to pit the power of the land against the power of the sea—an attempt to reduce Great Britain by forcing the powers of Europe to sever commercial relations with her. This last attempt ruined him in the end, for it combined the Continental powers against him.

End of invasion scheme.

Some two months after the collapse of the invasion scheme the Battle of Trafalgar was fought (21st October). This, the most famous of all sailing-ship actions, was the crowning glory of Nelson's matchless career. In the winning of it he gave to the world a unique example of a preconcerted plan, derived from his intense study of all great battles of the past, brilliantly applied to meet any conceivable movement of his present foes. This great plan, embodying what he called "the Nelson touch", was circulated through the fleet in the famous Memorandum of 9th October—twelve days before the fight. "Something," he said, "must be left to chance." As the event proved, he left very little to chance on 21st October. The French and Spanish battle-fleets were destroyed, leaving Great Britain undisputed mistress of the seas.

Trafalgar.

In the midst of his invasion scheme, Napoleon was crowned Emperor at Notre Dame (1804), and King of Italy, at Milan, in 1805. "I found the crown of France lying on the ground," he said, "and I picked it up with my sword." For eleven years, as Emperor, he never ceased to wield the sword.

Napoleon crowned Emperor.

Before Trafalgar was fought Pitt had succeeded in drawing Austria and Russia into the Third Coalition. Mistrust and fear of Napoleon had been increased by his creation of the Kingdom of Italy (1805) and by his seizure of Genoa and Hanover. But slowness of action was characteristic of the allies and, against Napoleon, it proved fatal. Breaking up his army at Boulogne, he launched it by different routes and a series of lightning marches into Bavaria, as Marlborough had done in the Blenheim campaign. There he thrust himself between Vienna and the Austrian field army under Mack. At Ulm, Mack was forced to surrender with 30,000 men (20th October, 1805). Then he entered Vienna, and on 2nd December won his overwhelming victory in the field against the Austrians and Russians at Austerlitz. The Third Coalition was at an end. The tidings of Austerlitz hastened the death of Pitt, who on hearing of the great disaster said: "Roll up that map of Europe: it will not be wanted these ten years." Austerlitz, too, brought the fall of the old Holy Roman Empire. Napoleon, playing the part of a second Charlemagne, now began to redistribute the state-system of Europe. By the Treaty of Pressburg, Venetia, Istria, and Dalmatia were ceded to France. Suabia and Tyrol went to Bavaria, which now, like Würtemburg, became a kingdom. As master of the fortunes of Italy, Napoleon gave Naples to his brother Joseph. Holland, now also become a kingdom, he gave to another brother, Louis.

Third Coalition.

Ulm.

Austerlitz.

Italy.

Germany he completely transformed. Between 1792 and 1805 some 360 states had been reduced to 82, and a further simplification was made in 1806 by the formation of the Rhine Confederation. This comprised fifteen rulers of western and southern Germany headed by Bavaria and Würtemburg, all of whom were now placed under French protection. This startling alteration in the map goaded Prussia,[1] now isolated, into war, only to be utterly defeated in two battles fought on the same day at Jena and Auerstädt (14th October, 1806). Within a month the Prussian armies were out of action and their king and people humiliated.

Germany.

Rhine Confederation, 1806.

Jena.

[1] Neutral since 1795.

Only Russia now remained to be encountered. He found in her a far more obstinate enemy. Geography and climate prevented the rapid manœuvring by which he so often gained great victories. Only after heavy losses in the drawn fight at Eylau, in February, 1807, did he win a decisive battle at Friedland on Marengo Day (14th June, 1807). The Treaty of Tilsit which followed was concluded at the famous meeting of the two Emperors on a raft in the Niemen. Both were inspired with hatred of Great Britain, and agreement was soon reached on terms which would virtually divide the old world between them.

Russia.

Friedland.

Treaty of Tilsit.

Prussia was almost erased from the map by the creation of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw in the east, and of the new Kingdom of Westphalia in north-west Germany, which provided a crown for Jerome Bonaparte.

Most significant of all was the decision to enforce the Continental system against Great Britain. Already, in 1806, Napoleon had issued from Berlin the decree which declared the British Isles to be in a state of blockade, and forbade all relations between Britain and France, or countries allied to France. He expected to bring Great Britain to her knees by ruining the world trade and commerce on which her sea supremacy was nurtured. For success it was necessary that all European states should obey the decree, so that no trade should filter through by way of neutral states. By the Franco-Russian agreement at Tilsit this condition was nearly realized. It was the attempt to realize it completely by force of arms that led in the end to Napoleon's downfall.

The Continental System.

On her side Great Britain retaliated by a counter-blockade, having in her fleets the power to make it effective, and to seize the sea-borne goods and the colonies of France and her allies.[1] The British navy was powerless to avert an Austerlitz or a Friedland —nothing in fact but superior armies could finally beat Napoleon— but given an ally with suitable seacoast and harbours, sea-power would enable Great Britain not only to challenge the Continental system, but to send troops and supplies into Europe in support of the land campaigns. This ally she found in Portugal. The

[1] For our war with America see pp. 291–92.

attempt of Napoleon to force Portugal to obey his decree, and to use Spain as his instrument, led to the great Peninsular War in which he aroused, for the first time, a truly *national* resistance far harder to overcome than the professional armies he had hitherto met and beaten.

The Peninsular War, 1808.

From 1808 onwards the "Spanish ulcer" was a steady drain on his resources. In Spain, for the first time, his marshals,



Masséna, Soult, and Souchet, learned the quality of British troops led by a great master of defensive tactics. There, too, he found that the barren, mountainous country and the length of his communication lines enabled the elusive guerrilleros of Spain to

maintain their resistance; his own armies were threatened with starvation; while the British field forces were supplied with the utmost ease by the fleet, which acted as a floating base. Bare mention of some leading events must suffice. After Moore's retreat to Corunna in January, 1809, the French planned a grand attack which should drive the British out of Portugal. Kept thus continually on the defensive, Wellington fell back in 1810 on the wonderfully prepared lines of Torres Vedras, which baffled Masséna, and forced him to retreat or starve. In 1811 the tide began to turn definitely against the French, who lost the three battles of Fuentes d'Onoro, Barossa, and Albuera. In 1812 the great victory at Salamanca enabled Wellington to enter Madrid, but not until 1813 could he confidently say good-bye to Portugal for the last time. In May, 1813, his crowning triumph at Vittoria drove the French across the Pyrenees, and opened the way for the southern invasion of France.

Corunna.

Torres Vedras.

Vittoria.

Napoleon had returned to France in 1809 to crush the Austrians, for the fourth time, at Wagram. Further cessions cost Leopold the loss of 4 millions of his subjects. Yet, in spite of this success, there were signs that resistance in Germany was stiffening, and that the same patriotic spirit was at last springing up which had proved itself unconquerable in Spain. One serious military disaster for France might well be the signal for revolt on the part of forced allies and conquered peoples. Prussia in particular burned to throw off the yoke and atone for her ignominious past. With every able-bodied man secretly trained for war, when the day of reckoning came she would be ready. Meanwhile the discontent and hardship caused by the Continental system grew apace. The power that suffered most commercial loss was Russia, where the French alliance had never been popular, and the prospect of a breach impelled Napoleon to provide a second string for his bow by a marriage alliance with the House of Austria. This was duly made by the divorce of Josephine (in December, 1809) and the marriage with the emperor's daughter Marie-Louise, celebrated in April, 1810. Thus, says Mr. Wells, "Napoleon was captured for the dynastic system; he might have been the

Wagram.

Austrian marriage.

maker of a new world, he preferred to be the son-in-law of the old". A son was born to him in the following year.

By 1811 relations with Russia were very strained, especially since Napoleon had seized Oldenburg from the Tsar's brother-in-law in order to ensure the exclusion of British trade. War came in 1812, when Russia definitely forsook the Continental system. Space admits here of no account of the Moscow expedition, in which Napoleon, contrary to his own maxim, attempted to make war on a desert. Considered as a single campaign, it was the most colossal disaster in modern history. Of upwards of half a million men who set out in June, 1812, some 20,000 recrossed the Niemen. It was the beginning of the end. The war of liberation had begun. The emperor could not make good his losses, and had now to face a new Coalition of Russia, Austria, and Prussia, while his best surviving troops were committed to the losing war in Spain. With young and raw troops he continued for a time to win victories, showing some of his old brilliance in his defeat of the Austrians at Dresden (13th August, 1813), but the end came when the allies at last concentrated round Leipzig in October, and overwhelmed him by force of numbers in the "Battle of the Nations". The empire of allied and new-created states collapsed like a pack of cards.

The Moscow expedition.

Dresden.

Leipzig.

Now at last on the defensive, Napoleon showed a genius worthy of comparison with his first offensive campaign in Italy. From January to March, 1814, he kept at bay three armies which were marching on Paris. But at length he left an opening which enabled the allies to enter the capital. He abdicated immediately, and was sent to Elba in a British frigate. Louis XVIII, brother of the late king, Louis XVI, now came to the throne.

Abdication.

The quarrels of the allies over the reconstitution of Europe gave Napoleon hopes of re-establishing himself, and after ten months' exile he escaped from Elba, and landed at Cannes on 1st March, 1815. Then followed the period known as the Hundred Days (dating from his proclamation at Paris to his second abdication).

Return from Elba.

Hundred Days.

The return of many veteran troops to France gave him hopes

of success, and he resolved to strike the first blow before his enemies could unite. As so often in the past, the decisive struggle was fought in the Netherlands, where Wellington, with a mixed force of British, Dutch, Belgians, and Hanoverians, was holding a line of over 100 miles in length, and ready at need to join forces with Blücher's Prussians. The Russian and Austrian armies were not yet within striking distance, so that Napoleon's hopes lay in a speedy victory in Belgium. His general plan was similar to that of the first Italian campaign: he would bring superior force to bear on each of his opponents separately, driving Blücher towards the Rhine and Wellington into the sea.

The Waterloo campaign.

On 16th June he brought his main force against the Prussians at Ligny, while Ney attacked a part of the British mixed army at Quatre-Bras. The Prussians were beaten but not pursued, or even accurately "marked", and this negligence ruined Napoleon's plan. Assuming Blücher to be in full retreat with no more fight left in him, he marched to crush Wellington's army which Ney had failed to dislodge at Quatre-Bras.

Ligny.

Quatre-Bras.

Wellington had now taken up an excellent defensive position at Waterloo, and, as the world knows, held it against furious gunfire and repeated charges of cavalry and massed infantry, until Blücher came up in the afternoon to relieve him. Then followed a general advance of the allies, which scattered the French army and the last hopes of the Emperor. He had no forces in reserve, and was compelled for the second time to abdicate. He surrendered to Captain Maitland of the *Bellerophon*, and was exiled to St. Helena, where he died in 1821. While the public career of Napoleon ends at Waterloo in irretrievable disaster, the man himself and his work have left an impression on the pages of modern history and on the imagination of its readers far surpassing that of any other historical personage. The output of Napoleonic literature appears to be inexhaustible.

Waterloo.

St. Helena.

The explanation of his unique position may be summed up briefly under three aspects—his amazing personality, the vast range of his ambition and achievement, and the tradition and legacy which he bequeathed to modern Europe.

First, we observe his tireless energy, his concentration, his

power to separate the essential from the unimportant, and his rare power to combine the grip of general principles with the minutest knowledge of details. In every department of civil and military administration his intellectual power was unsurpassed. No man, perhaps, had ever so great a belief in himself; no man had ever so great a power of impressing that belief on others. None has been more successful in enlisting the devoted service of his followers, from the field-marshal to the private of grenadiers. The dazzling successes which he gained so early in his life partially explain his final failure, for they led to supreme self-confidence, lack of scruple, over-ambition, and the running of unjustifiable risks.

Personality of Napoleon.

It is hard to say whether he held any definite religious beliefs. He well understood the importance of a religious system for the stablishing of his own political supremacy, but we have no evidence that his personal creed extended beyond belief in his own omnipotence.[1]

His ambitions and achievements in peace and war have already been summarized in this chapter. The map of Europe for the year 1810 affords the best concrete illustration. He would have the states of Europe revolve like planets about the glorious sun of France, dependent for their light and life upon her rays. We have seen that the ambitious dream of world-conquest did not endure, since Napoleon reckoned without the factor of sea-power, which he never fully understood, and without the factor of that national spirit which he aroused but could not lay. Thus, in the end, it proved that, for all his consummate skill, his military domination was temporal, while his work of reconstruction done for France was eternal.

His vast ambition.

There remains the tradition of his name—its association with a French policy of military prestige and glory. It was this that brought a second Napoleon to a new imperial throne in 1851 (p. 198 *et seq.*), when France preferred the glamour of a magic name to the humdrum mediocrity of the House of Orleans. This Second Empire brought back the

The Napoleonic tradition.

[1] E.g. it is hard to believe in the sincerity of the statements made at St. Helena, when he professed his attachment to liberal doctrines of government and the rights of small nations, and his love of peace!

atmosphere of restlessness and adventure into foreign politics, and the dramatic failure of the second Napoleon both as soldier and statesman went far to destroy the tradition of Bonapartism.

The consequences of Napoleon's bid for world supremacy were seen throughout the nineteenth century, in the unification of Germany and Italy which he had himself done so much during his lifetime to promote. That he should have begun the work which Bismarck completed is one of the strangest ironies of history. And yet, perhaps (except in France), the abiding results of his career and work have not been those that he deliberately designed. The struggle against his despotism brought to birth that spirit of nationality which, with the growth of democracy, will be seen to underlie all the important movements of the nineteenth century.

Direct effects.

IMPORTANT DATES

1796–7. First Italian Campaign.
1798–9. Egyptian Expedition.
1799, 9th Nov. Overthrow of Directory.
1799–1804. Consulate.
1800. Second Italian Campaign.
Marengo.
1802. Peace of Amiens.
1803. Renewal of War.
1804. Napoleon becomes Emperor.
1805. Oct. Trafalgar.
Dec. Austerlitz.
1806. Confederation of Rhine.
Jena and Auerstädt.
1807. Eylau and Friedland.
Treaty of Tilsit.
1808. Peninsular War begins.
1809. Corunna.
Wagram.
1810. Austrian marriage.
1812. Moscow Campaign.
1813. Vittoria.
Leipzig.
1814. Abdication.
1815. Return from Elba.
The Hundred Days.
Waterloo.

For List of Books for Reference see Appendix I

CHAPTER VI

Europe and the Congress of Vienna

Congress of Vienna.

Our fresh starting-point is the great Congress of Vienna, which met in 1815 to reconstruct the map of Europe and to establish permanent peace in the world after twenty-three years of war.

Every great peace conference builds with a view to permanence, but the result of their labours has been too often but a sad example of the vanity of human wishes. Treaty-makers are only human; they cannot legislate infallibly for posterity. But at least they have the benefit of past experience to guide them, and enable them to build upon reasonably sure and solid foundations.

Unfortunately the majority of the members of the Congress of Vienna had learned nothing and forgotten nothing. What they chiefly desired was to ignore the existence of the French Revolution and Napoleon, and return to the old world before 1789, the world of absolute kings and class privileges. Their nerve was shaken, and their crying need was security against all future aggressions on the part of the French people or French rulers.

Ignores principles of Nationality and Democracy.

They refused to recognize the growth of two principles (evoked respectively by the Revolution and Napoleon), namely the freedom of individual man and the freedom of individual States.

The principle that men have rights as well as duties in the State, that their liberty does not lie at the mercy of the sovereign and his advisers, that what concerns all must be approved by all: all this was a commonplace utterance of the Revolution. For the future, Democracy must count for more than Dynasty.

The iron tyranny which Napoleon had tried to impose on the world gave birth to the second principle, namely, that States, small or great, should be free to work out their own salvation in their own way, independent of the will of a superior power. This was a challenge to the assertion that Might is Right.

The idea of freedom is common to both principles, which we may now conveniently call Nationality and Democracy. In Great Britain both have long been accepted—the first was fast established on our supremacy at sea; the second lay at the roots of our flexible constitution. On the Continent this was not the case. There, too often, was found a government representative and liberal in name and form, but from which the *spirit* of liberty was entirely absent. If in 1914 you had exchanged your home in London and gone to live in Berlin or Breslau, you would have realized the difference of political atmosphere. Recall the Duma established in Russia in 1905, and reflect that King Edward I summoned his "Model Parliament" in 1295. We cannot understand the problems of European history in the nineteenth century unless we grasp this difference of attitude between governors and governed. Sovereignty in Great Britain was a partnership; in a great part of Europe it still remained the monopoly of a ruling prince, a bureaucracy, or a privileged caste.

For us in Britain the ideas of freedom, Parliamentary government, and equality before the law—all that is implied in the phrase "liberty of the subject"—are so ingrained in our history and our daily lives that we take them for granted:

> "We must be free or die who speak the tongue
> That Shakespeare spake: the faith and morals hold
> Which Milton held."

We no longer look upon them as privileges to be painfully wrung from the hand of the oppressor. On the Continent the plant of liberty is still of new and tender growth. Even yet it is not fully acclimatized.

Now the grant of personal liberty and constitutional government was no part of the Congress programme in 1815. On the contrary, the spirits of Nationality and Democracy, stalking like ghosts about the world, must be laid, if necessary, by the combined action of the great Powers.

Let us examine briefly the main clauses of the settlement. We shall then be in a position to understand the principles on which it was based.

France was thrust back to the frontiers she possessed before

the Revolution. She had to pay a huge indemnity, and submit for five years to the occupation of her north and north-east frontiers by foreign troops. Though she retained Alsace-Lorraine, she smarted under the humiliation incurred by the actual loss of territory and the sense of defeat. She was farther than ever from achieving her "natural" frontiers. The Bourbon Louis XVIII, brother of Louis XVI, came to the throne as legitimate heir. The Allied Powers, unwilling to punish the old dynasty, admitted Talleyrand to represent France in the Congress.

France.

In order to isolate France, and guard against further aggression, the smaller States which were her neighbours were enlarged.

On the north, *Belgium* was forced into an unnatural union with Holland, differences of race, language, and religion being ignored.

The Netherlands.

On the east was formed the *Swiss Confederation*, consisting of twenty-two cantons, whose neutrality was guaranteed by the Powers.

Switzerland.

On the south-east the kingdom of *Sardinia*, comprising Savoy, Nice, and Piedmont, acquired the old republic of Genoa.

Piedmont-Sardinia.

In Scandinavia, *Norway* was detached from Denmark and joined to Sweden, in recognition of assistance given by the latter country to the Allies against Napoleon.

Scandinavia.

Prussia regained Swedish Pomerania, which gave her a continuous coast-line on the Baltic; she acquired more than one-third of Saxony (which had remained faithful to Napoleon); and, most important of all, she gained Westphalia, on the right bank of the Rhine, and on the left bank, to the west and south, a rich province at the very gate of France. The watch on the Rhine began. Prussia took the place of Austria as the guardian of western Germany. In Poland she recovered the fortresses of Danzig and Thorn and the province of Posen. In all, she gained about two million subjects, mostly German. Only Hanover, Hesse, and Nassau now intervened to prevent the existence of a continuous Prussian State from Tilsit to Aachen.

Prussia.

Austria recovered the Tyrol and Salzberg, and the eastern

ARCTIC
ICELAND
ATLANTIC OCEAN
NORWAY
SWEDEN
Christiania
Stockholm
North Sea
DENMARK
Baltic
Edinburgh
GREAT BRITAIN
IRELAND
Dublin
London
English Channel
Brussels
NETHERLANDS
HANOVER
Berlin
PRUSSIA
Paris
LUXEMBURG
HESSE
SAXONY
GERMANIC CONFEDERATION
Bohemia
Moravia
Bay of Biscay
FRANCE
R. Loire
R. Seine
BAVARIA
Vienna
R. Danube
Buda Pest
AUSTRIAN
Oberne
SWITZERLAND
SAVOY
LOMBARDO VENICE
R. Rhone
R. Po
PIEDMONT
R. Save
Bosnia
Genoa
TUSCANY
PAPAL STATES
Adriatic Sea
Corsica
Rome
NAPLES
Sardinia
Naples
Balearic Is.
Mediterranean
Gibraltar
Sicily
Malta
AFRICA
SPAIN
PORTUGAL
R. Douro
Lisbon
Madrid
Andorra
R. Tagus
R. Guadiana

Adriatic coast to Ragusa. In the north of Italy she resumed her sway over Lombardy, to which was added the Republic of Venice. In return she willingly relinquished the Southern Netherlands (Belgium), which distance had always rendered more of a burden than a blessing. Austria was turning towards the east and south rather than towards the west. In addition to her rich North Italian provinces, the States of Parma, Modena, and Tuscany came under the sway of Hapsburg princes. Her share of dismembered Poland was eastern Galicia.

Austria.

Of the smaller German States, Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Saxony, which had been created kingdoms by Napoleon, maintained their dignities as such. Bavaria gained some ground west of the Rhine. Saxony was diminished to enrich Prussia. Hanover, now also a kingdom, belonged to the King of Great Britain until the accession of Queen Victoria in 1837.

Smaller German States.

By one of the ironies of history it was Napoleon who promoted the desire for unification in Germany and Italy. He had reduced the number of German States from 360 to 39. But the Congress attempted no closer union of the States. It formed a loose Confederation (the Bund), having its capital at Frankfort, but this was a confederation of ruling princes under the presidency of Austria, and as such could be trusted to stifle the longings of the German "people" for liberal government in a truly federal State.

The condition of *Italy* was even worse. In 1810 the whole peninsula was under the control of France. In 1815 the patchwork pattern of 1789 was reproduced. From Lombardy to Sicily the Italian people groaned under a heavy foreign yoke. The settlement of "Germany" and "Italy" afford the best possible example of the spirit that informed the Congress.

Italian States.

Russia retained Finland, which she had taken from the Swedes in 1809; she gained all of Poland (except the cessions to Austria and Prussia), and acquired Bessarabia from Turkey.

Russia.

Great Britain was unconcerned directly with the Continental redistribution. She acquired Malta, the Ionian Islands, and Heligoland. Her most valuable gains were colonial —the natural fruits of her power at sea. The Cape Colony,

Great Britain.

Ceylon, Mauritius, Guiana, Tobago, and Trinidad were ceded by France, Spain, and Holland.

This recital of the bare outlines of the settlement is enough to explain the spirit of its promoters. The assembly sat from September, 1814, to December, 1815. Although no less than ninety-three ministers were present from recognized States, it was soon clear that the real decisions lay in the hands of the representatives of Great Britain, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, to whose councils Talleyrand was admitted in the interests of France. The outstanding figures were the Tsar Alexander I, Metternich, and Talleyrand. The last, though utterly unscrupulous and shifty, was by far the ablest man present. He had fashioned his doctrines to the varying hour so successfully as to survive the many changes and chances of the Revolution. The bishop of 1789, the Foreign Minister of Directory, Consulate, and Empire, he appeared in 1814 at Vienna to watch the interests of France under the restored Bourbons. His design was to sow discord among the Allied Powers, so that France might regain her prestige, and the value of her alliance be recognized anew. He fomented the disputes as to the distribution of Saxony and Poland with such success that the Allies were soon divided—Great Britain and Austria against Prussia and Russia; until the return of Napoleon from Elba reunited them and renewed their animosity towards France.

Talleyrand.

The character of the Tsar forms a fascinating study in contrasts. Here was an autocrat of all the Russias filled with a passionate desire for reforming the world. A mystic and dreamer, he would devote his life to secure the welfare of his people and the brotherhood of men. With all this he remained every inch the autocrat. By God's aid he would legislate for his people's good, but never through their co-operation. But he was not the stuff of which great reformers are made. Always influenced by his immediate advisers, he could never decide upon one policy. In the year of the Congress, moved by deep but vague religious convictions, he issued the document known as the Holy Alliance, and persuaded the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia to sign it. The three rulers undertook to render one another mutual help,

Alexander I.

The Holy Alliance.

to regard themselves as members of one great Christian family, and to base their conduct towards all men on the teachings of religion. With the exception of Great Britain and Turkey all States acceded to the Holy Alliance, but the Tsar was alone in his pathetic faith that the millennium was now at hand.

Metternich.

Metternich, indeed, found in the Holy Alliance a weapon to his liking. He too had a mission to the world, but his gospel was very different. He preached the divine right of kings and their armies. He saw in the Holy Alliance a powerful engine for crushing by concerted action all liberal ideas of self-government and popular parliaments. For upwards of thirty years, until his fall in 1848, he maintained and supported throughout Europe a policy of rigid absolutism. From the Tsar's noble conception of a Concert of Europe which should make wars to cease, the Holy Alliance was degraded by Metternich into a police system for the safety of absolute kings. Based upon fear of France and the principle of Legitimacy (which is only a hard word to express the divine right of kings to rule as they please), the work of the Congress was a work after Metternich's own heart. The mighty were restored to their seat; only the poor were sent empty away. The smaller States were tossed about like counters in a game. Belgium, Norway, Saxony, Poland, the national aspirations of "Germany" and "Italy"—all were sacrificed to the system of Metternich. The great Powers came first and the rest nowhere.

The Congress reactionary in spirit.

The work of the Congress belongs in spirit to the eighteenth, rather than to the nineteenth century. Most of the latter century has been spent in reversing its decrees. It was too clumsy an attempt to set back the hands of the clock. From first to last it was designed to promote the interests and stability of ruling princes. "The despots whom the national spirit had enabled to overthrow the great French captain instantly took in hand the extinction of all the light and sacred fire of that very spirit."[1]

The best that can be said for the Congress is that it kept the peace for thirty-three years. But it was an uneasy peace: the waters were troubled, and there were dangers ahead. It was

[1] Morley, *Politics and History*.

characteristic of Metternich and his Absolutists that they refused to acknowledge the real causes of the danger; they were contented to suppress the symptoms. So far from reducing the pressure, they sat on the safety-valve. History could have taught them that excess will always lead to failure.

For List of Books for Reference see Appendix I

CHAPTER VII

The Rise of Prussia and the Unification of Germany

We have seen that in 1815 the expression "Germany" meant anything or nothing; it included Austria, it did not include East Prussia. It was a bundle of thirty-nine States very loosely connected. At best it was a union of princes, not of peoples, and of the princes themselves the House of Hapsburg was violently jealous of the House of Hohenzollern, while the lesser kings or grand-dukes were resolved to preserve their own petty independence. By 1871 all this was changed; a united German Empire appears on the map; the expression "Germany" has a definite meaning; Austria is excluded from German affairs; Prussia has become the greatest military State in the world.

Meaning of "Germany".

To seek the causes of this transformation we must look back to the earlier history of Prussia, for the creation of modern Germany and its present place in the world is the work of Prussia and Prussia alone. The rapid advance of Prussia to the position of a first-rate Power is easily explained; she achieved greatness by the sharpness of her sword. To maintain and increase her power by military efficiency was the consistent policy of her Hohenzollern kings. That "la Prusse n'est pas un pays qui a une armée, mais une armée qui a un pays", is as true in the nineteenth as it was in the eighteenth century. There is a strong family likeness between the founders of Prussian greatness in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries

Rise of Prussia.


NORTH SEA
BALTIC SEA
RUSSIA
SLESVIG
HOLSTEIN
East Friesland 1744
Hamburg
MECKLENBURG
West Pomerania 1720
East Pomerania 1648
Danzig
West Prussia 1772
East Prussia 1795
R. Weser
R. Elbe
HANOVER
Lingen 1702
Meinden
Ravensburg
Berlin
R. Vistula
POLAND
Cleves
Mark
Magdeburg 1648
R. Warthe
1793
R. Ruhr
SAXONY
R. Elbe
Silesia 1740-1763
R. Oder
R. Main
Bayreuth
Ansbach
BOHEMIA
R. Vistula
BAVARIA
AUSTRIA
0 50 100 Miles 150
Possessions of Brandenburg under the Great Elector
Acquisitions of Frederick the Great
Annexations from Poland
PRUSSIA
17th. & 18th. Century

and their modern successors. The *traditions* of a ruling dynasty are a very real force for good or evil.

For origins we must look back to the little State of Brandenburg, one of the seven electorates of the Holy Roman Empire, and to the Elector Frederick William of Hohenzollern (1640–88), who may justly be regarded as the founder of Prussian greatness, and who is generally known as the Great Elector. His natural talents for diplomacy were informed by no gracious courtesy nor recognition of moral obligation. To call his subtle statecraft Machiavellian is to cheapen the reputation of the great Italian writer. In the company of Machiavelli you may have become a criminal, but you usually remained a gentleman; modelled on the methods of the Great Elector you became a criminal and you often ceased to be a gentleman. Judged by any decent standard Frederick William too often behaved like a blackguard, but he flourished and his country flourished with him. There is an old proverb to the effect that man is what he eats, and Brandenburg had to be content with hard fare; she had to be fit to survive her harsh environment. The struggle left its mark upon the characters of ruler and people. Brandenburg was favoured by no advantages such as fertile soil or natural frontiers. If she wished to maintain her political independence she must be prepared to fight.

Brandenburg.

The Great Elector.

By the Peace of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years' War in 1648, Brandenburg obtained Eastern Pomerania on the Baltic, territory essential for the unifying of her scattered dominions. Further extensions were gained in the south-west, and control over Cleves, Mark, and Ravensberg constituted a seventeenth-century "watch on the Rhine". By 1660 the Great Elector was recognized as independent Duke of East Prussia. His successful policy was typically Hohenzollern in its single-eyed, steady, unscrupulous pursuit of power. He was essentially practical in his aims at home as well as abroad. Efficiency was the order of the day, and the elector's will was law from Königsberg to Cleves. He left his scattered lands united under an iron despotism enforced by a *standing army* of nearly 30,000 men. He left his State the unquestioned leader of Northern Europe. "The map of Prussia began to resemble

Peace of Westphalia, 1648.

the outstretched wings of a headless and tailless bird of prey."[1]

His son and successor, Frederick I, 1688–1713, lacked his strength of character, but his reign is notable for the successful bargaining by which he obtained the title of king in Prussia in return for his services to the Grand Alliance against Louis XIV. The elector of the shadowy empire had now become an independent European monarch.

Frederick, the first king.

From 1713 to 1740 reigned Frederick William I. Macaulay has left an unforgettable though ill-proportioned portrait-sketch of him. He carried on the Great Elector's work; he, too, was a typical Hohenzollern. His patriotism ran in the same narrow groove. His personality was far more disagreeable, since his eccentricities almost extended to homicidal mania. Equally with the Great Elector he left for good and evil a heritage which flourished later in the German Empire.

Frederick William I.

In a word, he created that marvellous, machine-like discipline in his army which distinguished the modern German troops, and on the existence of which the success of their tactical theories largely depended. The army was increased to 90,000 men, perfectly trained and equipped.

The methods of the drill-sergeant were extended to all classes of the population. If the poverty-stricken State was to maintain a gigantic army, rigid economy must be the order of the day. The king treated the country as though it were his private property, and its people his personal servants. So mercilessly did he bully and tax his subjects that at the end of his reign the revenue was doubled. Under his regime the people learned the lesson of docility so well that it has never been forgotten. "The bully of the royal hearth was the bully of the kingdom, whose conception of his prerogative and position was as domineering, raw, and graceless as was his exercise of power. We might perhaps forgive the manners of a sweaty boor, the love of beer, tobacco and sauerkraut, of tall and kidnapped grenadiers, and of flogging the children of his subjects. . . . But we cannot forgive his conception of manhood and womanhood, his contempt for and war upon everything in the realms of the spirit, intellect, and conscience that he could not understand,

His character.

[1] Fletcher; *The Germans*, Oxford pamphlets, 1914.

his determination to drill and thrash the men and women under his irresponsible autocracy into smaller copies of their master. . . . Above all, we cannot forgive him for warping and brutalizing the genius of his extraordinary son."[1]

When he died he bequeathed to that son the strongest army in Europe, and the resources wherewith to maintain and use it. For himself he was content to hoard and accumulate his men and money. He refused to be drawn into the vortex of northern international affairs; his single venture in this direction had resulted in the annexation of Stettin (1720) at the expense of Sweden. On the whole, we conclude, he was "only mad nor'-nor'-west".

In 1740 his son, Frederick II, succeeded this drill-intoxicated king. Like our Henry V, his true character came as an entire surprise to his people and advisers. Those who looked for cakes and ale again were woefully disappointed. The poetry and the flute-playing, as every schoolboy knows, were put away as childish things. Lord Acton calls Frederick II the most consummate genius that in modern times has inherited a throne. Like the Great Elector he was devoid of moral scruple in the means he adopted towards the same end—the consolidation and aggrandizement of his kingdom.

Frederick the Great.

The first five years of his reign afford a very pretty example of his methods. The death of the Emperor Charles VI (1740), and the accession of his daughter, Maria Theresa, furnished a glorious chance for a direct act of robbery. Ignoring the fact that Prussia had pledged herself to recognize Maria Theresa's succession to the Hapsburg territories, he invaded Silesia, thereby "adding the tail on the map to the Prussian bird of prey".[2] This barefaced theft was the signal for a concerted attack on poor Maria Theresa's empire on the part of France, Bavaria, Spain, Saxony, and Sardinia. This coalition was too successful to please Frederick; he therefore concluded a secret treaty with Maria Theresa in October, 1740, by which he definitely secured Silesia. Two months later he shamelessly deserted the Empress-queen and rejoined his unholy

Unscrupulous invasion of Silesia.

[1] *The Evolution of Prussia*, Marriott and Robertson.
[2] Fletcher, *The Germans*, Oxford pamphlets, 1914.

alliance. Such a series of international infidelities would be hard to parallel.

The end of this Austrian Succession War came in 1748, and Frederick had now eight years of peace. Like Napoleon in the latter years of the Consulate, he performed during this period the administrative work which proved to be of the most permanent value, and which, apart from his military genius, entitles him to the name of "Great". Like Philip II of Spain, and Louis XIV, he mastered and personally controlled the smallest details of every department. Like William II he would admit to his confidence no statesman of independent character, but was always his own prime minister. He regarded himself as the chief servant of the State; he never spared himself in her service. His capacity for work was astounding, and he exacted the same standard of industry and zeal from his secretaries and officials. He went to work at three in the morning in summer, and at four in winter. No man ever saw more clearly the shortest and most practical means of enriching his country. In times of peace he prepared for war by laying up treasure in bullion and in grain. Manufactures were rigidly protected, and agriculture prospered by leaps and bounds. Foreigners skilled in arts and crafts were encouraged to settle in Prussia. Great public works were promoted. The army was kept efficient down to the smallest detail. In all military concerns the king laboured ceaselessly; he devoted himself to intense study of the theory and practice of his profession. Perfect discipline created a most formidable engine of war handled by a commander-in-chief of supreme genius.

His capacity for work.

The machine and the man barely survived the fiery ordeal of the Seven Years' War (1756–63). In this war of revenge, for which Maria Theresa gathered together a league which isolated Frederick, Prussia must have succumbed but for the titanic exertions of the great king and his army. The State of Prussia was saved by the sharpness of his sword. "That is the tremendous power supported by millions of bayonets which was developed chiefly at Berlin, and it is the greatest danger that remains to be encountered by the Anglo-Saxon race." So wrote Lord Acton some twenty years ago.

The Seven Years' War.

Frederick, as we have seen, had time enough to provide the staying-power which, backed by British gold and sea-supremacy, enabled him to survive the Seven Years' War. Far-sighted preparation was a large part of his policy, and he set an example from which Bismarck and the modern Empire were not slow to profit. All that pertains to thoroughness of warlike preparation is as characteristic of the Prussians as improvisation is of our own countrymen.

When the Seven Years' War broke out, the army was raised to 160,000 men, which represented about 14 per cent of the male population fitted to bear arms. Frederick's sole ally was Britain. Against him, thanks to the Diplomatic Revolution, were ranged France and Austria. Russia, Sweden, and Saxony hastened to join in crushing the upstart.[1] Against such an array Frederick's sole chance of success lay in a series of lightning strokes delivered at each of his foes before they could unite their forces. Aided by an internal position and the slow mobilization of the Russians, he employed this strategy with remarkable success. In 1757 he won two brilliant victories, one at Rossbach against the French, the second at Leuthen against the Austrians, which Napoleon regarded as his greatest battle. In 1758 and 1759 he suffered heavy reverses. Then Pitt fell from office, and the subsidies from Britain ceased. Only the accession of a new Tsar—his fervent admirer—saved Frederick and Prussia. He bitterly reproached Britain for what he was pleased to call perfidy; as we have seen, he was a good judge of what constitutes a breach of promise.

The war ended with the Peace of Paris in 1763. It had been for Frederick a war of self-preservation, not of aggrandizement. He retained Silesia and that was all. Most of his remaining acts were concerned with the healing of the wounds of his sorely stricken country.

Peace of Paris, 1763.

One stroke of foreign policy remains to be recorded—the First Partition of Poland in 1772. Poland was a country which lacked geographical defences. She was exposed on all sides to invasion. From the end of the thirteenth down to the seventeenth century Poland had played a prominent part in European history. For a time she was supreme in the

First Partition of Poland.

[1] Spain concluded a Family Compact with France and joined in the war in 1762.

Baltic. In 1683 her heroic king, John Sobieski, had saved Vienna from the Turks. But her power lacked sure foundations. The crown was elective, and was often put up for auction by one or other of the noble families to whom all the real power and privileges belonged. Then, again, the population was not homogeneous: there were Russians and Lithuanians as well as Poles. Lastly, the country was torn by religious dissensions. Under these circumstances, as soon as greedy and powerful neighbours arose, her absorption was but a matter of time.

A strip of this unhappy country still separated Eastern Pomerania from East Prussia. The seizure of this strip was, like the taking of Silesia, an act of barefaced robbery; in this case Frederick shared the guilt with accomplices—Catherine of Russia and the Emperor, Joseph II. This partition of Poland was the first step towards her national extinction. It was an unblushing assertion of the damnable doctrine that Might is Right. It was a precedent for similar acts, for "history never does stop short". Two subsequent partitions in 1793 and 1795 completed this great crime against national spirit and public law.

Frederick died in 1786, leaving the throne to his nephew, Frederick William II, under whom Prussia fell rapidly from her high estate.

How long and how far Frederick the Great would have stemmed the high tide of Revolution that swept from France across all frontiers is matter for vain speculation. It is certain that his successor, like Louis XVI himself, was never born to steer a straight course in such troubled waters. His chief interest lay in completing the scheme for the spoliation of Poland. Austria, too, and Russia were absorbed in the same selfish quest, when all the military power of Europe might have been united against the French Revolutionary armies.

In 1793 Prussia took Posen, Thorn, Danzig, and a great tract of country southwards almost to Cracow. In 1795 she received Warsaw and territory northwards to the Niemen. Conceiving herself to have been slighted by Russia in this latter partition, Prussia hastened to make peace with France in April, 1795, and thereby ruined the First Coalition. Under Frederick William III she played the contemptible

Further acquisitions from Poland.

part of onlooker, while Napoleon, having bridled the Revolution, rode roughshod over the monarchies of Europe. When Austria and Russia had been laid low at Austerlitz, in December, 1805, Prussia, befooled and humiliated to breaking-point, was left to meet her fate in inglorious isolation. On 14th October, 1806, she fought two battles—Jena and Auerstädt. Her armies, which had been living on past prestige, collapsed utterly. Within a fortnight Napoleon was master of Berlin. The survivors of the broken armies now joined the Russians, only to share their discomfiture at Eylau and Friedland.

Prussia and Napoleon.

Jena and Auerstädt.

The Tsar hastened to make peace at Tilsit in 1807. This famous treaty hardened into a close alliance, by which the two emperors virtually undertook to divide Europe between them. Britain was to be ruined, and Prussia partitioned. The "bird of prey" was forcibly plucked of her most cherished feathers. She lost all territory west of the Elbe, and almost all of her recent Polish acquisitions. A huge war indemnity was levied on her, and her army was to be reduced to a maximum of 42,000 men. The fortunes of Prussia had sunk to their lowest ebb.

The Treaty of Tilsit.

The years of adversity, from 1807 to 1813, evoked a spirit of patriotism which went far to atone for the narrow and selfish policy of the previous ten years. This is perhaps the only period when an Englishman might have been proud to be a Prussian. In spite of Napoleon's grinding tyranny, and fired by the example of the heroic Queen Louise, and by Fichte's stirring *Addresses to the German People*, a group of remarkable statesmen, soldiers, and administrators, brought about an amazing revival. Von Stein showed his wisdom in the liberality of his internal reforms, the partial emancipation of the serfs, and the establishment of Parliamentary principles. The reformation of the army was the work of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, who introduced short-service conscription, and formed the Landwehr and Landsturm as reserves for defensive purposes, thus evading the numerical limit decreed by Napoleon.

Patriotic revival.

If Stein could have prevailed, Prussia would have joined Russia in the campaign of 1812, and the share of Prussian troops in that

stupendous disaster might have been avoided. As it was, Napoleon's failure led directly to the War of Liberation, in which all the powers were for the first time united against the common oppressor. In October, 1813, near Leipzig, was fought the Battle of the Nations, the invasion of France followed, and Napoleon was compelled to abdicate in April, 1814. The Congress met at Vienna. Then followed the "Hundred Days" (1815), and in the final decision at Waterloo the Prussians more than regained their military prestige.

War of Liberation.

Waterloo.

IMPORTANT DATES

1648. Peace of Westphalia.
1640–88. The Great Elector.
1700. Prussia a Kingdom.
1740–86. Frederick the Great.
1740–48 War of Austrian Succession.
1756–63. Seven Years' War.
1772. First Partition of Poland.
1793. Second Partition of Poland.
1795. Third Partition of Poland.
1806. October 14, Battles of Jena and Auerstädt.
1813. Battle of Leipzig.
1815. Battle of Waterloo.

For List of Books for Reference see Appendix I

CHAPTER VIII

The Creation of the German Empire 1815–71

The Congress of Vienna, as we have seen, did not advance the prospect of a united German nation. But the ideal was not forgotten. "Germany" now consisted of thirty-nine States. The most important question for the future to decide was the relation between the two first-rate Powers—Prussia and Austria. Conscious of her power, Prussia was now resolved that Austria should

NORTH SEA
BALTIC SEA
Heligoland
SLESVIG
Kiel Bay
Kiel
Gulf of Danzig
Königsberg
Danzig
HOLSTEIN
MECKLENBURG
Hamburg
Schwerin
Strelitz
Stettin
OLDENBURG
Bremen
R. Weser
R. Elbe
HANOVER
R. Warthe
R. Vistula
Warsaw
BERLIN
POLAND
LIPPE
BRUNSWICK
ANHALT
R. Oder
WESTPHALIA
WALDECK
Cologne
R. Rhine
Breslau
THURINGIAN STATES
Dresden
SAXONY
RHENISH PRUSSIA
HESSE
Frankfort
Sadowa
BOHEMIA
LUXEMBURG
GRAND DUCHY HESSE
R. Main
Prague
Sedan
RHENISH BAVARIA
Metz
LORRAINE
Stuttgart
BAVARIA
Strasburg
WURTEMBURG
HOHENZOLLERN
Munich
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY
SWITZERLAND
0 50 100 Miles 150
The GERMAN EMPIRE
Prussia
North German Federation 1866-1871
German Empire since 1871

no longer claim suzerainty over the smaller States on the strength of an imperial authority no longer justified by material force.

The "Bund" created by the Congress was a union only in name. It satisfied the parochial pride of the smaller States and the selfish policy of Austria. Clearly then, if unification were to be achieved, the first move must be made by Prussia in the face of Hapsburg opposition. It was a difficult problem for Prussia to shepherd into her absolutist fold those smaller States, where liberal ideas were growing up. It seemed that there was danger of a clash between the "national" desire for unification and the liberal desire for constitutional rule.

Problem of German unity.

What indication was there that Prussia would solve for Germany the problem of unification? Up to 1848 she was at one with Austria in her opposition to all liberal ideas, and her attitude was perfectly consistent with her past traditions. She was easily drawn into the orbit of the "Metternich system".

In the first half of the nineteenth century there was but one clear step made in the direction of unity, and it was set on foot by Prussia. This was the creation of a Zollverein (Customs-Union). Hitherto, German trade and production had been woefully handicapped by a primitive system of tariffs, which prevented trade from moving freely from province to province, still less between State and State. As early as 1818 Prussia abolished these vexatious restrictions in her own realms, and established a free flow of trade. Other States followed her lead, so that by 1840 free trade was established between nearly all the members of the Bund. Prussia was the presiding power. Austria was not invited to join. The magical increase of commercial prosperity that ensued was an object-lesson to those smaller States who clung so tenaciously to their precious independence. Although this evidence of Prussian business capacity did not allay their suspicion of her forward policy, it certainly appealed to their pockets.

The Zollverein.

The problem of ultimate unification was no nearer solution when the great revolutions of 1848 arose. In nearly every State of Europe the cry arose for freedom from the system of Metternich; the Liberal party "took charge" and forced a democratic constitution upon their demoralized princes.

Frederick William IV, who was King of Prussia (1840–61), was no extremist. He genuinely wished to rule in the interests of his people, while at the same time he upheld firmly the doctrine of the Divine Right of Kings. When, therefore, in March, 1848, revolutions broke out, Frederick William feared not so much the idea of reforms as the lessening of his personal authority. After much bloodshed in Berlin he bowed before the storm, consented to govern by Parliamentary methods, and pretended that he liked it.

He was not long to wear the democratic mask. By the end of 1848, thanks to the devotion of his army, he was again master in his own house. The popular assembly was dissolved, and by 1850 the king had substituted a constitution of his own devising, which embodied the essence of the modern Prussian spirit. This system was democratic only on paper. The privilege of voting was made worthless for the masses by a scheme of indirect franchise based on the amount of taxes paid, thus ensuring that the Conservative and "propertied" votes should swamp those of the democratic parties. Above all stood the king, who made and unmade the ministers, who were responsible to him alone. Ranged round him were the military and land-owning classes, whose influence stifled the growth of a truly representative Parliament.

The revolutionary wave had spread throughout Germany. In May, 1848, representatives of all German States met at Frankfort-on-Main, and in March, 1849, after long disputation, framed a new Constitution. Germany was to become an hereditary empire, with two Houses of Parliament. The Imperial Crown was offered to Frederick William IV of Prussia.

Here was the parting of the ways. Were the Hohenzollerns to forsake the absolutist tradition of their ancestors and bow to the decrees of a federal and democratic council? By accepting the offer of the Frankfort delegates Frederick William might, like Frederick I, gain a title, but he would assuredly lose the material driving power which Frederick the Great had so forcefully achieved. There would be no room for a Bismarck whose life-work was to Prussianize Germany, perhaps no German navy and no world war of 1914, since Prussia would be merged in Germany.

For the last time with effect the Austrian influence helped to

turn the scale, and the King of Prussia declined the offer as derogatory to his royal dignity. Acceptance would have aroused the fierce resentment of Austria. It was ordained that Prussia should achieve empire in her own time and in her own manner; the German federated States would have empire thrust upon them.

To tell the full story of German unification would be to write the biography of Bismarck. We are most concerned here to study the methods which he adopted, and to sum up the results of his policy.

When, in 1861, William I succeeded his brother, Frederick William IV, he found in Bismarck an adviser well versed in the problems of internal policy, and qualified, by practical experience, to plumb the depths of European diplomacy. **Bismarck.**

By birth and traditions Bismarck entered on his political career with a strong prejudice in favour of absolute monarchy. In his early life he seemed a typical product of that old Pomeranian Junker stock which saw in the army the only profession and in agriculture the only industry. We should call him a downright old-fashioned Tory. His uncompromising attitude to liberal ideas, which he was not afraid publicly to exhibit, explains why he was appointed to represent Prussia in the Federal Diet at Frankfort in 1851. The eight years which he spent in this capacity are all-important, since, out of the experience gained, his future policy was shaped. He saw clearly that if Germany was to be united under the ægis of Prussia, Austria must first be driven out. From 1858 to 1862 he gained invaluable diplomatic experience in Petrograd and Paris. Then King William I, in despair of convincing a Liberal Parliament of the urgent need for army reform, after some misgiving appointed Bismarck Minister-President and Minister for Foreign Affairs. He could be trusted to take a short way with Liberals who opposed him. **Early career.** **Minister-President, 1862.**

The control of the army became as clear an issue between Bismarck and the Liberals as it had been between Charles I and the Long Parliament. Bismarck's procedure was simple: when the Liberals refused to vote supplies, the king dissolved the House, and the Budget was carried without it. It was the

"Cromwell" touch, and Parliament was borne down by a military dictatorship. As Bismarck roundly declared: "The great questions were to be settled not by speeches and majority resolutions, but by blood and iron".

German Empire created by war.

It is easy, after the event, to sum up Bismarck's policy and its triumph. The German Empire was created in seven years by three successful wars waged by Prussia. The first was against Denmark, in 1864; the second against Austria, in 1866; and the last against France, in 1870.

But when he assumed the direction of affairs in 1862 the situation was perplexing enough. His hands were cramped, if not tied, by a hostile majority in Parliament, by the narrow dynastic spirit of the smaller German States, and by the need of isolating the internal affairs of Germany so far as to ensure non-intervention on the part of France and Russia.

The statesmanship of Bismarck gives simplicity and unity to the intricacy of this difficult period. It affords one more proof of the wisdom of the old Greek aphorism: "Character is fate". War alone could solve the German problem. The qualities of nerve and brain needed to wage it victoriously were possessed pre-eminently by Bismarck. The readiness was all. And the readiness was assured by Von Roon and Von Moltke, the strategists and tacticians of the Prussian army. Of these great soldiers it is sufficient to say that they had adapted the principles of Napoleon to modern weapons and means of communication. They were scientific soldiers. Nelson said of naval warfare: "Something must be left to chance"; in these three Prussian wars that "something" was reduced to a negligible quantity.

Confident in the strength of his weapons, Bismarck was quite unscrupulous as to the means he employed. His one fear was lest hesitating counsels should rob him of his opportunity. He was the last man to let his chances slip "by thinking too precisely on the event".

His first war, that against Denmark, was waged in alliance with Austria. In reality, Bismarck was resolved to make its issue a plausible pretext for a breach with the latter power. In this he was entirely successful.

The Danish War arose out of a long-standing and complicated

dispute as to the possession of the provinces of Slesvig, Lauenburg, and Holstein. Briefly, the claimants were: (1) the King of Denmark, who had received them at the Congress of Vienna, in compensation for the loss of Norway. His title was that of duke, and it was not hereditary; (2) the Duke of Augustenburg, who had a legitimate hereditary claim; (3) the German Confederation, which claimed the provinces on the ground that Holstein and Lauenburg were exclusively German in population. (Slesvig had a mixed population of Danes and Germans.)

War against Denmark, 1864.

There was a Danish party, an Augustenburg party, and a "German" party; but there was no Prussian party. On the surface, Prussia appeared to have no grounds for interference, and certainly no pretext for occupying all or part of the duchies. That she did so was due entirely to the craft and resolution of Bismarck.

The war of 1864 against the Danes has a special significance for Englishmen, since it made possible the development of the German navy from puny infancy to vigorous maturity. While we have no reason to suppose that Bismarck foresaw the amazing challenge flung out to British sea supremacy since 1900, it is certain that he grasped the strategic importance of Kiel Harbour and the canal which would open a door to the North Sea.

Kiel and naval ambitions.

Apart from the naval aspect, the Slesvig-Holstein question brought Bismarck for the first time as minister into direct contact with Austria. "The wished occasion of the plot he takes." From the beginning he kept annexation before his eyes, he says.

On the surface the war was waged to wrest Slesvig, Holstein, and Lauenburg from the Danish crown, and place them under German control. In 1863 the King of Denmark formally annexed Slesvig. The German Bund declared war on him. Here was Bismarck's opportunity. He came forward with the alternative plan that Prussia and Austria should take joint action.

The Danes could offer no prolonged resistance, and by a treaty at Vienna, in October, 1864, the provinces were duly surrendered to the two Powers.

Now Bismarck had gauged to a nicety the extent of Austrian

weakness. Her vitality was at a low ebb, her prestige tarnished by the Italian campaigns of 1859, her army was demoralized, her finances were insecure. In these circumstances she was forced to accept the dictation of Prussia in the settlement and administration of the provinces. A temporary arrangement was made by the Convention of Gastein (August, 1865), by which Prussia administered Slesvig and purchased Lauenburg, with the right to construct a canal from the Baltic to the North Sea (from Kiel to the mouth of the Elbe). Holstein was handed over to Austria. This Convention was regarded by Bismarck as merely "papering over the cracks". The existence of the Bund, to whom the provinces should have theoretically belonged, was ignored. Austria certainly lost prestige in the eyes of the smaller States. So far so good. But the Convention was no more than a formal salute before the opening of the real attack by Prussia upon Austria. Bismarck was simply sparring to secure a favourable opening. Before he came to closer contact, he must isolate his enemy and secure an ally for himself. Again, nothing must be left to chance. First, he made sure of France. In an interview at Biarritz he took the measure of Napoleon III's character, and now fooled him to the top of his bent, partly by hinting at French acquisitions on the Rhine frontier, in Belgium, or in Luxembourg, partly by the exploitation of his pose as champion of "nationalities". In the emperor's superficial view nothing but profit could accrue from a struggle *à outrance* between Prussia and Austria. At best it would be a war of attrition.

Convention of Gastein, 1865.

Isolation of Austria.

On the side of Russia there was no fear of intervention. The Tsar, grateful for assistance in the recent Polish rebellion, had signed a military convention with Prussia.

In April, 1866, Bismarck concluded a definite alliance with Italy, to whom he promised Venetia in return for help against Austria.

As for the smaller German States—the allies of Austria—Bismarck made a strong but unsuccessful bid for their support by proposing a wholesale remodelling of the Confederation which should definitely exclude Austria. This he did on the very eve of hostilities. He intended to base a plausible excuse for war, not on the administration of the Duchies, but on Austria's

rejection of his proposed "New Model". Defeat of Austria would be a barren triumph if it were not to pave the way towards a real union of north and south German States.

He was now ready to throw off the mask; it only remained to convince the king his master that war was inevitable.

Friction soon arose over the Duchies. Slesvig was subjected to the full rigour of Prussian militarism; in Holstein, Austria governed more mildly than she was wont. Prussia complained that such criminal laxity would prejudice her own position in Slesvig, and that Austria was encouraging the Augustenburg claim.[1] Austria declined to allow her policy to be criticized and began to prepare for war. Bismarck forced the pace by springing his revolutionary scheme of reform upon the Diet. It was defeated, but when Austria produced a counter-proposal that the question of the Duchies should be submitted to that body, Bismarck, declaring this to be a breach of the Convention of Gastein, withdrew the Prussian delegate. War followed against Austria and the smaller States.

Quarrel with Austria.

Throughout this maze of negotiation we mark the ingenuity with which Bismarck gave a cloak of plausibility to the Prussian attitude. Prussian diplomacy has not always, before or since, troubled to do this. The war was short and sharp, as its name "The Six Weeks' War" implies. The Prussian army, long prepared and superior at every point, startled Europe by its efficiency and the rapidity of its manœuvres. The infantry, armed with the new breech-loading "needle-gun", were able to fire three times as rapidly as their opponents. Austria was hampered by Italy in her rear, by timid strategy and slow tactics in the field. Bismarck was present with the king at the decisive battle of Sadowa (Königgrätz) on 3rd July. The arrival of the Crown Prince at 2 p.m. to turn the Austrian right flank decided the issue of the day. On 23rd August peace was concluded at Prague.

The Six Weeks' War, 1866.

Sadowa.

The campaign was a triumph of discipline. The behaviour of the Prussian troops, as recorded by Bismarck, is worth remarking. "They are friendly", he states, "to everyone; there is no

[1] Bismarck had previously offered to recognize the Duke of Augustenburg as a sort of vassal to Prussia.

plundering and burning; they pay what they are able, though they have mouldy bread to eat. There must exist a *depth of piety* in our common soldier or all this could not be." Since Bismarck's war that gospel of humane warfare has been strangely distorted into the devil-worship of force.

Treaty of Prague

Results of War.

The terms of peace imposed on Austria were formulated expressly with an eye to a future struggle with France, which, as Bismarck saw, "lay within the logic of History". Twenty-two States north of the Main were welded together in a close union and were called the North German Confederation. Frankfort-on-Main, Hesse-Cassel, Nassau, Hanover, in addition to Slesvig-Holstein and Lauenburg, were annexed by Prussia. Austria was excluded from Germany: a ring-fence was set up enclosing German territory, within which Austria would henceforward be regarded as a trespasser, and at last the old "Bund", which had talked so much and done so little, was dissolved, unwept, unhonoured.

North German Confederation.

Prussian unity completed.

A glance at the map will show that the complete unity of Prussia was now achieved. The constitution of the North German Confederation was the model on which the present Empire is based. There was a President (the King of Prussia), a federal Council of States (Bundesrath), and a Chamber of Deputies (Reichstag) elected by universal suffrage. Each State had in addition its own particular constitution. Outside the confederation of the North there remained, in South Germany, only Bavaria, Wurtemberg and Baden.

No territory was demanded of Austria, except Holstein; nor was a heavy indemnity exacted. Bismarck was determined that the wounds inflicted upon Austria should not rankle, nor the bitterness of defeat throw her into the arms of France. "We must finish off rapidly before France won time" to bring further diplomatic action to bear on Austria. "We were not there to sit in judgment," he says, "our task was the establishment or initiation of German national unity under the leadership of the King of Prussia." With extreme reluctance King William consented "to bite the sour apple and consent to so disgraceful a peace"; for at this time "military impressions were dominant in the king's mind".

In this manner was Austria excluded from Germany and forced to embark on the beginnings of a Near Eastern policy which furnished the occasion, if not the cause, of the World War of 1914.

Austria excluded from Germany.

We now enter upon the final act of Bismarck's war-drama, the completion of which saw Germany a united Empire.

The result of the Six Weeks' War fell like a thunderbolt upon Napoleon III and shattered all his half-laid schemes. He had miserably underrated the might of the Prussian arm, and his shifty policy had met with its own reward. In the division of spoil, so far from acting as a dignified and impartial mediator, France was sent empty away. No wonder if his soldiers declared: "It is France that has been conquered at Sadowa". Here was a united German Power, proved to possess military capacity of the highest order, established for the first time at the very gates of France, and France was powerless to apply the only remedy.

Effect of Six Weeks' War on France.

In a desperate attempt to save his face Napoleon demanded compensation. He suggested that Bavarian territory on the left bank of the Rhine should be ceded. Bismarck treated the proposal as the presentation of a hotel-keeper's bill, and passed it on at once to the King of Bavaria. Thus Napoleon lost a potential ally. Then he asked for Luxembourg or Belgium, thereby alienating the sympathy of all Europe. By Bismarck's contrivance the neutrality of Luxembourg was guaranteed by international conference in 1867.[1] The design on Belgium had been most incautiously engrossed in a signed document, which Bismarck published in 1870 for the edification of Great Britain.

Failure of Napoleon III's policy.

The emperor's instability had brought its own nemesis, and was reflected in the condition of his country. Between 1866 and 1870 Napoleon made feverish but fitful efforts to restore the army and finances. Himself a prey to an indecision aggravated by illness, he was hampered by divided councils, and his stanchest supporters were mostly men of second-rate ability. The reckless extravagance of the Court made sweeping army reform impossible. The half-measures adopted were worse than useless. Liberal and

[1] The previous position of Luxembourg had been anomalous: it belonged to Holland, was a member of the German Confederation, and was garrisoned by Prussia.

Socialistic elements clamoured insistently to be heard. Lack of governance was everywhere apparent. Disillusion and discontent were the outcome of the emperor's grandiose ventures in home and foreign policy. Such was the situation in France when Napoleon was drawn into war with Prussia.

Despite the weakness of France it was no part of Bismarck's plan to attack immediately. Time was needed to consolidate the North-German States, to enlist the active sympathy of South Germany. He was no believer in war for war's sake. If he could bring the Southern States into the union without recourse to war with France, so much the better.

As in the case of Austria in 1866, France must be isolated; by diplomatic weapons a critical situation must be forced in which France would forfeit all sympathy by putting herself hopelessly in the wrong.

The arrogant ineptitude of Napoleon simplified Bismarck's task, but does not diminish our respect for the nice combination of caution and readiness which affords an interesting comparison and contrast with the methods of modern German diplomacy. Recent events have proved that readiness for war is not alone sufficient. In 1914 France was not isolated; in 1870 her natural allies failed her. There was no Bismarck in the twentieth century.

The outbreak of war was hastened by the negotiations between France and Prussia in the matter of the vacant Spanish throne.

The Spanish throne and the Hohenzollerns.

Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern, to whom the Spaniards offered their crown, was a grandson of Murat, and a cousin of King William I of Prussia. His acceptance of the Spanish crown could bring no great accession of strength to Prussia. Yet, when the prince accepted the offer, the French empress, the Court, and responsible ministers chose to regard the situation as a menace to the very existence of France. Men talked wildly of the return of the Empire of Charles V. There was enough in this aggressive attitude to provoke Prussia into war. That Bismarck did not regard it as a challenge proves that he was no seeker for war at any price.

Prince Leopold, in fact, withdrew his acceptance of the Spanish throne. Had the matter been left at that, France could have claimed a great diplomatic victory, and there would have

been no war. But the French war party, headed by the empress, was not satisfied, and insisted, half insolently, upon a personal guarantee from King William that the Hohenzollern candidature should never be renewed. Benedetti, the French ambassador at Berlin, was ordered to present his demands directly to the king in a personal interview. This he did on 13th July, at Ems, where the king was taking the waters. While adhering to his approval of Leopold's withdrawal, William, when pressed, declined absolutely to bind himself as to his future attitude. He sent a long telegram explaining this incident to Bismarck, at Berlin. The Chancellor, with Roon and Moltke, was seated at dinner when the message arrived. All were plunged in gloom, since they feared that the king's interview might, at the eleventh hour, avert the war. In Bismarck's view, the king was much too fond of directing affairs of state in person. On receipt of the telegram the whole complexion of the affair was altered by the stroke of a blue pencil. "By striking out words, but without altering or adding," Bismarck edited the telegram so that it conveyed the impression that the king had rejected the demands of Benedetti and refused him further audience. The recital of this censored message had a cheering effect on the two soldiers. "Now," said Moltke, "it has a different ring; it sounded before like a parley, now it is like a flourish in answer to a challenge"; and Bismarck declared: "Success essentially depends upon the impression which the originator of the war makes upon us and others; it is important that we should be the party attacked, and this Gallic overweening and touchiness will make us . . . if we announce in the face of Europe that we fearlessly meet the public threats of France." Roon declared: "Our God of old lives yet, and will not let us perish in disgrace." Moltke was moved to exclaim: "If I may but live to lead our armies in such a war, then the devil may come directly afterwards and fetch away the old carcass", a lengthy speech for the man who was "silent in seven languages".

Benedetti.

The Ems telegram.

Bismarck's telegram appeared in special editions of the evening papers. It had exactly the effect he had anticipated. France was furious at what appeared a direct insult to her ambassador.

Prussia was burning to revenge what seemed an impudent attempt to coerce her king.

Franco-Prussian War, 1870–1.

War was declared on 19th July, and fighting began on 2nd August. On the side of Prussia everything was foreseen and prepared. France was utterly disorganized. That she held out so long is explained by the splendid natural fighting qualities of the rank and file, whose élan, courage, and devotion were beyond praise. Detailed description of the campaigns is unnecessary, and valuable only as a part of specialized military history. Here it must suffice to summarize the decisive events of the war. As an empire, France withstood Prussia for precisely one month. Alsace was quickly overrun and Lorraine invaded. After a Pyrrhic victory for the Prussians at Gravelotte, the hardest-fought battle of the war, Marshal Bazaine allowed himself to be shut up in the fortress of Metz. Then the Prussians prepared to march on Paris. Instead of concentrating on the defence of his capital, the emperor, now far too ill to think clearly for himself, was persuaded to march his remaining forces to the relief of Bazaine. On 2nd September, surrounded by vastly superior forces at Sedan, he was forced to surrender with 80,000 men. This disaster killed the Empire, but did not end the war. For five months longer the new Republic maintained a gallant losing struggle. Strasburg fell on 28th September. Bazaine made craven surrender of Metz in October. Nothing could break the iron ring which now encircled Paris. Despite the superhuman energy of Gambetta, who escaped from the city in a balloon, and raised fresh forces in the south, the capital, reduced to starvation by a siege of over four months, surrendered on 28th January, 1871.

Sedan, 2nd September, 1870.

Surrender of Metz, October.

Surrender of Paris, January, 1871.

In every department of the war the Prussians had proved themselves to be superior—in numbers, in equipment, in the qualities of the High Command.

Evidences of careful German preparation were abundant in the Great War. Defensive positions, howitzer emplacements, and the like were proved to have been prepared beforehand in French territory. This was no new part of the German strategy. In anticipation of the war of 1870, iron girders were constructed,

and carefully measured, for bridge-building across the Moselle and other rivers on the road to Paris. Plans and photographs of every description had been taken in France by German officers, who disguised themselves with great ingenuity. The modern Secret Service agents greatly extended their subterranean spheres of action, but Bismarck's men were fully their equals in efficiency.

One innovation in twentieth-century warfare, which owes little to Bismarck's example, is the terrorism or "frightfulness" practised in Belgium and elsewhere, and openly avowed as part of the German military policy. Whether the crimes of a barbarous or a civilized age are the more heinous is still an open question, for it is impossible to dismiss the proved instances of rapine and outrage as deliberate lies or old wives' tales. These are not the incidents of a brutal game; they are part of a deliberate policy. Of the Prussian soldiery of 1870 Lord Acton writes: "They entered France with the order and discipline of troops on parade. The ripe grapes were being gathered as they passed the vineyards of Champagne, and not a soldier trespassed. No French women were insulted by the invaders. A hungry English gentleman having picked an onion in a garden was very much surprised to find himself marched off under arrest. Another well-known Englishman took charge of a church which was filled with wounded from Metz, and immediately ordered the woodwork of the seats to be used for beds. The Prussian officers were horrified at this interference with the rights of property. My friend replied that Church property was fitly employed for the comfort of dying men, but the Prussians would not hear of it. In the country houses they occupied round Metz they hung up at the door of each room an inventory of the objects within."

On 18th January, 1871, William I of Prussia was proclaimed German Emperor in the Salle des Glaces, at Versailles. In the previous November the South German States had joined the Northern Confederation. By the formal treaty of peace signed in May at Frankfort, France ceded German Lorraine with Metz and all Alsace with the exception of Belfort. She paid, in addition, an indemnity of £200,000,000.

William I becomes German Emperor.

Cession of Alsace-Lorraine.

The unity of Germany had at length been accomplished by

the warfare of Prussia. The best years of Bismarck's life had been given to achieve this end. His remaining years were devoted to the maintenance of peace and the consolidation of the new empire. There is no clear sign in his acts or words that he would have approved of, or striven to promote, the ideal of a German *World* Empire, a colonial and therefore naval supremacy based upon sheer force of arms. He had, indeed, employed the sword as a means to a reasonable and clearly defined end. "Deutschland über alles" and a mission of Kultur to a benighted Europe he would have condemned as dangerous folly, which could only lead to national defeat at the hands of a European coalition. The rôle of a Louis XIV or a Napoleon had no attractions for him. On the contrary, he declares: "Germany is perhaps the single Great Power in Europe which is not tempted by any objects which can only be attained by a successful war. It is our interest to maintain peace, while without exception our Continental neighbours have wishes, either secret or officially avowed, which cannot be fulfilled except by war. We must direct our policy in accordance with those facts; that is, *we must do our best to prevent war or to limit it.* We must reserve our hand and not allow ourselves before the proper time to be pushed out of a waiting into an active attitude, by any impatience, by the desire to oblige others at the expense of this country, by vanity or other provocation of this kind. . . . It had always been my ideal aim, after we had established our unity within the possible limits, to win the confidence not only of the smaller European States, but also of the Great Powers, and to convince them that German policy will be just and peaceful."

He is very emphatic as to the danger of a hot-headed military caste "under a monarch whose policy lacks sense of proportion and power to resist one-sided influences". Unlike Treitschke and Bernhardi, he never regarded war as an end in itself; rather with Mommsen he would exhort his people to "have a care lest in this State which has been at once a power in arms and a power in intelligence, the intelligence should vanish, and nothing but the pure military State should remain". It was not of himself alone that he thought when he wrote: "Former rulers looked more to the capacity than the obedience of their advisers; if obedience alone is the criterion, then demands will be made on the general ability

of the monarch which even Frederick the Great himself would not satisfy, although in his time politics, both in war and peace, were less difficult than they are to-day". And this, too, was the danger of Bismarck's own contempt for Parliamentary government.

His genuine desire for peace explains much of his unwillingness to embark on a far-flung colonial development. His opinion of the German colonist is instructive. He sees the defects of the system so clearly. He sees, too, that the British system owes far less to luck than to good management. He makes no assertion of the decadence of our Imperial power, nor does he pretend to see the superiority of the sergeant's and slave-driver's methods which were nearly all that the German colonial authorities achieved. He faces facts steadily: in him is no "vaulting ambition which o'erleaps itself".

Enough has been said to show the qualities to which Bismarck owed his great triumph. In 1888, the grandson of William I ascended the Imperial throne. He promptly dropped the pilot (1890) and eight years later Bismarck died. Later German statesmen displayed little but the defects of his qualities. He had made the path straight; his successors lost their way upon it.

And yet, when all is said, while the aims of the Great Chancellor appear sane and legitimate in contrast with those of his successors, against him there remains the indisputable fact that the means whereby he attained those ends were ruthless and utterly devoid of moral scruple. In the list of Prussian political infidelities, from the rape of Silesia in 1740 to the violation of Belgian neutrality in 1914, the editing of the Ems telegram must be included. Bismarck triumphed where the lesser men who followed him failed. That fact must not allow his cynical disregard for political morality to be forgotten.

IMPORTANT DATES

1819–44. Zollverein.
1848. March, Revolution in Berlin.
1861. Accession of King William I.
1862. Bismarck, Minister-President.
1864. The Danish War.
1866. "Six Weeks' War" with Austria.
1870–71. Franco-Prussian War.
1871. William I, German Emperor.
1888. Accession of William II.

For List of Books for Reference see Appendix I

CHAPTER IX

The Making of Italy (I)

We have seen that 1870 was the birth-year of a great European Empire. In that same year "Italy", which, like "Germany", had been for centuries a mere geographical expression, became a united kingdom.

Geographical factors.

The destiny of a nation still depends in large measure on its geographical position. This was obviously true in the infancy of mankind, when life was a dour struggle for existence and man naturally followed the lines of least resistance. And even in an age of applied science, which has helped to make man master of his fate, History must still be interpreted in terms of Geography. We cannot think of Britain apart from the sea, or Switzerland apart from the mountains, or France and Germany without reference to the Rhine frontier. Still less can we understand the age of commercial expansion and competition in which we are living, without reference to the climatic conditions of those distant portions of the world on whose fertility of crops and wealth of minerals the Powers of Europe depend for their supplies of raw material. Without such reference we are powerless to explain why Germans looked from Berlin to Basra, or why Russia travelled from Petrograd to the Pacific. Nearly all our modern problems are at base economic, and economic problems arise from primary geographical facts. We cannot explain everything by Geography, but we can explain very little without it.

When we turn to the map of Italy we find certain physical factors which help to explain why she attained her unity so late in time.

In the north the great mountain masses of the Alps form indeed a natural frontier, but they are not, like the Pyrenees, a barrier impassable save at either extremity; the main passes were practicable for the march of troops from the day of Hannibal to the day of Napoleon.

Again, the peninsula is very long and very narrow, and the

spine formed by the Apennines makes for separation of small States rather than for unity. The coast line is enormously long in proportion to the total area of the country and its resources of wealth and population. We should therefore expect to find that Italy has been frequently invaded, that she has tended to split up into a number of small and mutually hostile States, and that she has therefore constantly fallen a prey to the greed of more powerful neighbours, such as the Austrians and French.

There are other contributory causes. The system of city-States was the popular product of Greece and Rome. The nation-State, as we know it, was entirely alien to their political genius. It was natural for independent republics to arise in Genoa and Venice. Then the Pope, who ruled as temporal prince of a large domain, was bitterly opposed to the creation of a rival "Italian" monarch. To keep the States divided, even by the introduction of foreign troops, was the keynote of his policy. Thus Italy, divided against herself, became the bone of contention for centuries between the rival powers of France and Austria. Alone in the fifteenth century Machiavelli, soldier and political philosopher, looked forward to the expulsion of the foreigner and the formation of a united State. The Golden Age of "Italy" was due to the sea-supremacy of Venice and Genoa, which "kept the gorgeous East in fee", until Diaz, rounding the Cape, and da Gama, reaching India by sea, substituted oceanic trade for Mediterranean, and ruined the Italian cities for ever. The glory of sixteenth-century Italy consisted not in material or political strength, but in the amazing achievements, scientific, literary, and artistic, which we call the Renaissance.

Living on past glories and the magic of a name is hungry work, especially before the age of Thomas Cook and the American almighty dollar. The caretaker of an ancient castle containing priceless manuscripts and works of art is not usually a man of means. He has not even the pride of ownership. He is dependent on the good graces of his master. It was just so with Italy. From the fall of old Rome in the fifth century, down to 1870, she never knew what it was to be a united nation. She was rich (until she was robbed), she was beautiful,

she was defenceless, because the members of her household spent in jealous bickering the energy they should have devoted to the repairing and manning of her castle walls.

Partitions of Italy.

In the sixteenth century the great House of Hapsburg occupied the fertile northern plain of Lombardy and the kingdom of Naples. By the eighteenth century the Austrian branch of the family still gripped the north, while Sicily and Naples were the appanage of the Hapsburg-Bourbon Kings of Spain.

"Italy" in eighteenth century.

Look at any map of Italy before the time of Napoleon and you will find a mosaic of States. On the north-west lay the little buffer State of Piedmont (to which belonged the island of Sardinia), whom geography condemned to depend for existence on the toleration of greater Powers. A "key" State, like the Netherlands and modern Serbia, she was powerless to help herself. This little State—a kingdom since 1713—was ruled by the House of Savoy, whose princes showed surprising astuteness in playing off one Power against another. Of Italian-speaking States it was by far the most peaceful and prosperous. It proved to be the Brandenburg, if not the Prussia, of Italy.

To the south lay the Republic of Genoa and the tiny State of Lucca. In the north centre the Duchy of Milan belonged to the Austrian Hapsburgs. East lay the Republic of Venice. Immediately to the south of Milan and Venice lay the small States of Parma and Modena, while farther south again was the larger State of Tuscany. All these three States were governed by Hapsburg princes. Central Italy from sea to sea was the patrimony of the Pope. In the south lay the Spanish Bourbon kingdom of Naples and Sicily. That is the picture presented by Italy at the end of the eighteenth century.

Napoleon's unifying work.

What sowed the seeds of patriotism and raised a harvest of devotion to an ideal of unity from such unpromising soil? It is the force of ideas that moves the world, and with the American and French Revolutions came the ideals of self-government and individual liberty. Napoleon, as general of the French Republic, was hailed as a liberator when in 1796 he entered Milan. Austrian Lombardy became part of the

CONFEDERATION OF THE RHINE
Scale of Miles
0 50 100 150
SWITZERLAND
AUSTRIA
Illyria
KINGDOM OF ITALY
Milan
Turin
Venice
Trieste
BOSNIA (Turkish)
Genoa
ADRIATIC SEA
Florence
CORSICA
KINGDOM OF NAPLES
Rome
Strait of Bonifacio
Magdalena I.
TYRRHENIAN SEA
Naples
KINGDOM OF SARDINIA
S. Pietro I.
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
Palermo
KINGDOM OF SICILY
Syracuse
Malta
ITALY
under Napoleon
French Empire
Napoleon's Kingdom of Italy
Kingdom of Naples

Cisalpine Republic. In 1804 Napoleon established his "Kingdom of Italy", which, while it disappointed the hopes of freedom raised by the Revolution, suggested the ideal of unity by a partial illustration of its feasibility. As he had done in Germany, Napoleon welded the separate States together, and so laid the foundations of modern Italy. As the Revolutionists would "force men to be free", so Napoleon by a strange irony evoked that invincible spirit of nationality which in the end destroyed him.

When his empire fell the Vienna Congress reconstructed the map on the old eighteenth-century patchwork plan, the States being restored as far as possible to the same owners. Kings and emperors must know best what is good for their subject-peoples. Their methods were to be modelled on the patriarchal system of Old Testament times. If the subjects of the King of Naples or the Emperor of Austria lacked the "culture" necessary for the appreciation of the parallel, they had only themselves to blame.

The Congress of Vienna.

But the spirit of liberty lived through all persecution. For fifty-six heroic years the fight for unity and freedom was maintained, till in 1870 the King of Italy entered Rome, his natural capital. Rome, venerable storehouse of mighty traditions, became the first city of the youngest nation.

The making of Italy was the life-work of four great men. Great crises generally produce great men, whether soldiers or statesmen. Unhappy the country in time of need whose government, or want of it, fails to find its Dictator, or, having found him, fetters his freedom of action.

Foremost of a host of devoted patriots stand four great men:

> "We think of those
> Who blew the breath of life into her frame
> Cavour, Mazzini, Garibaldi: Three:
> Her Brain, her Soul, her Sword, and set her free
> From ruinous discords with one lustrous aim."

And the list is incomplete without the name of her most gallant king, Victor Emmanuel.

Never before, perhaps, had there been three men who, setting before them the attainment of the same end, differed so

profoundly in the means they wished to adopt, as did Mazzini, Garibaldi, and Cavour. But as

> "Many things, having full reference
> To one consent, may work contrariously:
> As many arrows, looséd several ways,
> Come to one mark; as many ways meet in one town;
> As many fresh streams meet in one salt sea;
> As many lines close in the dial's centre;
> So may a thousand actions, once afoot,
> End in one purpose, and be all well borne
> Without defeat."

Mazzini, the prophet and dreamer, Garibaldi, the impetuous and undaunted leader of forlorn hopes, Cavour, the subtle statesman and patient diplomatist, and, over all, the "Re Galantuomo", every inch a king—each with his special gift was needed to create the Italian Commonwealth.

There were many fruitless attempts to break the bonds of tyranny. Especially in the south there were many ardent patriots who risked exile and death, or the living death of the dungeon, in the name of liberty. Secret societies, of which the Carbonari was the chief, met in the depths of the forests at dead of night to whisper the name of Italy. But they had no concerted plan, no constructive policy. In 1820–1 risings in Naples and North Italy were cruelly put down.

It will simplify the story if the several aims of these great makers of Italy are grasped here, for to do full justice to each we must study their work as far as possible apart. Each, we remember, in his own sphere was indispensable. Mazzini and Garibaldi at first looked for a republic. Cavour worked unceasingly for a monarchy represented by the House of Piedmont-Sardinia in the person of King Victor Emmanuel.

Garibaldi's fighting zeal, undiluted by diplomatic sense for the timing of a *coup d'état*, brought him later into armed conflict with the forces of King Victor; yet there never lived a man in whom the fire of patriotism burned more brightly.

There are two dates fraught with special significance in the first half of the century. These are 1830 and 1848. The first saw a Revolution in France; the second brought Revolution

throughout Europe. Both had profound influence on the Italian movement. After 1848 we may take as landmarks the years 1859, 1860, and 1870, when the unification was finally completed.

The work of Mazzini is concerned chiefly with the movements of 1830 and 1848, when he shared with Garibaldi the perils and glories of a losing fight.

The career of Cavour may be said to reach its zenith with the success of his policy in 1858–60.

In 1860 the heroic figure of Garibaldi holds the stage supreme and alone. By the end of that year his greatest glory was achieved. Henceforward the brain of the diplomat rather than the hand of the soldier was needed to complete the work. In the closing scenes there was no part in which Garibaldi could display his real genius. The impetuous man of action could not control "the whirlwind of passion" nor "acquire a temperance that may give it smoothness".

To an observer of Italian affairs in 1830 the prospect of liberty and union must have seemed remote. A twofold tyranny hung like a cloud over the land. From without, to the north and south were Austria and the kingdom of Naples; within, there was the despotic sway of the Pope and the petty princes.

At this stage the work of Mazzini began. Without him Italy might have remained under the cloud. He brought and inspired a burning faith that no adversity could quench—a faith in the future "Italy" at a time when "practical" men could see no glimmering of hope. The Carbonari were true patriots, but they were hopelessly unpractical and provincial in their outlook. To Mazzini alone was given the inspiration and the power to unite and concentrate their strength. This he did by the formation of "The Association of Young Italy". His single-hearted devotion to the cause, the purity of his motives, and his sacrifice of self gave him extraordinary influence over his followers. He had strong personal magnetism; he was a brilliant writer and an eloquent speaker. Like Loyola in a different cause his whole strength of mind and body was spent in one endeavour. The man who chooses one road and never deviates from it is likely to travel far. In his student days at Genoa he decided to give his life to the work of liberation. His resolve to dress always

in black, as in mourning for his country, was made at the same time. Joining the Carbonari he soon became an object of suspicion. He was described by the Piedmontese authorities as "a young man of talent, very fond of solitary walks all night, and habitually silent as to the subject of his meditation, and the Government was not fond of young men of talent, the subject of whose musings was unknown to it".

He was promptly seized and imprisoned in a fortress, and for the rest of his life he was a marked man; only at his peril could he set foot again in his own country. He sought shelter in France, in Switzerland, and in England,[1] his exile embittered by abject poverty. His privations shattered his constitution, but nothing could diminish his enthusiasm for the cause of Italy. His "Young Italians" were as devoted to him as his Jesuits to Loyola. Fired by his example, they spread his doctrine of faith with amazing rapidity. They kept closely in touch with him, and in the ten years from 1838 to 1848 the longing for independence steadily widened and deepened. King Charles Albert, of Piedmont-Sardinia, was openly sympathetic, and in 1846 the election of Pius IX as Pope was hailed as the dawn of a new era. Mazzini, ready to sacrifice his republican views in the great cause, did not hesitate to exhort both king and Pope to take the lead in a national crusade. What mattered the means so long as they achieved the end?

In March, 1848, came the news that Revolution had broken out in Vienna, and that Metternich, the great oppressor, had been forced to flee. All Italy was stirred, from the Alps to Messina. Now, if ever, it seemed that the time had come to strike hard and strike together. As Napoleon had done in Spain, the Austrians in Lombardy felt for the first time the force of a truly national resistance. They evacuated Milan after five days of fierce street fighting, during which they were disheartened by the incessant clanging of the church bells. In Venice a simultaneous rising under Manin was equally successful. After some delay Charles Albert, to whom were now attached Parma and Modena, declared war. Tuscany followed suit. A contingent was sent from the Papal States in defiance of the Pope, who shrank from offending Austria. Had the South responded with like readiness, all Italy

[1] In London he kept a night-school for young Italian organ-grinders.

would have been at one. But the tide of success ebbed very rapidly. Charles Albert handled the campaign with indecision, and failed to follow up the Austrians. The Italians had to pay the penalty of their past history. Hastily-raised, inexperienced troops, many of them volunteers, however heroic, were no match for the seasoned regulars under the able command of the veteran Radetzki. Charles Albert was outwitted and outfought at Custozza, and again, in 1849, at Novara. In despair he abdicated. A true patriot, he was incapable of resolute decision in action. His subjects named him *Tentenna* ("The Hesitating"). Victor Emmanuel II, his son, was a man of tougher fibre.

The lesser States were easily reconquered; Manin defended Venice to the last gasp. The situation in Rome needs more attention, since it brought together Mazzini and Garibaldi, both of whom had hurried from exile to share the glory and disaster of the Lombard rising.

Garibaldi was now to embark on the first of the wonderful enterprises which made his name resound through Europe. His previous life had been one long preparation for the part he was to play in the creation of modern Italy.

He was born at Nice in 1807. Like Mazzini, he was born a patriot, and like him suffered many years of exile. From his earliest years we see him encircled by a halo of romantic adventure. The years from fifteen to twenty-five were spent at sea in the merchant service. The story of his voyages in the Levant teems with exciting episodes. "It was a world of which Scott or Stevenson would love to tell enchanted tales." He voyaged "in the seas of old romance, of pirates, Turks, and revengeful Giaours with long guns and knives and fierce dark faces". Thrice was he captured by pirates. As the captains of Nelson's day found in the Mediterranean the station for honour, so in Levantine waters Garibaldi learned to live dangerously, to dare and do all that may become a man. There too he learnt his passionate devotion to the cause of Italy. "He believed in Italy as the saints believed in God."

What may be called this sea-apprenticeship, of a man who was from first to last a man of action, ended abruptly in 1834, when he attached himself to Mazzini's party of Young Italy. He soon

became a marked man: sentence of execution was actually passed on him. Finding no choice between death at home and exile abroad, he sailed for America in 1836. First in Rio Grande and then in Uruguay, campaigning in the vast prairies and forests, he cultivated guerrilla warfare until he achieved perfection. If to wring conspicuous successes out of the slenderest resources in men and material be the mark of a great leader, then Garibaldi must be reckoned the greatest guerrilla leader of all time.[1] In the midst of perils by land and water he met and married Anita Ribera. For ten years she was to share his worst hardships, and at the last, when his fortune had ebbed very low, and, hunted down, he fled through Italy in '49, though sick unto death she refused to leave him, and died in his arms.

His fame and that of his Italian legion had long since spread to Europe. The great year of Revolutions, 1848, marked the end of his first exile. With a handful of followers he sailed from Montevideo and landed at Nice.

The events of 1849 at Rome would alone suffice to make the name of Garibaldi immortal. Louis Napoleon had at first dispatched nearly 10,000 men to restore the Pope, upon whose future goodwill he counted. Garibaldi was charged with the defence of the city—a hopeless task. Of the troops at his disposal very few were seasoned, and the French were soon reinforced to nearly 20,000 men. Yet throughout June, 1849, the defence held out. Garibaldi, who had no chance in such a cramped position of displaying his peculiar genius, made up by reckless daring what he lacked in tactical science. His was the same spirit that had prompted another national hero, if need be, to die in the last ditch. Against his better judgment the walls were held to the last gasp, since Mazzini insisted that Rome's example was necessary to fortify the rest of Italy. Even when the positions on Mount Janiculum,

[1] Another great natural fighter who had matured his art off the coasts of South America was Cochrane, Lord Dundonald. Between the two men there is a certain likeness: in both the same great physical strength; in both the same impatience of the rule for the rule's sake, the same fertility of invention; the same *flair* for forlorn hopes and heavy odds; the same insensibility to the craft of statesmen and politicians; the same knight-errantry in the cause of the desolate and oppressed. In one respect their careers were different. Cochrane never had the fortune to assume high independent command. Garibaldi's name is illuminated for ever in the pages of modern history by the defence of Rome and the march of The Thousand, even as his statue stands proudly forth on the Janiculum, watching the city and the people he had loved and fought for, and whose freedom his spirit still defends.

where the last stand was made, were shattered, and the French guns threatened the heart of the city, Garibaldi had still no thoughts of surrender. On the night of 2nd July he led some 4000 men eastwards from Rome to begin the most amazing retreat then recorded in the annals of war. "Wherever we go," he said, "there will be Rome." Hemmed in by French, Spanish, and Austrian armies, dependent for supplies on what he could carry or drive, weakened by desertions, exhausted by the difficult traverse of the Apennines, he reached the Adriatic near Ravenna. The use he made of mounted scouts enabled him to escape the net that was spread for him. On 2nd September, 1849, having doubled back across Italy, once more an exile, he sailed in a fishing-boat from a Tuscan port. After a sojourn of six months at Tangier he left Europe for the United States.

With his departure coincided the fall of Venice, desperately defended for a year by Daniel Manin, a patriot cast in the same heroic mould.

Mazzini, who had remained in Rome till the entry of the French, was suffered to depart unmolested for fear of the people.

On this note of failure Mazzini's active share in the work of unification came to a close, though his quickening spirit continued to inform the movement. Most of his remaining years were spent in England, which, though not his country, he came to regard as his real home.

It was not the fault of Mazzini that the States of Italy were not yet ready for complete unity. The failure of 1848–9 was due to Charles Albert's indecision, the clashing of monarchical and republican opinion, and, above all, the problem of the Papal States, which kept the North and South apart. Mazzini had neither the worldly wisdom nor the diplomatic gifts requisite for the solution of these problems. He had stirred the soul of a people out of apathy and torpor. That is why his name can never die.

IMPORTANT DATES

1804.	Napoleon's Kingdom of Italy.
1848.	Revolution, Battle of Custozza.
1849.	Battle of Novara.
	Defence of the Roman Republic by Garibaldi.
	Abdication of King Charles Albert.

CHAPTER X

The Making of Italy (II)—Cavour and Garibaldi

The Italian bid for liberty in 1848–9 was crushed with frightful severity. In the north, Austria restored peace by dint of brutal floggings and numerous executions. In Naples and Sicily, King Ferdinand established a reign of terror described by Mr. Gladstone as "the negation of God erected into a system of government".

From the year 1851 dates the active sympathy of Great Britain for the oppressed Italians. Hitherto, although there was widespread sympathy for the homeless exiles and a strong Liberal antipathy to tyrants, whether lay or clerical, the British Government was averse from taking sides. Now, when Mr. Gladstone, while travelling in Italy, saw for himself the unspeakable horrors perpetrated by the Neapolitan rulers, and on his return to England published what he had seen, sympathy hardened into a definite policy of supporting Italy by ensuring her a fair fight and freedom from foreign attack.

Sympathy for Italy in Great Britain.

This attitude of Great Britain proved invaluable when the struggle was renewed. The policy of Palmerston and Lord John Russell must be reckoned as contributing to the ultimate success of the Italians. That they were actuated often by fear of French aggrandizement does not diminish the fact. The moral weight of British sympathy was a great encouragement to the makers of Italy, and meant more, in the long run, than the armed intervention of Napoleon III.

Although, after the failure of 1849, tyranny had returned, and the future looked black, the new King of Piedmont-Sardinia did not share his father's despairing views. His was the type of character that disaster stimulates. He saw that victory would never be won on the old lines—however lofty the ideal, however earnest the will—so long as power, in terms of men and guns, was lacking. He set himself to nurse his nation through a period of convalescence. The day of the prophet was passing; the day of the

subtle statesman had arrived. At this stage the king called in Cavour to help him, and the whole atmosphere of the drama seems to change.

Men were looking wistfully towards the little kingdom in the north; it was clear that "Italy" must enlist the help of foreign friends. Only the king and his minister were capable of forming a foreign alliance. There would be no romance about such friendship. Italy must prove her merit by her own deeds, and must be prepared to pay her way. This was a business proposition as it appeared to a business man. That man was Cavour.

Cavour.

Like Mazzini and Garibaldi, Cavour was born a subject of Piedmont. He came of a small and intensely proud aristocratic stock, and it was natural that he should look for the salvation of Italy to a king rather than to a republic. Early in his career he saw that the first urgent need was economic and social reform. Piedmont must acquire wealth by agriculture and commerce, good laws, and a contented population. Only then could she hope for the sympathy and support of powerful allies. Cavour set himself to gain a sound first-hand knowledge of farming. He had everything to learn. "The habitué of the salon", he declares, "feels a certain repugnance for works which begin by the analysis of dunghills and end in the middle of cattle-sheds." He persevered, and travelled far to learn the newest and best methods abroad. He spent many months in Great Britain and Ireland. In London, he was constantly to be seen in the Strangers' Gallery at the House of Commons, where he studied and absorbed the intricate details of our Parliamentary system. He was deeply interested in such subjects as Free Trade and the Poor Laws. He saw in English institutions the model on which the new monarchy of Piedmont should be founded.

His chance came in 1850, when he was appointed Minister of Commerce and Agriculture. Two years later he became prime minister, and set on foot the reforms which would render the alliance of Piedmont worth consideration. Mazzini chafed at all delay; Cavour was content with small beginnings. Cavour was satisfied with a partial success where Mazzini's enthusiasm would have all or nothing. While Mazzini had the highest ideals,

Cavour was alive to the value of compromise. "Let us", he said, "do one thing at a time; let us get rid of the Austrians and we shall see." Unaided, this was beyond his powers, so he looked about him for allies.

In 1855 he took the bold step of sending 17,000 Sardinian troops to assist the Allies in the Crimean War. Though he had the whole Cabinet against him, the king was on his side. In a great speech Cavour defended his policy, pointing out how Italians, by their moderation, courage, and endurance, might merit the esteem and alliance of Western Europe. His apparent rashness was amply justified in the event. The conduct of the Italian contingent was admirable. As Cavour wrote to General La Marmora: "They had the future of Italy in their haversacks." The troops themselves were alive to their great opportunity. "Out of this mud", exclaimed a soldier in the trenches, "Italy will be made." And so it was. In the Congress at Paris, on the conclusion of the war, Cavour had won the right to speak for Italy. He was able to proclaim to the world the misery under which the several States, more especially the Papal dominions and the Spanish kingdom, were groaning. He ensured that the wrongs of Italy should be discussed; his next step was to secure an alliance.

Sardinian troops in Crimean War.

England, though sympathetic, remained true to her policy of non-intervention. It was easier to tempt Napoleon III. Italy recalled the origin of his family. Italy had seen the first signal triumphs of the Great Napoleon; his own prestige depended on successful war; territory might be gained in reward for his support. Papal displeasure must be risked. An attempted assassination by an Italian, who threw a bomb at his carriage, had the effect of hastening his decision. A formal alliance was made at Plombières in 1858, by which the emperor undertook to fight until Austria was beaten out of Italy. Lombardy, Venetia, and the Central States were to be joined to the kingdom of Sardinia. Savoy, and possibly Nice, was to be given to France. King Victor's daughter, Clotilde, was to marry Napoleon's cousin, Joseph.

Alliance with Napoleon at Plombières, 1858.

Cavour's task was now similar to that of Bismarck in 1870. He had to find a pretext for hostilities. When at the opening

of the Parliament at Turin, in January, 1859, the king declared: "We are not insensible to the cry of anguish which comes to us from many parts of Italy," his words were received with frantic applause. Volunteers poured into Piedmont from all parts of Italy. Austria demanded immediate disarmament, and war ensued (April, 1859). It lasted barely two months. The French supplied 100,000 men. On 4th June a great victory at Magenta cleared Lombardy of the Austrians, who retreated to the Mincio. Exactly three weeks later they were still more soundly beaten in a "soldiers' battle" at Solferino.

War with Austria, 1859.

Garibaldi bore his part with characteristic fire and resource at the head of some 3000 "Cacciatori" operating in the region of the Alpine passes and the Lombard lakes. He had returned from America to Nice in 1854, but had made his home in the little island of Caprera. When the fresh call to arms sounded he was at hand. Cavour, alive to the magnetic power of his name, gave him an independent command on the extreme left wing of the Allied armies. As in 1849, his surprise tactics baffled the Austrians, though, as then, he had obsolete muskets and no artillery. His little force of 3000 men was first across the frontier of the Ticino, in advance of the army that was pledged to redeem Lombardy.

Just at the moment when Austria was faced with complete defeat, Napoleon decided that he had done enough, and suddenly concluded an armistice at Villa Franca. Lombardy was ceded to Piedmont, but Venice was retained by Austria. The States of Italy were to be formed into a confederation under the presidency of the Pope. The simplest explanation for the sudden peace is to be found in the fear and suspicion with which Napoleon regarded Prussia. After Magenta, 250,000 Prussians were mobilized and moved towards the French frontier. Doubtless Napoleon acted wisely in his own interest, but the breach of faith towards his ally was unpardonable. Italy could not continue to fight alone, so Victor Emmanuel, like a wise man, decided to make the best of it. At least he had gained Lombardy. Cavour for once let his rage and disappointment get the better of his judgment. He reproached the king for accepting the treaty. He had counted on the union of all the Central States with Pied-

Peace of Villa Franca.

mont. But his work was not in vain, for in 1860 Parma, Modena, Tuscany, Bologna, and Romagna joined themselves by popular vote to the kingdom. The Parliament which met in that year represented 11,000,000 Italians. The price that Cavour had engaged himself to pay—no less than the cession of Savoy and Nice—raised a storm of indignation among the republicans led by Mazzini, while Garibaldi fiercely resented the cold-blooded stroke of statesmanship which "made him a foreigner". Estrangement between the two parties threatened ruin to the great cause that both had equally at heart. Fortunately a diversion arose which enabled Cavour to find work for Garibaldi which he alone was qualified to do. This was the liberation of Naples and Sicily in 1860.

When Napoleon III's adventure in Italy ended at Villa Franca, Italy was determined henceforward to do her own work. From 1860 onwards the lion's share in the unification belongs of right to Garibaldi. It is hard to see how the next stage could have been accomplished by other agency than his.

Francis II, nicknamed "Bombino", who succeeded Ferdinand ("Bomba") as King of Naples and Sicily in 1859, was weaker than his father in character and proved even more intolerable to his subjects. And yet Cavour dared not openly support a revolution for fear of offending France and Austria. It was Mazzini's part to stir up the rising and for Garibaldi (unofficially) to assist.

On 5th May, 1860, began the great adventure of "The Thousand".

Garibaldi and The Thousand, 1860.

The party sailed from Genoa in two steamers and landed at Marsala in Sicily under gun-fire from a Neapolitan warship. A well-directed fire on the disembarking "Red-Shirts" might have wrecked the expedition; as it was, the total casualties were "one dog wounded in the leg and one man in the shoulder". The Neapolitan naval commander, unnerved by the chance presence of a British sloop and a gunboat, jumped to the conclusion that they were instructed to intervene on behalf of Garibaldi, and delayed attack till he had ascertained their intentions.

The Thousand were safely landed. Then Garibaldi carried all before him. Against heavy odds he stormed the heights which

led to Palermo, took that large city, and by the end of July was master of Sicily. As usual, his firearms were insufficient and inferior; he depended on fierce rushes with the bayonet and the wonderful moral effect of his own leadership.

Conquest of Sicily.

Now strongly reinforced by volunteers from North Italy, he crossed from Sicily to the mainland, and, almost unopposed, entered Naples early in September. He determined to march straight on Rome, still garrisoned by French troops. Such a move would have been fatal, for Napoleon would assuredly have taken the field in defence of the Pope. Garibaldi was now the wrong man in the wrong place, and he could not or would not see the danger of precipitate action. The lion had the brains of an ox. The qualities by which he achieved the impossible on the battle-field were worse than useless in the lists of diplomacy. Unlike Cavour, he burned to reform his world in a moment; he could not endure to "stay the very riping of the time".

Occupation of Naples.

Victor Emmanuel and Cavour acted promptly. Anticipating Garibaldi's advance, they marched south and invaded the Papal States. Garibaldi was now forced to fight a severe defensive battle on the Volturno against the Neapolitans, after which he had to give up all idea of an advance on Rome. Meanwhile the army of the king swept on through Umbria and the Marches till nothing was left to the Pope except the Patrimony of St. Peter immediately surrounding the city.

Intervention of Victor Emmanuel.

In October Garibaldi met the king and hailed him as King of Italy. Side by side they drove through Naples. The southern kingdom was added to the north by almost unanimous vote of the people. The man who had been dictator and conqueror refused all honours and rewards and retired quietly to his island home at Caprera. His greatest warfare was accomplished. Though now past his prime, his spirit was proof against advancing age, and he played a characteristic part in the final act of union.

Cavour himself was not to live to see the completion of his life's work. He died in June, 1861. His patience, resolution and consummate statecraft entitle him to be named the Bismarck of his country. Without him there could have been no unity.

Death of Cavour, 1861.

Rome and Venice still remained without the pale. No persuasion could induce the Pope to resign his temporal dominions. The amazing conquest of Sicily and Naples was gained in face of the ill-concealed hostility of Austria, France, Russia, and Prussia. Their non-intervention was due in the main to the attitude of Lord John Russell, the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs. While public opinion was enthusiastic for the Italian cause, Palmerston and Russell were not disposed openly to espouse it. It needed the private representations of Hudson and Elliot, our ambassadors at Turin and Naples, to stimulate Russell to write his famous dispatch of 27th October. In it he announced that "Her Majesty's Government must admit that the Italians are the best judges of their own interests", and that "it is difficult to believe, after the astonishing events that we have seen, that the Pope and the King of the Two Sicilies possessed the love of their people. . . . Her Majesty's Government will turn their eyes to the gratifying prospect of a people building up the edifice of their liberties and consolidating the work of their independence."

Effect of British policy.

Cavour was not slow to acknowledge the value of this "moral support". He wrote to thank Russell for "the immense service he had rendered Italy". In a letter to his uncle from Rome, Odo Russell bears testimony to the same effect. "Ever since your famous dispatch of the 27th you are blessed night and morning by twenty millions of Italians. . . . The moment it was published in Italian, thousands of people copied it from each other to carry it to their homes and weep over it for joy and gratitude in the bosom of their families, away from brutal mercenaries and greasy priests."

Great Britain has cause to be proud of the statesman without whose "moral support" Italy could hardly have become a nation.

Cavour's idea of "a free Church in a free State" had no charms for the Vatican, and Venice was still an Austrian province. On 13th March, 1861, Victor Emmanuel assumed the title of King of Italy.

Victor Emmanuel, King of Italy, March, 1861.

In 1862 Garibaldi made a fresh attempt to attack Rome, only to find himself confronted at Aspromonte by Italian troops, who fired upon him as he tried to keep the peace. He was wounded in the foot by an Italian bullet and taken prisoner.

It was the Prussian alliance in 1866 that joined Venetia to the kingdom (p. 98). In the campaign of that year the Italian troops were badly led and suffered defeat at Custozza (June), and their fleet was beaten off Lissa in July. Sadowa redeemed Venice.

Venetia added to the Kingdom, 1866.

The Roman question alone remained. In 1867 Garibaldi and his volunteers tried again to enter Rome, only to be routed by the French at Mentana (3rd November). Garibaldi was carried off under escort to Caprera. His precipitate action only embarrassed the Government, for the fate of Rome had an international bearing; as the presence of French troops attested, it was not the concern of Italy alone.

It was nearly three years later when, on the withdrawal of the French garrison at the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War, the Italian army entered Rome (1870).

Rome the capital, 1870.

United Italy had at last risen to her feet; she had now to learn how to walk alone, to manage her own affairs. But she had to be content with small beginnings, for she was miserably poor, and needed a long period of peace to heal her wounds. Time alone could efface the tradition of separation of North and South; the sense of common ideals and interests is not created by Royal Proclamation or Act of Parliament. The Lombard business men had little in common with the peasants of Naples and Sicily. But time and the sense of comradeship begotten of perils shared in common have worked wonders. Italy has travelled far in a short time.

We have now briefly reviewed the main events of two great national movements, resulting in the creation of Italy and the German Empire. It is worth while, in conclusion, to note some difference in kind between the two. The unity of Germany was achieved by force and acquisition of foreign territory. The peoples of Slesvig and Alsace-Lorraine were Germans against their will. Within the frontiers of Italy there are none but Italians. She annexed no foreign territory. The several States *voted themselves* into union with the Kingdom of Piedmont. The fate of the smaller German States was decided, not by the vote of the people, but by the will of their sovereigns. Lastly, while Italy is ruled by a constitutional king, Germany was ruled by an irresponsible

Kingdom of Sardinia
1815-1859
FRANCE
SWITZERLAND
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY
TYROL
Carnic Alps
SAVOY
To France
1860
LOMBARDY
1859
VENETIA
1866
Trieste
ISTRIA
Fiume
Milan
Solferino
Custozza
Villafranca
Venice
Turin
Novara
Magenta
PIEDMONT
PARMA
1860
MODENA
1860
Genoa
Ravenna
BOSNIA
(Turkish)
To France
1860
Ligurian
Sea
LUCCA
1860
Nice
Florence
TUSCANY
1860
PAPAL STATES
MARCHES
Ancona
Castelfidardo
ADRIATIC SEA
CORSICA
(French)
Ajaccio
1870
Rome
Mentana
KINGDOM OF NAPLES AND SICILY
Str. of Bonifacio
Maddalena
Caprera
R. Volturno
Naples
1860
TYRRHENIAN
SEA
SARDINIA
Gulf of Taranto
S. Pietro
Isle
Cagliari
CALABRIA
Palermo
Messina
Aspromonte
MEDITERRANEAN
SEA
Marsala
SICILY
1860
IONIAN
SEA
Syracuse
C. Passaro
Malta
The Unification of
ITALY
1815-1870
English Miles
0 50 100 150 200

despot. So, in Italy we find the assertion of our twin principles, Nationality and Democracy; in Germany, an autocracy pledged to ignore their existence.

The year 1870 brings the Risorgimento (resurrection) period to an end. The story of the new kingdom now begins. Two troublous factors were inherited from the heroic period.

The new kingdom.

There was the anomalous position of the Pope; there was long-continued hostility to France.

It was easy to enlist foreign sympathy for the prisoner of the Vatican. First in France and then in Austria a strong party clamoured for the restoration of the Papal principalities and powers. No compromise was possible, for the Pope would not accept the olive branch held out by the Italian Government in the Law of Guarantees of 1871.[1]

Position of the Pope.

Partly from the Papal dilemma arose the Italian mistrust of France. Memories of Napoleon's duplicity and desertion, the loss of Savoy and Nice, the defeat at Mentana, were still fresh and bitter, and, even were they forgotten, the interests of the two countries clashed in the Mediterranean area. Englishmen familiar with their own far-flung supremacy at sea are apt to forget that Italy's future lies upon Mediterranean waters. Her natural path from poverty to prosperity was by way of commerce and colonies. She possesses to-day 1100 miles of seaboard, and no less than one-third of the Mediterranean population springs from Italian origin.

Mistrust of France.

After the disasters of 1870 France turned with equal urgency towards colonial expansion. She contemplated a vast North African Empire, the foundation of which had been already laid by the annexation of Algiers in 1830. In 1881 her occupation of Tunis aroused the keenest resentment of Italy, which looked upon Tunis and Tripoli as her own happy hunting-grounds.

Bismarck, of course, fomented these rivalries (just as he encouraged Anglo-French and Anglo-Russian jealousies in Egypt, Persia, and the Indian frontiers), as the best means of ensuring

[1] This Law of Guarantees defined the position of the Pope, giving him the privileges of a reigning sovereign, an annual revenue, and entire freedom of correspondence.

the isolation of France on the Continent. Thus, in 1882, Italy became a member of the Triple Alliance. Sheer necessity brought her into agreement with Austria, her inveterate enemy. It was a *mariage de convenance*, a business arrangement, and in no sense a reconciliation and union of hearts. Italy stood alone and helpless. Only by the aid of powerful backers could she compete successfully with France, or allay the fear of Austro-German intervention on behalf of the Pope. And so she was drawn into the orbit of the Central Powers. "Italy and Austria can only be allies or enemies."

The Triple Alliance, 1882.

Italy could never forget that the Austrian frontiers, fixed in 1866, were thrust forward in a great mountain salient frowning over the Lombard plains, nor that behind those frontiers some 390,000 Italians in the Trentino were still unredeemed from Austrian rule. About the same number were distributed in the provinces of Gorizia-Gradisca, Istria, Dalmatia and the city of Trieste. This was that "Italia Irredenta" of nearly one million inhabitants without which no patriot could call Italian unity complete.

Italia Irredenta.

Fortified by the alliance of 1882, Italy embarked on her colonial adventures. As the first step to an African Empire, Abyssinia was to be occupied, but the claim to suzerainty was not supported by sufficient military resources, and in 1896 an ill-equipped expedition against King Menelik met with disastrous defeat at Adowa. Italy withdrew her claims and had to be content with a much-restricted territory. She had burned her fingers badly, lost prestige, and squandered resources she could ill afford. She was out of conceit for a time with colonial enterprises. A tariff war with France and labour troubles at home added to her discomfiture.

Failure in Abyssinia.

From 1898 relations with France steadily improved, while, on the other hand, it became ever clearer that German "World-politics" and Austrian designs on the Balkans could bring no benefits to Italy, which, as a sea-power, must prevent the establishment of a strong rival on the eastern shores of the Adriatic.

Geography has forced the Near Eastern Question upon Italy. The position is clear when it is remembered that the western or Italian coast of the Adriatic is sandy and shallow, and, apart

from Venice and Brindisi, has very few natural harbours. Such a coast is not easy to defend. The opposite shores provide a wealth of natural harbours, such as Trieste, Pola, Fiume, Cattaro, and Valona. There are numerous bays and fiords flanked by a string of rocky islands. A naval power in possession of such bases must command the Adriatic. History shows that this has been the case. The Romans never felt secure at sea till they had made the Adriatic coasts their own. All through history we trace the marks of civilization conveyed from the west to the Illyrian and Dalmatian coast, and this despite the coming of the Slavs. In the fifteenth century Venice, at the height of her power, was mistress of the Adriatic. The Hapsburg influence, which dated from the acquisition of Trieste in 1382, and increased steadily after the seizure of Croatia in 1526, loomed ever larger. In the Napoleonic era all that remained to Venice became first Austrian and then French. Napoleon's creation of the "Kingdom of Illyria" had potently inspired a national ideal among the Southern Slavs. After 1815 the Austrians resumed their supremacy over the Adriatic.

The Adriatic.

In 1866 Italy gained the western but not the eastern shores. The Adriatic question still remained. The Balkan policy of Austria-Hungary and the consistent bullying of her Italian subjects completely estranged Italy.

So Italy was doubly interested: she had her own people to redeem; she had to safeguard her maritime position. In one policy alone Italy and Austria were agreed—the exclusion of the Southern Slav element from the Adriatic. To attain this, both States sought in Albania to develop trade, commerce, and education in their own interests. When, in 1912, the Serbians made their wonderful march across the snow-clad mountains to the sea, Italy and Austria insisted on their expulsion and the creation of an independent State.

As the plans of the Central Powers for the absorption of the Balkans became clearer, Italy grew more and more uneasy and her membership of the Triple Alliance more uncomfortable. Her attitude grew more independent. This was seen at the Algeciras Conference, but most

War with Turkey, 1911–12.

of all in the declaration of war (1911) on Turkey, the ally of Germany—a war which gained her Tripoli (1912), the last of the Ottoman dominions in Africa.

By her declaration of neutrality in 1914 Italy refused to recognize the War as defensive on the part of the Germanic Powers.

Neutrality in 1914.

When, in May, 1915, she formally quitted the Triple Alliance she abandoned an intolerably false position.

Italy joins the Allies, May, 1915.

By the secret Treaty of London, April, 1915, Italy had been promised the coast of Dalmatia, with the exception of Fiume. When the Peace Conference met in 1919, the Yugo-Slavs denied the right of Italy to land which was mainly occupied by a Slav people.

Then d'Annunzio seized and held Fiume, and war seemed probable. Fortunately great restraint was shown by the Governments on both sides, and a final settlement was made at the Treaty of Rapallo (Nov., 1920) when Italy gave up her claim to Dalmatia, with the exception of Zara, while Yugo-Slavia agreed that Fiume should become an independent State.

IMPORTANT DATES

1858. Cavour's Alliance with Napoleon III.
1859. Battles of Magenta and Solferino.
Peace of Villa Franca.
1860. Garibaldi's Conquest of Naples and Sicily.
1861. Death of Cavour.
March, Victor Emmanuel took title of "King of Italy".
1866. Venetia added to Kingdom of Italy.
1867. Battle of Mentana.
1870. Rome became the Capital.
1882. The Triple Alliance.
1911–12. War with Turkey.

For List of Books for Reference see Appendix 1

CHAPTER XI

The Rise of Russia

In the development of modern Germany and Italy we have watched the process of unification, the welding of a single national State out of a number of small, dissociated fragments. The history of Russia is very different. From the beginning of the eighteenth century we see a huge, single State, owing allegiance to an absolute monarch, extending its boundaries by means of foreign conquest.

Contrast with Germany and Italy.

The key to the political and social evolution of Russia is found to a great extent in her climatic and geographical conditions.

The simplicity and self-evidence of geographical facts tend often to obscure their immense significance. Mechanical and physical science have encouraged the complacent view that man is the master and Nature the slave. Yet Nature is ever renewing her claim, sometimes in a manner disconcerting to the best-laid schemes that applied science can devise. Not even a war lord can abide her frosts, still less her thaws. Rivers remain barriers, for bridges can be broken. The Alps remain a "natural" boundary. The fighting fronts are not selected blindly, without reference to the physical and contour map. One is tempted to assert that geography now exerts its influence chiefly *in* the ground or *under* the ground. Sea, soil, and climate remain the raw material from which scientific man constructs the complex, variegated web which is his history. This is a truism; perhaps that is why we are apt to forget it.

Geographical influences.

The grim struggle with Nature helps to explain why Russian progress, in the Western sense of that puzzling word, has been slow and painful. Much of the soil was poor, the climate rigorous, the population thinly distributed. Her most important rivers, running east and south, flowed into landlocked waters whose key was in enemy hands, others debouched into icebound northern ports. So she was severed from the Western world.

Her vast extent was as effective a barrier as the sea or mountains to the interchange of ideas. Few strangers ventured far into the interior, where stone, and therefore roads, did not exist. Only on the coast was foreign trade, the great carrier of ideas, conducted. It was natural that in the vast solitudes of northern forest and southern steppe, man, as a social animal and in the organized state, should be slow to emerge. Like some unwieldy mammoth Russia has groped painfully and blindly towards the attainment of national unity.

It was from over sea that the impetus came. In the ninth century the Norsemen, under Rurik, swept down upon the eastern Baltic, made Novgorod their capital, and, like the Normans in England, established order, central authority, and a dynasty of military chiefs. In the tenth century Greek missionaries brought Christianity and the beginning of the later close connection between Russia and the Eastern or Orthodox Church. The history of Russian civilization in the Middle Ages is largely the history of two towns—Kiev on the Dnieper, and Novgorod some 100 miles south of the modern Petrograd. Doubtless both owed their early importance to their positions on the primitive trade routes connecting the interior with the Baltic coast.

Coming of the Norsemen.

Kiev had become a great principality in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, chief among a number of minor feudal princedoms. Though he did not succeed in welding all these into a single national state, the Grand Prince of Kiev was head of a federation and enriched by a vast trade. The position on the Dnieper brought it into touch with the Black Sea and eastern empire. The capital city is said to have contained 400 churches and eight markets. Unfortunately this prosperity was based on slavery, so that class divisions, quarrels of princes, and migrations led to decline. In the thirteenth century Kiev fell a prey to the Tartar invaders.

The fortunes of "Old" Novgorod form a fascinating chapter in Russian history. Novgorod though nominally a principality was a city-State with republican institutions. Before the rise of Kiev, it had been the capital of early Russia, and when Kiev declined Russian life again centred round Novgorod. There we can

distinctly trace the sturdy democratic independence of a great commercial empire. The burgesses of Novgorod made short work of troublesome minorities and unpopular princes. The power of the people was a literal fact. The trade carried on at Novgorod in the thirteenth century was astonishing, and the city as a main centre of the Hanseatic League was famous throughout Northern Europe. The prosperity of Novgorod even survived the Tartar invasions.

These invasions in the thirteenth century wrought a complete change in Russian history; they led to the substitution of Moscow for Novgorod as the chief representative Russian State, and so to the establishment of absolute rulers whose aim was to build up a unified national State.

In the thirteenth century came the westward wave of Tartar or Mongol hordes. There was nothing in Russian geography to stop an invasion from the east. A second Attila, in the person of Chingiz Khan, rode roughshod by way of the southern steppes and imposed his barbarous yoke upon the infant Muscovy, which for 200 years suffered eclipse similar to that endured by the Balkan States at the hands of the Turks (Ch. XIV). Moscow, like Kiev and Novgorod, owed much to its geographical position. It had a central position where trade-routes crossed; it lay between the basins of the Volga and the Oka. But Moscow owed most to her princes. The princes of Moscow alone, like the Greeks of the Balkans, contrived by skilful intrigue to escape complete submersion. It was one of these princes, Ivan III, who, towards the end of the fifteenth century, shook off the Tartar yoke and first assumed the title of Tsar.

Tartar invasion.

Ivan III.

By the sixteenth century a definite Russian State had emerged. Ivan IV (1533–84), thrusting the Tartars back, extended his frontiers to the Caspian Sea by the capture of Astrakhan. His own authority he asserted by ruthless cruelty which earned him the title of "the Terrible".[1] The features of later Russian rule are clearly seen in his government. He aimed at expansion of territory and at tyrannical power.

Ivan IV, the Terrible.

[1] The search for a northern passage to the East led to the first trading intercourse between England and Russia. In 1553, Chancellor, voyaging north-about, visited Ivan at Moscow. An English "factory" was established where Archangel now stands. In 1557 a Russian ambassador came to London. Ivan IV himself was a suitor for the hand of Elizabeth.

Doubtless it was hard for him to do otherwise, yet upon him rests most of the responsibility for the foundation of Russian autocracy. In a fit of ungovernable temper he killed his eldest son, so that on his death, for some thirty troublous years the disputes of rival claimants threatened to undo his unifying work. In 1613 Michael, first of the House of Romanov, succeeded to the throne, and at this point the history of modern Russia begins.

The House of Romanov, 1613.

Henceforward two factors increase in importance: first, the ever-growing despotism of the Tsars; and secondly, the beginnings of something approaching a foreign policy.

Three elements in the infant State made for disunion and anarchy: these were the Boyars, or feudal nobles, the conservative Church, and the military caste called the Streltsi. A rough, modern parallel for these parties may be found in the Junkers, the State Church, and the military hierarchy of modern Prussia. The essential difference, of course, is that in Prussia these parties were the corner-stones of the Hohenzollern absolutism, while in Russia they were fatal obstacles to the centralizing policy of the Tsar.

Elements of disunion.

A ruler was needed endowed with force of character sufficient to destroy those centrifugal elements, and to bring Russia into line with the Western nations by "opening a window" looking into Europe.

Such a ruler was found in Peter, grandson of Michael Romanov, known in history as Peter the Great. He had little of the craft and subtlety of the Great Elector; in his elemental and savage singleness of purpose he has more in common perhaps with Frederick William I. His personality was compounded of generosity, shrewd judgment of his fellowmen, business capacity, barbarous excesses, and devilish cruelty. For good or evil, he knew his own mind, and would admit no half-measures. Both in home and foreign affairs he saw his policy very steadily.

Peter the Great, 1682–1725.

So long as she was barred from full and free intercourse with her neighbours, Russia must remain poverty-stricken and uncivilized. The acquisition of ice-free ports on the Baltic was, therefore, the keynote of Peter's policy. Such a

Keynote of his policy.

policy involved war with Sweden. The work of Gustavus Adolphus must be undone, and the Swede must give place to the Russian as the ice king of the north, for the Swedish provinces stood between Russia and the Baltic waters, and their ruler, Charles XII, had inherited a double portion of his ancestors' genius for war.

It was Peter's first task to train and equip a disciplined army on French and Austrian models. Then ships must be built, and the fine art of seamanship acquired. To attain these ends, and to gain the first-hand knowledge for himself, the Tsar paid lengthy visits to Germany, Holland, and England, while foreign experts were imported to instruct his subjects.

Army, navy.

He touched no department of state or social life that he did not reform. Education was promoted by the formation of engineering and commercial colleges. Industries and agriculture were fostered, women emancipated from their Oriental seclusion, the manners and customs of Western society introduced. These colossal changes he brought about by sheer brute force of character. There was nothing of the visionary in his outlook. Efficiency was his goal, and he startled his people into the attainment of it. His gospel of force was informed by no spiritual sanction. No other method could have awakened Russia.

Internal reforms.

In 1700 his new-model army was highly tested at Narva against Charles XII of Sweden, and failed. Peter himself expected to buy his experience in this campaign. Nine years of rigid training ensued, which bore fruit at Pultava (1709), where Charles met the fate common to most Western invaders of Russia. Aided by vastly superior numbers, Peter destroyed the bulk of the Swedish army. By the terms of the Peace of Nystadt, 1721, he finally secured the Baltic provinces, and with them the window looking into Europe.

War with Sweden, 1700.

Four years after the treaty Peter died, but the fruits of his tremendous energy survived. His system of despotism, combined with and conducted by a servile bureaucracy, took so deep a root that, although after his death the throne was occupied by women for wellnigh seventy years,[1] no revolution reversed his polity.

Death of Peter, 1725.

[1] Catherine I, Peter's wife, till 1727; (Peter II, till 1730); Anna, 1730–40; Elizabeth, 1741–62; (Peter III, 1762); Catherine II, 1762–1796.

The eighteenth century saw the beginning of the southward march of Russia at the expense of Turkey, which is the first phase of the Eastern Question. The nineteenth century saw the Turks minished and brought low, and the interference on their behalf of other Powers, who feared the ever-increasing advance of Russia.

Beginning of Eastern Question.

While expansion to the north and west brought Russia into collision with Sweden and Poland, her "national mission" lay to the south and south-east, with Constantinople as the ultimate goal. Eastwards, to the Ural Mountains and beyond, she was capable of almost indefinite expansion.

She had already asserted her power at the expense of Poland. Lithuania was the bone of contention, and by 1667 Russia had wrested from Poland the regions of the upper and middle Dnieper known as White Russia and Little Russia. After this Poland ceased to be a serious rival; she was destined to be the prey of her greedy neighbours.

The foreign policy of Peter the Great was directed mainly against Sweden. By the end of his reign he had set Russia in her place as the chief Baltic Power, and it was by way of the sea that Peter brought the brains, the arts, the sciences, the industries of Western Europe into Russia. And when he had schooled her with his iron discipline he left her unquestionably a first-class Power.

With Sweden out of the race, and Poland at the mercy of her neighbours, the Western Powers awoke to an uneasy recognition of the youthful Giant of the North, whose fighting weight was not to be ignored. The rise of Prussia—almost simultaneous—redressed the threatened balance of power.

From the death of Peter (1725) to the accession of Catherine II (1762) the Russian tide of expansion made ever more persistently towards the Turkish Empire.

A series of great Turkish wars gives unity to the Russian foreign policy of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. There was a religious and national element in these wars which was lacking in the dynastic struggles of France, the Empire, and Frederick the Great, and which was lacking in the Russian war against Japan.

Turkish wars.

The first object of these wars was to drive the Turks from the

Black Sea and convert it into a Russian lake. From this must inevitably follow the struggle for a free outlet for trade through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles.

Peter failed signally against the Turks. Azov, which he had taken in 1696, he lost again in 1711. A second war in 1739 was more successful—Azov was regained, and the frontier extended from the Dnieper to the Boug.

Then came the reign of Catherine II (1762–96)—perhaps the ablest woman who ever ruled a great empire. In her masculine strength of will and wide grasp of affairs she resembled our Queen Elizabeth, while in intellectual power she far surpassed her. Her reign saw the final extinction of Poland and the rapid decline of Turkey.

Catherine II, 1762–96.

In the matter of Poland, Catherine became one of three accomplices in the perpetration of a great crime.

Partition of Poland.

In extent of area Poland had been, until the rise of Russia, the largest kingdom in Europe. But her geographical position had been too hard for her; she had no natural boundaries suitable for defence against the encroachments of Prussia, Russia, and Austria. The nature of her government had increased this natural weakness. Nothing but a strong ruler, modelled upon the Tudor despots, could have saved the independence of the nation. But the boon of a strong executive was for ever denied her. The king was elective, not hereditary, and often a foreigner; the governing power was in the hands of a multitude of nobles, any one of whom was free at will to veto reforms of the constitution, however necessary. Feudalism in Poland was indeed a system. It was as if the development of the English constitution had stopped short at the death of Stephen. Three religions—Roman Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox—strove for supremacy. Commerce and finance were largely at the mercy of the Jews. And yet, despite all these dividing factors, Poland was *a nation*, with a strong pride of race, language, and a glorious tradition—a pride that still refuses to admit the grim fact of political extinction. The first partition of Poland (1772), for which Frederick the Great and Catherine II were chiefly responsible, was a great crime against the principle of free nationality. Doubtless they had a plausible excuse in discovering danger to their own

Weakness of the Polish State.

domains in the chronic disorders of their hapless neighbour, but that excuse is not sufficient to condone an act of deliberate robbery. Doubtless Frederick's portion of the spoil was Prussianized into a prosperity it had never before known. The same may be said of Alsace-Lorraine. Prosperity has not dimmed the national memory of Poland nor unlinked the spiritual hoops which "grappled" France to the soul of Alsace-Lorraine.

Russian acquisitions.

By the iniquitous compact of 1772 Poland lost about one-third of her territory. Of this Russia took the lion's share, embracing the rest of White Russia and of Livonia. But this was only a first instalment. The years 1793 and 1795 saw the total absorption of Poland, and Russia the greatest gainer of area. Of a total population of over 19,000,000 Poles, Russia claimed in 1914 nearly 11,000,000.

From Poland.

From Turkey.

In her contest with Turkey Catherine was almost equally successful, and far more legitimately. The Turks still blocked Russia's natural outlets on and around the Black Sea. In two wars Catherine annexed the Crimea and northern Kuban, seized the fortress of Oczakov, and pushed the frontier forward from the Boug to the Dniester. By the end of her reign, in 1796, nearly 220,000 square miles and 700,000 subjects had been added to her empire.

Russia and Napoleon.

During the Napoleonic Wars the Tsar Paul I joined in the Second Coalition (1798) but soon fell foul of his allies. An eccentric and irresponsible autocrat, he was easily persuaded by Napoleon to join the armed neutrality against Britain (1801). In that year he was murdered, and his son, Alexander II, soon realized the danger of Napoleon's ambitions. In 1805 he joined Pitt's Third Coalition, which crumbled into dust at Austerlitz. Disastrous defeat at Friedland in 1807 convinced Alexander that continued war spelt ruin, and the Treaty of Tilsit witnessed a complete change of front. Dazzled by Napoleon's flattery, the Tsar was persuaded to break with his old allies and join Napoleon in compassing the downfall of Britain by means of the Continental System. He was encouraged to seize Finland, which was surrendered by Sweden in 1809, thus completing the work begun by Peter the Great. But, above all,

he was urged to strike at Turkey, reminded by Napoleon that the Dardanelles was the key of Russia's house. Disillusionment soon followed: the seizure of Oldenburg, the property of the Tsar's brother-in-law, Napoleon's Austrian marriage, and most of all the Continental System, which impoverished Russia, impelled Alexander to break with Napoleon in 1811.

The Moscow expedition in 1812 ended in a great triumph for Russia, and in 1813 she shared in the decisive defeat of Napoleon at the Battle of the Nations.

For her notable share in the final defeat of the tyrant she was rewarded, in 1815, by the acquisition of the greater part of Poland. (See p. 81.) Finland also she retained.

As against Turkey, she was now in a very strong position. By 1812 she had regained Bessarabia and reached the Danube.

Relations with Turkey. Her strength and success now made her the object of the deepest suspicion to Western Europe. Though, side by side with Great Britain, her navy fought at Navarino (see p. 182) in 1827 for the liberation of Greece, henceforward the interests of the two empires clashed.

A splendid opportunity for interfering with the Turkish Empire came when Mohamed Ali, Pasha of Egypt, rebelled against his master, the sultan. In return for Russian assistance Turkey undertook to exclude from the Black Sea all warships hostile to Russia. This agreement, made at Unkiar-Skelessi (1833) virtually placed Turkey at the mercy of Russia and made the latter complete mistress of the inland sea.

From this vantage-point it was but a short step towards the Russian claim to protect all Christian subjects of the Sultan—

The Crimean War. a claim which led to the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1854. No war, perhaps, ever brought less solid and permanent results in return for its cost. By the terms of the Peace of Paris (1856) the integrity of the Sultan's dominions was guaranteed, the Black Sea and Danube were neutralized, and the Bosphorus and Dardanelles closed to the warships of all nations, Turkey alone excepted. The Sultan pledged himself to sweeping internal reforms and religious toleration. His pledges remained unredeemed and he showed himself a past master in the art of evading his liabilities.

What we have to note is the futility of the war, for it furnished neither a guarantee against future Russian aggression nor a working scheme of insurance against future Turkish misgovernment.

When England and France called a temporary halt to Russian encroachments on Turkey, Russia turned her eyes once more to Central Asia. Since the Great Powers barred the way to open waters in the north and south of Europe, she would seek her outlet in the Pacific by way of Siberia. There was nothing new in this adventure: as early as 1645 Cossack frontiersmen and pioneers had reached the Pacific, though not an ice-free port, at Okhotsk. But up to the middle of the nineteenth century this penetration had been unofficial; Siberia was merely a convenient dumping-ground for political prisoners and other criminals. After the Crimean War, negotiations with China resulted in the establishment of the Maritime Province with its port of Vladivostok. The steady colonization of Siberia followed the completion of the Trans-Siberian Railway in 1901. South of Siberia lay the vast desert wastes of Turkestan. Just as the Dervishes menaced the upper reaches of the Nile, so the fierce Turkoman nomads had it in their power to cut the great continental line.

Eastern advance of Russia.

In the course of forty years the Russians spread south-eastwards from the Caspian till they occupied Bokhara, Samarkand, and Khiva. In 1884 they reached the Merv oasis, within striking distance of the Afghan frontier, and in the following year an encounter with Afghan troops at Penjdeh brought Russia to the brink of war with Great Britain. Only by tact and forbearance on both sides was a boundary peacefully arranged. A commission was necessary in 1895 to define the boundary on the plateau of the Pamirs—"the roof of the world".

The menace to India, 1884–5.

This approach to within a few miles of the gates of India was the more disquieting to Great Britain inasmuch as it was accompanied by the rapid construction of the Trans-Caspian Railway.

In 1877–8 Russia fought yet another round of her age-long battle with Turkey. Again she assumed the rôle of saviour of the Christian Slavs. Again it appeared as a national war. Again, when the Turk was brought low, the

Russo-Turkish War, 1877–8.

Powers intervened to withhold the spoils from the conqueror. The fear of Russia carried more weight than pity for the martyrs of Macedonia. Russia, which regained the portion of Bessarabia ceded in 1856 to Rumania, remained at peace with Turkey until the outbreak of the Great War, though she watched with solicitude the interests of her brethren in the Balkan States.

IMPORTANT DATES

1533–84. Ivan the Terrible.
1613. House of Romanov.
1682–1725. Peter the Great.
1700. Battle of Narva.
1709. Battle of Pultava.
1721. Peace of Nystadt.
1762–96. Catherine II.
1807. Treaty of Tilsit.
1812. Napoleon's Moscow Expedition.
1833. Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi.
1854–56. Crimean War.
1861. Emancipation of Serfs.
1877–78. Russo-Turkish War.

CHAPTER XII

Russia and the Far East

Russia and China.

The ambition which had carried nearly 6000 miles of railroad across a continent brought Russia into close contact with China and Japan. Predominance in the Pacific could not be won without the consent, passive or enforced, of these two Powers.

China was already persuaded that submission to peaceful penetration on the part of Russia was her best guarantee against dismemberment by other rapacious "foreign devils". She had made the best of a bad job.

China looked back upon a civilization of immense antiquity. She wished to continue in the old ways, peacefully oblivious

of Western progress and Western ideas. She was intensely hostile to all changes or innovations. Very slowly and very unwillingly she was compelled by force of arms to open her ports to the persistent trading enterprise of France and Great Britain. From 1840 onwards treaty ports were conceded: in 1842 the island of Hong-Kong was ceded to Great Britain, and five ports, including Canton and Shanghai, were opened to British trade.

In 1860 the torture and murder of Europeans led to the occupation of Pekin and further concessions from China. Russia secured at the same time the Amour province and the port of Vladivostok. Then, for a time, reforms were introduced, but the mass of the people hated to be reformed, and reaction succeeded. The railways were demolished on the ground that the bolts which fixed the rails to the sleepers would injure the dorsal spines of the sacred subterranean dragons. China retired into her shell.

Strangely contrasted with the inertia of China was the amazing activity of her neighbour, the island Empire of Japan.

Rise of Japan.

There is no precedent in history for the marvellous transformation by which, in the space of twenty years, Japan advanced from a state of mediæval feudalism to the condition, political, military, and economic, of a Western European State. In size and geographical position, Japan stood to Asia much as Great Britain stands in relation to Europe. Her future expansion must depend on her relations with China. The doors must be opened and kept open. It was imperative for Japan to have the first option of the exploitation of China. The piecemeal absorption of the Pacific coast by Russia or by any other Powers would not only ruin the prospects of Japan, but actually imperil her control of her own waters.

Question of Korea.

The Chinese Government viewed with disgust the creation of the new Japan, and sharp contention soon arose over the administration of Korea.

Now Korea represented to Japanese eyes all that Egypt and Belgium have implied to Englishmen. As a weak, distracted State, with a listless people demoralized by centuries of misrule, she constituted a perpetual danger at the very doors of Japan. She could never be allowed to fall into the hands of a foreign

Power. That Russia was casting covetous eyes on the Korean ports was an open secret. China, which claimed the suzerainty, resented and obstructed all the efforts made by Japan to induce the Koreans to reform themselves. In 1894, when Japan proceeded to force a programme of reforms upon Korea, war followed with China. The Chinese made a gallant but ineffective resistance to the new-model Japanese forces. After the storming of Port Arthur (November) and Wei-hai-wei (February, 1895) China accepted the Peace of Shimonoseki, by which she ceded the Liao-Tung Peninsula, Formosa, and the Pescadores.

War between China and Japan.

All that Japan had gained was counted for loss by Russia. Port Arthur she had long marked out for her own. Not only was it an ice-free port, but its possession implied the domination of northern China. Professing anxiety for the integrity of China, Russia, Germany and France compelled Japan to surrender the Liao-Tung Peninsula. But solicitude for Chinese integrity was not for long allowed to stand in the way of Russia's designs. In 1897 these same three Powers were cynically disposing of the very spoils of which they had so arrogantly deprived Japan.

European intervention and acquisitions.

The murder of missionaries—an event which recurred in China with distressing frequency—lent colour to the annexation of the ports. Russia obtained a lease of Port Arthur, which she proposed to link up with the Trans-Siberian line. She had already arranged that the railway should run through Manchuria direct to Vladivostok. Germany took Kiao-Chau, with its mineral wealth, France obtained Kwang-Chow-Wan, and Great Britain occupied Wei-Hai-Wei.

After this spoliation the Japanese Government began quietly and resolutely to prepare for war. The immediate effect was seen in the outbreak of the Boxer Movement (May, 1900), a savage crusade against all foreigners and all Westernizing reforms. The movement spread over Northern China, and for two months the European legations were besieged at Pekin. Only concerted action on the part of the Powers involved sufficed to quell the uprising against the "foreign devils" (September and October, 1900). In 1901 China

The Boxer Rising.

signed a peace by which she agreed to pay a huge indemnity, to dismantle the forts round Pekin, and to ensure adequate protection for the lives and property of Europeans. The Powers in return guaranteed the integrity of China.

For Japan the fighting had furnished an opportunity of showing the high endurance and efficiency of her troops, who fought by the side of the European contingents. In 1902, she strengthened her position enormously by concluding an alliance with Great Britain which ensured that the coming war would be fought out without interference by other sea Powers: the navy of Japan would have a clear ring. If she were attacked by more than one Power, Great Britain was pledged to intervene on her behalf. On the other hand, this alliance was most useful to us, since it safeguarded our commercial position in the Far East, and enabled us to concentrate our naval strength in European waters. And, be it remembered, neither party to the alliance had any reason to love or trust Germany.

Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902.

The policy of Russia hastened on the day of reckoning. She made no secret of her intention to dominate the Far East. So far from respecting the integrity of China, she maintained a large force in Manchuria, and declined to evacuate that province without further concessions, though she had agreed by treaty to do so; she was converting Port Arthur into a formidable arsenal; she was assembling a Pacific squadron. When, by virtue of a concession to cut timber, she proceeded to trespass over the Yalu, on Korean ground which Japan counted as her special sphere of influence, war was inevitable. Negotiation broke down. On the night of 8th February, 1904, without declaration of war, the Japanese torpedoed Russian warships outside Port Arthur and landed their army in Korea.

Aggressive policy of Russia.

Russo-Japanese War.

The course of the war was an object-lesson in the working of sea-power. The Japanese obtained command of the sea and kept it. The Russians were heavily handicapped by sea and land by the immense distances that separated their bases from the battle-fields. Neither army nor navy were prepared: the High Command was irresolute; equipment was defective; commissariat often broke down. Nor was

National attitude contrasted.

the war a people's war. Few of the rank and file understood the cause for which they were called upon to fight. They were inspired and fortified by no religious or racial impulsion: the wonder was that they fought so well.

From the outset there was no question of a Russian offensive. Japan took the initiative, her objective being the capture of Port Arthur. Her troops combined high intelligence with reckless contempt for death. For them the war was a national war and their patriotism was their religion.

Importance of sea power.

The whole struggle turned on the command of the sea. To defeat the Russians in Korea and Manchuria, Japan must bring her armies over sea. She could only do this if the seas were cleared of the Russian squadrons. So it was the business of Admiral Togo to prevent these squadrons from getting clear of port without fighting a general action. Togo performed his task admirably, while the naval strategy of the Russians was faulty in the extreme. First, they made the mistake of dividing their Pacific Fleet between Vladivostok and Port Arthur, which gave the Japanese the advantage of an interior position; secondly, they kept the main body of their fleet under the guns of Port Arthur, forgetting that the primary business of a fleet is not to assist in the defence of a fortress, but to seek out and destroy the enemy's forces.

Defects of Russian strategy.

The best plan was to stake all on a general action at sea, to inflict as much damage as possible on the Japanese fleet, which had no reserves to fall back upon. The Russians did not adopt this plan and entirely failed seriously to interrupt the transport of the Japanese armies to Korea and Manchuria. In the end, the fallacy of the "fortress fleet" was exposed, since the Port Arthur squadron, weakened by torpedo attacks and mines, was compelled to quit the port as the Japanese closed in upon it from the land side.

The Yalu River.

With undisputed command of the sea, by decisive victory on the Yalu River Japanese armies swept Korea clear of the enemy, and were free to transport troops thence to the coast of Manchuria. By rapid and secret movements they disconcerted the Russians, much as a clever light-weight boxer outwits a clumsier though heavier man.

MONGOLIA
Harbin
RUSSIA
La-Perouse-Strait
Liao-ho
Yezo
Vladivostok
Mukden
Liao-yang
Peking
Tsugaru Strait
SEA OF
Wiju
Yalu R.
Port Arthur
Chinampo
Seoul
JAPAN
PACIFIC
Weihaiwei
Chemulpo
Kiaochau
YELLOW
SEA
Masampo
Fusan
Tokio
OCEAN
Tsu-
shima
Korea Strait
Shanghai
CHINA SEA
Sketch Map
to illustrate
The RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR
Scale of Miles
0 100 200 300 400

The railway north of Port Arthur was soon cut and the fortress isolated. By August the harbour became untenable for the warships, which put to sea, only to be defeated and scattered by Togo's fleet. The Russians strove desperately to raise the siege, and both sides lost very heavily. Still the Japanese crept forward. An heroic attempt to storm the whole position on 20th August was beaten back with a loss of over 15,000 men. The Japanese now settled down under command of Nogi to a regular siege of Port Arthur, covered by their main army, whose duty was to ward off Kuropatkin's attempts at relief. Two fierce battles, resulting in heavy losses to both sides, brought the Russians no nearer to raising the siege. All through the autumn the Japanese crept closer. Early in December, at great cost, they captured 203-Metre Hill, which commanded the town and harbour. On 1st January, 1905, General Stoessel surrendered the place, somewhat abruptly in view of his ample supplies of provisions and ammunition.

Siege of Port Arthur.

Fall of Port Arthur.

The main objective of the Japanese was now attained. It remained to deal with Kuropatkin's field army, which had failed to strike a decisive blow before Nogi's reinforcements joined the enemy. From 24th February to 10th March a terrific struggle raged round Mukden, which ended in the retreat of the Russians from that place and the exhaustion of both sides. The Japanese had over 70,000 casualties, the Russians lost about 60,000 killed and wounded, besides 25,000 taken as prisoners. It was becoming clear that the resources of Japan could not long support such Pyrrhic victories. In the long run her supplies of men and stores would be exhausted. And however successful she might be in battle, she had no means of inflicting a mortal wound on Russia. The position in the field was becoming a stalemate, since neither side seemed capable of striking the decisive blow.

Battle of Mukden.

The conclusion of the war was hastened by the arrival of the Russian Baltic Fleet and its annihilation at the hands of Togo in the Straits of Tsushima and the Sea of Japan on 27th May, 1905. Had the Pacific squadron taken the offensive with more vigour, Admiral Rozhestvensky's wonderful

Voyage of the Baltic Fleet.

voyage across half the world might have had a very different result. Togo's fleet might have been so weakened that his triumph at Tsushima would have been less signal; he might himself have suffered so severely that fresh reinforcements from Russia would have turned the scale against him. It was in the power of the Russians, and not of the Japanese, to send fresh ships. In the long run they might well regain the lost control of the sea. For this reason Rozhestvensky's voyage was justified even after the fall of Port Arthur, on the presumption, of course, that his sole objective was the infliction of damage on the enemy's ships.

The resulting battle ended in the annihilation of his fleet. He met in Togo a man of genius; his own force was in no condition to fight; he was hampered by anxiety for his coal-supply; and, above all, his prime objective was to make the port of Vladivostok and not to try conclusions with the opposing squadrons. Battle of Tsushima.

This great calamity hastened on the negotiations for peace. Neither side could look forward with confidence to a prolongation of the struggle. The resources of Japan were almost exhausted. On 5th September, 1905, the Peace of Portsmouth (U.S.A.) was concluded. Russia recognized the Japanese protectorate of Korea, evacuated Manchuria, and ceded to Japan the Liao-Tung Peninsula, including Port Arthur, and the southern portion of the Island of Sakhalin. Thus Japan became the preponderant power in the Far East. The Peace of Portsmouth.

For Russia the war had exposed the rottenness of her administration. As it had been after the Crimean War, so it was after Tsushima. Radical reforms followed hard upon national humiliation. Even before peace had been signed at Portsmouth, the Duma was convoked, and it seemed that a new era was about to dawn in Russian history.

The Internal Development of Russia.

It was neither possible nor desirable that the autocratic rule of the Tsars should be abandoned in a moment of time. This was not possible, because, as we have seen (p. 82), after the Congress of Vienna the Tsar, Alexander I, with all his humane and enlightened ideas, would relinquish no jot of his own divine right to "mete and dole unequal laws unto a savage race". Reforms must be made for the people, but never by them. Nor was it desirable that reform should come too quickly. The awful example of the French Revolution was a fresh reminder of the danger of entrusting a government to unpractised hands, and vast masses of the Russian population were utterly ignorant; their capacity for self-government was no more advanced than that of the English or French peasantry of the fourteenth century.

The Autocracy.

There was nothing complex in the constitution of Russian society. There were virtually only two classes: the Tsar together with his nobility and advisers, and the peasants. Of the latter nearly nine-tenths were serfs, bound to the soil and deprived of personal liberty. About one-half of these were the property of the Tsar, who disposed at will of the life, persons, and property of all his subjects. His will was expressed in imperial *ukases* and enforced by an all-powerful police.

The isolation of the Empire from Western nations, the extreme backwardness of the people, the rigid climate and vast distances, help to explain why Russian history has to record no Peasants' Revolt, except in Catherine II's reign, and, until 1861, no Charter of Liberties.

It was the Tsar Nicholas (1825–55) who first adopted a definite policy of terror to crush out the introduction of all liberal ideas. A great Polish rebellion in 1830 was ruthlessly suppressed. The strictest censorship was imposed on the Press and on all scientific and religious works. University education was scrutinized and limited.[1] In the schools a catechism like that of Napoleon was prescribed to inculcate Tsar-worship. No

Despotic measures.

[1] After 1848, the year of Revolution, the number of students in each University was limited to 300.

foreigner could enter nor Russian leave the country without a special passport.

In spite of all these despotic measures the craving for liberty and reform steadily increased. Its mouthpiece was the "Intelligenzia", the party formed by some of the noble families and educated "middle class". The writings of such men as Dostoievsky[1] and Tolstoi exposed in a lurid light the abuses and corruption under which the people groaned. Persecution was powerless to check the movement.

Rise of "Intelligenzia".

When the national disasters of the Crimean War were ascribed by the Liberals to the "bankruptcy of autocracy", a reforming Tsar in the person of Alexander II succeeded his father, Nicholas. He accomplished what his predecessors had only dreamed. No sooner was the Peace of Paris signed than he expressed his desire to free the enslaved peasants. A period of five years elapsed before the design was executed (1861), the main difficulty being the distribution of the land, which the noble landlords were unwilling to surrender. Freedom without land would simply mean freedom to starve. Ultimately, each peasant became a proprietor, the land itself becoming the property of the *Mir*, or whole community. Both peasants and Mir were jointly responsible for payment of an indemnity to the original landlord.

Alexander II and emancipation of serfs.

Alexander then turned his attention to governmental reform. In 1865 local councils, called Zemstva, were formed, the members of which were elected. These Zemstva elected members to a higher provincial council. These councils, which may roughly be compared to our County and Municipal Councils, albeit their range of activity was very narrow, did much useful work in the way of poor relief, hospital and sanitary organization, and education. They were a distinct, if short, step in the direction of responsible local government.

The Zemstva.

In the domain of justice, too, the Tsar showed his liberal tendency. In place of the old "Star Chamber" methods of secret enquiry, the courts of justice became public, and trial by jury was established for criminal cases.

This policy earned for the Tsar the name of "Liberator", but

[1] Dostoievsky was exiled to Siberia for reading forbidden books.

it did not extend far enough to satisfy the extreme reformers. With all his good intentions, Alexander II pleased nobody. He alarmed the old-fashioned "Government" party; he failed to satisfy the Liberals.

The Nihilists.

Then there arose a new party, known as Nihilists (Turgeniev's word). They were not numerous, and were recruited chiefly from the student class. They believed that the world could be reformed only by the total destruction of all past traditions, laws, and customs of government and society. All institutions hallowed by time must for that very reason be swept away as effete and corrupt. Nothing of the past or present must be permitted to survive. Beginning as a theory, like the Utopian dreams of Rousseau, Nihilism never took firm root among the people. Its preachers were limited to a few hundred fanatics, who, although they went to live among the peasants, never succeeded in uprooting the innate reverence for Tsar and Church. This extreme party hoped to compass their ends by resorting to terrorism. They believed that a series of murders would force the Tsar to concede all their demands. Military governors and police officials were therefore frequently assassinated. The crisis was reached at the end of the Russo-Turkish War, when the Powers intervened to deprive Russia of the fruits of her victory. In 1879 unsuccessful attempts were made to shoot the Tsar and to wreck the imperial train. In 1880 a portion of the Winter Palace was wrecked by dynamite, the Tsar again escaping uninjured. Punishment by death or exile only increased the terrorist movement. Alexander was persuaded to make some concessions in the direction of Parliamentary government. Something like a States-General was to be summoned to discuss the framing of a new Constitution. With reluctance Alexander gave his consent to this new policy. On the very day (13th March) that his ukase was to be published, a bomb was thrown at his carriage in Petrograd, and a second, which burst at his feet, inflicted fatal injuries. This senseless crime killed the cause of constitutional rule. Reaction set in, and lasted for another generation.

Terrorism.

Murder of Alexander II.

The new Tsar, Alexander III (1881–94), adopted the attitude of benevolent despotism. The natural loyalty of the peasants was

encouraged in every way. The "Intelligents", on the other hand, were subjected to a harsh régime. Russia was again to be cut off as far as possible from Western ideas. Her subject peoples—Finns, Poles, and North Germans—were to be deprived of all distinguishing marks of nationality. The whole people were to look for benefits and improved conditions to the Tsar alone. There should be no more talk of Constitutions.

Reaction.

At the same time conscientious attempts were made to improve the administration. Alexander III has some claim to the title of the "Peasant Tsar". The people were encouraged and aided to buy their lands. Relief works were established. The sale of vodka—the curse of the peasants—was restricted. In these ways the Tsar attached his people to himself, and to that extent discredited the influence of the Nihilists.

The "Peasant Tsar".

That the Empire acquiesced in his reactionary policy was due mainly to his own personality. Within his somewhat narrow outlook he was absolutely sincere in his desire to improve the lot of his people. It is certain that he undermined his splendid constitution by his unceasing personal toil in the work of government. The rôle of benevolent despot, presiding over the welfare of over 150,000,000 subjects, was too exhausting, and, like his predecessors, he lived in continual danger. He died in 1894, in his fiftieth year. *In his own way* he had done all that was possible to reforge the link which bound the Tsar to the people.

Nicholas II (1894–1917) had little of his father's commanding personality. He succeeded neither in purifying the bureaucratic administration nor in satisfying the ever-increasing demand for reform. The Industrial Revolution had now begun for Russia. Wealth was increasing; the Empire was expanding with the railway to the East. Coal and iron industries were developing fast. In addition to the peasants, a new class was arising—the working communities in the towns, who swelled the ranks of the reforming party and increased the outcry against the reactionary and despotic Government. The working men wielded a new and formidable weapon in the establishment of great strikes.

Industrial development.

The ten years of the reign of Nicholas II which preceded the

outbreak of the war with Japan were years which witnessed the slow but steady growth of a body of moderate public opinion, insistent on reform and self-government. What we call in England the "middle classes" were combined in "unions" to demand a share in the government, liberty of the subject, freedom of the Press and of public meeting, and the responsibility of ministers. Within this great mass of liberal reformers there were, of course, many shades of opinion, ranging from the more conservative type, which was anxious to work *with* existing institutions, down to the extreme Radicals, who clamoured for their complete subversion. Still, the great gulf which had always yawned between the reactionary and the terrorist seemed at length to have been bridged. Methods of extreme violence were now discredited. The autocrats alone persisted in execution and banishment or arbitrary imprisonment, methods which only served to strengthen the position of the moderate reformers.

On the outbreak of the Japanese War the Government proved hopelessly incompetent and corrupt. Both army and navy were paralysed by officials who had long been ignorant of their duties, and whose sole aim had been to cling to office and the sweets of office. Plehve, who had for years been the chosen instrument of tyranny, organizer of political police, and sworn enemy to all reforms, was now virtual dictator of Russia. All public-spirited movements towards war relief, medical aid, and Red Cross organization were regarded with the deepest suspicion. When Red Cross supplies were misappropriated and openly sold in the streets of Moscow, Plehve refused to interfere, and even punished those who dared to protest. So intolerable had his system become that in July, 1904, the news of his death in Petrograd at the hands of a revolutionary bomb-thrower was hailed with delight.

Plehve's system.

In November a great congress met in Petrograd, representing the best educated of the reformers, the Zemstva, and Town Councils. It presented to the Government a very definite Charter of Liberties and demands for self-government.

Demand for self-government.

Here was a great opportunity for the Tsar to come forward and meet his people, to make positive concessions and carry them

out without delay. But here, as ever, he lacked the necessary force of character. He failed to see that direct intercourse between Tsar and people was the only sound remedy for the present state of discontent. The barrier of officialdom and the persuasion of his immediate advisers were too strong. Indeed, it was hardly possible for him to receive an unprejudiced view of the situation. As it was, the compromise and concessions which he announced were vague and confused, and satisfied nobody. On 19th January he left the capital, from which he remained absent for over a year; buried in the guarded seclusion of his palace, by his own inaction he allowed events to drift until a day arrived when the very prestige of his title and the sanctity of his office could avail no longer to save his dynasty.

Weakness of Nicholas II.

While the Tsar's advisers hesitated to grant reforms, and continued an irritating policy of repression, a great strike took place in Petrograd (January, 1905). Headed by a priest named Father Gapon, the strikers resolved to present their grievances to the emperor. As they marched unarmed through the streets, they were fired on by the troops, defenceless persons of both sexes were shot down, and General Trepoff was appointed to restore "order" by the usual blood-stained methods. But the unrest spread rapidly to the provinces, strikes were organized, the Grand-duke Serge, uncle of the Tsar, was murdered at Moscow, and the peasants raised the cry of "all the land for those who labour".

Strike in Petrograd, 1905.

Such was the internal condition of the Empire when Port Arthur fell and the Battle of Mukden was fought and lost. In May the crowning disaster at Tsushima and the meeting of new congresses demanding the summons of a national assembly convinced the Tsar that the old policy of repression was bankrupt. Just as the Peace of Portsmouth was being signed he issued a decree for the meeting of a Duma. Count Witte was recalled as prime minister, and revolutionary outbreaks in army, navy, and among the peasants hastened the elections. When the first Duma met in May, 1906, it was found that the "moderate" Radicals, known as the "Cadets", were in a large majority; in addition there were Conservative and

The Duma summoned.

Labour parties. There were hardly any representatives of the old régime. The Duma at once showed that it intended not merely to talk but to act. It demanded control over the executive ministers and the immediate circle surrounding the Tsar. Then Stolypin, who had succeeded Witte as prime minister, advised his master to dismiss the Assembly. The elections for a new Duma were conducted on a much narrower franchise, yet still the "Cadet" party predominated. In March, 1907, the second Duma met, only to share the fate of the first. A charge of conspiracy against the life of the Tsar was brought against the Social Democrat party, and, although no proofs were established, the Duma was dissolved in June.

Second Duma.

The Government then set itself more strenuously than before to the task of excluding the Radical and revolutionary members. It was as though in England the franchise were restricted to the days of 1832. The town classes were barely represented. Meanwhile the execution or exile of the revolutionary suspects was ruthlessly pursued.

On 14th November, 1907, the third Duma met. The disfranchising policy had had the desired effect. The Conservatives were now three times as numerous as the Cadets. It appeared possible that Stolypin would now be able to bridge the gulf between reaction and revolution by working in harmony with the new Duma. Although this body was in no sense representative of the people, half a loaf was better than no bread. Some useful reforms were carried out, notably the grant to the peasants of individual ownership of their lands. In 1911 Stolypin was the victim of assassination, and no great statesman has since come forward to forge the link between Government and people.

Third Duma.

Just so long as the rulers insisted on their right to dictate laws or withhold liberties at pleasure, the unrest would inevitably persist. For modern Russia, like the England of a hundred years ago, is experiencing an industrial revolution. New and intelligent classes have emerged to assert their rights and liberties. The old bottles will not contain the new wine.

The Tsar and his advisers were reluctant to face the obvious

fact that the people had outgrown the autocrat. Concessions were made grudgingly and of necessity. It is better to lead than to be drawn unwillingly. It will be remembered that the year 1907 saw the beginnings of the closer political understanding between Britain and Russia. It was natural that the Duma should welcome cordial relations with the "Mother of Parliaments". In 1909 the President of the Duma, with a party of the moderate leaders, paid a visit to England, which did much to cement the friendship by a recognition of common ideals.

The Duma and Britain.

On the other hand, it was natural for the autocratic advisers of the Tsar to seek for their spiritual affinity in Germany. The Government which sought to extinguish Polish hopes of nationality, and to deprive Finland of Home Rule, looked to Potsdam for object-lessons in the art of repression.

The Tsar missed a great opportunity of proclaiming himself a national Tsar of a national Government and a united people. So, when a truly national war broke out, the efforts of governors and governed would have been combined in the one great cause.

But Nicholas II had no vision, and the fate of his great empire was not long to lie in his uncertain grasp.

In 1917 the lessons of incompetence, learnt in the Crimea and in Manchuria, bore fruit in a far greater crisis. The army and people would no longer endure to be underarmed, half-starved and humiliated because the Tsar lacked character to rid himself of his quasi-loyal and incompetent advisers. On the night of 15th March Nicholas was forced to abdicate.

The Russian Revolution is still in progress. The full course of events cannot be truthfully narrated, nor can the end of anarchy and civil war yet be predicted. In the absence of public opinion, an extremist party—the Bolsheviks[1] ("majority")—established a reign of terror. Unlike the Jacobins of the French Revolution, they found no excuse for their atrocities in the presence of a foreign invader. On the contrary, they did not scruple to break faith with France and Britain, and on 17th December negotiated an armistice with Germany. By this act the long agony of the war was prolonged.

[1] So called because this party had obtained a majority at a Socialist conference.

IMPORTANT DATES

1898. Russia leases Port Arthur from China.
1900. Boxer Rising.
1901. Completion of Trans-Siberian Railway.
1902. Anglo-Japanese Alliance.
1904. Outbreak of Russo-Japanese War.
1905. January 1, Russians surrender Port Arthur.
February–March, Battle of Mukden.
May 27, Battle of Tsushima.
September, Peace of Portsmouth.
Revolution in Russia.
Meeting of the Duma.

For List of Books for Reference see Appendix I

CHAPTER XIII

Austria-Hungary—The Dual Monarchy

The unification of Germany and Italy struck heavy blows at the power and prestige of the House of Austria. Bismarck had forced the Hapsburgs out of Western and Central Germany. By 1870 their possessions south of the Alps had been wrested from them. From 1870 onwards Austro-Hungarian interests and policy turned more and more towards the Balkan States. The cause of this will become clearer if we try to picture the nature and composition of the Dual Monarchy.

The nearest parallel to the dominion of the Hapsburgs is the Ottoman Empire. Austria-Hungary was the Turkey of Central Europe. There was the same medley of subject nationalities, among whom the ruling power strove to preserve an "equilibrium of discontent". The normal state was a state of crisis, and yet the chronic invalid lived on.

Why is there so sharp a contrast between the unified States of Germany and this "ramshackle" empire of Austria-Hungary, which never solved its national and racial problems? To answer the question we must first enquire how this team of restive subject States came under the curb of a single dynasty.

Strictly speaking, there was no such State as "Austria", which

was merely the name of an arch-duchy belonging to the family of the Hapsburgs. Officially, the Empire was styled "the kingdoms and lands represented in the Reichsrath". The history of "Austria" was a family history; the emperor addressed his subjects as "My Peoples". The Hapsburgs.

The Hapsburgs derived their importance first from the fact that they held the imperial title. The Holy Roman Emperors, in theory elected, belonged in fact from the fifteenth century onwards in unbroken succession to the House of Hapsburg. Secondly, the Hapsburg emperors had a perfect genius for adding to their possessions. This they achieved partly by success in war, but mainly by marriage alliances. Thus it came about that the Emperor Charles V, who acceded in 1519, found himself controller of more than half of Western Europe.[1]

It was not possible for him to hold his dominions securely, since, geographically, they were widely separated. The only really solid part of this huge empire was the territory surrounding Vienna, and the diversity of races was already very apparent. Italians, Slavs, and Magyars, in addition to Flemings, Walloons, and Spaniards, owed allegiance to the Hapsburg House.

On the whole, "Austria" used her power for the good of Europe, since she was the safeguard of the West against the Turk, who knocked at the gates of Vienna as late as 1683. By the end of the seventeenth century the Turks had been thrust out of Hungary, and the Hapsburgs had extended their southern frontier to include the greater part of Croatia and Slavonia, the Danube forming a rough dividing line. In 1718 Belgrade was redeemed, together with a portion of modern Serbia, though this extension only lasted till 1739. War with Turks. Further expansion.

Till 1740, then, the Empire had not been seriously challenged

By the marriage with Mary, Maximilian added the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Franche-Comté to his Austrian dominion.

From the marriage of Philip with Joanna, Naples, Sicily, Sardinia, Spain, and the New World came to Charles V in addition to his paternal heritage.

as the overlord of Central Europe. Russia, indeed, had entered the competition for Turkish territory; yet, apart from the traditional feud with the Bourbons, the House of Hapsburg had no formidable rival to fear.

In 1740 all was changed by the unprovoked assault of Prussia under Frederick the Great. The theft of Silesia may be called the prelude to the struggle which was to end in the banishment of the Hapsburgs from "Germany" in 1866. The rivalry with the House of Hohenzollern had begun.

Rivalry with Prussia.

Thenceforward the Hapsburgs were torn between two ambitions—the one to maintain the tradition of imperial overlordship in Germany and the west, the other to extend to the south and south-east at the expense of Turkey and Poland. Their eagle-emblem faced in both directions.

In 1772 the first partition of Poland brought Galicia into the Hapsburg net. The Bukowina Duchy was added in 1777, and in 1795 by the third partition were annexed Little Poland and Western Galicia.

Partitions of Poland.

So profitable was the task of dismembering Poland, and so absorbing were the questions of distribution, that the Empire quite failed to appreciate the full significance of the French revolutionary movement in 1789. Then, from 1795 until Napoleon's star of conquest began to wane, she suffered a series of staggering blows. By 1809, as the result of the lost campaigns of Italy, Ulm-Austerlitz, and Wagram, "Austria" was shorn of her outlying provinces. The Netherlands had been the first to go, next Lombardy, then Tyrol and Venetia, and finally Western Galicia and the Illyrian provinces. Her appearance on the map was much more compact; she had now no longer access to the sea at any point.

Defeats by Napoleon.

The year 1806, which saw the creation of Napoleon's Confederation of the Rhine, deprived her of all semblance of authority in western Germany. The "Holy Roman Empire" was now but an empty title signifying nothing. Recognizing the melancholy fact, the emperor assumed, in 1806, the new title of "Emperor of Austria".

By the settlement of 1815 the Hapsburg dominions, like the thirty-nine German States, kept the mark of compactness that

Magyars
Germans
Slavs (South)
Slavs (North)
Slavs (Poles)
Slavs (Ruthenes)
Latins (Italians & Rumanians)
SAXONY
PRUSSIA
RUSSIA
BOHEMIA
Czechs
Prague
R. Vistula
Silesia
Poles
GALICIA
Lemberg
Ruthenes
Forests
Carpathians
MORAVIA
Czechs & Slovaks
BAVARIA
Munich
AUSTRIA
VIENNA
Germans
R. Danube
BUKOWINA
Tyrol
Innsbruck
SALZBURG
STYRIA
TYROL
CARINTHIA
Italians
BUDA-PEST
HUNGARY
Magyars
Rumanians
TRANSYLVANIA
CARNIOLA
Slovenes
Agram
Trieste
Venice
Fiume
CROATIA-SLAVONIA
Transylvanian Alps
RUMANIA
Bukarest
ITALY
Adriatic Sea
Southern Slavs
BOSNIA
1878
annexed 1908
Belgrade
SERBIA
R. Danube
Serajevo
DALMATIA
HERZEGOVINA
Slovenes
BULGARIA
MONTENEGRO
0 50 100 150 200 Miles
The DUAL MONARCHY
1867 to 1914
Racial distribution roughly shown by shading

Napoleon had impressed upon them. The provinces—Italian, Tyrolese, and Illyrian—which she recovered at the Congress were all comparatively accessible from the central seat of authority. The loss of the Netherlands and outlying German strips of territory, such as the Breisgau, were a positive gain to her, in so far as their maintenance had always involved great expense of men and money.

Congress of Vienna.

For the first half of the nineteenth century the problem of keeping the Italian, Magyar, and Slavonic nationalities in subjection was tackled by Metternich, who would admit no compromise or concession, but stood as the champion of despotic rule. Within the same period the House of Austria struggled to maintain her supremacy over the loose federation of German States, pitting the tradition of the past against the present fact of Prussian military strength. Like Alice's Cheshire cat, the "grin" still survived after the real embodiment of power had faded away.

Metternich's system.

Metternich's system did not prove strong enough to destroy the democratic spirit born of the French Revolution, nor the impetus towards free nationality begotten of the Napoleonic wars.

The Zollverein formed under the ægis of Prussia ignored the Hapsburg pretensions, and no constructive far-seeing statesman could be found to grasp the nettle of discontent growing ever more rapidly within the Empire. The repressive policy of Metternich was directly responsible for the tremendous outbreaks of revolution in the year 1848.

This year of 1848 stands out as a signpost pointing the new road to Democracy and National Freedom from the barren Land of Repression; it marked in Austria the flight of Metternich and the downfall of his system. The young Emperor Francis Joseph, who succeeded Ferdinand I in that same year, adopted in place of Metternich's persecutions a policy of drift, and followed the lines of least resistance. We shall understand the risings of 1848 best by recollecting the constituent elements of the Empire.

Revolution of 1848.

There were four main racial divisions—the German, Magyar, Slavonic, and Latin.

Racial divisions.

Of these the first two alone occupied a central position. (See

map.) The German element grouped round Vienna extended westward on both banks of the Danube till it reached the Bavarian and Swiss frontiers. The Magyars—a non-European people akin to the Turks—were spread over the great plain of Hungary.

German.

Magyar.

It was very different with the Slavs and Latins, who were widely scattered. Of the latter, there were Rumanians in Transylvania and Italians in Lombardy, Venetia, Trieste, and the Trentino. The Slavs were subdivided into a number of kindred groups. To the north were the Czechs of Bohemia and Moravia, the Slovaks, the Little Russians and Ruthenes. To the south lay the Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, and Dalmatians, collectively known as the Southern Slavs.

Latin.

Slav.

It is clear that geographical position made for a union or compromise between German and Magyar, whose mutual interest lay in keeping Slav and Italian subjects scattered and subordinate.

All the subject States looked back upon traditions of independence. Ever since the eighteenth century it had been the aim of the Hapsburgs to destroy this tradition, together with differences of language, law, and local custom. This, as we have seen, was what Metternich's oppression had attempted and failed to do.

1848, the Year of Revolution

The Revolutionists of 1848 smote with a two-edged sword. The risings in France and most of the German States had for their main object the establishment of constitutional government in place of absolute monarchs and irresponsible advisers. In Prussia, as in Bavaria, Würtemberg, Baden, and many other States, the Liberals demanded Parliamentary government, responsible ministers, and a free Press—all, in fact, that we in Great Britain understand as a "limited monarchy". At the same time there was the strongest desire for the union of the German States under one Crown.

In Austria the racial aspect predominated. The Magyars of Hungary and the Slavs of Bohemia rose to sever the chains that bound them to the Hapsburg Empire. Unfortunately, though they had everything to gain by united

Racial aspect.

action, there was bitter race enmity between Hungarian and Slav. The Magyars, regarding themselves as representative of a higher culture, had nothing but contempt for the aspirations of the Slav peoples, whom they regarded as semi-barbarous. Thus, although Metternich fell in the Liberal rising at Vienna, and the emperor for the time yielded to the storm and granted a Constitution, the division between the Slavs and Magyars played into his hands, and, by enabling him to crush each revolt separately, made his ultimate victory certain.

Thus, at Prague, where an assembly representing all Slav subject-peoples was assembled in June, 1848, the imperial troops under Prince Windischgrätz bombarded the city, which surrendered after four days' fighting. All concessions granted to the Czechs of Bohemia were now withdrawn. Then Austrian victories in northern Italy led to reaction in Vienna, and by the end of October the revolution in the capital was suppressed, and the abdication of the weak Emperor Ferdinand in favour of his nephew, Francis Joseph, led to more vigorous handling of the crisis.

Rising in Bohemia.

Meanwhile, the Magyar revolt had proved far more formidable. Inspired by the somewhat narrow patriotism of Kossuth, who, like Mazzini in Italy, had prepared the soil for revolt, and, like Garibaldi, was ever in the forefront of the battle, the Magyars threw off all allegiance to the Empire. It was the rising of a whole people, not of a single city as at Vienna and Prague. Then the Magyar racial intolerance proved a fatal obstacle to the attainment of freedom. While fighting for her own liberties, Hungary roundly refused to grant them to the Croats, Serbs, and Dalmatians, whom she regarded as subject and inferior to herself. What was sauce for the goose was not sauce for the gander. Hungarians asserted a prescriptive right and a superior civilization which justified them in refusing Home Rule to benighted Slavs. This attitude was fatal, for it threw the Croats and Serbs into the arms of Austria. Though they fought stoutly for many months, the Hungarians were finally hemmed in by a threefold advance. Hard pressed on two flanks by the Croats from the south and the Austrians from the north-west, they made a gallant fight. But the intervention of

Hungarian revolt.

Its failure.

the Tsar, who feared that his subject Poles would be tainted by the breath of revolution, turned the scale, and the main Hungarian army capitulated at Vilagos in August, 1849.

The vanquished patriots were savagely punished by wholesale executions and long terms of imprisonment. A few of the notables, including Kossuth, escaped, to keep the national cause alive in England and America. And the struggle was not in vain: chronic disaffection so imperilled the safety of Austria that in 1867 the Compromise (*Ausgleich*) was arranged by which Hungary emerged as an equal and independent kingdom.

The Compromise, 1867.

The twenty years that succeeded the revolution of 1848 were disastrous for the imperial prestige. Lombardy was lost in 1859, and the "Six Weeks' War" of 1866 brought the surrender of Venetia and final exclusion from Germany.

Austrian losses in 1859 and 1866.

From 1866 onwards "Austria" was absorbed in racial problems, and sought a partial solution of those problems in a policy of expansion by way of the Balkans.

Distraught by the defeats of 1866, and threatened with the dissolution of his empire, Francis Joseph had no option but to come to a peaceful understanding with the most powerful and dangerous element of his subject States. He accepted an arrangement generally known as the Compromise, which was largely the work of Deák, the greatest of Hungarian statesmen. Austria and Hungary became equal and entirely separate States. The only links between them were the monarch, joint ministries of war, finance and foreign affairs, and "delegations", or bodies representing the Austrian Parliament and the Hungarian Diet, which met twice a year, alternately in Vienna and Buda-Pest. The Hapsburg Empire became a dual monarchy.

Dual monarchy.

This Compromise was fraught with most important consequences. It placed the German and Magyar races on a pedestal from which they surveyed the remaining nationalities —Slav and Latin—with supreme contempt. The Magyars in particular now began a systematic policy of repression. All who were Slav by name they chose to regard as slaves by nature. It is this attitude of the Magyars that has always nullified

Results of the Compromise.

the milder and more conciliatory policy of Austria. All serious attempts to allay racial discords, whether by some form of federation or by the addition of a third and Slavonic partner to the dual monarchy, have been met with the bitterest hostility by Hungary. This determination to "Magyarize" his "barbarians" brings the Magyar into a spiritual alliance with the Prussian, and upon Hungary, therefore, must rest a large share of responsibility for the outbreak of the Great War.

The record of Hungary as suzerain over Slovaks, Rumanians, and Croats was very black. She tried by every means, by force and fraud, to deprive these little nationalities not only of self-government but of self-expression. Like the schoolboy, who, remembering his own sufferings, proceeds in due time to "take it out" of his unfortunate juniors, so did Hungary in her turn mete out harsh measure to Slav and Latin alike. It is not for nothing that Magyar and Turk derive from common stock. Englishmen had so long enjoyed the blessings of personal liberty, freedom of speech, and equality before the law that it was difficult for them to imagine that vast European areas still existed in the twentieth century where these privileges did not obtain. Imagine yourself imprisoned for speaking or writing your native language, fined because your child was found wearing your national colours, the case in court conducted in a language you do not understand, and you begin to grasp a few of the lesser infamies perpetrated in the Hungarian realms.

Hungary and her Slav subjects.

There is a strangely selfish taint in the spirit of nationality that denies to others what itself has gained. Thus, "Germany a nation" has no liberal treatment to spare for her Poles or her Danes. To the Magyar, "lowliness" was "young ambition's ladder". The Radical promoted to the Peerage usually sees things from a new and different angle. As in human nature, so in States, it seems to be inherent that the strong shall give the law to the weak.

In justice to Austria this attitude of Hungary must always be remembered. Were Austria disposed to show some liberality, Hungary was always certain to protest. The ideal of the Emperor Francis Joseph was to unite the many races into one political whole, as Prussia had united

The aim of Francis Joseph.

Germany. The task of Austria was far more difficult: she had to unite not one race but several; she had to reckon with an exacting partner; she was fighting the spirit of nationality, not furthering it. It has been truly said that "on the day when Europe imagines she has solved the Eastern Question, she will inevitably find herself confronted with the Austrian Question".

The best that the old Emperor Francis Joseph could achieve was to muddle along, trusting to preserve the "equilibrium of discontent". *Divide et impera* was a tolerable second-best to *Viribus unitis*.

Austria and the Balkan States.

From 1870 the trend of foreign policy was more clearly defined. Austria set herself to become a Balkan Power. It is sometimes possible for a State temporarily to stifle its domestic discord by a vigorous foreign policy. That was what Napoleon III had tried to do. Unfortunately for Austria, her eastward inclination forced her to fall foul of the Southern Slavs. Of all her mixed brood the Southern Slav element was the ugliest duckling. The ambition which drove her to seek an outlet on the Adriatic and Aegean Seas ran directly counter to the ambitions of Serbia, which dreamed of a Greater Serbia that should one day embrace all Southern Slavs. Between the two ambitions there could be no compromise, and to that extent Austria's policy was "offensive-defensive" in its nature.

It was quite obvious that any advance into Balkan preserves must meet with the bitterest hostility from Russia, the great protector of the Slavs.

The key to the situation lay in the hands of Bismarck, whose friendship was now, in face of Russia, indispensable to Austria. This friendship he was very willing to extend, since it made for the continued isolation of France. He gave every encouragement to Austria in the pursuit of her Balkan plans, and at the Congress of Berlin (1878), in the capacity of honest broker, secured for his client a first instalment of her Balkan investments. Bosnia-Hercegovina was placed under Austrian administration, and the corridor Sandjak of Novi-Bazar was handed over to Austrian garrisons.

Bosnia-Hercegovina, 1878.

Austria was now fairly embarked on her new enterprise, which

was bound to increase the enmity between herself and Russia, who was baulked at Berlin of her "Big Bulgaria" plan. So essential was the continued support of Germany that in 1879 Bismarck found little difficulty in hardening the understanding into a formal alliance. Three years later the Triple Alliance was established by the inclusion of Italy. Henceforward Germany and Austria had common interest in the Teutonic march towards the east. The one was indispensable to the other.

Contact with Russia.

Triple Alliance.

Between 1878 and 1908 the tension between Austria and the Southern Slavs steadily increased. The recognition of Austria's interest was clearly seen when Russia consented to enter into an agreement with her by which Macedonia was to be pacified by the joint efforts of an Austro-Russian gendarmerie (1903). This was on the eve of the Russo-Japanese War.

In 1906 the advent of Count Aehrenthal as prime minister at Vienna led to a more forward policy. It was Aehrenthal's ambition to free Austria from the humiliating position of a brilliant second to Germany, and to prove her capable of strong independent action. This policy he asserted in 1908 by annexing Bosnia-Hercegovina outright, before Russia had recovered from the losses of the Japanese War.

Policy of Aehrenthal.

A great war was bound, sooner or later, to follow from this act. It stirred Slav feeling to its depths. It goaded Serbia to desperation. It occasioned such public humiliation of Russia as she could neither forgive nor forget. And yet it was undertaken by Austria with her eyes open. Aehrenthal, posing as the Austrian Bismarck, would cut the Southern Slav tangle with one bold stroke, and he could count on the support of Germany.

He had already schemed to make the worse appear the better cause by fastening a quarrel upon the Croatian national party.[1] The leaders of this party were accused of sedition on evidence which was proved to be forged. Hard upon this provocative

[1] A series of articles were written by Dr. Friedjung, the Austrian historian, purporting to prove the Croatian leaders guilty of seditious practices. In a libel action brought against Friedjung it was proved that his evidence was based on forged documents supplied by the Austrian Government.

move followed the deliberate breach of the Berlin Congress in the annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina. This act, which appeared on the surface to be a triumph for Aehrenthal, accomplished what centuries had failed to achieve—united action on the part of the Balkan States.

Annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina.

From 1908 to 1914 the policy of Austria is best studied in the light of Balkan affairs. The rapid triumph of the league over Turkey was a shrewd blow to her, which she hastened to counter by setting Serbia and Bulgaria at variance, and insisting, in the final peace at Bucharest, upon terms which forbade all future prospect of Balkan tranquillity.

From even this short study of the policy of the Dual Monarchy, a general negative principle emerges: it is the denial of democratic self-control and equal rights to the Slav and Latin nationalities. In so far as she persisted in this denial the Dual Monarchy became a menace to the peace of Europe, and a brake upon the wheels of free development. For that reason she found a congenial place in the camp of Turkey, Bulgaria, and the German Empire.

The Dual Monarchy was a twentieth-century anachronism. Until its dissolution there could be no lasting peace for Europe.

IMPORTANT DATES

1806. End of the Holy Roman Empire.
1848. Risings in Bohemia and Hungary.
1848–1916. Emperor Francis Joseph.
1866. Sadowa.
1867. The Compromise.
1878. Austria administers Bosnia-Hercegovina.
1882. Triple Alliance.
1908. Austria annexes Bosnia-Hercegovina.

For List of Books for Reference see Appendix I

CHAPTER XIV

The Balkan States and the Eastern Question

Until very recent years the Balkan peninsula, its inhabitants and its politics, have been to most Englishmen an unknown quantity.

This has been due not entirely to insular narrowness or lack of imagination: it has been a part of our tradition and policy to refrain from interfering in European affairs when our own interests were not directly endangered. It has been our aim to isolate ourselves as far as possible from Balkan affairs. These affected us only indirectly as a cross-current in the troubled waters of Turkish contumacy and misrule. Our interest has been mainly academic, our attitude akin to the patronizing curiosity with which the Cockney visitor to the Tower surveys the weapons and armour of the Middle Ages. If we have thought at all, it has been in terms of "atrocities"—the outcome of the eternal scuffling of kites and crows—to be expected so long as the anomaly of Turkish despotism survived in Christian Europe. Not until the Balkan wars of 1912 was it fully realized how readily these young and vigorous nationalities had, like the new Japan, adopted and applied the weapons and equipment, the strategy and tactics, of the Western Powers. Like their Russian kinsmen trained by Peter the Great, the Southern Slavs might still be despised as semi-savages; they could no longer be ignored, since by their own valorous exertions they had deserved the success they so notably achieved.

Comparative ignorance of Balkan affairs.

Since 1912 closer knowledge has been forced upon us, for the connection of Serbia with the outbreak of the Great War is only apparent when the previous relations between Austria, Russia, and the Balkan States are understood.

It is necessary to survey the origin of the little States, and to trace their fortunes up to the year 1878, when, under European

guarantees, they received a Charter of Liberties at the great Congress of Berlin.

In the Balkan peninsula geography has much to answer for. A close study of the map will clear our minds, for it explains partially the strange medley of race, language, and religion which characterizes this area. Geographically, at least, it is here that East meets West. Here is the bridge over which invaders have poured from the days of Attila in the fifth century to the days of Mohammed the Conqueror in the fifteenth. During the thousand years that elapsed from the defeat of the Huns (451) to the Turkish capture of Constantinople, (1453) diverse races struggled for supremacy in the Balkan peninsula. The Greek, the Serb, the Bulgar, the Albanian, and the Vlach emerged from the struggle with definite religious and racial, though not geographical, distinctions, which go far to explain, though not to solve, the perplexing problem of the Near East.

Importance of geography.

Savage south-east Europe seems to break all the rules of historical causation. With the coming of the Turks we might expect to find, as was the case of Spain and the Arab invaders, the welding together of united States against a common danger; or, granting the triumph of the Turk, we might expect, in the course of centuries, some measure of assimilation to the language, customs, and religion of the conquering race. In the Balkans, though some conversions to Mohammedanism were made, there was, on the whole, neither union nor assimilation. The explanation lies partly in geographical factors and partly in the character of the Turkish conquest.

Geographically, the Balkan area was the region below the bridge by which most of the barbarian tribes passed into the Roman Empire. In the stress and struggle for existence, certain tribes or portions of tribes were pushed off the bridge altogether, and continued their scuffling combat below, while the main stream of barbarism passed westward spreading in ever-widening channels.

It was no peaceful lagoon into which the Balkan peoples fell, but seething waters which European statecraft has never yet contrived safely to navigate.

Race instincts are a great mystery: no one in fact has ever quite decided what goes to the making of a nation or a race. But there are certain obvious links which form a strong chain; for example, a common stock, a common language, the same traditions, the same creed, the same political ideals—all these will probably, though not of necessity, contribute to the formation of a united nation. For if you disagree with your near neighbour on all or most of these important subjects you have no mutual sympathy, no common ground. You do not ask him to dine, or borrow his golf-clubs. Indeed, you may need all your tact to avoid an unseemly brawl. The High Church parson does not habitually exchange pulpits with his Nonconformist brother, nor is the Tory squire on calling terms with the Socialist butcher. The lion has not yet learned to lie down with the lamb.

Differences of race and creed.

There were six different races in the peninsula, embracing three different creeds. They lived too close together to appreciate one another properly. In fact they constituted a mutual-hate society which destroyed all hopes of making common cause against the Turk.

Geography and providence have endowed the Englishman with a double portion of exclusiveness. It is hard for him to grasp the Balkan problems. He is the owner of a detached house: he is not "overlooked". This was not so with the Balkan States; they were not even semi-detached and the party walls were very thin. Imagine a tenement building where the representatives of half a dozen races jostle and fight incessantly for the possession of the best flats. When, as frequently happens, the tumult and the shouting prove too disturbing for the landlord's peaceful enjoyment of his siesta, he marches down, cudgel in hand, and hits out right and left with sublime impartiality. It is the method he has always adopted, and he has not the will or power to change it. Normally he is concerned simply to extort his exorbitant rent. Provided they pay up punctually, the wrangling of his tenants is not altogether disagreeable to him, for, thus employed, they are too busy to think of demanding a reduction of rent and easier conditions of tenure.

That was the condition of the Balkan house and the Turkish landlord.

Look at the map again, and you find other reasons for disunion. On the west you find a series of mountain chains or spines running roughly from north to south. In the centre there is hill-country for the most part, and there is the Balkan range in the north-east and the Rhodope to the south. Between the spines and central uplands run broad valleys like corridors. There is no natural boundary to the north, nothing to check the march of an invader along the corridors. The inhabitants must take to the hills for shelter, whence they emerge to dispute the possession of the fertile plain. The map can show no "nucleus" State to play the rôle of a Piedmont or a Brandenburg. Thus Nature has discouraged the creation of one dominant united State, while she has put strong temptation in the path of ambitious foreign nations.

The Balkan peninsula formed a part of the Eastern Roman Empire; the division of which under Constantine saw the creation of the old Byzantium as new capital of the eastern half. The earliest inhabitants may have been Illyrians in the west and Thracians in the east; but of these "ancient Britons" little or nothing is known; doubtless they were greatly influenced by Greek and Roman civilization. Those who fled to the mountain fastnesses may be the ancestors of the Albanians and possibly of the Vlachs (or Rumanians).

Inhabitants.

The Eastern Roman Empire.

The westward movement of the Huns soon brought pressure upon the Roman Empire, since it dislodged, from the north-east, the Eastern and Western Goths, who in their turn made way for the irruptions of the Slavs.

Coming of the Slavs.

The Eastern Empire was allowed no breathing-space. It had to deal with the Slavs in Europe, the Persians in Asia, and shortly afterwards with the pressing danger of the Arab invasions. Professor Oman describes the reign of the Byzantine Emperor Heraclius (610–641) as "the best dividing-point between Ancient History and the Middle Ages". It is certainly in his reign that the Empire became definitely Greek.

In the eighth, ninth, and tenth centuries the Empire may be

said to have fairly held its own and kept the Slavonic and Bulgar tribes in subjection. In 1018 the Greek Emperor Basil II earned for himself the title of "Bulgaroktonos" (Slayer of Bulgars) and held dominion over the whole peninsula, with the Danube as his frontier. When the Crusading period arrived, the Byzantine grip was relaxed and the Empire was exploited for the gain of western adventurers. From 1204 to 1261 a "Latin" or Western kingdom was actually established in Constantinople. During this half-century the Slavs speedily established separate States. Then in the fourteenth century the Ottoman Turks entered Europe. Their conquests would have been even more rapid had they more fully realized the extent to which the Greek Empire had declined in this period of unceasing feuds. Disunion in the face of a common foreign danger is the one constant factor in Balkan politics from this point down to the short-lived Balkan League of 1912. The Balkan States have never lived it down.

The period preceding the total eclipse of independence which resulted from the Ottoman conquest has an importance which is sometimes overlooked, since it furnished the small modern States with undying traditions; and traditions, like "moral" in war, have a living force which must be reckoned with. The history of the world is not adequately explained in terms of big battalions or the money market.

Serbia.

Let us look, first, at the story of the Serbs. The occupants of the districts to the south of the Danube (including, for convenience, the Bulgarians) are generally known as the Southern Slavs, to distinguish them from their kinsmen, the Czechs of Bohemia in the west, and the Poles and Russians to the north and east. By the middle of the seventh century most of the centre and south of the peninsula had been overrun by the Southern Slavs; only in the large towns, such as Salonica, on portions of the coast, and in the islands the Greeks and Albanians held their own.

The kings.

Until the twelfth century the history of the Serbs is obscure. Not until then can we trace the existence of a strong dynasty. Family quarrels and external pressure from the Greek Empire and Hungary explain the slow emergence of a powerful State. The thirteenth century marks the beginning of a

real national consciousness when the history of Serbia may truthfully be called the history of her kings. Nearly all of these were named Stephen, a name which, like that of Cæsar, grew into a title. To the first half of the fourteenth century belongs the golden age of Serbia. It was then that she wrested Macedonia from the Greek Empire; it was the period of the national hero-king, Stephen Dushan (1331–55). During a reign of over twenty years he proved himself great as a warrior and an administrator.

Stephen Dushan. At the expense of Hungary and the Greek Empire he built up a dominion embracing nearly the whole peninsula. He introduced laws and a civilization which, if not original, had been hitherto conspicuously lacking among his own people. Unfortunately, all that he achieved, and it was much, depended entirely upon his own resolute personality. He died suddenly at the age of forty-six, and his empire collapsed like a pack of cards. The effete Greek Empire lingered on till 1453. Constantinople held and defended by Stephen Dushan might well have excluded the Turk indefinitely. On his death feudal anarchy ensued. Bosnia, Thessaly, Albania, and Bulgaria became independent and the Turks advanced to Adrianople. By 1386 they had reached Nish.

Kosovo, 1389. The Christian States formed a belated alliance, and in 1389 Serbians, Bosnians, Bulgarians, Albanians, met a common doom in the crushing disaster at Kosovo. Treachery decided the issue, for Brankovitch, a rival of King Lazar of Serbia, deserted him at a critical moment. Even at this crisis the besetting sin of faction dogged the Southern Slavs.

The defeat at Kosovo marked the decline and fall of Serbia. She now became for over 400 years a province of the Ottoman Empire. When, in 1396, Sigismund of Hungary was beaten on the Danube at Nicopolis, all hopes of intervention were shattered.

For a while in the middle of the fifteenth century the valour of John Hunyadi, "the white knight"—a Hungarian Hereward of the Balkans—postponed the evil days, but this was but the fitful flickering of a dying lamp. National existence perished. The little country fell a helpless prey to the greed and ferocity of her conquerors.

On the map she denoted nothing but a tax-contributing district.

Distance alone made her plight a little less intolerable than that of Bulgaria. But the memories of her former greatness still lived on, enshrined in the noble series of historical ballads which are the typical literary products of the Balkan States. Then again, since the policy of "thorough" in the Prussian sense is alien to Turkish methods of occupation, there is always a chance of recovery for a people whose customs and language are contemptuously tolerated by an indolent despot. It was so in Serbia. A scientific and deliberate policy of absorption like that applied by Prussia in Poland might have withered her national aspirations for ever. The Ottomans left a wilderness but they did not poison the ground. So when dry rot within and Russian pressure from without compelled the Turks to loosen their hold, there was not wanting in the Serbs the will to shake off their yoke. Therefore in 1804 Serbian history begins anew. Serbia created herself afresh by her own exertions and became a factor of ever-increasing importance in the Eastern Question. From this period grew rapidly the consciousness of race-brotherhood and the tendency to look upon Russia as the "big brother" and patron of all smaller Slav communities.

Conquest by Turks.

The struggle for independence was headed by Karageorge, grandfather of the late King Peter I. Assisted at intervals by Russia, whose preoccupation with Napoleon rendered her alliance spasmodic, Karageorge freed a large part of his country by sheer hard fighting. But he was no diplomat and his influence was undermined by a rival leader, Milosh Obrenovitch, by whom he was treacherously murdered in 1817. This murder gave rise to the blood-feud between the houses of Karageorge and Obrenovitch—a sinister blot on the subsequent pages of Serbian history—which perplexed and retarded the sympathies of Western Europe. In 1829, by the Peace of Adrianople which ended the Greek War of Independence, Serbia won a measure of local self-government, though Turkish garrisons were still maintained in Belgrade and other fortresses. In 1830 Milosh Obrenovitch was recognized as hereditary prince by the Sultan, and in 1867 all Turkish troops were withdrawn.

Struggle for freedom. Karageorge.

Peace of Adrianople, 1829.

The next great landmark for the Balkan States was the meeting

of the Congress of Berlin in 1878. For Serbia it effected little beyond the formal ratification of her hard-won freedom. It was fraught with menace rather than with promise for her future as a nation State.

Bulgaria.

For Bulgaria the coming of the Turks proved even more disastrous. In origin the Bulgars were non-Slavonic; they were a Mongol tribe from Eastern Asia who had moved across Russia by slow stages. By the seventh century they had formed an independent Christian State, and they appear to have possessed a keener sense for political organization than the Serbs. By the tenth century we hear of the first Bulgarian "Empire", whose ruler assumes for the first time the title of Tsar. This empire suffered severely at the hands of the Greeks under Basil "Bulgaroktonos" (p. 173), who for a time dominated the whole peninsula. This worthy, whose methods of warfare, seem to derive more naturally from Oriental than Greek traditions, is said to have blinded 15,000 of his prisoners, only a few of whom were spared one eye to lead the victims home to their king.

Turkish Conquest.

More than a century elapsed before Bulgaria recovered her strength. A second empire arose in the thirteenth century under Asen II (1218–40), who profited by the quarrels between Greeks and Crusaders. While he lived, Bulgaria flourished. On his death the glory quickly departed. Attacks by the Tartars and continual fighting with Serbia sapped the strength of the Bulgars. In 1389 their power, like that of Serbia, was shattered on the field of Kosovo. Situated nearer to her great destroyer, Bulgaria as a nation disappeared far more completely than Serbia. Not until 1878 could she claim the semblance of autonomy, nor even until then could travellers discern the existence of a separate stock.[1]

The first stirring of national spirit was seen in 1870, when a Church independent of the Greek Patriarchate was readily recognized by the Sultan. Unhappily this brought the renewal of the dissensions between Christian States. It is hard in the East to

[1] Sir C. Eliot reminds us that Kinglake passed across modern Bulgaria in the 'thirties without mention of its inhabitants; the latter, in fact, were wont to describe themselves as Greek.

BALKAN STATES
1878
Congress of Berlin
0 50 100 150 200
Miles
R. Danube
Buda Pest
HUNGARY
Carpathian Mts.
RUSSIA
Moldavia
Transylvania
Transylvanian Alps
RUMANIA
Principality 1859
Bukarest
Wallachia
R. Danube
Dobruja
Constanza
Silistria
Varna
BLACK SEA
R. Save
Belgrade
Bosnia
Serajevo
SERBIA
R. Morava
Nish
Plevna
Hercegovina
Sandjak of Novi Bazar
Kosovo Plain
Balkan Mountains
Sofia
Burgas
BULGARIA
East Roumelia 1885
Cetinje
Prizrend
Scutari
Adrianople
Bosphorus
ADRIATIC SEA
Durazzo
ALBANIA
R. Vardar
R. Struma
TURKEY
Macedonia
R. Maritza
Constantinople
Sea of Marmora
ITALY
Salonika
Dardanelles
Corfu
Epirus
Thessaly
1862
Arta
ÆGEAN SEA
ASIA MINOR
IONIAN SEA
Smyrna
Athens
Morea
Crete

separate patriotism from religion. Greek was now again pitted against Bulgar; racial hate was reinforced by religious dissensions. It was precisely the atmosphere which for centuries had favoured the persistence of Turkish despotism.

For Bulgaria, too, the Congress of Berlin, primed with good intentions, brought ultimately not peace but a sword.

Rumania.

Of all the Balkan States Rumania is, to Western observers, perhaps the most interesting and sympathetic. As the name implies, the original inhabitants, probably Thracians, came under the sway of the Roman Empire and adopted a modification of the Latin tongue. Their fortunes bear out the assertion that the nation is happiest which has no history. The existence of Moldavia and Wallachia—the Danubian principalities—is explained partly by their position. While they lay clear of the line of Turkish advance, and remote from the control of the Greek Empire, they formed the bridgehead for the stream of Slavonic invaders who took possession of their lowlands. Their desire to render themselves inconspicuous, and their habit, which still persists, of living in the most inaccessible hill country, explain why they escaped much of the sufferings undergone by their neighbours.

Not until the fifteenth century do they appear as a factor to be reckoned with. Kosovo was a black day for Wallachia, which became tributary to the Sultan. Moldavia retained her liberty a little longer through the prowess of a national hero, Stephen, and even after his death in 1504, though yielding tribute, she contrived to elect her own rulers, and Turkish settlements were forbidden. Gradually, however, the office of governor came to be sold by the Sultan to the highest bidders, who, in the eighteenth century, were almost invariably Greeks. At the same time Russia began to interest herself in the provinces and disputed control over them with Turkey.

Moldavia and Wallachia united, 1859.

Kingdom, 1881.

In 1859 both States elected the same man as *Hospodar*, and from that time Rumania was regarded as a single State. In 1866 Prince Charles of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen was elected, and in 1878 total independence was achieved. Three years later the principality became a kingdom.

Passing to the western coast, we find in Albania another non-Slavonic race and language which appear to derive their origin from the earliest-known inhabitants of the peninsula—the Illyrians. More than all the rest, they have retained their primitive mode of life. Though nominally a province of Turkey, they have never been completely subjugated. The Albanian has been the Ishmael of the Balkans. Frequently he has made common cause with the Turk, for there is a higher percentage of Moslems in Albania than in any other State of the peninsula. War is his business and his recreation. He has fought for the Turk against the Slav, and when there is no foreign war to wage, the Gheg of the north harries the Tosk of the south. To shoot or be shot in the family blood-feud is the avocation of most respectable villagers of High Albania. So it is that the most westerly of all the little States has remained most Oriental in its unchanging adherence to primitive custom and tradition, its contempt for civilized "improvements", its hostility to all that we understand as progress. Yet the Albanian is not without honour save in his own country. Throughout the Levant and Egypt, transplanted from his native soil, he has proved capable and trustworthy, and his services are eagerly sought to fill responsible offices. He is a picturesque and familiar figure in the streets of Cairo, where he is employed as a commissionaire, and can be trusted to cope successfully with native guile. As a soldier he has formed the backbone of the Turkish armies. While in his native hills he made no history, his destiny became a storm-centre in the latest phases of the Eastern Question. Albania can look back to no golden age parallel to that of Stephen Dushan, unless it be to the deeds of Skanderbey (Alexander Bey), who is to be regarded rather as an adventurer than a patriot, personal ambition with him counting for more than the freedom of his countrymen. For over twenty years from his mountain strongholds he defied all attempts of the Turk to subdue him. For a time his reputation rivalled and even outshone that of his contemporary, John Hunyadi, as Hammer of the Turks. When he died, in 1467, he bequeathed no tradition of national union, no ideal of political order.

Albania.

Warlike character of the people.

Skanderbey.

It remains to notice one other Albanian worthy who flourished

at the beginning of the nineteenth century whose struggle for independence coincided with the Greek War of Independence (1821–30). This was Ali Pasha of Janina. He, too, fought for his own hand, and was a byword for cruelty among his own people. He slew all rival chieftains, and made common cause with the Greeks, not because he loved them better, but because he hated the Turks more. The exploits of Ali impressed the Turks sufficiently to provoke a wholesale massacre of Albanian notables, after which the hereditary pashalik was abolished. In 1822, Ali himself was brought to bay in his castle of Janina, induced to surrender, and treacherously murdered.

Ali Pasha of Janina.

Throughout the nineteenth century the country remained a turbulent province of the shrinking Ottoman Empire. The record of the past lends little encouragement for the prophet to predict a peaceful, united, independent State in the near future. The ideals of unity, peace, and religious concord would deprive the Albanian of all that gives his life a zest and savour.

Province of Ottoman Empire.

The Greeks of the Balkan Peninsula may claim, in a sense, to be regarded as its oldest inhabitants. Yet this claim is very difficult to substantiate, and the extent to which the modern Greek can trace a lineal descent from the men who fought at Marathon or Salamis remains an unsolved problem. One thing is certain — the modern Greek people is liberally diluted with alien elements. To the inheritance of the spiritual, literary, and artistic glories of his "ancestors" the modern Greek can make but little claim. It is not his rôle "to feed the high tradition of the world"; there was no affinity between the age of Pericles and the age of Constantino.

Greece.

A mixed race.

And yet the lustre of the past heroic age has been a very potent factor in the creation of the modern kingdom of Greece. It enlisted the sympathies of the West for that which once was great. It inspired the scattered Greek communities with a Great Idea, namely, that the Hellenes of the Near East should become a great, united people. The great idea prevailed over the undeniable fact that the modern

The "Great Idea".

Greeks are a mixed breed. To that extent, therefore, Greece was happy in the possession of a past history.

When in 395 A.D. the Roman Empire was divided, the eastern half, with its capital at Constantinople, became definitely Greek, and survived the western or Roman half by a thousand years.

With the coming of the Slavs began the three-cornered contest between Serb, Bulgar, and Greek, in which the Greek Empire fairly held its own till towards the end of the twelfth century. While invaders seized territory piecemeal, they came themselves under the spell of the superior tradition and culture of the empire, and endeavoured to model their crude polity on the Greek pattern. Above all, they had owed their conversion to Christianity in the ninth century to the missionary efforts of Greek priests. And Constantinople and the monasteries remained the treasure-houses of what was left of ancient art and learning. By the time of the Turkish invasions the material strength of the Greek Empire was brought very low. She had suffered many things at the hands of Slavs. Twice the Arabs had knocked at the gate of Constantinople. By strange irony it was a Crusade that hastened the decline. In 1204 Constantinople fell before a Venetian armada, a prey to commercial rivalry and bitter theological hatred.

Decline of Greek Empire.

With the capital city in the hands of foreigners from 1204 to 1261, the Greek Empire lost grip as well as prestige. There was no time for recovery before the coming of the Ottoman Turks. In 1453 Constantinople fell to the latter, and the Greeks shared the fate of their Slav neighbours.

Fall of Constantinople.

If the Greeks suffered less acutely under the blight of Turkish conquest, this was due not to superior power of resistance—for, like the rest, they lay helpless—but rather to their superior intelligence, education, and administrative faculties. In short, they made themselves useful, and, finally, indispensable, to the Turk, who, as we have seen, was too lazy to organize his empire. On the rare occasions when he attempted to do so, he found in the Greeks able instruments ready to his hand. The Greek Church system, too, was preserved as a useful method of communication with Christian subjects. A class of Greek officials arose—called the Phanariots—which gained great

Condition under Turkish conquest.

wealth and power. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, for instance, Moldavia and Wallachia were governed by Phanariot viceroys.

The position of the Greeks, therefore, in the Balkans was that of "most favoured nation". As the Turkish power declined before the assaults of Austria and Russia, the Greeks further established their position. They had a genius for commerce and banking. They monopolized the coasting trade of the Levant. Their numerous islands begat a hardy seafaring stock. Many Greeks who had sought and found fortune abroad preserved a lively sympathy for their distressed countrymen.

In the nineteenth century the ideas of the French Revolution fell in Greece upon fertile soil.

Patriotic societies were formed—notably that of the Philiké Hetaireia (League of Friends) in 1814. By 1820 this is said to have possessed 200,000 members. The object was two-fold—to eject the Turkish oppressor and to create a big Greece, which should draw her Balkan sisters into her orbit.

Rise of national spirit.

In 1820 the struggle for independence began. It was happy for Greece that she had not to depend solely on her own exertions. The rising in the north, led by the Phanariot prince Hypsilanti, who counted on rousing Rumania into revolt, proved a hopeless failure. In the south the genuine Greek effort had at first a great success. By 1821 the Turks in the Peloponnese were almost exterminated. At sea, too, the ships furnished by the islands shut up the Turkish fleet in the Dardanelles. The struggle was characterized by terrible wholesale massacres, and the Greek Patriarch was murdered in Constantinople. After two or three years of confused fighting, it became quite plain that the Greek leaders—for the most part adventurers—could agree to no clear concerted plan of action; they were divided by self-seeking quarrels. There arose no Hellenic Napoleon or Cromwell to suppress party faction fights and concentrate the national will.

War of Independence.

Left to themselves, they would have succumbed to the superior fighting strength of the Sultan. In 1824 the latter, who had already successfully prevented the revolt from spreading northwards,

Continued over

called upon his powerful vassal, Mohamed Ali, Pasha of Egypt, with his son Ibrahim, to crush the rebellion. The position at sea was now reversed, for the Pasha of Egypt had a tolerably trained squadron of war-ships. In 1825 the control of the sea enabled Ibrahim to land fresh troops of high quality. In April, after an heroic resistance, Mesolonghi fell. It was there that Byron had died of fever a year before. Despite the efforts of volunteer commanders like Sir Richard Church and Lord Cochrane, Athens surrendered in the summer of 1827.

More than volunteer effort was now needed for the salvation of Greece. Enthusiasm for the Greek cause had sent thousands of volunteers to fight in the War of Liberation, eager to repay a portion of the great debt that the Western World owes to Ancient Greece. But dreams "that Greece might yet be free" were far as yet from being realized. Not until the Greeks were at their last gasp did Great Britain, France, and Russia agree to intervene. In 1827 an allied fleet annihilated Ibrahim's Turko-Egyptian squadron at Navarino, and in 1828 the advance of Russian armies into Turkey removed the pressure from Greece.

Intervention of the Powers.

In 1829 a boundary line was drawn from the Gulf of Volo to the Gulf of Arta. South of that line the new State of Greece was created. A republic was at first set up, which only resulted in anarchy. In 1832 a monarchy was established, the crown being accepted by Prince Otto of Bavaria (1832–62). This first king proved incapable of furthering the progress of his adopted people, and was finally exiled in 1862. Prince George of Denmark succeeded him in 1863.

The Turks

No survey of the Balkan States can be complete without some description of the conquering race, the Ottoman Turks. Logically, indeed, our survey should begin with them; since without the Turkish conquests there would be no Eastern Question, at least in the form it has assumed in the nineteenth century. To ignore the Turk would be to play *Hamlet* without the Prince, or, rather, to present *Paradise Lost* without the Prince of Darkness.

Who were the Turks, and what brought them, an Oriental race, into contact with the West?

No one can fully explain why races and tribes move in a certain direction. But there are certain predisposing causes. Man's instinct compels him to seek the line of least resistance. If his lands become barren and his flocks and herds are growing lean, he must seek fresh woods and pastures new, where the struggle for existence will be less severe. This "moving on" will generally provoke hostilities with competing tribes, or the weak may be compelled by the strong to break camp and "trek" elsewhere.

Origin of Seljuk Turks.

Let us imagine Central Asia as a vast no-man's-land for the first thousand years of our era, bounded on the east by the great wall of China and on the west by what remained of the Eastern Roman Empire. In this area a ceaseless struggle raged between a number of obscure tribes, all of whom may be described broadly as belonging to the Mongolian race. First one tribe succeeds in subduing the rest, only to be in turn subjected by a new conqueror. Out of this welter of strife the Turks emerge and begin that westward march, which is for them the line of least resistance. This gigantic "shunting" process brought certain Turkish tribes into touch with the Arab Empire, which had been formed with marvellous rapidity in the seventh century. This meeting of Arabs and Turks was highly significant, for it endowed the latter with a religion pre-eminently suited to a fighting race.

The westward movement progressed but slowly until the tenth century, when the Caliph of the Arab Empire, which was now divided, and menaced by Persia, called in the Turks to his defence.

Westward movement.

The eleventh century saw the beginning of Turkish conquests on a grand scale. First appearing as the protectors of the Caliph of Bagdad, they rapidly succeeded to his dominions and carved out a vast empire, comprising Mesopotamia, Syria, Armenia, part of Persia, and most of Asia Minor. Then began the period of the Crusades, which failed signally to dislodge the Turks. Far more effective was the devastating wave of Mongol invasions in the thirteenth century, under Chingiz Khan, who swept, like a second Attila, over the middle East. When this

Rapid conquests.

storm subsided the Seljuk Turks fell into feudal anarchy, and the ensuing game of "general post" brought yet another tribe of Turks to Asia Minor. These were the Osmanlis. Coming first as saviours, then as usurpers, they gained their footing in much the same manner as their Seljuk kinsmen. Under their chief, Othman, from whom the Ottomans derive their name, they took Brusa, approached the Sea of Marmora, and by 1336 were masters of all Asia Minor. The next step forward would bring them into Europe.

Rise of the Ottoman Turks.

The point to grasp is that hitherto no Eastern invader had come so far in such good condition. The Seljuks were stale and exhausted by their previous struggle. The Ottoman branch arrived with youth and vigour unimpaired. Nomad by nature, they travelled far and fast, and brought surprisingly little luggage with them.

The Turk, unlike the Arab or the Norman, brought no art and culture, no governing genius in his wake. His book of chronicles is one long recital of battle and murder. He was first and last a fighter, and if to be a successful fighter entails a measure of self-restraint and temperance, these qualities may be allowed him. But these alone are not enough to justify his continued tyranny over progressive peoples. A prize-fighter may possess the like qualities; they do not qualify him for the office of Governor-General or Secretary of State. As a farmer and a fighter the Turk had undeniable qualities; of statesmanship and administration he was sublimely ignorant, and, being incorrigibly idle, he had no desire to learn. The Turk has been the cuckoo in the European nest. His tenure of European territory has been essentially military, and he has not the slightest intention of changing his methods of rule.

Qualities of the Turks.

Such was the race that was now for over three centuries to set its foot on the neck of the Balkan Peninsula. Their career of rapid European conquest is easily explained. In the fourteenth century, when the Turks first set foot in Europe, Slavs, Greeks, Albanians, and Bulgars were hopelessly divided against themselves. They were like some acrimonious vestry-meeting heatedly discussing a point

Causes of their rapid success.

BALKAN STATES
1914
By Treaty of Bukarest

0 50 100 150 200
Miles

of ritual, while an armed burglar is taking possession of the church plate.

Yet, even had they been united, the Western peoples might well have succumbed before the matchless valour and discipline of the Turkish hosts. Apart from the vigour of a great line of sultans, the Ottomans owed their conquests to the peculiar constitution of their army. Other empires and kings have employed foreign legions and maintained foreign body-guards, but there is no real parallel in history to the corps known as the Janissaries ("new soldiers"). This was raised by the steady accumulation of male children captured in war. Every fourth year one-fifth of these children were surrendered by conquered Christian communities as tribute. They were trained and educated for one purpose alone—the creation of professional soldiers. They literally turned Turk, were converted to Islam, and forgot their own people and their father's house. They were allowed neither to marry nor to follow a civil profession. They led a life apart. Their early training reminds us in its rigidity of the old Spartan or modern Prussian system; in its austerity it resembled the mediæval monastic orders, and in its unquestioning obedience to superiors it anticipated the Order of Jesuits.

Janissaries.

For this military caste, war was at first the sole interest in life. Later, when they began to realize their own corporate strength, like the old Roman legions they became a danger to their master. By Napoleon's time they had grown entirely insubordinate, so that in 1826 the sultan massacred their leaders and disbanded the corps.

It is easy to see how this "tribute of blood" must have sapped the vitality of the conquered provinces. It ensured that the best fighting-stock of the next generation should be found in the Turkish ranks, and explains the startling success achieved, when the Ottomans had once set foot on European soil.

Hardly less remarkable than this unique offensive weapon was the line of strong sultans, which endured with scarcely a break from Othman (1288) down to Suleiman the Great (1566). Once only in this period was their empire shaken, when, at the opening of the fifteenth century, there came the latest and worst of the Mongol invasions, led by Timour

Strong sultans.

the Lame (Tamerlane), himself of Turkish stock. By 1402 this "scourge of God" had overrun the whole of the Eastern world —in fact, judging by quantity, he must be counted the greatest conqueror the world has seen. At Angora he met and beat the Sultan Bayazid, whom, the story tells, he carried captive in a cage or litter. Only his own death in 1405, followed by the dissolution of his empire, brought relief to the Ottoman Turks.

Nothing could now save the helpless Greek Empire. In 1453 Constantinople fell. For about a hundred years from that date the Turks steadily increased their European dominion. The greater part of the eastern Mediterranean and the whole of the Black Sea became Turkish lakes. This conquest of the sea was perhaps the most important feature of the fall of Constantinople. The whole of the Balkan Peninsula, the Greek islands, and very nearly the whole of Hungary were overrun. Not until Vienna itself was menaced was a halt called to the victorious advance. The unsuccessful siege of Vienna in 1529, in the reign of Suleiman the Great, proved the high-water mark of conquest.

Capture of Constantinople.

Siege of Vienna.

From that date the tide began slowly to ebb, and it has ebbed slowly ever since. The causes are not far to seek. In the sixteenth century the Turks met for the first time the powerful resistance of a great empire. The House of Hapsburg, then at the height of its power, was able, despite many distractions, successfully to guard its eastern gates.

Beginning of decline.

Causes.

In the seventeenth century, under the capable administration of the Kiuprilis—viziers of Albanian race—Turkey enjoyed a brief revival. By the end of the century she had to face the rising ambition of Russia, the most formidable of all her foes. For the first time she was forced to adopt a defensive policy, for the Russian menace was two-fold: southward to the Black Sea and eastward to the Caucasus, and thence to Persia.

Rise of Russia.

In the eighteenth century began a series of great wars between Russia and Turkey, in which the former made notable advances. By 1774 the Crimea was Russian, and Russian ships were free to navigate the Black Sea. At this time, too, Russia began to assert her claim

Russo-Turkish Wars in eighteenth century.

to protect the Christians in the Turkish Empire, and looked ever more intently towards Constantinople, as the Mecca of the Orthodox Church. Almost simultaneously Austria (which had regained Hungary, 1699, and portions of Croatia and Slavonia) by the acquisition of Dalmatia advanced to the borders of Bosnia.

By the opening of the nineteenth century the Turkish Empire seemed doomed to dissolution. That she has survived so long as a European and an Asiatic Power is due in part to her strange vitality, but in the main to the conflicting ambitions of the great European Powers. The spoil was so valuable that the birds of prey could never agree to a peaceful division. Great Britain and France, mutually jealous, were mortally afraid of the giant power of Russia. The small nations which groaned under the Turkish yoke, even supposing they were capable of concerted action, were but pawns in the greater game of the Powers.

Rival ambitions of Great Powers.

Turkey became in turn the protégé of France, Great Britain, and finally of Germany, and out of this position she has sucked no small advantage. It has enabled her with impunity to defy the dictates of God and man in the treatment of her subject peoples. The incredible record of Armenian atrocities must remain as a terrible indictment of the international and diplomatic conscience of the latest age. "Of the 1,800,000 Armenians who were in the Ottoman Empire two years ago, 1,200,000 have been either massacred or deported. Less than a tenth of the Armenians who were in the empire in April 1915, after sufferings and privations which caused a high mortality, fled across the frontier to Caucasia or Egypt."[1]

The fear of Russian advance prevailed over disgust at Turkish contumacy. Up to 1878, Turkey was bolstered up in her wars with Russia. In the first of these nineteenth-century wars (1812) Russia regained Bessarabia and extended her frontier to the River Pruth. Between 1812 and 1829 the Turkish hold on the Balkans was challenged by the rising of Karageorge in Serbia and by the Greek War of Independence. The second Russian war, due to the Tsar's intervention on behalf of the Greeks, led to the opening of the

Russo-Turkish Wars in nineteenth century.

[1] Mr. Balfour to the American Committee for Armenian Relief, 26th February, 1917.

Bosphorus and Dardanelles to Russian ships, and increased Russian control over the Danube delta.

The ambitions of Mohamed Ali, the Viceroy of Egypt, led to a Convention of London in 1840, by which Turkey was protected from her formidable vassal, whose activities were henceforward confined to Egypt. In 1842 the Powers agreed to close the Dardanelles to warships of all nations. These measures were clearly dictated by fear of Russia. Then came the

Crimean War.

Crimean War, which called a further, albeit temporary halt to the march of Russia. In this war Great Britain and France definitely allied themselves to Turkey. They could not stand by and allow Russia to hasten the death of the "sick man" in order to divide the spoil.

Treaty of Paris, 1856.

The Treaty of Paris in 1856, admirable "on paper", in effect proved utterly futile. Its success depended entirely upon the ability of Turkey honestly to carry out her promised reforms in the treatment of her Christian subjects. But the Ethiopian could not change his skin. In theory, the treaty was framed to afford no future pretext to Russia or other Powers for further attacks upon Turkey. In fact, the hands of Russia were tied to the extent that she gave up her claims to protect Rumania; the Black Sea and Danube were neutralized; and the Bosphorus and Dardanelles were closed to all warships except those of Turkey.

Between 1856 and 1878 events in the Balkans led directly to a repetition of the old pre-Crimean situation. In 1859 Rumania became an independent State, and the spirit of Balkan nationality rose high. In the "seventies" Turkey resorted to her usual remedy —massacre of her rebellious subjects. The "Bulgarian atrocities" of 1876 startled Great Britain and the Western Powers out of their attitude of protectors of Turkish integrity and gave Russia a golden opportunity of taking the field as champion of the Pan-

War of 1877.

Slavic movement. In April, 1877 she declared war on Turkey. Then from July to December her advance southward was stayed by the heroic defence of Plevna, the capture of which cost the Russians nearly 60,000 men. Thereafter there was little to stop them, and in January the Turks sued for peace. Left to themselves, the Russians would

have cut the Ottoman Empire in pieces by the creation of a "Big Bulgaria" at the Peace of San Stefano, but the Powers intervened and the Congress of Berlin met to seek for a fresh and final solution of the Eastern Question.

IMPORTANT DATES

1389. Battle of Kosovo.
1453. Capture of Constantinople by the Turks.
1529. Siege of Vienna.
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries. Decline of Turkish Empire.
1804. Serbian Struggle for Independence begins.
1821–30. Greek War of Independence.
1859. Rumania Independent.
1878. Congress of Berlin.

For List of Books for Reference see Appendix I

CHAPTER XV

Congress of Berlin

After the fall of Plevna, in December, 1877, the Russians carried all before them, and the fate of the Turkish Empire appeared to be at their disposal.

In accordance with her traditional policy Great Britain was bitterly opposed to such a situation. Austria, too, was alarmed for the future success of her plans for aggrandizement in the Balkan Peninsula.

On 3rd March, 1878, Russia dictated her terms to Turkey in the Treaty of San Stefano. Briefly, they announced the complete independence of Serbia, Montenegro, and Rumania, and the creation of a new State—"a big Bulgaria"—extending from the Danube and Black Sea to the Albanian frontier, and including Macedonia and Eastern Rumelia. The little that remained to Turkey in Europe would be cut into two small slices. Russia herself was to reach the Danube by the cession of Southern Bessarabia, and to receive Batoum, Ardahan, and Kars, failing payment of a huge war indemnity.

Treaty of San Stefano.

To Great Britain and Austria such a settlement was quite intolerable, as Russian influence would unquestionably predominate throughout the peninsula. Both Powers made immediate preparations for war. The dispute was declared to be a European Question, and, as such, should be submitted to the arbitration of a congress. Realizing her own weakness and losses in the recent war, Russia finally agreed to submit her case to an International Conference.

Intervention of Powers.

In June, 1878, the Congress met at Berlin under the presidency of Bismarck, who assumed the unwonted rôle of benevolent neutral.

Settlement at Berlin.

After much dispute between Great Britain and Russia, a compromise agreeable to the Powers was arrived at, and the map of the Balkans re-fashioned.

The most important enactments of the Congress were the following:—

1. The "Big Bulgaria" projected by Russia at San Stefano was stifled. A State called Bulgaria was created between the Danube, Balkans, and Black Sea. Though still tributary it was to be self-governing and free to choose its own prince.

Macedonia was handed back to the tender mercies of Turkey, while south of the Balkans a Turkish province was created and named Eastern Rumelia. This was to be ruled by a Christian governor appointed by the Sultan. Its inhabitants were almost entirely Bulgars.

2. Rumania, which became independent, was compelled, sorely against her will, to give up Southern Bessarabia to Russia, for which she received in compensation the Dobrudja—a marshy tract inhabited largely by Bulgarians.

3. Serbia, which also gained complete independence, extended its boundaries in a south-easterly direction to include "unredeemed" Serb territory which she had actually occupied by successful war in 1877. (See map.)

Montenegro, which had never been completely conquered, was now nearly doubled in size. She received the port of Antivari and (in 1880) Dulcigno.

4. The Turkish provinces of Boznia-Hercegovina, entirely inhabited by Southern Slavs, were now to be occupied and

administered by Austria-Hungary. Nominally they remained a part of the Turkish Empire.

The narrow corridor district of Novi-Bazar was also retained by Turkey, but admitted Austrian garrisons.

5. Greece, which had to wait until 1881 for the satisfaction of her claims, received Thessaly and a portion of Epirus (*Arta* district); Crete and Albania were refused to her.

6. Russia, which had borne the brunt of the fighting, acquired, in the Caucasus, Ardahan, Kars, and Batoum, in addition to the Rumanian province of Bessarabia.

7. From below the Iron Gates, navigation of the Danube was to continue free, and war-ships were excluded.

Turkey retained control of the Dardanelles, from which foreign war-ships were still excluded.

8. Great Britain gained occupation of Cyprus in return for her support of Turkey. She paid yearly tribute for the island, and once more renewed the solemn injunction to the Sultan respecting reforms in the treatment of his Christian subjects.

This, in brief outline, was the achievement of the Berlin Conference of 1878.

In so far as it set out to prevent Russia from dismembering Turkey, it was a success. In so far as it established the small States—Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria, and Rumania—in real or virtual independence, it deserved credit. In so far as it aimed at a peaceful and permanent settlement of the Eastern Question, it was a conspicuous failure.

Its partial success.

That *Austria-Hungary* had now a definite stake in Balkan concerns by the control of Bosnia-Hercegovina augured ill for the future of the small Slav nationalities of Serbia and Montenegro. For them the decline of Slavonic Russian influence marked the entry of the Teutonic Powers with an aggressive forward policy which threatened to absorb the smaller Balkan States. While the Austrians occupied Novi-Bazar and Bosnia-Hercegovina there could be no union between Serbia and Montenegro, still less a greater union of South Slavonic States —the ideal longed for by the Serbian nationalists. Bosnia-Hercegovina was an Eastern Alsace-Lorraine.

Interest of Austria-Hungary.

Bulgaria was now indeed a separate State, but not the State constructed at San Stefano. She was disappointed of her hopes of uniting all Bulgarian districts and becoming the dominant State in the peninsula.

Rumania bitterly resented the loss of Bessarabia. By her high-handed action, Russia estranged a people who should have been her natural ally, and drove them into close relationship with Austria-Hungary. "Rather Russia as foe than guardian" now became the watchword of Rumanian foreign policy.

For Great Britain the Congress was a triumph over Russian ambition. Russia was the most serious danger to our Eastern interests. We desired no more than to call a halt to her march through the Ottoman Empire. The "integrity of Turkey" was the corner-stone of our foreign policy. Our faith in the Sultan's ability to rule his Christian peoples righteously was touching in its simplicity. Our occupation of Cyprus in return for support lent to Turkey gave opportunity for foreigners to doubt the purity of our motives. Here, at least, self-interest triumphed over altruism, in so far as Cyprus was a convenient post from which to guard our line of approach to India. The Sultan on his side was gratified by the regular payment of an annual tribute.

The Congress was an attempt at compromise. As an attempt to find a lasting solution of the Eastern Question, or Questions, it was a complete failure. It failed to satisfy the small nationalities; it failed to secure guarantees for Turkish reforms; while so far from allaying the jealousies of the Great Powers, it introduced Austria-Hungary as a new and powerful rival to Russia in the politics of the Near East.

General criticism of the Congress.

Within seven years of its signature, Bulgaria, by annexing Eastern Rumelia, defied the treaty, and set an example which all States concerned were quick to follow. On the outbreak of the Balkan Wars of 1912 there was little left of the treaty which Lord Beaconsfield extolled in 1878. The "settlement" brought neither peace nor honour.

CHAPTER XVI

France in the Nineteenth Century

The recent policy of France has displayed none of the thirst for military renown that characterizes the ages of Louis XIV and the great Napoleon. The military tradition has endured, but her time of aggressive warfare is long since past. Her modern conquests have been made in the realms of science, literature, arts, and crafts. Only in the race for colonies has she found occasion for serious disputes with rival Powers. Although the loss of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871 was never forgotten, and the restitution of these provinces was looked forward to as an ideal which must one day be fulfilled, there are no historical grounds for asserting that a restless desire for *revanche* was a contributory cause of the Great War.

Importance of French history in nineteenth century.

Yet in a general survey of the nineteenth century the history of France is indispensable.

You may collect the parts of an engine or machine, but, without knowledge of the principle which governs it, you are powerless to construct a working model. It is just so in dealing with the nineteenth century. We must seek the general principles round which the bewildering masses of facts may be grouped. Out of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic age emerged the twin principles of democracy and nationality. The idea of liberty is common to both. In the former, France was most directly interested. Though she had her unredeemed provinces to regain, she had no subject peoples within her borders. But with the growth of democracy she has been critically concerned: it is here that she has served as a "political thermometer" to other nations. It is upon this aspect of her fortunes rather than upon her foreign politics that we desire to lay most stress in this chapter.

Growth of democracy.

For the sake of clearness, the century of French history may be divided into five periods. The first of these, from 1815 to 1830, may be called the Restoration. It is the period of the Bourbon kings, Louis XVIII and Charles X, and ends in a great revolution.

Divisions of French history.

The second period, from 1830 to 1848, witnessed an experiment in Constitutional Monarchy—the reign of Louis Philippe—and ended in a still greater revolution.

Kings were tried and found wanting. The third period, 1848–52, was very short. A republic was set up which satisfied nobody.

The fourth period saw the restoration of an empire, due mainly to the magic of the name of Bonaparte. This period, too, ended in revolution.

The fifth and last period begins in 1871 with the establishment of the Third Republic, which has endured for half a century.

Truly may France be called the "Land of Revolutions". Often it seemed that she was condemned for ever to be the prey to factions and parties, and would never rise from these to the dignity and strength of a united national policy. It is important to distinguish, through all these revolutions and changes of dynasty, the steady increase of the democratic idea, which in the end prevailed, and substituted a public opinion and representative government in place of the interests of a class or the irresponsible will of a monarch.

France the land of revolutions.

In 1815, when the tumult and the fighting had died, and the Congress of Vienna bade fair to inaugurate an age of talk after an age of action, the situation in France was highly unsettled. There were many rival parties. It was as if in England the heirs of Cromwell, the Stuarts, the Hanoverians, and the admirers, say, of Mr. Bernard Shaw, were jostling rudely to secure the reins of power. So you get a crude notion of the distracted state of France.

First let us trace the events which led up to the Revolution of 1830. When Napoleon I was exiled to St. Helena, Louis XVIII, brother of Louis XVI, came to the throne, pledged to rule as a Constitutional king. He consented to the adoption of a charter, which guaranteed personal and religious liberty and freedom of the Press. Deputies were elected to share with the king the making of the laws. They were by no means representative of the nation, since only those who possessed a considerable income had the right either to vote or stand for

Restoration of Bourbons.

election. This compromise satisfied neither the ultra-royalists nor the extreme republicans. Still, the reign of Louis was, on the whole, peaceful, owing to the moderation and good sense of the king, who was an old man and had no desire to go on his travels again.

Louis XVIII.

On his death in 1824 he was succeeded by his brother, Charles X, a man of very different calibre. He had learned nothing and forgotten nothing in exile, and proposed to restore the *ancien régime* and ignore the accomplished facts of the great Revolution. He roundly declared that he would sooner saw wood than reign after the manner of an English king. He had the courage of his convictions. Choosing his ministers from the ultra-royalist party, his first act was to introduce a Bill for the vote of a milliard of francs, to compensate the *émigrés* for the loss of their lands. He tried in every way to restore the old power and privileges of the Church. Still more unpopular was his restoration of a rigid Press censorship. The successful colonial venture resulting in the capture of Algiers (January–July, 1830) encouraged the king to try his subjects even more highly. He issued four Ordinances on 26th July, 1830, which in effect would deprive the Press of all liberty, and would limit the franchise to landed proprietors. This was a direct violation of the Charter.

Charles X.

On the 28th July Paris rose, barricades were erected, the king's troops, some of whom deserted him, were fairly beaten in a series of street battles. Charles X had no choice but to abdicate. This he did, and in August embarked from Cherbourg for England. Thus the Bourbon absolutism had its day and ceased to be.

Revolution of 1830.

The full significance of this revolution was not confined to France. In 1830 Belgium struck for her independence; Poland rose against Russia. In Italy, in Switzerland, in Brunswick, Saxony, Hanover, and other German States was witnessed the outbreak of the revolutionary fever. The symptoms were unmistakable: the desire for national independence and the overthrow of oppressive rule. France had led the way.

Out of the July revolution arose a fresh experiment in monarchy. Louis Philippe, of the House of Orleans, was chosen king.

He was in a difficult position, because France was still divided into several parties. Besides the remnant of the Bourbon Legitimists there was a Bonapartist faction which looked for the restoration of a strong military State. Lastly, there were the direct heirs of the French Revolution, the Republicans, who wished for the abolition of the monarchy and a return to the principles of 1792. These last were reinforced by what may be called a Labour Party, the pioneers of the modern Socialists. Between 1830 and 1848 this party had to be more and more seriously reckoned with by the king and his ministers.

Louis Philippe and the middle party.

Louis Philippe formed a middle party, averse alike from military dreams and levelling tendencies. It followed that he drew his chief support from the wealthy bourgeois class. In other words, he tried to forget the watchwords of the Great Revolution and the victories of the great Napoleon. Both had proved failures, but none the less both were facts; both were indelibly impressed on the mind and imagination of the French people. Louis Philippe was what we now call a poor psychologist. A respectable mediocrity, he succeeded in thoroughly boring his subjects. While his policy of peace at any price alienated the Bonapartists, his utter failure to grasp the growing nettle of Socialism ensured his downfall. Perhaps his most attractive trait was the simplicity of his private life. He loved to walk through the streets of Paris, with his umbrella under his arm, stopping here and there to greet the workingmen. His levées were entirely informal, and in the homely royal household the bourgeoisie saw the reflection of their own virtues. During the first ten years of his reign Louis Philippe had to fight hard against the Legitimist Bourbons, who had still a party, and against a series of Republican risings. By 1840 he and his minister, Guizot, had triumphed, and for the next eight years bent all their energies to the preservation of "things as they are".

Le roi bourgeois.

It was the age of Industrial Revolution in France. Machinery had displaced hand labour. Unemployment and low wages created a dangerous mob in the large cities. So long as the Government refused to extend the franchise, the working-classes were powerless to voice their grievances and insist upon

Labour unrest.

redress by Parliamentary means.[1] New bourgeois was but old noble writ large. There was no lack of suggested remedies; indeed the example of Babœuf, who under the Directory had advocated the abolition of private property, had been followed by many Socialistic reformers. About 1830 St. Simon had preached a "new Christianity" which should reorganize society and close the widening breach between the employer and his workmen. But his views were much too vague to impress the working classes, who were bewildered by a multitude of rival Utopian schemes.

In 1840 Louis Blanc, a young journalist, produced a book entitled the *Organization of Labour*, in which he outlined a precise programme of reforms. It was, he declared, the *duty of the State* to provide work for all. National workshops should supersede private enterprise, and should be controlled by the workers, who would divide the profits. It was a form of co-operation.

Louis Blanc.

Guizot, the king's mouthpiece, steadily refused to make any concessions, and discontent grew ever more intense, till, in February, 1848, the crisis was reached.

The Reform party, which included a number of Opposition deputies, had determined to hold a banquet in Paris. This the Government forbade, and troops were ordered to parade the streets. The National Guards openly sympathized with the people. Recognizing the situation to be serious, the king dismissed Guizot, but he was too late.

An attack by the troops upon the crowd on the night of 23rd February sealed the fate of the monarchy. All Paris rose; the soldiers were ill-led and half-hearted. Not even a strong personality could have saved the throne; Louis Philippe played for safety, and, like Charles X, fled to England. He was not regretted. He was never in touch with the nation. He starved the proud military tradition; the strength of the fermenting democratic spirit he never gauged.

Revolution of 1848.

With the fall of the July Monarchy a decree of universal suffrage was at once passed, and France became for five years a republic in name.

[1] Of a population of more than 30,000,000 only 190,000 persons possessed a vote.

This Second Republic was never firmly established. A struggle at once ensued, between the moderates and the extreme labour agitators, which threatened to dissolve all elements of order. National workshops, which were intentionally but a caricature of Louis Blanc's scheme, were opened, and proved a hopeless failure. The Government had very little useful work to offer, and, since it undertook to pay all applicants, thousands of rogues and vagabonds and idlers were attracted to Paris, and the precious scheme was found to be costing the State 150,000 francs per day. Then the workshops were closed, and the workers invited either to join the army or betake themselves to the provinces. In June, 1848, insurrection broke out, and, after street fighting of the most savage description, entailing 10,000 casualties, General Cavaignac, acting for the moderate Republicans, restored peace, and became temporary dictator.

The Second Republic.

National workshops.

But security and confidence were badly shaken. Trade and commerce suffered accordingly. Like the business men, the peasants dreaded the Socialist programme, which, they feared, would divorce them from their lands. The vast majority of Frenchmen longed for the return of a settled Government, capable of keeping the peace at home and restoring the declining national prestige. A strong executive, guided by a strong man, was the crying need of the hour. History so far repeated itself in that a second heir to a revolution arose from the house of Napoleon to heal the wounds and advance the glory of his country.

The Assembly of "moderates", which met after Cavaignac's suppression of the June agitators, framed a new Constitution. It consisted of a single Chamber of deputies, who made the laws, and a President, who executed them. He was to hold office for four years, and was elected by vote of the whole people.

The events of 1848 had brought back Prince Louis Napoleon, nephew of the great Napoleon, to fish in the troubled waters. Now a man of forty, he had spent his life in exile, and was almost unknown in France. In 1848 it was the name that mattered. When Louis Napoleon, who had already been elected as deputy for several departments, declared his intention of standing for the Presidency, he had the solid support

Louis Napoleon.

of the army[1] and the peasantry. It would not be difficult to woo and win the working classes in the city. A legend was well established that Napoleon I had intended to rule as the people's emperor. Had not Prince Louis himself, as author of a work entitled *Napoleonic Ideas*, developed this novel point of view? Now he stood forth, a second Antony, to enlist all hearts by reciting Cæsar's will.

He was elected President, with an overwhelming majority over three other candidates.

He now set himself with consummate skill to overthrow the Second Republic. The army was already with him. He won the sympathy of the Church by sending an expedition in 1849 to overthrow the Roman Republic and restore the Pope (p. 117). He spared no pains to render the Assembly of deputies unpopular in the eyes of the nation. At length, by a *coup d'état*, which was a model of careful preparation, he overthrew the Constitution (December, 1851), and replaced it by a form of government which corresponded roughly to the Consulate of 1800. The nation approved by an almost unanimous vote. Exactly one year later, with equal unanimity, it proclaimed Louis Napoleon Emperor of the French.

The "coup d'état" of December, 1851.

The Second Empire, December, 1852.

Before we review the main events of the Second Empire, it is well to recall that the notable events of 1848 in France had tremendous significance for nearly the whole of Europe. The French Revolution of 1848 was a stone thrown into the European lake. The surface was ruffled in ever-widening circles, until all but the big backwater of Russia[2] was vitally affected. The spirit of self-government was abroad. It smote with double force in the name of the small nation and in the name of liberal constitutions. In Baden, Saxony, Bavaria, Hanover, and other German States the rulers granted reform. At Berlin and Vienna, the high places of despotism, the eagles of autocracy were roughly shaken in their eyries. In Italy, Hungary, Bohemia, the storm broke.

Effect of French Revolution, 1848, on Europe.

[1] A veteran of the great wars exclaimed: "How should I not vote for this gentleman—I, whose nose was frozen at Moscow?"

[2] And even in Russia there were no less than sixty-four serf insurrections.

Metternich fled from Vienna, never to return. There were revolutions in Switzerland; there were risings in Spain. In Holland the king authorized a Commission to discuss reforms.

Thus the heat wave indicated by the French thermometer had spread till it affected nearly the whole of Europe.

The eighteen years' personal rule of Napoleon III, on which the nation built such high hopes, were doomed to end in disillusion and disaster.

Character of Napoleon III.

In 1852 France was hypnotized by a name. Just as in 1799, at the *coup d'état* of Brumaire, Napoleon I, standing for the restoration of order at home and the revival of the national glory abroad, had snatched the supreme power from the nerveless grasp of the Directory, so, in 1852, his nephew appeared to the vast majority of Frenchmen as the saviour of the State and people.

Perhaps no man in history has deceived himself or others more profoundly. He owed his early successes to the prestige of his house and to a certain air of mystery which covered his physical inertness and mental indecision. It seemed that his strength was to sit still. Yet when he attained to imperial power he failed signally to justify his name by brilliant action, and all his defects of character were exposed. His reign became one long series of disasters. By 1870 he had all France against him, and through him the cause of Bonapartism was lost. The principles of monarchy have died hard in France; the Second Empire, which dragged her down to ruin, bade fair to destroy these principles for ever.

His ambitions.

Napoleon III resembled his uncle only in the wide range of his ambitions: he could not translate them into action. His programme was universal in its scope. At home the rights of man would be regarded. The empire, he declared, stood for peace. All classes would profit, because every branch of trade and industry would prosper. The interests of the Church would be ardently promoted. Abroad, France would shine forth as the champion of oppressed nationalities, and would become the magnanimous judge of the disputes and rivalries of less happy States. France should enlarge her borders; colonies would increase and multiply.

That was the dream. Let us turn to the fulfilment.

The Second Empire lasted eighteen years, which may conveniently be divided into two periods at the year 1860. In the first period, from 1852 to 1860, Napoleon was despotic at home and liberal abroad. He made himself dictator in France by silencing the Press, by assuming entire control of finances, and by manipulating the elections so as to ensure the return of his own nominees. **Foreign Policy.**

In his foreign policy, as champion of the oppressed he was conspicuously successful in the Crimean War (1853–6) and in his intervention against the Austrians in the cause of Italian freedom (1859). **Crimea.**

This last campaign had all-important results for Napoleon's domestic situation. It marked the turning-point of his reign—the end of the despotic period—and the reason for this is clear. Assistance given to the Italian Nationalists was contrary to the interests of the Pope, for which Napoleon professed himself so concerned. The Catholic party in France was alienated from him. At the same time a commercial treaty with Great Britain was concluded which met with bitter opposition from most French manufacturers. Napoleon had lost his natural allies. He was compelled to bid for popular support by granting to the Assemblies the power of criticizing home and foreign policy. The concession recoiled upon his own head: he forged a weapon against himself which was to grow ever more powerful. **Italy.**

From 1860 onwards his fortunes steadily declined. From 1861 to 1866 he committed himself to a reckless adventure in the affairs of Mexico, out of which he expected ultimately to establish a vast French colonial empire. Meanwhile he proposed to foist an Austrian archduke upon the Mexican people, who had no desire to accept him. The whole scheme lacked judgment, foresight, and management. Napoleon's troops were insufficient to operate in such a vast country. As soon as their civil war ended, the United States intervened peremptorily in assertion of the Monroe doctrine (see p. 293), the French tamely withdrew, and the archduke was left to be shot as a common rebel. Men now began to lose confidence in an emperor who spent life and money so lavishly with no return for his outlay. A great **Mexico.**

opposition party was fast growing, including many Republicans. The emperor halted between two opinions, but, on the whole, he tended steadily to renounce his absolute power. He would graciously delegate his sovereignty to a people which was now capable of exercising it. His Parliament was now to control the Budget and the actions of his ministers. The liberty of the Press was restored.

Meanwhile, in the field of foreign politics the emperor had begun his contest of wits with Bismarck, who had taken his measure to a nicety. In 1866 the neutrality of France was easily gained by hints of French reward in Belgium, Luxembourg, or on the Rhine. Napoleon, indeed, welcomed the idea of a war between Prussia and Austria: it would be a war of exhaustion, from which France had everything to gain. When that war broke out the Austrian armies were crushed in less than seven weeks. Prussia, now unquestionably the greatest military power in Europe, had advanced her frontier to the eastern gates of France. (See map.)

Relations with Bismarck.

This startling result fell like a bolt from the blue on the emperor and his advisers. It was France, men said, who had been beaten at Sadowa. Napoleon had misconstrued everything. It was now no longer a question of decreased prestige: it was a question of national security. The rights of small nations were forgotten. There was nothing for it but to beg for compensation, and trust to Prussian gratitude. The emperor's requests for Belgium, the Rhine Palatinate, or Luxembourg were contemptuously rejected by Bismarck, who kept them for the edification of other Powers. (The publication in 1870 of the demand for Belgium did much to alienate English sympathy which might have inclined towards France.)

Common sense now dictated prompt and energetic military reforms, much needed to ensure efficiency in the war which was fated to come.

But Napoleon was fast bound in the fetters he had himself forged. The extravagance of the Imperial Court was appalling. Finance ministers had been unbusiness-like and unscrupulous. And now it was in the power of a representative Assembly to criticize their methods. "Economy"

Internal condition of France.

became the popular cry. Urgent army reforms implied increased expenditure; therefore these reforms were never properly effected. The emperor, now the prey to a terrible disease, had no resolution left. Only a vigorous commanding personality could have saved France at this eleventh hour. His inaction stands in strange contrast to the iron nerve of Bismarck under similar circumstances.

It is unnecessary to detail here the course of events which led immediately up to the disaster of 1870 (see Chapter VIII). The stars in their courses seemed to fight for Bismarck, and impelled Napoleon, now a very sick man, to submit, partly against his will, to the dictation of the empress and her advisers, who clamoured loudly for war. Napoleon must have known that the army was utterly unprepared, and by his own irresolute diplomacy he had not a single ally to help him. Only the magnificent fighting spirit of the French soldiers postponed final defeat and surrender for six months. But for this the war might well have ended in six weeks. The whole of the odds were in favour of Prussia. She was superior in every department: in high command, in numbers, in armament. At the outset, it was a calamity that Napoleon, who was incapable of sustained thought or effort, should have acted as Commander-in-Chief. (He resigned the command to Bazaine on 11th August.) Apart from him, very few general officers had kept abreast of their profession, or studied the new problems introduced by railways and modern guns. Because the French Chassepot rifle was actually superior to the Prussian weapon, the leaders were induced to pin their faith to defensive warfare, and failed to utilize the natural genius of their troops for attack. Again, Algerian fighting, where casual bravery sufficed, had led them to incur the risks of war too lightly. They were incapable of thinking out scientifically, and in detail, the conduct of a great campaign. Scouting and intelligence were woefully defective. Officers had no "eye for country". Very few could read a map, even supposing a map were forthcoming. (One map of the Moselle district did duty for an army corps.) The French guns were old-fashioned, while the Prussians had Krupp breech-loaders, and nearly twice as many of them. This advantage was increased by the fact that at ranges between 1500 and 3000 metres

The war of 1870.

Defects of the French army.

the French guns were ineffective, because the shells with fuses timed to explode at intermediate distances were no longer manufactured. The French had about 150 "mitrailleuses". These, too, were useless, for the gunners had no previous experience in handling them.

Hard fighting and sheer heroism could not avail to balance such inferiority, much less to outweigh the genius of Moltke and his staff, the machine-like precision, and the long preparation which left nothing to chance in the war-plans of Prussia.

The Prussian tactics were far from perfect, but the strategy of Moltke, who kept in touch with all the armies by means of the field-telegraph, was beyond reproach.

The first part of the war lasted just a month. Beginning with the loss of Alsace, which followed a great battle at Woerth (6th August), and the shutting up of Bazaine with 180,000 men in Metz, it ended with the surrender of the emperor and his army at Sedan, on 2nd September. That was the end of the Empire.

Sedan.

The second period of the war lasted for five months, during which France struggled to repel the invader. Paris was besieged from 19th September to 28th January, 1871, when it was starved into capitulation.

Abdication of Napoleon. Siege of Paris.

A National Assembly was elected to discuss the terms of peace. Two ministers—Thiers and Jules Favre—met Bismarck at Versailles. By the final treaty, which was signed at Frankfort, France ceded Alsace (except Belfort) and the north of Lorraine with Metz. She agreed to pay an indemnity of £200,000,000.

No sooner were the preliminaries of peace arranged than a savage and senseless attack was made upon the National Assembly by the Paris mob. There was a widespread belief that the country had been betrayed into surrender, and that defeat was not final. The workmen were starving; the Socialist element inflamed them. Before the Government fully realized their danger, the malcontents had seized the guns and mounted them on Montmartre, which commands the city. A new Government—the Commune—was proclaimed.

The Commune.

The German troops who held the eastern portion of Paris

now witnessed the strange spectacle of civil war in the city they had so lately reduced. Paris was subjected to a second and more terrible siege. For six weeks the insurgents held out. On 21st May, reinforced by the return of 150,000 soldiers lately released from Germany, the Government troops re-entered Paris. After a week of desperate fighting, during which the Communards did their best to set fire to the city, order was restored, and France was free at last to begin the uphill task of reconstruction.

The last period of French history that we have to discuss is concerned with the building of the Third Republic, which has lasted from 1871 up to the present day. Fully half a century has elapsed since the last great revolution, and there are no signs that modern France is weary of her present form of government. The Third Republic.

It would be easy to over-emphasize the contrast between this recent period and the troublous times that preceded it. The character and genius of the people have not altered; many of the old notes are still sounded, but the key has changed. Since 1870 we seem to hear the organ-voice of a *nation* rising above the drums and the fifes of party. The party discords die hard, witness the Boulanger and the Dreyfus crises, but there has emerged a solid and sane expression of public opinion which is strong enough to drown them. As Thiers summed it up: "It is the Republic which divides us least".

It is sufficient for our purpose to lay stress upon three aspects of the Third Republic, which correspond roughly to three periods. These may be called the period of Reconstruction, lasting until 1881; the period of Colonial Expansion, from 1881 to 1904; and, lastly, the period of the "Triple Entente".

The ten years following on the tremendous disasters of 1870 and 1871 imposed upon France the double burden of paying off the huge indemnity and rebuilding her shattered fortunes and prestige. Reconstruction.

Naturally these were not years of expansion or adventure.

The indemnity was paid off by the spring of 1873, and the German army of occupation quitted French territory. Then, with amazing energy and patience, the new Republic undertook the work of recuperation. The lost provinces were ever mourned,

but the immediate problem was to maintain peace even in face of German provocation, until, in the fulness of time, their recovery should lie within the range of practical politics. Meanwhile Frenchmen must refrain from all open expression of *revanche*. It seemed as though France had set her teeth to endure the lean years, and to apply the lessons of thoroughness in organization and method which she had learned from her conqueror. The national revival was little short of miraculous, even if we allow for the natural fertility of the soil and the thrifty and industrious character of the people.

The Republican form of government was at last firmly founded, owing to the work of two great men—Thiers and Gambetta. By 1875 army reform was well under way, and a fourth battalion was established for every regiment. This measure Germany chose to regard as a direct menace to herself. Von Moltke and the fire-eaters clamoured loudly for a second war which should finally bleed France white. Only the protests of Great Britain and Russia prevailed to avert a criminal and unprovoked attack. Bismarck, who tried to shift the whole responsibility on Von Moltke, now set himself to keep France isolated. The whole incident betrayed the hectoring tone of Germany, and convinced France that she must be ever watchful and prepared.

In ten years France had restored her fortunes. She was amply justified in embarking upon a forward colonial policy. It is interesting to remember that in so doing she met with the unreserved encouragement and approval of Bismarck, who foresaw that successes abroad would be certain to embroil France with Great Britain. There was no surer method of securing the continued isolation of France in Europe. Russia had long been on friendly terms with Prussia, and while Bismarck remained in power "the wire to Petrograd" was never cut.

Colonial policy.

So France began to develop her colonial empire. It was in Africa that she was mainly interested. She alone of the Great Powers had the advantage of close proximity to her dependencies. It was her aim to extend her territory along the North African seaboard, to become the great Mediterranean power, and then penetrate inland to the heart of the Dark Continent. There

was, of course, no question of establishing colonies by emigration of French settlers on a large scale. The population of France did not admit of this, nor, except in Algiers, Morocco, and Tunis, did the climate of Africa favour the growth of "white man's" colonies.

African protectorates.

Economy and a stationary population demanded that French colonies should take the form of protectorates, and as such they have been astonishingly successful. The Frenchman has a natural gift for tactful and sympathetic handling of native coloured races. Unlike the Englishman, he is not averse from intermarriage with them. Unlike the German, he is slow to impose, wholesale, methods of government which are alien to and misunderstood by the native. This aptitude of France was well shown in the eighteenth century, when she had a long start of Great Britain in India and Canada.

Tunis.

In 1881 Tunis was occupied, and became a protectorate. Its prosperity has been most remarkable. Unfortunately, the occupation clashed with the cherished ambitions of Italy, which had similar visions of a North African empire. Now that France had anticipated her on what she considered her own ground, Italy threw in her lot with Prussia and Austria, and the year 1882 saw the formation of the Triple Alliance (p. 129).

Events in Egypt.

Far more serious was the feud which now began with Great Britain. It arose over the condition of Egypt. Up to 1880 it was French and not British institutions and culture that had prevailed in that country. Yet, when the Suez Canal was constructed, Britain could not remain indifferent to the future of Egypt. When, in 1881, the Arabi revolt broke out (p. 233), Britain invited France to join her in restoring order and ensuring a settled government. The French Chamber refused men and money for the expedition, which was undertaken by Great Britain alone. For the next twenty years France did all in her power to increase the immense difficulties of the British occupation. There was continued friction, until, in 1898, the Fashoda incident brought both countries to the verge of war. This was exactly what Bismarck had worked for. French opinion was successfully diverted from Europe, and the old feud between the two great colonial powers was maintained for a few years longer.

Jealousy of Great Britain.

In point of fact, the retirement of Bismarck in 1890 had put an end to the isolation of France. By 1896 a cordial understanding was reached with Russia, so that France no longer felt defenceless and friendless.

William II's policy.

The restless and provocative policy and speech-making of William II soon destroyed the diplomatic web so skilfully woven by Bismarck, and cleared the path towards an Anglo-French agreement. From 1898 it became ever clearer to both France and Britain that common interests made an understanding essential. In 1904 all differences were sunk: Britain was given a free hand in Egypt, and, on her side, recognized the French protectorate of Morocco. That was the beginning of a close friendship, one of the first results of which was the *rapprochement* in 1907 between Russia and Great Britain.

Formation of Triple Entente.

By the end of this middle period, from 1881 to 1904, France was unquestionably the second greatest colonial power in the world. She controlled nearly the whole of North-West Africa. The north was linked to the west by the occupation of a series of oases, and a "trans-Sahara" railway is contemplated. Notable among her other possessions were Madagascar, Annam, and Tonkin in the Far East, and, in the West, Guadeloupe, Martinique, and French Guiana.

Home affairs.

At home the Third Republic stood quite firm against the last assaults of party, whether monarchical or anarchist. A dangerous attack took place been 1886 and 1889, when General Boulanger, an adventurer with nothing but a handsome presence and a glib tongue to commend him, conspired with Bonapartists, Radicals, and other hotheads to overthrow the Republic. Known in popular songs as "General Revanche", he was the advocate of military reforms, and so gained a following among the soldiers. The man was a danger to the country, because, as War Minister and head of a "League of Patriots", he was extremely likely to afford a plausible excuse to Germany for waging a second war. Fortunately the Republican party was strong enough to suppress Boulanger, who fled to Brussels, where, later, he died by his own hand.

Boulanger.

In 1894 the Republic had to meet a far more dangerous

situation. The Army and Church parties allied themselves to discredit the Government, which, they declared, was exploiting the best interests of the nation, both in military and financial circles, in favour of the Jews. A fierce anti-Jewish movement led to the conviction of a Jewish officer, Captain Dreyfus, who was charged with selling plans to the German Government.

The Dreyfus case.

The country was split into two factions, and, quite apart from the merits of the case, it was clear that the movement was a blow at the credit of the Government. The friends of Dreyfus, among whom were some of the ablest thinkers in the country, did not rest until the case was retried. In 1899, before a fresh court at Rennes, the evidence against Dreyfus was proved to have been forged, but not until seven years later was full reparation made and Dreyfus reinstated in the army.

From 1904 onward the revival of France caused increasing anxiety to Germany. So far from being isolated, France appeared capable, in German eyes, of turning the tables and isolating Germany. All the while, in both countries, it was felt that there could be no assured peace so long as Alsace-Lorraine continued to be a part of the German Empire.

German restlessness.

Germany lost no time before testing the strength of the Anglo-French agreement. In 1905 the Kaiser paid a visit to Morocco, in the course of which he declared that Germany intended to negotiate with the sultan independently of France, and that no measures affecting the control of Morocco should be taken without the approval of Germany. This move was made at a significant date—three weeks after the Russian defeat at Mukden. France was unready for war, and might, therefore, be constrained to yield a portion of Morocco. She must be shown that the British alliance was useless to her. To separate Britain and France was the supreme object. And here the Kaiser completely failed. He did succeed in procuring the resignation of M. Delcassé, the "Anglophil" Foreign Minister, and insisting on the calling of a conference to settle Moroccan affairs. But this conference, meeting at Algeciras in 1906, confirmed to France her position as a protecting Power.

Crisis in Morocco, 1905.

Algeciras Conference, 1906.

This intervention of Germany had an all-important consequence: it hastened the agreement in 1907 between Great Britain and Russia, which ended all outstanding differences in Afghanistan, Tibet, and Persia. Germany, therefore, paid dearly for her interference, and lost what little faith she possessed in the settlement of quarrels by conference.

The Agadir incident, 1911.

In 1911 Germany made yet another attempt to fasten a quarrel on France. When French troops entered Fez to suppress a native rising, the German gunboat *Panther* was sent to Agadir to "safeguard German interests". Again Britain and France stood firm. We made no secret of our resolve to stand by our ally. War was narrowly averted, perhaps only because the Potsdam War Council decided that they were not quite prepared. The pacific intentions of France were proved by her cession of a portion of the Congo, and the war-cloud once more lifted.

In 1914, when Germany declared war on Russia, France had no choice: honour and self-preservation clearly summoned her to arms, and she was not slow to answer the call.

IMPORTANT DATES

1830. Revolution—Abdication of Charles X.
Accession of Louis Philippe.
1848. Revolution—The Second Republic.
1852. Second Empire.
1870–71. Franco-Prussian War.
1871. The Commune.
The Third Republic.
1881. Occupation of Tunis.
1895. Franco-Russian Alliance.
1904. Anglo-French Agreement.

For List of Books for Reference see Appendix I

CHAPTER XVII

The British Empire in the Nineteenth Century

The beginning of the twentieth century has seen a great change in the relations between Great Britain and her neighbours. We have been forced to take a side in a vast Continental war, to create armies on a scale undreamed of, and to send them to fight on European battle-fields side by side with our allies.

British foreign policy.

If we look back more than a hundred years, to the great war against Napoleon, we shall find indeed no parallel in the numbers we employed nor in the resources we could command; but then, as now, we were called on to support an alliance by sea and land against a tyranny that threatened our existence as a free people.

In a survey of the period between the fall of Napoleon and the close of the nineteenth century two facts emerge: first, that a British army has appeared only once to fight in European battle-fields; secondly, that extra-European wars have persistently occurred where British troops have been called, *in the cause of empire*, to fight in nearly every part of the world. Whenever our relations with a European Power have been strained, the source of trouble can always be traced to our concern for the safety of our overseas dominions. Thus, our consistent support of Turkey against the advance of Russia was prompted by fears for the safety of India. We were on the brink of war with France over the partition of Africa and the administration of Egypt. Only for the neutrality of Belgium, which so vitally concerned our own safety and honour, were we ready to take sides in a European as contrasted with an Imperial question.

Colonial interests predominate.

And when we look back to the infancy of our Colonial Empire we see that this aloofness from the European arena is not of yesterday. The eighteenth century saw a British king for the last time lead his troops abroad in person. For the most part we were satisfied that our fleet would "keep foreigners from fooling

us". If Canada was won on the plains of Germany, this was the result of British gold rather than British arms. A big bank deposit was the best guarantee of the balance of power. Against Napoleon, it is true, we gave freely of all that we had. While we owed our preservation to the power of the sea, we needed more than that to crush the power of the land. When at length that danger was removed we reverted to our insular position—"in a great pool a swan's nest". The early nineteenth century brought us many problems—offspring of the Industrial Revolution—Slave Emancipation, the Reform of Parliament, the Free-trade controversy, and the eternal problem of Ireland. We were burdened with an enormous debt; the war had brought vast additions to our colonies. While we looked with warm sympathy on the struggles of rising nationalities and the growth of liberal ideas in Europe, we had no Quixotic desire to enter the lists as champion of the oppressed. We had work enough to do in the administration of our colonial empire.

We have seen how the greater portion of nineteenth-century history is concerned with the assertion of two great principles—the right of a nation to rule itself without foreign interference and the right of the people within the nation to have a share in their own government.

When we turn from European politics to the growth of the British Empire, we find that the same principles apply with equal force. They are principles which lie at the root of our Constitution. Of their existence we received a rude but wholesome reminder in the revolt of the American colonies. We learnt our lesson early—woe to the would-be colonizing Power that has never learned it. It has been our task to educate, to emancipate, and, by our example, to insist that the possession of rights implies the fulfilment of duties.

Weal of self-governing colonies.

The nature of the task precludes the attainment of rapid results. Every case must be judged on its own merits with reference to its own peculiar history. Our colonial system embraces one-fifth of the world's area; its peoples represent all stages of civilization, ancient customs, creeds, and codes. We have learnt wisdom by our mistakes.

It will help us to understand the work we undertook and the

problems we had to solve, if we divide the empire roughly into two categories: first, that portion which is peopled mainly by Anglo-Saxon or European stock, such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand; secondly, the portion wherein the vast majority of the population is of non-European origin, such as India, in itself an empire, the Malay Peninsula, the African Protectorates, and a host of smaller crown colonies. South Africa comes mainly, but not entirely, under this second category. Broadly, the distinction is one of colour. But there is another obvious difference between the two groups which lies in the nature of their government. The first are self-governing colonies with entire control over their own affairs. The other group, allowing for wide diversity, is governed by representatives of Great Britain.

Two main types of imperial government.

There was a time, notably after the American Declaration of Independence, when many shrewd observers concluded that all attempts to found an empire overseas were futile, that colonies, like ripe fruit, will always drop from the parent tree, for "'tis the complexion of them all to leave the dam". This argument has proved fallacious, since we learned, applied, and taught the lesson that government is in the interests of the governed. It was no easy task to reconcile the French Canadian to our rule; he must be persuaded that he would secure justice and fair play, and that his language, customs, and traditions would be preserved. And it was so. That Canada stood firm when the American colonies rebelled was not the result of force. Again, in South Africa, the political insight that decreed equality before the law between Boer and Briton and appointed as first prime minister of the new Commonwealth the man who had been our bitterest opponent, is proved by later events to have been sound.

When we are asked upon what system the success of our empire-building depends, we may truthfully reply that it has been due in the main to our want of system. There has been no iron uniformity, such as the Prussian enforced in Poland or in Africa, but flexibility and instinctive mistrust of written constitutions and rigid, soulless routine. By their works ye shall judge the rival methods. The submerged nations of the late German Empire underwent a long course of "Kultur" treatment; we

prefer to abide by the old prescription based upon the larger laws of liberty.

When we turn to our second group—the non-European subjects of our empire—we find the same identity of interest between governors and governed. Our task has been exceedingly difficult. We do not pretend that our intercourse with Eastern peoples has been unblemished by misunderstanding, ignorance, and lack of imagination, but we may fairly claim honesty of intention to deal generously, justly, and mercifully.

Our intercourse with Eastern peoples.

This burden of empire was never deliberately sought by us. It has come to us as a unique mission in an unexplored field, where history can neither beckon us to the well-beaten track nor warn us where the ground is treacherous. We are making our own history after our fashion. If in perfect sincerity we have sought to scatter in Eastern or African soil the seed of Western social and political ideas, we must be prepared to reap the harvest. That is the Imperial problem of the near future.

Since our motives and our methods have been belittled and despised by more up-to-date colonial competitors, let us now examine a little more closely some aspects of our Imperial mission. For this purpose let us choose some landmarks in the history of India and Egypt. In India we shall find what may be called the classical example of Anglo-Saxon administration on the grand scale. In Egypt, while we had to solve many of the same internal problems, our difficulties were magnified up to a recent date by the hostility of a Great Power, and by our own inability to give a definite explanation of our intentions.

NOTE.—Since the above was written, the Nationalist party in Egypt has grown rapidly. The Peace terms at Versailles, which gave freedom to so many "subject" nationalities, doubtless inspired the malcontents to insist upon Home Rule and on the entire removal of British control. Lord Milner's mission (1919–20) recommended that Egypt should be independent, but that Great Britain should hold a privileged position and garrison the Canal zone. The Capitulations were to be abolished. The extremists in Egypt are not yet satisfied, and serious riots have rendered the presence of British troops still necessary. See *infra*, p. 239.

For List of Books for Reference see Appendix I

CHAPTER XVIII

India

The assumption of closer interest in India by the British Parliament coincides with the career of Warren Hastings, Governor of Bengal and first Governor-General. At the beginning of his thirteen years of administration came North's Regulating Act (1773), a most ineffective assertion of home control, under which Hastings's good work was thwarted by a hostile council and an independent court of justice, while he had no power to control the follies of the other presidencies. Despite overwhelming difficulties, Hastings did succeed in making reforms which clearly showed that he regarded India as a *trust* and not as a plundering-ground. He took all responsibility and with entire success imparted his spirit to his subordinates, assured that his confidence would not be abused. The old rapacious, selfish spirit rapidly died out, and from the reforms of Hastings dates the selfless spirit of service so characteristic of the Indian civil servant. For the first time, too, all reform was directed to the furtherance of native interests. Indian laws and customs were respected; Indian judges were appointed; the welfare of the *ryots* was promoted.

Warren Hastings.

His work.

No man did greater work in the face of such appalling difficulties. Not only had he to face the bitterest open hostility of the majority of his own council, but from 1778 to 1782 the whole weight of a series of wars was cast upon his shoulders. How he supported the Bombay Presidency against the Marathas and saved Madras from Haidar Ali, the savage Sultan of Mysore, cannot here be described. This was the period of the American War of Independence. The French, of course, did all in their power to help our foes, and they succeeded in securing the independence of our American colonists. But in India we lost not an inch of territory. That was the record of Hastings, which entitles him to rank as the greatest of the great Englishmen who founded our Indian Empire.

His difficulties.

Hastings retired in 1785, just after the passing of Pitt's India

Bill. This was a great improvement on North's Act. The transactions of the Company were now subjected to a Board of Control appointed by the Home Government and presided over by a cabinet minister. Bombay and Madras were subordinated to the Governor-General at Calcutta. The Company continued to make appointments, but the Governor-General had to be approved by the Crown. This Act, by which India was governed substantially till 1858, was a long step towards Parliamentary control, and immensely strengthened the hands of the Governor-General. The seven-years' trial of Warren Hastings, while it exposed the invincible ignorance on Indian affairs of brilliant men like Burke, led to a marked increase of direct interest in India. Hastings's reputation has long been cleared of the ill-informed and unbalanced charges which Macaulay did so much to perpetuate. The trial at least served to show that Hastings was saddled with a burden of responsibility such as no man could be expected to bear, and that he found the funds and provided the armies which saved the Indian Empire by the only means available, and without a thought for self-advancement.

Pitt's India Bill, 1784.

There was no acquisition of territory (save Benares) in the time of Hastings. It was during the succeeding period of increasing Parliamentary control that our great conquests in India were made. It was long before the Home Government, like the home directors, could be brought to see that a policy of isolation and non-intervention in native politics was incompatible with the security of our dominion. Thus the first "Parliamentary" Governor-General, Lord Cornwallis, though strictly charged to keep the peace, was speedily involved in war with Tippoo Sahib of Mysore, son of Haidar Ali, and sworn foe to the Company in Southern India. Tippoo's possession of a portion of the west coast made his intrigues with the French dangerous. There was in the centre and south a ceaseless triangular rivalry between Mysore, the Nizam of the Deccan, and the Marathas. Alliance with one of these surely involved war with one or both of the others; isolation as surely involved diminished prestige and the danger of combined attack against us.

Lord Cornwallis, 1786–93. Renewal of wars.

By 1798 it was obvious that if we wished to remain in India

AFGHANISTAN
Khaibar Pass
R. Indus
KASHMIR
SIKH STATES
CHINESE EMPIRE
Himalaya Mountains
BALUCHISTAN
Bolan Pass
R. Sutlej
Delhi
North West Provinces
Rohilcund
NEPAL
Bhutan
OUDH
Lucknow
Cawnpore
Agra
R. Chambal
RAJPUTANA
R. Indus
SIND
MARATHA TERRITORY
Scindia
BEHAR
R. Ganges
BENGAL
Calcutta
Cutch
GUJERAT
Baroda
R. Nerbudda
Argaon
NAGPUR
Assaye
BERAR
ORISSA
Northern Circars
R. Godavari
Bombay
Ahmadnagar
NIZAM
Arabian Sea
Bay of Bengal
Goa
MYSORE
CARNATIC
Madras
Pondicherry
Porto Novo
Travancore
Trincomalee
CEYLON
INDIA
1805
British Possessions
0 100 200 300 Miles 500

the policy of non-intervention must be reversed. By this time the Maratha confederacy had grown extremely formidable. Representing the nearest approach to national sentiment to be found in India, they held a central position in relation to the British presidencies; fighting and marauding were their profession. Before their incessant attacks the Mughal Empire had proved powerless. There could be no security for the British possessions while the Maratha confederacy remained unbroken. At this critical time a man of genius was appointed Governor-General in the person of Lord Wellesley. He saw quite clearly the futility of non-intervention. He was resolved to establish British supremacy over the Sultan of Mysore, the Nizam, and, above all, the Marathas, and this he well-nigh accomplished in seven years of victorious war (1798–1805). By 1805 we were beyond dispute the paramount Power in India. In 1799 Mysore was partitioned, the whole sea-coast falling into our hands. In 1801 the Carnatic was annexed. Between 1803 and 1805 the Maratha confederacy was partially broken, its States isolated, the British power established over all lands between the Ganges and the Jumna, and the poor old "shadow" emperor at Delhi remained our pensioner. The conquered States were required by subsidiary treaties to receive Anglo-Indian troops. The British Empire of India was an accomplished fact. Wellesley's share entitles him to rank with Clive and Hastings. There was reaction, indeed, from this age of conquest, but no substantial reversal of policy.

The Maratha confederacy.

Lord Wellesley, 1798–1805. His conquests.

Our triumphs at sea, which coincided with Wellesley's conquests, struck a death-blow to French hopes of revival in India. The French were striving tirelessly to undermine our position: Napoleon persevered for ten years—from 1798 to 1807. But the sea-way was impassable. In 1810 a thorn in our side was removed by the capture of Mauritius. A French plan for an understanding with Persia and Turkey and attack overland by way of Afghanistan never matured, but served to attract British observation to the north-west, and foreshadowed the importance of our future diplomatic relations with Central Asian Powers.

In 1805 the Home Government, alarmed at the pace set by Wellesley, recalled him, and reverted largely to the policy of non-

intervention. The result might have been foretold: the Maratha chiefs, notably Sindia and Holkar, took heart again, and returned to their old game of rapine and plunder in Central India. The Rajput princes called for our aid, for their very existence was menaced by the hordes of armed robbers known as the Pindaris, who, under the patronage of the Marathas, swept over middle India as far south as the Kistna and eastwards to the Northern Circars. Their horrible atrocities forced action on Lord Hastings, our Governor-General. In a two-years' war (1817–9) he finally broke the Maratha power and exterminated the Pindaris.

Maratha power broken, 1819.

Now at length the British were able, for a time, to turn their whole attention to the reconstruction of their new empire. It was felt that our hold on India was only justified by making the interests of the inhabitants our prime concern. Briefly, our ideal was to retain all that was best in Indian law, custom, and religion, to abolish cruel rites, such as *sati*, and to introduce such a measure of Western education as would in the end fit India for self-government. India was in truth to be held "in trust". It was laid down in 1833 that no native of India should be barred from holding offices of State.

Internal policy.

While this benevolent internal policy was being honestly pursued, problems of defence were centred more and more in the north-west approaches. There had been little anxiety for the British on this frontier, because the passes were barred by the establishment of a strong Afghan dynasty and because the Sikh power in the Punjab interposed a formidable "buffer" between an invading army and British India. It was our aim to maintain these defences. Any intrigue by another foreign Power in Afghanistan was regarded as a direct danger. Consequently, when Russia advanced beyond the Caspian Sea and gained influence in Persia, the loyalty of the Ameer of Afghanistan was a matter of the utmost importance to Great Britain. Mistrusting the ruling prince, the Government made an agreement with the Sikh ruler, Ranjit Singh, to replace Shah Shuja, an ex-ameer, upon the throne. This was effected, against the will of the Afghans, by an expeditionary force, after a hazardous march through the Bolan

Advance of Russia towards Afghanistan.

First Afghan War, 1838–42.

and Khaibar Passes. In 1841 Macnaghten, our political agent, was murdered, and the British were forced to leave Kabul. Then followed the disastrous retreat to Jelalabad (1841), during which the whole force, 15,000 strong, was destroyed, Dr. Brydon alone surviving to tell the story. British prestige sank low, and although in 1842 Generals Nott and Pollock re-entered Kabul and exacted retribution, our whole policy in Afghanistan was felt to have been mistaken and ill-conducted.

As a base for the campaign in Afghanistan the port of Karachi, north of the Indus delta, had been seized, and an agreement made with the Ameers of Sind, by which portions of their land were occupied. The not unnatural unwillingness of the ameers to cede their territory led to war, and Napier's victory at Meeanee (February, 1843), after which the lower Indus valley and delta, comparable to Egypt in fertility, fell into our hands and virtually completed our hold on the entire sea-coast of India.

Annexation of Sind, 1843.

The First Afghan War hastened the outbreak of war in the Punjab. So long as Ranjit Singh was alive the peace which he had sworn to keep with the British was strictly preserved, but after his death a Sikh army crossed the Sutlej in December, 1845. Within two months four obstinate battles were fought by Sir H. Gough before the invaders were defeated. The cession of some land did not convince the Sikhs of their final defeat, and in 1848 they rose again, fought a fierce drawn battle at Chillianwala, and then lost decisively at Gujrat (February, 1849). Lord Dalhousie, the new Governor-General, now annexed the whole Punjab, and the last British conquest in India was completed.

First Sikh War, 1845.

Second Sikh War, 1848–9.

Annexation of Punjab.

We must now examine the internal history of India during these years. It will be remembered that the liberal policy of "India for the Indians" was pursued after the fall of the Maratha chiefs in 1818. "There is one great question", wrote Sir Thomas Munro, Governor of Madras, in 1824, "to which we should look in all our arrangements: what is to be their final result on the character of the people? Is it to be raised, or is it to be lowered? Are we to be satisfied with merely securing our power and

protecting the inhabitants, leaving them to sink gradually in character lower than at present; or are we to endeavour to raise their character, and to render them worthy of filling higher situations in the management of their country, and of devising plans for its improvement?"

Most of the benevolent measures adopted coincide with the Governor-Generalship of Lord William Bentinck (1828–35). He had the courage to abolish *sati* and to suppress the Thugs, the murderous brigands who terrorized every province.

Internal Reforms.

In 1833 the Company ceased to exist as a trading body, though its officials continued to act as "trustees for the Crown". The existing machinery was considered too useful to be entirely scrapped. The Company still lived on, reigning but not governing, until the Mutiny of 1857 put an end at last to its existence.

The Mutiny, like most revolutions, was due to a number of causes. It came suddenly, and its magnitude was unforeseen. Yet, on the whole, it was a military mutiny, not a national rising, for India was not a nation. There was no concerted action even among the troops. The rising was confined in the main to the sepoys of Oudh and Bengal. The lower-caste armies of Bombay and Madras were untainted, while the conspicuous loyalty of the Sikhs, recently our sternest foes, was testimony to the justice and honesty of the British *raj*.

The Mutiny.

The outbreak was due far more to overhasty reforms than to a wave of fanaticism. It was a salutary warning that with the best intentions and excess of zeal a Western reformer can dangerously unsettle the life of an Oriental people.

Its causes.

That is exactly what happened under the administration of Lord Dalhousie (1848–56). For eight years he laboured unceasingly for the good of the Indian people. Of the many reforms he enacted, not one but has been amply justified by later experience. The need of certain reforms was clear; their expediency was not always so evident. The amount of work accomplished by Dalhousie entitles him to a very high place among the rulers of India. By the introduction of railways, telegraphs, improved roads, and canals, he set on foot the Industrial Revolution, which is growing so rapidly to-day. He introduced the departmental


INDIA
under Lord Dalhousie, 1856
English Miles
0 50 100 200 300 400 500
British Territory shaded thus
60°
70°
80°
90°
100°
30°
20°
10°
Kabul
AFGHANISTAN
KASHMIR
R. Indus
PUNJAB
BALUCHISTAN
Delhi
RAJPUTANA
NEPAL
SIKKIM
BHUTAN
OUDE
SIND
R. Chambal
CENTRAL INDIA AGENCY
R. Ganges
BENGAL
R. Narbada
Calcutta
BURMA
KATHIAWAR
BERAR
NAGPUR
Bombay
R. Godaveri
NIZAM'S DOMINIONS
R. Kistna
Goa (Portuguese)
MYSORE
Madras
CEYLON
TENASSERIM
SIAM
Longitude East 70° of Greenwich
CEYLON

system in the Government service. His Department of Public Instruction established vernacular schools throughout India. Above all is he remembered for his policy of annexing native States where the succession had failed. In doing so he was generally amply justified by the disorder and gross misrule that obtained in these States. There could be no question that many subject populations would gain all and lose nothing by the substitution of British rule for irresponsible native tyrants. Specially was this the case in Oudh, whose nawab was deposed and his State annexed on the ground of scandalous misgovernment. By the doctrine of "lapse", i.e. on the failure of legitimate heirs, he annexed Satara, Jhansi, and Nagpur to the British Government.

Taken together, all these drastic acts, however salutary, were misunderstood, and led to the belief that the British intended to destroy all native tradition, custom, belief, and independence. To this shaken confidence in our motives was added disbelief in our invincibility. We put too much power in the hands of the sepoys. Constant successes in the field, and, after 1848, comparative idleness, bred in them insolence and an exaggerated sense of their own power. Our losses in the Sikh and Afghan wars were remembered, our blunders in the Crimea exaggerated. The annexation of Oudh, a fertile recruiting-ground, was savagely resented. The number of British troops had been greatly reduced: we had only six battalions between Calcutta and the Sutlej. The proportion of native troops to British—rather more than six to one—was dangerous. The personal link between officers and men was less close, partly because officers were continually being transferred, and partly because steamships and railways now made short leave in England possible. Commanding officers were too old, while the abler junior officers often found civilian employment.

The sepoys bitterly resented foreign service over "the Black Seas" in China and Burma, and extra pay for service across the Sutlej had been abolished.

The introduction of railways and telegraphs and Western notions of land reform and education all tended to unsettle the native mind. The East India Company inspired no sense of loyalty such as might have been offered to a personal monarch, and there was a prophecy widely current that the year 1857—one

MODERN INDIA
0 100 200 300 400 500
Miles
Native States
AFGHANISTAN
KASHMIR
TIBET
PUNJAB
Indus
Jhelum
Delhi
Meerut
NEPAL
BHUTAN
BALUCHISTAN
RAJPUTANA
UNITED PROVINCES of AGRA and OUDH
R. Brahmaputra
ASSAM
SIND
Karachi
Kanpur
Lucknow
R. Ganges
BEHAR
BENGAL
CENTRAL INDIA
Calcutta
Kathiawar
CENTRAL PROVINCES
BURMA
BERAR
R. Irrawaddy
SIAM
Bombay
HYDERABAD
Godavari
BAY of BENGAL
Goa
INDIAN OCEAN
MADRAS
MYSORE
Andaman Islands
Gulf of Siam
CEYLON

hundred years from Plassey—would see the end of the British *raj*.

The excuse for the outbreak was the introduction of a new rifle, the Enfield, for which greased cartridges were needed. A wild outcry arose that this was a diabolic plot on the part of the British to contaminate Hindu and Mohammedan alike as the prelude to converting them to Christianity. This unfounded suspicion led to the frenzied crime at Meerut, near Delhi, on 11th May, where the sepoys murdered their officers in cold blood. They marched on to Delhi, where they proclaimed the old Mughal, Bahadur Shah, as emperor. Rapidly the mutiny spread to Oudh and most of the North-West Provinces. In Lucknow the garrison was besieged; in Cawnpore, about forty miles to the south, the small British force and all the women and children were brutally massacred by Nana Sahib. The outbreak.

On 25th September Havelock cut his way through to Lucknow, and was in turn besieged until Colin Campbell brought final relief in November.

Meanwhile troops were pouring in from overseas in addition to vast native forces from the south, which had remained loyal throughout. On 14th September Delhi was taken by storm after desperate street fighting. Brigadier-General John Nicholson, who led the assault, was mortally wounded. Among that great company of heroes—the Lawrences, Havelock, Outram, Rose, Edwardes, and many more, Nicholson was distinguished, not only as a soldier, but also for his amazing insight into the native mind, and for a personal magnetism which led many to see in him the attributes of a god. He impressed Lord Roberts more profoundly than any man "I have ever met before. . . . He was the beau ideal of a soldier and a gentleman."

By the end of 1857 the worst was over. It remained for Sir Colin Campbell to suppress the mutineers in detail over a wide area in Northern India. By June, 1858, tranquillity was restored except in a few isolated regions.

There has been no serious rising in India since the Mutiny. Our chief concern has been for the safety of the north-west frontier in face of the advance of Russia. This concern led us once more into war with the Afghans. Second Afghan War, 1878–80.

Since 1846 Russia had made rapid strides eastward and south-

eastward from the Caspian. By 1878 she forestalled Great Britain in the negotiation of a treaty with the Ameer of Afghanistan. On the refusal of the latter to receive our envoy, his capital was occupied by British troops, and his son appointed to reign in his stead. This son, Yakub Khan, proved weak and unpopular, the resident envoy, Sir Louis Cavagnari, was murdered at Kabul, and the whole Afghan people rose fiercely to expel the British. Though Kabul and Kandahar were retaken and held firmly, the British position was untenable in face of a people in arms. Fortunately a capable candidate for the throne now appeared in Abdurrahman, with whom a treaty was made. But hardly were the terms completed when a new pretender arose, who defeated a British force at Maiwand (1880), and laid siege to Kandahar. Then followed Roberts's famous relief march from Kabul, in which he covered 318 miles in 21 days. Abdurrahman was soon strong enough to secure his throne firmly, and the frontiers were definitely marked out. Another serious boundary dispute with Russia occurred in 1885, but after that date relations between the two great Powers steadily improved, till in 1907 a complete understanding was secured. The independence of Afghanistan is guaranteed by Great Britain, whose influence must be paramount in this buffer State.

Improved relations with Russia.

The three wars waged with Burma (1824–6, 1852, 1885) afford another example of the necessity for safeguarding the outposts of India proper. By threatening the frontier, hampering trade, and intriguing with French agents the Kings of Burma had proved themselves a danger to the peace of India for over sixty years. The last war resulted in the total annexation of their State.

Burmese wars.

It now remains to sketch the development of British India from 1857 to the present time.

"The Mutiny swept the Indian sky clear of many clouds." With justice it has been described as "reactionary in its causes and revolutionary in its effects"; it cleared the air for reconstruction and improvement. By an Act of Parliament (1858) "for the better government of India", the direct government, hitherto administered in trust by the Honourable East India Company, was transferred to the Crown.

End of the East India Company.

A Secretary of State in Council took the place of the President of the Board of Control and the Court of Directors. As before, the Governor-General in Council remained the supreme executive authority within India. The Mughal dynasty now disappeared. A proclamation made by Queen Victoria, disclaiming all desire of annexing further territories, and expressing her royal resolve to respect the creeds as well as the dignity and honour of her Indian subjects, rapidly restored native confidence. It was easier for the Indian people to feel personal loyalty towards a queen than towards a trading company.[1]

British administration.

In the period following the Mutiny there was everything to do and very little money to do it with. On a vaster scale the situation was similar in kind to that which confronted Lord Cromer in Egypt after the revolt of Arabi in 1881. So long as the vast majority of the inhabitants of India remain tillers of the soil, it is the first and all-important duty of the Government to safeguard their interests and further their prosperity. For it must not be forgotten that the population is miserably poor. While the standard of living is far below that of any European country, the margin between a bare livelihood and starvation is very narrow, and may depend on the fickle favour of the monsoons. The peasant has no reserves with which to weather the losses incurred by drought or storm. It follows that for about nine-tenths of the population taxation must be very light, and cannot be appreciably increased. The tax paid per head of the population is certainly not above two shillings.

Problems of poverty.

But how is the lot of the peasant to be improved? His most dreaded foes are drought and plague and famine, and these can only successfully be routed by huge expenditure on public works. Material progress in India is perforce slow, because the difficulties to be met are many, and the remedies are costly. An Indian Government is constantly called on to weigh the claims of rival schemes for expenditure, and decide which is most urgent. And this is not all. It can never neglect the susceptibilities and emotions of an Eastern people, with whom Western logic and intellect will weigh for nothing against tradition and religious observance.

[1] The Company was formally dissolved in 1874.

Famine relief.

Although famine cannot be entirely prevented, its worst horrors have been mitigated by the construction of railways and canals. Over 35,000 miles of railways and 25,000,000 acres of canal-irrigated land ensure that relief can be speedily brought to famine-stricken areas, and that crops can be grown in many districts independent of the monsoon rains. The canals, too, have converted desert lands, notably in the Punjab, into rich agricultural provinces.

One result of this expenditure has been an enormous saving of life and increase of population. Yet, in spite of this, the standard of life and comfort has actually increased.

India, like other countries, must experience an industrial revolution. The isolated, self-sufficing life of the old village communities is gradually giving way to production on a large scale now that India grows crops of jute, cotton, and grain for the world's markets. Town life, too, has developed very rapidly. The Government of India has striven to mitigate the hardships attendant on this great economic revolution, and many laws have been passed to protect the small cultivator from grasping landlords and rapacious money-lenders. The peasant is enabled to borrow from the Government at a low rate of interest. Most important of all is the success of the village co-operative societies, which have multiplied exceedingly in the last fifteen years.

Plague.

The improvement of public health is not least of the all-important duties of the Indian Government. Sanitary reforms are not popular, and can only be promoted with the utmost caution. There is always a danger of outraging religious prejudice. So long as the people of India refuse to co-operate in reforms, the scourge of plague will never wholly be removed.

Education.

At the root of all Indian problems lies the educational problem. Ninety per cent of the total population is illiterate, and wishes to remain so. While this condition obtains it is futile to discuss the feasibility of this or that scheme of representative government. Nor is it safe to admit that the small educated minority has any claim to represent the vast majority. The British rule has as yet procured for Indians either no education or a defective education. Lack of funds has prevented the

wide establishment of schools throughout a land that resembles a continent rather than a State. As the designer of a battleship must balance the rival claims of speed and strength in the construction of his vessel, so the Government of India in its expenditure had always to weigh such pressing claims as defence, irrigation, or railway construction against vast educational experiments framed in the interests of the next generation. Rightly or wrongly, the Government has, so far, refrained from embarking on the educational experiment.

Within the last generation there has grown up an increasing agitation for Home Rule, voiced and led by that small fraction of the Indian people which has received a higher education. Among this small minority the feeling has steadily strengthened that the Government of India has been guilty of false pretences; that, while it has bestowed upon India the blessings of peace, justice, and material prosperity, it has cynically and deliberately barred the avenues by which native Indians may come to share in their own executive government. The British are charged with inconsistency: they have, it is said, vaguely pointed the way towards Western political and social ideals, but have refused to lead or to smooth the path towards the final goal, which is self-government. There is some justice in this complaint. Higher education in India is open to many criticisms. The University has become rather a college for clerks than a school for statesmen. At the same time, the small class who have received this travesty of Western education claim the right to represent the interests and control the fortunes of the whole population of India. It claims to be an aristocracy of intellect, and is far from anxious to see its privileges extended broadcast to the multitude. Like the Brahmin, it would remain aloof and superior. Out of this educated class nearly all the modern unrest has arisen. It is felt that the British Government has not honestly pursued the policy laid down in the Charter Act of 1833 and reasserted in the Queen's Proclamation of 1858, that natives of India should be eligible to hold any office. Disappointed of their hopes, an extremist party has arisen which has preached from Press and platform open disloyalty to the British, and has tried to re-establish anarchy by a reign of terror.

Home Rule agitation.

Now it is quite true that British policy has not been consistent. If our schemes for higher education have really aimed at producing men capable of broad views, initiative, or the assumption of responsibility, to that extent they have failed, and the fault is ours and not that of our Indian pupils. This failure in education has now placed the Government and Indian civilians in a false position, in so far as disloyalty and outrage have impelled them to ordain that, fit or unfit, Indians must now be admitted to a large share of responsible government. The pity is that the period for preliminary training was not used to better advantage.

What has actually already been done to admit Indians to a share in their own government?

In 1861 provincial Legislative Councils were created which consisted in part of Indian members. These had no means of enforcing their views upon the Government, but they might be valuable as mouthpieces of Indian opinion, and as such were welcomed by the Government. But the educated Indians were not content with this. In 1885 a National Congress met at Bombay, claiming to be a "Parliament", though it represented no one but itself, and the Mohammedans held aloof. Its subsequent meetings soon showed that it was more interested in political agitation than in social reforms. It was no nursery for the responsible statesmen of the future; its members took no steps to gain governmental experience by interesting themselves in local administration.

"National Congress" founded, 1885.

An Act of 1892, which added more Indian members to the Legislative Councils, increased neither their responsibility nor their fitness to hold office.

The discontent grew ever stronger and more dangerous. The South African War, the success of Japan, and the creation of a Duma in Russia encouraged the "Nationalists" of India to demand Home Rule. The partition of Bengal was made the pretext for the outbreak of a series of crimes.

In 1909 Lord Morley, as Secretary of State, and Lord Minto, as viceroy, sought to allay the discontent by largely increasing the number of Indian members of the Legislative Councils. These members were chosen by a system of election. Two Indian members were appointed to the Secretary

Morley-Minto reforms, 1909.

of State's Council in London and one to the Viceroy's Executive Council in India. These measures did not reduce the disaffection, for they conferred no new executive powers; their chief result was to swell the chorus of irresponsible criticism, and so to embarrass the executive Government.

In the great Durbar held at Delhi in December, 1911, the king-emperor announced the transfer of the seat of government from Calcutta to the old capital, Delhi, and the partition scheme for Bengal was revised. Nevertheless, the "Home Rule" party persisted in their seditious practices, and even the outbreak of the Great War failed to quell them. In fact, the prospect of reconstruction in the relations between the mother country and the self-governing dominions, arising out of the war, has increased the demand in India for national self-expression. The extremist party regained influence in the National Congress of December, 1917, which elected as president Mrs. Besant, who had for some time used her wide influence and unquestioned ability in support of the Home Rule party. Still the Government could decide upon no definite policy, and the agitation showed signs of spreading even among the uneducated classes. Meanwhile, in August, 1917, Mr. Montagu, the new Secretary of State, was empowered to declare that the Government pledged itself "to increase the association of Indians in every branch of the administration", and that steps in this direction would be taken without delay. At the same time he added that progress in this policy could only be achieved by successive stages, and that "the British Government and Government of India must be the judges of the time and measure of each advance". Mr. Montagu himself proceeded to India in November, 1917, to study the whole problem, and, by receiving delegates representative of every class, to gain a first-hand knowledge of the conflicting issues and ideals.

The Durbar, 1911.

The Government is therefore committed to a *radical* change in the structure of Indian administration, brought about partly by the democratic spirit of the age, partly by the apparent and increasing agitation against the old order. This change cannot at first increase efficiency. It will be hard for the British civil servants to stand aside and watch the work to which they have

devoted their lives entrusted to inexperienced and less competent hands. But the Empire stands committed to this great experiment in constitutional rule. The experience must be bought and mistakes must be made. Although we can look to history for no precedent, a present memory of the circumstances under which we came to hold our Indian Empire as a trust will beget broad views and a balanced judgment.

IMPORTANT DATES

1526–9. Babur's conquests.
1600. Foundation of East India Company.
1707. Death of Aurangzeb.
1741–54. Career of Dupleix.
1756. "The Black Hole."
1757. Plassey.
1760. Wandewash.
1765. Grant of *Diwani*.
1773–85. Career of Warren Hastings.
1784. Pitt's India Bill.
1798–1805. Conquests of Wellesley.
1848–56. Dalhousie's administration.
1857. The Mutiny.
1858. End of the East India Company.
1885. National Congress founded.
1909. Morley-Minto reforms.
1911. The Delhi Durbar.

For List of Books for Reference see Appendix I

CHAPTER XIX

The Occupation of Egypt

There is an obvious relation between the British Empire and the political condition of Egypt—the last of our protectorates.

Importance of Egypt.

Egypt, in a broad sense, is the strategic flank of India, and to hold India securely we must be sure of our communications through the Mediterranean, Suez Canal, Red Sea, and Persian Gulf.

The completion of the Suez Canal in 1869 forced Egypt into

the forefront of our imperial vision, but it must not be imagined that, previous to that date, we were indifferent to the fortunes of that country. Ever since the decline of Turkey created an Eastern Question, an Egyptian question has existed for us.

It was Napoleon, of course, who clearly saw that the path to Indian conquest lay through Egypt, and that the annexation of that country would prove a deadly blow to Britain. "Alexander", he writes, "displayed his genius more in founding Alexandria and in contemplating his transportation of his seat of empire thither than by his most dazzling victories. The city ought to be the capital of the world; it is situated between Asia and Africa and connects Europe with the Indies." **Napoleon and Egypt.**

The French expedition of 1798 first brought a British armament to this vital area, and marked the beginning of the century-long disputes and jealousies that ended in 1904.

In 1802, by the Treaty of Amiens, Egypt was restored to the Turks, whose nominal suzerainty endured, though not unbroken, till in December, 1914, a Sultan of Egypt was proclaimed under the protectorate of Great Britain.

For the sake of clearness we may distinguish between two aspects of our concern with Egypt, which may be divided roughly into two periods. In the first, from 1801 to 1869, we were concerned to "prop up" the sick man—Turkey—in all places of his dominion and everywhere to oppose the encroachments of Russia. **British interest in Egypt.**

In the second,[1] from 1869, or, more strictly, from 1883 onward, we were compelled on imperial grounds to intervene actively. This intervention led to permanent occupation and the creation of a new Egypt.

The first period saw a very rapid decline in the power of Turkey. Serbia partially freed herself, Greece became a kingdom, France annexed Algeria, Russian pressure was insistent. A peaceful province of Egypt was devoutly to be wished. But Egypt proved a broken reed. Although Napoleon's victory near the Pyramids had brought the Mamelukes very low, this ruling caste still governed independently of the Ottoman Sultan.

[1] The opening of the Suez Canal, 1869, broadly marks the transition from the first aspect to the second.

In the confusion which followed the withdrawal of the French, Mohamed Ali, an Albanian military adventurer, achieved such power that the Sultan thought well to nominate him as pasha. By wholesale murder the new pasha rid himself of the Mameluke leaders and proceeded to Europeanize the Egyptians. He was "a rough man of genius", a man of boundless ambition. He aimed at creating anew the empire of Salah-ed-din. He gained almost immediate success. His word was law in Egypt, where an undiluted despotism was no new thing. Mohamed Ali differed from his predecessors in so far as behind the mask of the despot there lay some traces of a genuine wish to leave his country better than he found it. Though he was not an Egyptian, his is still a name to conjure with in Egypt, where the opinion can still be heard that British reforms only begin where Mohamed Ali left off. As Peter had done in Russia, he introduced foreigners, especially Frenchmen, to act as engineers, scientists, and doctors. Himself entirely unlettered, he knew the value of education and established a national system. He introduced the cotton plant, and, realizing how the very life of Egypt depends on irrigation, he laid the foundation-stone of the first great barrage or dam a few miles below Cairo. All that he did, he did, not for the benefit of Turkey, but to establish his own dynasty. He laboured to create a large and efficient army and a respectable naval force, both of which were called on by the Sultan to assist in the Greek War. In 1831 he threw off all pretence of loyalty and marched into Syria with his soldier son Ibrahim Pasha.[1] The Turkish defence collapsed, and decisive actions in Asia Minor brought the Egyptians within hail of Constantinople. Then the Powers, with the exception of France, which had always supported Mohamed Ali, stepped in on behalf of the Sultan. In 1841 he was forced to content himself with the hereditary Pashalik of Egypt, whose brief experience of aggressive warfare was now ended. In 1848 he abdicated, and died in 1849. Mohamed Ali did more for Egypt in forty years than Turkey had accomplished in three centuries. By contrast his immediate successors were slight men.

Mohamed Ali.

Ismail, his grandson, who succeeded in 1863, brought ruin

[1] Known to the London crowd as Abraham Parker—a fine natural soldier and nothing else.

on his country, and was directly responsible for the British occupation. He was the most extravagant ruler in modern history. In thirteen years he had incurred a debt of over ninety-one millions, and had absolutely nothing to show for it except the Suez Canal and the title of *Khedive*, purchased at a price from the Sultan. Even the Canal brought no direct benefit, since, in 1875, Disraeli bought the khedive's shares for £4,000,000. It soon became impossible, despite the most elaborate taxation, to pay the interest—some seven millions per annum—on the debt. Egypt was a poor country with a small population. Soon the creditors began to press for payment, and Ismail, who could raise no more loans, applied to Great Britain for a financial adviser. Two experts, an Englishman and a Frenchman, were sent to reduce order out of chaos. The accounts were in a hopeless muddle; it was clear that Ismail had for years been the prey of unscrupulous swindlers. To satisfy the *bona fide* creditors an international commission was formed—the Caisse de la Dette—the business of which was to receive a portion of the yearly revenue and pay off the interest due. In 1877 Major Baring (afterwards Lord Cromer) was appointed as British representative of this commission. But Ismail, hating to be reformed, soon grew tired of his advisers, and in 1879, on the recommendation of the Powers, he was deposed by the Sultan[1] in favour of his son Tewfik.

Ismail Pasha.

His extravagance.

Bankruptcy.

Ismail deposed, 1879.

Great Britain and France, as the Powers most directly interested, now undertook a Dual Control, our representative being Major Baring. It seemed that a period of peace, retrenchment, and reform might redeem the country from chronic bankruptcy. This was not to be. Two events—an army mutiny and war in the Sudan—filled the cup of misery.

The Dual Control.

In 1881 native officers, led by Colonel Arábi Pasha, fearing reductions in the army and increased foreign control, raised the cry of "Egypt for the Egyptians". For a time they overthrew the Government, and a riot in Alexandria,

Revolt of Arabi, 1881.

[1] The Sultan announced his deposition by the dispatch of a telegram to Cairo addressed to "Ismail Pasha, late Khedive of Egypt".

resulting in the death of sixty Europeans, brought British and French squadrons off that port.

On the refusal of France to take further action it was left for the British forces to restore order. In July, 1882, Alexandria was bombarded by Sir Beauchamp Seymour, and in September Sir Garnet Wolseley scattered Arábi's army to the winds of the desert at Tel-el-Kebir. From that date the British army of occupation has been the real master of Egypt.

Scarcely was order restored when a terrible epidemic of cholera broke out in 1883. Its severity was increased by entire lack of sanitary precautions and the ignorance and apathy of the natives.

Events in the Sudan.

In quick succession came the last and greatest disaster. In the Sudan a Mahdi[1] raised the flag of rebellion. The movement was very formidable, owing to the number of the enemy and the size and difficult nature of the country.

The British Government made the fatal mistake of allowing the khedive to dispatch General Hicks with a raw and cowardly native army to court disaster in the heart of the enemy's country. In November, 1883, Hicks, surrounded in a vast forest, perished with the bulk of his army. Such half-measures were worse than useless. We had already in Egypt more than enough to do. The only reasonable course of action was to evacuate the Sudan till the Egyptian prospect brightened.

General Gordon murdered 1885.

General Gordon, who was sent to Khartoum in 1884 to bring in the outlying garrisons, was cut off, and the relief expedition sent to relieve him arrived too late. In 1885 Khartoum fell, and Gordon was murdered. For thirteen years the Mahdi and his successor were fated to exercise their savage sway over the unhappy Sudan.

In the same year of gloom Sir Evelyn Baring, British Agent and Consul-General since 1883, began his great task of re-generating Egypt. His position was one of appalling difficulty. To quote his own words: "One alien race had to guide a second alien race in the government of a third race". European as well as native opinion misconstrued every action; the British

[1] "Mahdi" means literally one who is "conducted in the right path". Moslem tradition holds that a Mahdi will appear to convert the whole world to Mohammedanism.

Government was itself puzzled to explain how long or how far the "veiled protectorate" could endure.

For twenty years the French, adopting a policy of pin-pricks, jealously opposed the work of reform, Europe in general preserved an attitude of benevolent neutrality.

Had there been no system of government our task would have been simpler, but Egypt had always groaned under the evil system which has been described as that of the three "C's"—Corruption, the Corvée, and the Courbash. There was no tradition of personal liberty. The lives of his subjects were at the mercy of the khedive. The courts of justice were hot-beds of bribery and "baksheesh". The Fellaheen—the back-bone of the country—were enslaved by forced labour (corvée), and brutalized by flogging (courbash). They were despoiled by usurers, and taxed to their last crop. Over all hung the heavy weight of Ismail's debt, the interest on which was the first charge on the miserable revenue, of which it yearly consumed one-half.

To have raised Egypt out of all her misery, and to have created the modern prosperous and peaceful State in the short space of twenty years is one of the most remarkable achievements in modern history.

That is what Lord Cromer and his subordinates did. The benevolent Pharaoh of the nineteenth century had first to set himself a problem reputed old — the making of bricks without straw. The bricks were the fundamental reforms by which alone the house of Egypt could be established. The straw was renewed credit and financial solvency. Egypt could barely pay her way, much less provide the funds so urgently needed for regeneration. The whole secret of Egyptian prosperity is contained in one word—irrigation. Egypt is "the gift of the Nile". Distribute that gift generously and regularly, and Egyptian soil becomes the most fertile in the world. The distribution, in Egyptian hands, had been unjust, unscientific, and wasteful. Canals and reservoirs were inadequate and neglected. The little that was done was done badly.

Work of Lord Cromer.

To meet a desperate situation desperate means were essential. Lord Cromer adopted the bold measure of borrowing £1,000,000, to be applied directly to irrigation schemes.

Irrigation.

First, the barrage near Cairo, hitherto useless, was put into working order, with the result that the cotton crop at once increased by leaps and bounds. This wise outlay, much criticized at the time, just enabled Egypt to turn the corner. With growing wealth the revenue increased, the debt began to weigh less heavily, and surplus sums became available for vaster projects.

Work on the great Assuan Dam, begun in 1898, was completed in 1903, since when the supply of water available has been doubled. The Nile has been harnessed, and the life of the country depends no longer in the old degree on the good graces of its yearly flood.

Under British advisers every department of the State has been reformed, and every effort made to fit Egyptians for self-government. Progress in this last direction has been slow. The native has been very quick to appreciate the fruits of reform. He has not yet fully learnt that citizenship implies responsibility as well as privilege.

At the end of thirteen years of increasing prosperity there remained only one cloud on the horizon.

Reconquest of the Sudan, 1896–8.

The savage rule of the Mahdi had made a howling wilderness in the several provinces of the Sudan. The population was reduced by half. In the name of civilization we were called to action. National pride impelled us, for we were responsible for the policy of evacuation. Nor could there be any real security for Egypt so long as the upper reaches of the Nile were exposed to the mercy of savages. In England, Gordon's fate was not forgotten. There was a strong feeling that his murder had gone too long unpunished. On the ground of trade expansion, too, reconquest was expedient.

Creation of the Egyptian army.

Not the least of the modern miracles wrought in Egypt was the conversion of the army from the spiritless rabble of 1883 to a well-disciplined, self-respecting force. Led by British officers, Egyptian troops had been severely tested in several frontier fights against the Dervishes, and had emerged with high credit. This result was due to the skilful and patient training of Sir Evelyn Wood, Sir Herbert Kitchener, and Sir Reginald Wingate. Where British officials were given a free hand success was always attained.

By 1896 the men and money were forthcoming for the Sudan campaign. The Sirdar (Sir H. Kitchener) was an ideal leader for this desert warfare, where problems of transport and supply were no less important than correct tactical dispositions. A long line of railway had first to be constructed and defended before the Khalifa could be driven back on his last stronghold at Omdurman. The health and feeding of the men were a constant anxiety. But Kitchener's organizing genius left nothing to chance, and when at length the Dervish army stood to fight, the result was never doubtful. Reckless courage was of no avail against modern weapons. The fanatics came on repeatedly in lines, like surging waves, against our steady rapid fire, and only when half their army was killed and wounded did they turn in flight. This was the crowning victory. The power of the Khalifa was shattered and Gordon was avenged.

Omdurman, September, 1898.

Financially, the campaign was a model of economy: $2\frac{1}{2}$ millions was the price paid for the $2\frac{1}{2}$ years' campaign. Speaking at the Mansion House on his return, Lord Kitchener pointed out that "against this large expenditure we have some valuable assets to show; we have, or shall have, 760 miles of railways, representing $2\frac{1}{4}$ millions out of the money granted, and for the other $\frac{1}{4}$ million we have 2000 miles of telegraph line, six new gunboats, besides barges, sailing-craft, and—the Sudan".

The Sudan made a rapid recovery, but has only just begun to pay its way. Of an area comprising one million square miles, only a few thousand are as yet under profitable cultivation, and there are vast tracts of sandy deserts. As a link in our great chain of African possessions, and as a security for our new Protectorate of Egypt, the Sudan is a necessary addition to our burden of empire.

Above and beyond our own material gain, the Sudan has received freedom, justice, and peace, gifts that her people understand and appreciate.

Almost simultaneously with the victory at Omdurman, Major Marchand and a small native force reached Fashoda (some 300 miles south of Khartoum), which he claimed in the name of France. Lord Kitchener hastened to meet him, and insisted on hoisting the Egyptian flag. For a time relations with France were severely strained, but Frenchmen were now

Fashoda.

beginning to realize that their best interests were identical with those of Great Britain, and the Fashoda incident was quickly forgiven and forgotten.

In 1904 the famous Anglo-French agreement was signed, by which France, forsaking her old attitude of jealousy and suspicion, gave us a free hand in our control of Egypt, while we, on our side, recognized the French as paramount in Morocco. This definite understanding was of immense advantage to Britain, France, and Egypt. In the last country we were now free to use our own judgment without fear of incurring the enmity of France, neither were we continually pressed to name the day of our final evacuation.

Anglo-French agreement, 1904.

In 1907 Lord Cromer—the creator of New Egypt—resigned his office. He was succeeded by Sir Eldon Gorst, on whose death, in 1911, Lord Kitchener became Consul-General. His return to the scenes of his old labours and triumphs was welcomed in Egypt by natives of all classes, for no Englishman has understood more clearly and sympathetically their mind and temperament.

Retirement of Lord Cromer.

When, in 1914, Turkey joined the Central Powers, the British position in Egypt had to be reconsidered. Abbas Hilmy, the khedive, threw in his lot with our enemies—an act of political suicide. He was deposed in December. Throughout his reign he had proved himself an arch-intriguer, caring less for his country than for his own enrichment. This time he had backed the wrong horse, and few in Egypt regretted his downfall. In the proclamation of the British Protectorate it was announced "that the religious convictions of Egyptian subjects will be scrupulously respected, as are those of His Majesty's own subjects, whatever their creed, and that the strengthening and progress of Mohammedan institutions is naturally a matter in which His Majesty's Government takes the deepest interest".

Deposition of Abbas II, 1914.

British Protectorate.

The story of our difficult task in Egypt illustrates the strongest elements in our imperial mission. Material prosperity is there in abundance, and it has been the interest of Great Britain to promote it. But Egyptians have not been exploited in the promotion of a higher "Culture". Their religion is tolerated, their language

AFRICA in 1914

and customs survive and flourish. Equality before the law and security of life and property are well established. Initiative and personal responsibility are encouraged. The leaven of Western culture is beginning to stir the "flat unraisèd spirit" of the Egyptians. It is neither probable nor desirable that change should come too rapidly.

By "Western" spirit we understand the law of Liberty, not the will to power, not the spirit "that would ride in triumph through Persepolis", but the spirit by which, in Burke's words, "our ancestors have turned a savage wilderness into a glorious empire, and have made the most extensive and the only honourable conquests, not by destroying, but by promoting the wealth, the number, and the happiness of the human race".[1]

IMPORTANT DATES

1811–48. Mohamed Ali's rule.
1863–79. Ismail Pasha.
1869. Opening of Suez Canal.
1879. Dual Control.
1881–2. Revolt of Arabi.
1883. Rising of Mahdi in Sudan.
1885, Jan. Fall of Khartoum.
1898. Battle of Omdurman.
1904. Anglo-French Agreement.
1907. Retirement of Lord Cromer.
1911. Lord Kitchener Consul-General.
1914. Abbas II deposed.
British Protectorate.

For List of Books for Reference see Appendix I

CHAPTER XX

Development of German World-Policy

We have seen how Bismarck created the German Empire by three successful wars. He provided for its safety by the formation of the Triple Alliance and a defensive agreement with Russia. He regarded Germany as a "satiated State", whose greatest need

[1] But see note, p. 214.

was peace. His views were not unlike those of Colbert in 1670, when Louis XIV stood at the parting of the ways, one of which pointed to peaceful expansion by trade, industry, and agriculture, and the other to the military aggression which so fatally attracted him. So it was when William II succeeded his father in 1888. He was not satisfied with the power he possessed, nor yet that it should be increased by the slow but certain paths of peace. Judged by his speeches and actions, nothing but world-supremacy would satisfy him. The immediate result was seen in the formation of a Franco-Russian understanding (1893), the subsequent convention between Britain and France (1904), and finally in the Triple Entente of 1907.

Restless policy of William II.

When Germany turned to her new policy she found that nearly all the best of the world's empty spaces were already occupied. There are no new colonies nowadays in the older sense of the word, mainly because the portions of the earth's surface still available are unsuitable for the settlement and multiplication of European peoples. In the nineteenth century, with the notable exceptions of Australia and South Africa, we find that a new colony connotes any given tract of country which a European Power has declared to be under its protection or within its "sphere of influence". The value of such a colony lies in its capacity to provide raw material—wool, cotton, rubber, rice, tea, coffee, and minerals for home industries and consumption. A flourishing colony, too, will open a new market for home manufactures.

German colonial ambitions.

Of the areas as yet unvisited by Great Britain or other States, few could be described as ports and happy havens. It was a question of Hobson's choice, and Germany manfully prepared to make the best of it. If her manner of acquisition might not always be entirely courteous, hustling methods were not unnatural in an imperial parvenu with so much leeway to make up. Nobody, least of all Great Britain, could quarrel with her legitimate desire for overseas expansion.[1]

Germany was fast becoming a nation of shopkeepers, and if a shopkeeper is not merely to keep his doors open, but enlarge

[1] Speaking in 1884, Mr. Gladstone hailed Germany as "an ally and partner in the execution of the great purposes of Providence for the advantage of mankind".

his premises and increase his staff, he needs ever-increasing customers and markets for his wares. That was the position in which Germany found herself towards the end of the "Bismarck" period. The need for new markets, after Protection was adopted in 1879, was imperative; the want of outlets for surplus population, though not immediate, was apparent.

Need for markets.

Bismarck did not incline to a forward colonial policy. He was most at ease in the European theatre; it was for William II to play the lead on a world-wide stage. It was not that Bismarck took no part in the promotion of colonial enterprise; only, his true genius did not lie that way; he felt less at his ease than when playing on his own ground. This distinction between the cautious view of Bismarck and the hydra-headed wilfulness of William is seen in the light of events. On the one hand stands the reasonable and pacific expansion hatched out naturally by economic pressure. On the other stands the feverish and provocative "Welt-Politik" incubated by the artificial heat of Treitschke and his school, offensive in design, resolved that the mailed fist should secure for Germany a place in the sun and a future on the water.

The new colonies did not flourish; they were a doubtful blessing and a certain source of expense. They could not solve the emigration problem, for no shrewd German would seek his fortune in them when he found the door open in America or Brazil. In this way tens of thousands of valuable citizens were lost to the Fatherland, for the flag did not follow the trade. So the empire lost "man power". Although emigration has been steadily diminishing of late, $2\frac{1}{4}$ million Germans left the Fatherland between 1876 and 1906. In nine years, from 1880 to 1888, there were over $1\frac{1}{4}$ millions of emigrants who would never be persuaded to exchange into a "home" colony. That was the dilemma which the Kaiser set himself to solve in his own uncompromising way. He had got the men, he had got the money, he would get the ships.

The story of German colonization is short but instructive. It is mainly concerned with the scramble for Africa which ensued upon the "discovery" of the dark interior of that continent. The discoveries of Livingstone (d. 1873)

The scramble for Africa.

and Stanley, foremost among a host of intrepid explorers, opened the eyes of princes, statesmen and merchant adventurers to the potential value of this vast area. Then a number of able writers put in a powerful plea for the creation of colonies.

Explorers like Gustav Nachtigal (1834–85) and Gerhard Rohlfs, by their enterprise and activity, led the way to the formation of the German African Company in the seventies. In 1882 came the German Colonial Society.

The year 1884 is all-important, for it saw the establishment of German South-West Africa, Togoland, and the Cameroons. In November of the same year a conference met, by Bismarck's invitation, at Berlin, to discuss and settle the partition of Africa. This sane and peaceful way of settling disputes and deciding differences commended itself to all the great European States. It was pronounced that all occupations of fresh territory must be *effective* if they were to be recognized by other States, and it defined a "sphere of influence" as an area in which some one Power possessed a priority of claim. (*Cambridge Modern History*, Vol. XII, p. 659.)

The year 1884.

We may think of Africa in the seventies of last century as a huge pear, and of the European settlers as wasps who have so far confined their attention mainly to the external surface. Germany found but little of the coast-line still "to let". Nearly everywhere she looked, some other nation had pegged out a previous claim. To the north the French were predominant; in the south the British. Other parts of the coast were appropriated by Spaniards and Portuguese, Dutch, and British and French again. Still, there were certain appreciable gaps: to the west on the Guinea coast, to the south-west between Portuguese Angola and British Cape Colony, and on the east coast to the north of Portuguese East Africa.

These gaps Germany hastened to fill. In the south-west, Luderitz, a Bremen merchant, had bought from a native chief land round Angra Pequena. The British Government, fully occupied with Egyptian affairs, acquiesced in the transaction, and the first modest purchase extended to the occupation of the whole of Namaqualand and Damaraland, with the exception of Walfish Bay, which the prescience of Sir Bartle

South-West Africa.

Frere had secured for Britain in 1878. So Germany gained her first colony.

In July of the same year (1884) Dr. Nachtigal proceeded to Togoland and the Cameroons, both of which were placed under German protection. While the conference was still sitting at Berlin, Dr. Karl Peters set out secretly, travelling under a false name, to steal a march in East Africa. To the south-east Luderitz had already preceded him. In this region, as in the south-west, we had been first in the field, and forestalled Luderitz at S. Lucia Bay. Peters, who was not scrupulous, so far succeeded in wringing concessions from the Sultan of Zanzibar that, in face of our opposition, the German East African Company was founded. In 1890 an important agreement was signed between Britain and Germany defining their spheres of influence. Zanzibar became a British protectorate, while Heligoland was ceded to the German Empire.

Togoland. Cameroons.

East Africa.

In a little over a year the four principal colonies had been founded.

In the Pacific, from 1884 to 1886, the north-east of New Guinea was acquired and renamed Kaiser Wilhelmsland; Samoa, too, was taken, and a number of small islands came under the German "sphere" and were called the Bismarck Archipelago. Only one notable addition was made to the list when, in 1897, Kiao-Chau was taken from China. For this the Kaiser was personally responsible; it belongs not so much to the story of German colonization as to the later policy of "World-Power".

The Pacific.

Enthusiasm for colonies soon began to cool. German pro-consuls had none of the experience that we have bought so dearly. Their methods were rather akin to the old Spanish system, which regarded colonies as estates to be worked for the benefit of the mother country. Against the better judgment of Bismarck, all control lay in the hands of Government officials at home instead of the business men and merchants who had first-hand knowledge of local problems. It is true that the local officials had often bad records. Still, it is hard to think of the old "John Company", which created British India, existing under the ægis of a Prussian bureaucracy.

German colonizing methods.

The system has reacted on the relations of governors and governed. The history of the African colonies has been the history of punitive expeditions. They have literally made a wilderness and called it peace. Ruthless extermination has been the sole remedy for native unrest. The Herero rising in South-West Africa, which lasted for three years, reduced the 65,000 natives to one-third of that number, and cost the empire £32,000,000. Young colonies run on these lines are an expensive luxury. Since 1884 Germany has spent nearly 100 millions on them.

After 1907, when a separate Colonial Office was created, Germany began to realize and in part to remedy her mistakes. She set herself to study British methods, and brought all her national qualities of intense energy, pertinacity, and scientific method to bear upon the task of setting her colonial house in order.

So long as Germany was content to plant colonies in unclaimed lands, she could not seriously disturb the peace of the world. But when William II came to the throne, he threw Bismarck's caution to the winds. He combined in his brilliant and versatile nature the burning patriotism and romantic strain of his ancestors. First one and then another of his hereditary qualities appeared uppermost in his kaleidoscopic record. Even his own people were startled by his capricious moods. When a man of this character has autocratic power, the effect is soon seen in foreign politics. In 1890 William looked restlessly round to assert himself. Impatient of all advice, he dismissed Bismarck. "One only is master within the Empire, and I will tolerate no other. Those who oppose me in my work I will crush," he said. Where Bismarck had been defensive, the Kaiser was offensive. A German writer remarks: "Our foreign policy began to think in Continents. Henceforth no decision should be taken without Germany's directing and determining voice." As a shrewd Frenchman declared: "The Kaiser always wants your friendship *against* someone else."

His attitude alarmed other States almost at once. He made no attempt to renew the Russian alliance, and immediately embarked on a naval policy that was certain to arouse the suspicions of Great Britain.

The development of German sea-power was in fact a sort of barometer which indicated the increasing pressure of the atmosphere.

Development of German navy.

As early as 1853, Prussia had purchased in Jade Bay a window looking into the North Sea. In 1869 Wilhelmshaven was opened as a naval base. At the end of the Danish War of 1864 Kiel became the head-quarters of the Prussian navy, although Bismarck's idea of a North Sea-Baltic Canal was pigeon-holed for many years owing to the hostility of Moltke and the "big army" party.

In 1890 the cession of Heligoland augured well for the Kaiser's declaration at Stettin "that our future lies on the water". The little rock lying 35 nautical miles north-west of Cuxhaven had been in British hands for eighty-three years. We gave it up with a light heart, for its maintenance involved considerable expense, and it was believed that the erosion of the waves would speedily demolish the island. By the Germans it was so fortified by concrete, armour-plate, and heavy long-range guns as to become as nearly impregnable as a place may be.

Heligoland.

It was not until 1898 that the building of a big fleet was seriously considered. The famous Navy Bill of that year was the outcome of the seizure of Kiao-Chau and the desire to foment the trouble between Briton and Boer in South Africa. The Kaiser is again the spokesman: "The Trident must pass into our hand," he says, and "I shall not rest until I have brought my fleet to the same standard as my army".

In 1897 Von Tirpitz came to the Admiralty to do for the navy what Scharnhorst had done for the army (see p. 91). The Bill of 1898 was the first challenge to our naval supremacy. It provided for a battle-fleet of seventeen battleships and formidable cruiser squadrons. The programme was to be completed in six years, and every ship was to be replaced at definite intervals. From this time forward the welfare of the navy became a national concern. The German people was educated to enthusiasm partly by the Navy League, partly by the Ministry of Education.

But, even so, the pace was not hot enough for the Kaiser. When the Boer War broke out, in October, 1899, an unwonted sympathy for small States discovered "the bitter need" of a

strong navy for Germany. Therefore, in 1900, came a second Navy Bill launched on a flood of Anglophobia. "Germany must have a battle-fleet so strong that even the adversary possessed of the greatest sea-power will attack it only with grave risk to himself." No attempt was made to disguise the fact that Germany was building against Great Britain. Two battle-fleets were voted, comprising in all 38 battleships, 14 large cruisers, 38 small cruisers, and 97 torpedo boats, the programme to be completed by 1917. In 1906, 1908, and 1912 amendments were introduced.

The "Dreadnought" period had now been reached. We must remember the amendment of 1908 carefully, as it was the answer to the policy of reduced armaments which the British Liberal Government had suggested and acted upon in view of the Hague Conference of 1907. The amendment of 1908 was the answer of Rehoboam: Germany would make the yoke of armaments heavier still. Fifteen battleships were added to the programme already under way. This would mean an actual superiority over Great Britain in battleships by the year 1914. The British Government awoke to the gravity of the national danger. To make up the leeway eight Dreadnoughts were to be laid down in 1909. Our conscientious attempt to slacken the pace in this insane race for armaments had done more harm than good, for it was interpreted as a sign of exhaustion and decadence. Germany again increased the pace, so that by the amendment of 1912 a third active battle-squadron was voted, and "four-fifths of the entire German navy was to be maintained in full permanent commission—a proportion that finds no example in the previous practice of any modern naval power" (Mr. Winston Churchill, 1912). Our answer was the declaration that we should double any given number of ships that Germany might lay down, though we still left the door open by undertaking a corresponding reduction, and the First Lord (Mr. Winston Churchill) in 1913 once again held out the olive branch in his plea for a "naval holiday". The answer was an increase of half a million in the German estimates.

This, briefly, is the record of German naval growth. She was already, beyond question, the greatest power on land. For

Britain the navy was her all in all. Her navy was a necessity. "We have been at least as seriously menaced by Germany at sea, as Germany has been menaced by Russia on land. But we can confidently say that in the period of rivalry our fleet has never been used as a threat or hired to the purposes of an aggressive colonial policy. Rightly or wrongly we have refused to make possible intentions a case for an ultimatum. We have held by the position that only a breach of public law would justify us in abandoning our efforts for the peace of Europe."[1]

In the German armies, unquestionably supreme in Europe, there has been throughout the Kaiser's reign an ever-increasing "peace" establishment. Germany was the best judge of her defensive needs. The existence of two long lines of land frontier was ample justification. Then, having put her hand to the plough, she found it impossible to turn back.

Since the disaster of 1870–1 French policy was devoted to recuperation at home and colonial development abroad. So far from wishing to provoke a quarrel with Germany, France studied to avoid having one thrust upon her. But her conspicuous success as a colonizing power counted to her for unrighteousness. The acquisition of Tunis in 1882 had produced the Triple Alliance. Her relations with Great Britain were at times severely strained, e.g. in Egypt, and, temporarily, during the Dreyfus case. A Bismarck would have delighted to fish in such troubled waters. The "mailed fist" policy of William II produced the Triple Entente, by which Great Britain was brought into agreement with the two Powers which had long been objects of her suspicion.

Relations with France.

Germany had now to learn that her ever-increasing armaments, so far from overawing her neighbours, were only serving to strengthen their resolution and draw them together in self-defence. There was no time to be lost. The action of Germany was characteristic.

The interest of France in Morocco is very natural. She alone is fortunate enough to possess in North-West Africa colonies at her very doors. They almost amount to extensions of the mother country. Compared with the interests of France, and even Spain,

[1] *Why We are at War* (Oxford University Press).

the interests of Germany in Morocco were very small. The chancellor, Von Bülow, admitted this in 1904. We may allow that Germany was justified in asking that her interests should be safe-guarded, and the integrity of Morocco guaranteed anew. But she cared little for the settlement of the Morocco question on its merits. She wished to make it the occasion for the humiliation of France, and to discover the strength or weakness of the Anglo-French entente.[1]

The proof of this lies in the sequence of events. In March, 1905, the prestige and power of Russia received a shattering blow at the Battle of Mukden. From her, France could look for no support. Suddenly Germany discovered that she had a grievance, and the Kaiser visited Tangier and proclaimed that nothing concerning the administration of Morocco could or should be managed without the consent of Germany, and that no other Power should be allowed to step in between him and the sovereign of a free country. This implied a denial of the prior importance of French interests, and the intention of Germany to secure compensation and the repudiation of the Anglophil French minister Delcassé.

Events in Morocco, 1905.

France was not ready for war. She sacrificed her minister and agreed to the holding of a conference at Algeciras in January, 1906. This substantially confirmed the *status quo* in Morocco, i.e. France was allowed to continue her "protecting" policy.

Algeciras Conference.

Germany gained nothing. The end of the Russo-Japanese War had come, and she could no longer count so securely on the isolation of France. Her blustering intervention had done her more harm than good. It had enraged the French, tightened their friendship with Great Britain, and hastened on the Anglo-Russian understanding.

Germany had overreached herself, but this did not induce her to change her attitude.

The set-back was regarded in German eyes as the outcome of conferences as opposed to plain unvarnished force. On

[1] The historian Rachfahl wrote: "Because under the surface of the Morocco affair lurked the deepest and most difficult problems of power, it was to be foreseen that its course would prove to be a trial of strength of the first order".

another occasion the display of the strong man armed should be still more imposing. No chance must be let slip to assert that the Triple Alliance stood, as it had done for twenty-five years, as the arbiter of European politics. The Triple Entente must be shown to be a negligible quantity. Thus exactly was it when in 1908 Germany stepped into the ring to support the Austrian annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Germany set out to dominate and dictate the policy of the Continent, offering as alternatives submission to her will, or war. There was no third way contemplated. Germany "had taken her stand in shining armour" by the side of her ally. Russia, still weak, was not prepared to fight. France could not stand alone, while Britain was not so directly concerned as to justify intervention.

1908. Germany supports Austria.

Three years later, going from strength to strength, Germany provoked what is known as the Agadir crisis. In 1911, France was compelled, in the interests of peace, to send an army of occupation to Fez. Germany made protests, and backed them by the dispatch of the gunboat *Panther* to Agadir to help and protect German subjects and clients in those regions. The German subjects were few and far between, but the port of Agadir had its own value as a coaling station on the Atlantic coast, conveniently situated as a half-way house to South Brazil or the West African colonies. Germany failed to break the Triple Entente in 1911. It was made perfectly clear by our statesmen that we should stand fast by our friend, and this plain speaking probably averted war. It has been said that the War Council at Potsdam decided that they were not ready for war. Germany fell back on diplomacy, agreeing to recognize the French Protectorate in Morocco in return for a slice of the French Congo.

The Agadir crisis, 1911.

At Agadir, as at Algeciras, the pact between Great Britain and France remained unbroken.

From 1911 Germany redoubled her efforts to show the world that she was firmly resolved not to be put aside. The Estimates for 1912 provided for huge increases in army and navy. In 1913 an Army Act decreed a war strength of 5,400,000 men. Were these defensive measures against Russian encroachment or French

"revanche"? Or were they preparations against the Day when Germany should snatch from the Balkan sea of troubles the excuse for a fight to a finish against all who disputed her claim to give the law to Europe? The survey of her previous record can alone entitle us to answer these questions.

It would be quite misleading in a survey of German world-policy to leave the impression that the Imperial Government was content to adopt a bullying attitude simply to annex possessions overseas at the expense of Great Britain and France. The German programme did not consist simply in waiting for something to turn up in international affairs, which might afford a favourable opportunity for colonial expansion. It was something much more definite, and the Germans were at no pains to disguise it.

We have seen that outside Europe, judged by French and British standards, Germany has shown little aptitude for colony-building. But comparative failure overseas does not apply to German colonizing activity within Europe. From the days of the Teutonic Knights of the thirteenth century to the Prussian "peaceful penetration" of Turkey in the twentieth, we are compelled to recognize the undoubted if disquieting fact that the Germans possess a natural driving force which impels them to overflow their borders and bestow the "blessings of a superior civilization" upon other lands. When the Industrial Revolution came, this *wanderlust* increased by leaps and bounds. We have seen that it explains the planting of South African colonies in the eighties of last century. We have seen, too, that Bismarck regarded Germany as a "satiated" State; when her unity had once been achieved, she could afford to develop by peaceful means.

After his day there arose a powerful party with a very different programme. The Pan-German League was founded in 1886 by Dr. Karl Peters. It came to be all-embracing in its ambitions, for it included not only the acquisition of a navy, and oversea colonies as markets and havens for the German emigrant, but also a scheme for colonizing the whole of Central Europe. The foundation-stone would be laid by the blending of "Austria" with the German Empire. The two would count as one for

Pan-German League.

"Middle Europe."

trade and military measures. By degrees Switzerland, Holland, Belgium, Scandinavia, and the Balkan States would be drawn into this central "Continental" system, which would embrace upwards of 150 million people and the most valuable area in Europe. The pious aspiration of a mediæval empire would thus become a tremendous fact. All the absorbed little States would learn by prosperity gladly to accept their fate!

Even this was not the end of the colossal Pan-German schemes. The Turks were a "played-out" people, and still possessed, in Asia Minor, Syria, and, above all, in Mesopotamia, lands which could be made rich in corn and wine and oil when once fertilized with German capital combined with German organizing genius. So began the plan for a Berlin-Bagdad railway. The idea was older than the German Empire: it had been mooted as early as 1846. In 1882 German advances were made to the Sultan. In 1889 William II paid his first visit to Constantinople, the outcome of which was a concession for a railway to Konia. When, in 1898, he made his grand tour of the Near East to advertise his affection for the Moslem world, he paid a personal visit to Abdul Hamid. In the following year concessions were won for the construction of the railway as far as Bagdad, and in 1902 further concessions were granted. The subsequent years were spent in endeavouring to persuade foreign Powers to find money for the railway, in "squaring" Russia by encouraging her Persian expansion, and in trying to persuade Great Britain that the scheme in no way menaced her Indian Empire.

The Berlin-Bagdad railway.

This last task was difficult, for the railway, when extended to the Persian Gulf, would afford Germany a path to the East unassailable by sea-power. "Great Britain saw in the search for the shells of oysters in the Persian Gulf their replacement by shells made by very competent human hands at Essen on the Rhine." The completion of the railway would be followed sooner or later by the establishment of a German naval base—a second Tsingtao—on the flank of our road to India.

Obviously Egypt would be no less imperilled by the German exploitation of the Near East.

That is the scale upon which the Pan-Germanists were

prepared to work. They had other strings to their long bow —notably the design to occupy South Brazil and to create a German South Africa.

"The wave-beat knocks powerfully at our gates and calls us a great nation to maintain our place in our world—in other words, to pursue *world-policy*. The ocean is indispensable for German greatness; but the ocean also reminds us that neither on it nor across it in the distance can any great decision be again arrived at without Germany and the German Empire." So spake William II in 1900. Doubtless he saw in the fulfilment of some or all of the Pan-German schemes the consummation of his restless personal ambition.

IMPORTANT DATES

1884. German Colonies founded in Africa.
1888. Accession of William II.
1890. Acquisition of Heligoland.
1897. Acquisition of Kiao-Chau.
1898. First Navy Bill.
1900. Second Navy Bill.
1905. Intervention in Morocco.
1906, Jan. Algeciras Conference.
1911. Agadir crisis.

For List of Books for Reference see Appendix I

CHAPTER XXI

Peace Ideals and "Real" Politics

The years from 1878 to 1912 were marked by no great war in Europe. Never since the days of the Roman Empire had there been so long a period of peace. But it was an armed peace, and there was no sense of security. Cavour used to talk of "people like me who have more faith in ideas than in cannon for mending the lot of humanity". There were partisans of both these remedies during this peace period.

Peace period, 1878-99.

Since the War of 1870 and the Congress of Berlin in 1878,

Europe gradually assumed the aspect of two huge armed camps. Anxiously watching without stood the smaller nations, occasionally to be attracted irresistibly into the magnetic field of one or other of the Great Powers. So strongly was the need of taking sides felt that Great Britain forsook her "splendid isolation".

Two armed camps.

The two great armed camps came to be called the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance. The first was the natural outcome of the last.

The success of Bismarck against France in 1870 had made Germany the greatest military Power in Europe. No one knew how she proposed to use her strength.

There could be no genuine understanding with France. Alsace-Lorraine could never be forgotten. France herself maintained a quiet and dignified attitude in face of much provocation, and sought in colonial expansion the means of recovering her strength.

Austria was fully occupied with her Slav subjects, and was scheming for Balkan aggrandizement. Russia looked towards Persia, Afghanistan, and the Far East. Italy was miserably poor, and still too young and weak to play an independent part.

It is strange to recall that the League of Germany, Austria, and Italy was at first welcomed by Great Britain. It was the work of Bismarck. The alliance with Austria was made by him from fear of France and Russia.[1] Italy was drawn into the alliance largely out of pique, because French development in Tunis trespassed on what she counted as her own close preserves. The Triple Alliance was formed to enable its "senior partners" to proceed with their several ambitions and designs without interference. More than that, they could impose their own will on Europe.

The Triple Alliance.

The direct consequence was the rapprochement between France and Russia, neither of whom could exist comfortably without an ally. First an *entente*, then an alliance, was formed in 1895. It cannot be too carefully noted that it was made in self-defence. The same sense of

The Triple Entente.

[1] With the latter he always desired to see friendly relations. He approved of her despotism, which he desired to see in Prussia, and he hastened to "reinsure" himself by fresh treaties in 1884 and 1887.

insecurity caused Britain and France to sink their colonial differences in the *entente* of 1904. In 1907 an agreement of the same kind was made between Britain and Russia, when spheres of influence were defined in Persia and the Further East. Thus was the Triple Entente evolved by the law of self-preservation. If the Triple Alliance was the work of Bismarck, it is equally true to say that the Triple Entente was the work of William II.

To this period of the formation of the "armed camps" belong the attempts to abolish war by arbitration.

There is nothing new in the idea of regulating warfare in the interests of humanity. It was the idea of law that set a sharp line of distinction between the Greek and the Barbarian. In the *Trojan Women* of Euripides we find the first moving protest against pitiless massacre and enslavement of women and children. That play dates from the fifth century B.C. Among Greek thinkers there is a clear sense of the brotherhood of man.[1] Rome stood for settled government, order, and, above all, for law. Her "Jus Gentium" is witness to her sense of the "rights" of weaker peoples. Virgil's view of his empire's destiny—"pacis imponere morem . . . parcere subjectis"—contains the same thought, To the Dark Ages the Church had brought a Gospel of Love, so that in the Middle Ages incessant strife was tempered by ideas of chivalry and the conviction that all is not fair in war: there was the Truce of God and the Church's denunciation of slavery.

A law of nations was needed all the more when, as independent nations rose, the Pope and Emperor lost their old *rôle* of arbitrators.

The founder of modern international law was the Dutchman Grotius (1583–1645). He was witness of the unspeakable atrocities that stained the Thirty Years' War, when no quarter was given and, among non-combatants, neither age nor sex was spared. He saw the crying need for a code by which the nations would abide in good faith. Till this was obtained, the state of man's life in the civilized world would remain but "poor, nasty, brutish, and short", as Hobbes imagined it in a state of nature.

Growth of international law.

[1] Though the Greek Commonwealth was based on slavery, it was marred by few of the horrors of modern slave States.

In the eighteenth century the cause of arbitration languished. Frederick the Great regarded treaties as so much "filigree-work, made rather to please the eye than to be of use".

In the nineteenth century we find formal conventions meeting to lay down definite regulations for the conduct of war, the position of neutral States, and the treatment of non-combatants. The credit for this advance belongs largely to the Tsars Alexander I and Nicholas II at the beginning and end of the century. It was a great encouragement when the impulse towards peaceful settlement of disputes came from reigning princes. Alexander I had aimed at a confederation of Europe. Between his reign and that of Nicholas II we mark progress in the Declaration of Paris (1856), which abolished privateering, and the Geneva Conference of 1864 (extended in 1906), from which the Red Cross Society has sprung, borrowing the Genevan "red cross on the white ground" as the ensign of its mission of mercy. At Geneva was laid down a series of rules, accepted by nearly every State, relating to the treatment of sick and wounded. The inviolability of Red Cross "neutrality" was established.

Tsar Alexander I.

Declaration of Paris, 1856.

Geneva Conference, 1864.

From 1879 onwards the race of armaments grew more intense. The maxim that, if you wish for peace you must prepare for war, was taken only too literally. Mutual suspicion and the strain of competition seemed ever to increase. In 1899 the Tsar Nicholas II issued the rescript which led to the First Conference at the Hague. In 1907 the Second Hague Conference amended and enlarged the "Laws and Customs of War". The main object of the meetings was to provide for a mutual insurance society against *the abuse of force* in time of war on land and sea, with the object of safeguarding the interests of populations against the greatest disasters that could happen to the ordinary population in time of war. Cases which are not covered by the regulations are to be governed by "the laws of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience". A court of arbitration was set up.

The Hague Conference.

Court of Arbitration.

What was the significance of the Hague Conference? It meant that public opinion saw in war a stupid anachronism. It suggested that the increasing cost of armies and navies was a

danger rather than a safeguard to peace. It pointed to an ideal, and on that account has been condemned and derided as an impossible Utopia, and the present state of war has been cited as evidence of its futility. But if there were no ideal there would be no progress, and that the ways are darkened now is no excuse for refusing to look forward where progress lies. The air was not conquered by compiling statistics of fatal accidents. And so, lest one bad custom should corrupt the world, we need not despair if Prussian policy and false philosophy prescribe war as a wholesome medicine for nations, and if the necessity of Prussia knows no laws of mercy and goodwill to men.

The Hague Conference recognizes with Mazzini a higher necessity than success at any price, namely, that the nations are the citizens of humanity.

We have seen in the Hague Conference the beginnings of a movement towards the abolition of war, to mitigate the horror and suffering that war involves, to safeguard the smaller and weaker nations. Is it because this idea aspires to the ideal that mankind has been so slow in embracing it?

Against the ideal of international peace there has arisen an "armed doctrine", which we may call "real politics".

Influence of ideas in literature.

One may exaggerate the influence of great writers and books upon the history of their times — their own people are often unwilling to receive them—but we cannot afford to neglect it altogether. In the Middle Ages, and later, if you were regarded as unorthodox, your books were burnt by the Church and you were fortunate if you escaped a like fate. Think of Wyclif, Huss, Galileo, or the Protestant reformers. Luther's writings were condemned because the Pope was well aware that such work would spread in ever-widening circles. A great idea nobly expressed is the shrapnel of progress: it sweeps a wide area in a short time. So it was with Calvin's book, *The Institutes of Christianity*. In Puritan times England was "the people of a Book", and Milton wrote of a good book as "the precious life-blood of a master spirit". In the political world, Machiavelli's *Prince* launched a new theory of statecraft.

In the eighteenth century we see the heralds of revolution in Montesquieu, Voltaire, and, above all, in Rousseau. It was

Rousseau's book—*The Social Contract*—that gave to the French their watchwords of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity, and did more than any other single book to hasten the march of democracy. That his reasoning was faulty and his hypothesis untenable did not diminish the potency of his doctrine. The *ancien régime* once abolished, the golden age of liberty would return again. Thus fortified by an idea, the Revolutionary armies overflowed their borders to convert Europe.

Yet another example may be seen in the "heroic age" of Prussia, when, sore stricken by Napoleon, she owed her resurrection, in part at least, to the inspiration of poets and thinkers. Arndt, Körner, Schiller, Fichte were creators of a public opinion. They were national educators, and they made the work of the men of action easier. Conscription became a glory and not a burden. Theirs was a spirit of natural growth born of the desire to shake off an oppressive yoke. It was not itself aggressive. "There came a tyrant and with holy glee" they "fought against him." There was no deep-laid plan to educate a people to think in terms of world-power. The spirit of 1812 differs from the spirit of 1912 as a wild flower from a hot-house plant. National opinions were not then made to order.

When we turn to the modern German Empire we find that the writer and his book are enlisted in a single cause. It was truly said by the Jesuits of old that he who controls the education of his own generation shall be master of the next. The Germans believed this, and where they conquered they founded a university. This is precisely what has happened in Germany to-day. If we may not bring an indictment against a whole nation, we may justly arraign its governing and educational trend. The Great War was not solely the creation of a war-lord and a military caste; it was equally the war of a nation which had been schooled to place duty to the State before duty to God and its neighbours.

Two writers stand out above the rest by reason of their influence and repute. They are Nietzsche the philosopher and Treitschke the historian. Put shortly, their theory runs: "There is but one God—Power: Nietzsche and Treitschke are his prophets".

Nietzsche and Treitschke.

Nietzsche's idea was that the strong shall inherit the earth.

The future was to belong to a race of supermen who should be a law unto themselves. Christianity, which championed the poor and needy, must be discarded as a religion only fit for slaves. This natural aristocracy does not yet exist; its production will be the work of time. Meanwhile the unfit will be eliminated. To this end war must be waged. He is quite clear that war is an unmixed blessing.

Now modern Prussia has appropriated the portions of Nietzsche's teaching which are suited to her own ambitions. The superman and super-race of the future was the Prussian. Prussia must impose her will and superior "Kultur" upon Europe.[1]

While Nietzsche unwittingly inspired Prussia with a belief in her mission of conquest, Treitschke laid down a far more definite programme. As his views were narrower so his influence was more direct. Prussia, the creator of a united Germany, was to be lord over all Europe, and dethrone Britain from the sovereignty of the seas. He was perfectly frank. He who runs may read his view of world-politics. The superman is the Prussian. Prussia has owed her greatness to her strength in war. By war she must fulfil her destiny. "The one unpardonable sin", he says, "is the failure to use one's might." "It is the sin against the Holy Ghost in politics." Self-interest alone must be consulted. "A good cause, you say, sanctifies every war. But I say unto you: a good war sanctifies every cause." And again, "War is politics *par excellence*." "The living God will see to it that war shall always recur as a terrible medicine for humanity."

No care for the supposed rights of smaller States or the observance of sworn treaties must be allowed to weigh for an instant against the ceaseless pursuit of power. "The State is power: it is the highest thing in the external society of man, above it there is nothing at all in the history of the world."

"The State is power."

Treitschke was a professing Protestant, but little room is left in his theory of politics for the love of God and your neighbour. He does not expect other States willingly to bow down and

[1] Nietzsche, of course, said nothing about Prussia as the elect among the nations. On the contrary, he had nothing but violent abuse for her policy; but his doctrine of the "will to power" and the glorification of war as an end in itself was a fine foundation for a world-policy.

worship before the Prussian State; successful war alone can obtain universal recognition for the blessings of German culture.

Such were the doctrines taught in school and university. The German professor is in the closest touch with the Government. Small wonder, then, that Treitschke's opinions have deeply influenced the politics of his generation. The seed fell on prepared ground. Bismarck's policy of blood and iron had triumphed. In 1888 William II became Kaiser.

Treitschke had many imitators and admirers; General Von Bernhardi, in particular, spared no pains to show in detail how Great Britain must first be destroyed that Germany might fulfil her destiny.

A new religion was preached—that might was right; that war was a blessing and a tonic.

We oppose to that assertion the old sanctity of the pledged word, the defence of the weak and mercy to the fallen, the belief that true culture is not the property of a single people, but the goodly heritage of all; that it is the gift of a spirit that bloweth where it listeth, that has no more affinity with the sword than the Parthenon with a powder factory.

Whatever be the worth of these "sanguinary sophistries", the awful outcome of their influence lies before us in the causes and conduct of the Great War.

CHAPTER XXII

The Near East Again

It is just to regard the riddle of the Balkan States as one of the main causes of the war. Now the unrest in the Balkans is itself only an aggravated form of a distemper from which modern Europe has suffered more or less acutely throughout the nineteenth century. This distemper may be crudely described as arising from the germ of suppressed nationalities. We saw how the Congress of Vienna,

Rise of nationality in the Balkan States.

meeting, as it were, like a medical association, roughly diagnosed the disease, but made no attempt to search narrowly for its causes. So virulent was the germ, it seemed that kings and statesmen feared to investigate it thoroughly. The best that can be said for the measures taken is that they were calculated to localize the ailment and prevent it from spreading.

The distemper has assumed its most violent form in the Balkan States, young States being naturally most susceptible; but the taint appeared unmistakably in the Prussian part of Poland, in Slesvig-Holstein, in Alsace-Lorraine. In Polish Russia, too, and in Finland the symptoms were apparent. Austria-Hungary lived in incessant dread lest the infection should spread from the Serbian Southern Slavs to her own Slav subjects, of whom she had some 26 millions. We see it again in Italy—it brought Italy into the war. We see it in Rumania; we see it to some extent also in Greece.

Let us try to realize the nature of this disease that has troubled Europe so insistently.

Meaning of a nation.

It is very hard to define what we mean by a nation. It is easier to explain what we do not mean. For example, common stock or race, common religion, common language do not necessarily compose a nation. No modern nation is derived from one pure and undiluted stock. The Swiss nation possesses three languages. Most modern States embrace a variety of creeds. The term nation connotes rather a sentiment, a sense of common interest, tradition, and outlook. It is of the spirit, not of the law. On no other reckoning could we explain the spiritual bond that unites Alsace-Lorraine to France, the patriotism of the Swiss or Belgians.

We often hear or read the facile phrase "racial hatred" cited as the begetter of great wars; we are probably nearer the truth in deciding that no great war has been caused by the sentiment of race alone. At least, the conscious force which impels one race to fly at the throat of another is hardly to be found in ancient history, or yet in the Middle Ages. Not until after the American and French Revolutions, when the *peoples* began to think about foreign politics, do we find the spirit of racial assertion.

We may, for clearness, distinguish between two manifestations of the modern race idea. In the one we find the overweening spirit that sees in its own race alone the future of the world, that will admit no superior and brook no competitor.[1]

Ideas of "race".

If you think like that about your own race or people, you may be tempted to announce the glad tidings among the lesser breeds. Though, like the Inquisition, your means of conversion may appear ungentle, extending where necessary to the annexation of other people's property and lives, the unique merits of your culture will justify your methods.

That is one side of the racial question. It is the spider's point of view. The spider thinks it most ungrateful of the fly not to appreciate the honour of introduction to such a beautiful web. (And, be it remembered, the spider is at least no hypocrite!)

But there is another side which is even more relevant to the issues of the recent war, and this is the situation viewed from the side of the subject nationality. We find in the centre and south-east of Europe nearly 30 million Slavs subject to Teuton or Magyar domination. That is the standpoint of the fly caught in the toils of the imperial spider.

Add to this the fact that the Russian Empire regarded herself as the natural protector of these weaker Slav brethren, and we begin to realize the meaning of racial hate.

Both these aspects of race sentiment appear in the issues of the present war. Prussianized Germany, convinced of her "mission", and the Slavs restive under the "sharp discipline militar", which denies them constitutional and civic equality and the freedom to develop their national life.

That is the true meaning of a "race war" between Teuton and Slav.

Let us turn to see how it fared with the Balkan States since their Charter of Liberties was signed at Berlin in 1878.

The pious hope was expressed that Turkey would reform herself, and extend the blessings of enlightened government to her remaining Christian subjects.

[1] This strange obsession found an interpreter in the renegade Houston Chamberlain, who would acknowledge no greatness—political, artistic, or religious—but of Teutonic making.

Failure of Berlin Congress to secure peace.

It was hoped that Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece would bury their past discontents, develop on approved European lines, and form an effective series of buffers to prevent further collisions between Russia and Turkey.

It was an admirable settlement on paper, but paper, especially when employed for treaty purposes, is perishable stuff.

Permanent peace could only be assured on three conditions: first, that foreign Powers should refrain from interfering to advance their own ambitions; secondly, that the persistent jealousies among the small States should be allayed; thirdly, that the Sultan would institute real reforms.

Unhappily, not one of these conditions was fulfilled; the Berlin settlement, in short, was a complete failure.

Ever since the Congress, the Balkan States have contrived to increase their power at the expense of Turkey, but were never, until 1912, united against her. The persistent "hates" of the several small nationalities seemed unlikely to diminish now that more prosperous days had dawned.

The fortunes of the Balkan States have depended, since 1878, very greatly upon the character of their rulers and statesmen. On the independence or subservience of these to foreign Powers, and on their personal ambitions, the destinies of their States have hung.

Serbia

The monarchy.

Serbia was unfortunate in her dynasties. In 1882 she attained the rank of a kingdom, and for the next twenty years she was discredited in European eyes by her "sad stories of the death of kings". The feud of the rival Karageorgevitch and Obrenovitch houses led to murders and abdications with almost tiresome regularity. We must go back to York and Lancaster, or the Montagues and Capulets of the mediæval Italian States, for similar atrocities. But they remind us how much the Balkan States have missed; the life wellnigh extinguished in the fourteenth century revives in the nineteenth, but the painfully-acquired lessons of six centuries, the political sense and social code, which time alone can teach, are as yet unlearnt. The landmarks are strange, the neighbours—all

but one—are unfamiliar; all except the Turk have changed.

It was with the Balkan States as with a traveller in the night express, who sleeps uneasily and wakes to find the scenery changed from the lone splendour of the high Alps to the verdure of the valleys. All has changed; but the churlish fellow-passenger of overnight, who trod on his toes, dug him in the ribs, and insisted on keeping the window closed, has remained.

The Balkans still belong in part to the Middle Ages.

So the story of the Serbian kings is savage. The changes are rung with bewildering frequency, from the murder of Kara George in 1817 to the murder of Alexander Obrenovitch and Draga, his wife, in 1903. It is hard for a Serbian monarch to start with an untarnished scutcheon. Rumania and Bulgaria have preferred to run no risks with native princes. Their monarchs have been made in Germany; while Denmark found a royal house for Greece. Only in Montenegro did a native dynasty persist and prosper. As will be seen, the welfare of these States has not always coincided with the personal and dynastic aims of their rulers.

For the future prosperity of Serbia, free access to the sea, whether Adriatic or Ægean, was imperative. This she had not acquired at Berlin. Her independence was complete, but hopes of expansion north-westward to the sea were dashed by the Austrian occupation of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Her increase of territory to the south-east, from Nish to Vranja, included Bulgarian inhabitants, while old Serbia, to the south-west, was left in Turkish hands. On the west lay the Sandjak, a vital corridor between mountain-walls giving access to Macedonia and separating Montenegro from Serbia. Here, in what was still nominally Turkish territory, the Austrians obtained the right to keep a garrison (see p. 191).

Access to the sea essential for prosperity.

Thus, though her area was increased by about one-fourth, Serbia was flanked by Austria, Bulgaria, and Turkey. Her future was not promising.

Her first king, Milan Obrenovitch, placed the privileges and pleasures of his rank before his duties to his people, and readily lent himself to the designs of Austria. Urged on by the latter Power, in 1885 he sought "the bubble reputation in the cannon's mouth", and, without troubling to

Attack on Bulgaria, 1885.

prepare adequately for war, he fell upon the Bulgarians at Slivnitza, only to meet with disastrous defeat in a three-days' fight. The result was increase of debt, subservience to Austria, the wane of his popularity, and abdication in 1889.

Alexander, his son, aged thirteen, reigned in his stead. The change brought no improvement. Austrian influence increased and all liberal ideas of government diminished, until the wayward young king crowned his failures by a marriage with his mother's lady-in-waiting, Draga Mashin, whose rank and reputation were questionable. There was no heir, and all parties—the Karageorgevitch claimants, the Radicals, the army officers, combined to rid the country of the Obrenovitch dynasty. This was achieved on the night of 10th June, 1903, when certain officers broke into the palace and murdered the king and queen under most brutal and cold-blooded circumstances.

Increase of Austrian influence.

Revolution, 1903.

The passing of the Obrenovitch dynasty, with its pro-Austrian leanings and political barrenness, and the accession of Peter, grandson of Kara George, opened a new vista for Serbian national ideals.

King Peter, 1903–.

While the king and people suffered—the former unjustly—from the stigma incurred by the Belgrade murders (King Peter, at least, fairly lived it down) the financial and social position of Serbia began steadily to improve, and this despite the heavy handicap of Austrian trade tyranny. Serbia was essentially an agricultural country, her chief exports being grain and pigs. She shared with Switzerland the unenviable distinction of possessing no outlet to the sea. An attempt to arrange a customs treaty with Bulgaria only led to a tariff war with Austria, often known as "the Pig War". It was quite clear that economically Serbia lay at the mercy of Austria-Hungary. Behind all lay the wider issue, the clash of ambitions. Greater Serbia was set against the "Drang nach Osten" (drive to the East). The Teuton triumph implied the downfall of the Jugo-Slav idea.

Tariff war with Austria.

Then in 1908 came the annexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina, which to Serbia spelt national death. From that moment it became quite clear to every Southern Slav that war could not be long delayed.

Austria annexes Bosnia-Hercegovina, 1908.

Bulgaria

When we turn to Bulgaria we see at once that geographically she was far more favoured. The country, despite the Balkan range, is less uniformly mountainous. The Black Sea coast gave an outlet to trade; the people themselves were far less scattered and divided than the majority of the Southern Slavs.[1]

In her ruling princes, too, the country appeared to be more fortunate. Her foreign policy was far more "national". After the Congress of Berlin it was natural that the infant State should have a healthy appetite for expansion. By the San Stefano treaty a big Bulgaria had been contemplated, extending from the Danube to the Ægean, embracing all Macedonia and completely dismembering Turkey.

Bulgaria the creation of the Congress of Berlin.

The principality of 1878 only extended from the Danube to the Balkans, south of which Eastern Rumelia, though autonomous, was still considered a Turkish province, while Macedonia remained, as of old, a part of the Ottoman Empire.

To annex Eastern Rumelia, to rescue unredeemed Macedonia, and eventually to go to Constantinople and "take the grand Turk by the beard"—that was the national programme of Bulgaria.

National ambition.

Meanwhile the principality lacked a prince, till in 1879 a ruler was found in Prince Alexander of Battenberg, a nephew of the Russian empress. He had a fine presence and was an intrepid soldier, but possessed none of the subtler qualities of a statesman. No man needed them more. His position was very difficult. He was torn between the strong Russian influence and the liberal national party, which desired a constitution free of foreign control. Persuaded at length to break with his Russian advisers, he led the national party in the revolution of 1885, which added Eastern Rumelia to his principality. This breach of the Berlin treaty and the independent attitude assumed greatly annoyed the Tsar, and provoked shrill demands for compensation on the part of Serbia and Greece.

Alexander of Battenberg, 1879.

Eastern Rumelia annexed, 1885.

[1] For convenience, Bulgarians may count as such.

King Milan of Serbia, incited by Austria, blundered into a fortnight's war, only to be hunted back to Nish by the raw Bulgarian levies whom the personal gallantry of their prince rallied to victory in a three-days' fight at Slivnitza (north-west of Sofia). The treaty which followed merely restored the *status quo*, but the Russian dislike of Alexander's independence speedily produced a *coup d'état*. A party of Bulgarian officers who favoured Russia entered the palace at Sofia in the early morning of 21st August, 1886, forced Alexander to resign, and deported him to Russian territory. Although Stambulov and the national party were strong enough to recall him within a fortnight, he had lost his nerve and was unequal to the task of breaking the Russian leading-strings. On 7th September he formally abdicated. After a brief regency, during which Stambulov acted as dictator, the throne was accepted by Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg in 1887. For seven years the new ruler lay low and bided his time, leaving public affairs in the able hands of Stambulov. The latter deserved well of his country, for he restored order, created credit, fostered trade, constructed railways and roads, and proved himself in fact a benevolent despot. When in 1894 Stambulov, who had never troubled to become a courtier, fell in a palace intrigue, the prince was free to develop his own policy in his own way. His first step was to restore "the wire" to Petrograd, which Stambulov had resolutely refused to do. He felt, reasonably enough, that his adopted country was too weak to stand alone. His next step was to promote Bulgarian influence in Macedonia, which, since San Stefano, was regarded as "unredeemed Bulgaria". This policy was bound to bring him into conflict with Serbia and Greece, both of which also claimed a considerable part of that debatable land, and, needless to say, with his suzerain, Turkey, to which it still belonged. Macedonia was neither a nation nor a state. Nominally a Turkish province, it was in reality an arena into which Serbians, Greeks, and Bulgarians, and even the unobtrusive Vlachs were wont to fling their irregular bands on behalf of their unredeemed brethren. The Balkan States needed no call from the men of Macedonia to come over and help them. The latter

Slivnitza.

Abdication of Alexander, 1886.

Stambulov.

Ferdinand's policy.

Macedonia.

indeed were never quite sure to what name they were expected to answer. It is impossible to decide between the conflicting claims. In fact, the Macedonian peasant yielded readily to the temptation to belong to any one of the little "nations" which promised some security of life and property. That his lot was not a happier one was not entirely the fault of the Turk, who under continual provocation from the Slav States resorted periodically to indiscriminate massacre—the only remedy he thoroughly understood.

Such was the nature of the soil out of which Ferdinand prepared to reap a rich harvest.

It was in 1908 that he first openly showed his hand. Taking advantage of the Young Turk Revolution (see p. 270), he proclaimed the complete independence of his adopted country, and assumed the title of Tsar or king (7th October). Two days later Austria annexed Bosnia-Hercegovina.

Bulgaria becomes a kingdom, 1908.

From these two actions three results are clearly seen. Austria-Hungary had definitely challenged Russia on her own ground, and was openly seeking a path through the peninsula to the Ægean Sea. Bulgaria, by her rapid progress and successful diplomacy, appeared as the State to which the future had most to offer. Serbia, now desperate, caught between the upper millstone of Austria and the lower millstone of Turkey, adopted a double-edged policy. Against Austria she waged a Press campaign, and formed patriotic societies, the chief of which, the Narodna Odbrana, may be compared to Mazzini's "Association of Young Italy". Their sole object was, by fair means or foul, to cut the south Slavs free from the Austrian octopus.

Serbian interests affected.

Meanwhile Serbian expansion must be sought in the south, and Turkey must be expelled from Macedonia.

The "sick man" had been for ten years assiduously nursed by Germany. The time was at hand when no settlement of Near Eastern affairs might be made without her assent. William II would prove less careful than Bismarck for the bones of his grenadiers, in defence of Austria, "his brilliant second". The interests of Germany and Austria were identical. The Teuton

challenges the Slav and defies the time-honoured claims of Russia.

By 1908 there was not much left of the Berlin Treaty.

Greece

Nowhere did the flame of national spirit burn more brightly than in Greece, although the fifty years that had elapsed since the War of Liberation had been marked by little progress. Her slow development had been due in part to the presence of the Turks along the whole of her northern frontier, shutting her off from intercourse and trade with her unredeemed countrymen and her neighbour States.

Causes of slow development.

Economically she started with a heavy handicap—the result of the ten years' war—and there was but little encouragement to sink capital in concerns which depended on the good graces of the Turk. Further, the State was divided into two hostile parties, the one urging a policy of peace and economic development, the other a forward policy of defiance to the traditional foe. Greece fell between the two stools despite the patient efforts of Trikoupis, who held office as prime minister from 1882 to 1895. Like Colbert, he wished to build up his State on the sure foundations of commerce and agriculture, only to find the warlike policy of his opponents preferred. On his retirement the fortune of Greece sank very low. In 1897 his successors courted disaster by plunging recklessly into war with Turkey on behalf of Crete. A month of war saw Greece decisively beaten, and ensuing bankruptcy dictated the policy of the next eleven years.

Trikoupis.

Turkish War, 1897.

Then, like all her neighbours, she was roused before her time by the Young Turk programme of reform. It was Crete that forced her hand by the announcement of her desire for union with Greece.

Affairs of Crete.

Since 1897 Crete had enjoyed self-government under a Greek Commissioner and the guarantee of the Great Powers. In 1908 the majority of the people, who were ardent nationalists, seized the occasion of the Turkish revolution to proclaim their union with Greece and to send deputies to Parliament at Athens.

Recognition by the latter meant war with Turkey, and, as Greece was in no condition to fight, it was fortunate that the Powers intervened to restore the settlement of 1897.

Then there appeared as the *deus ex machina* a man of genius in the person of the Cretan statesman Venezelos. Few men have done so much for their country in so short a time. Within two years he had infused a new life into every department of State. Brigandage disappeared, the army and navy were reformed under the tuition of French and British officers. A national policy now at last became what it had never been before—a practical policy. To external affairs Venezelos brought the same conspicuous qualities of prescience, tact, and decision. What patriotic Greeks demanded was first the liberation of their brethren in Macedonia and Crete, in the Greek islands, such as Mitylene and Chios, and security for the prosperous and numerous Greek communities on the coast of Asia Minor.

Venezelos.

A national policy.

Success was contingent on the complete overthrow of Turkey. In the meanwhile it was quite clear that Macedonia must prove a bone of contention between Bulgaria and Greece.

Venezelos wisely saw that premature attempts at a hard-and-fast arrangement must retard if not frustrate the formation of a Balkan League. He therefore induced Bulgaria to accept his alliance, and to leave the division of spoil until the inevitable war had been decided. The wisdom of this course is clearly seen by contrast with the utter failure of a prearranged agreement between Bulgaria and Serbia. Ferdinand and Venezelos saw that military success must depend on concerted action.

Rumania

Rumania was not so directly concerned with the burning racial questions south of the Danube. Her "national" problem centred in Transylvania, where nearly 3 million Rumanians lay under the tyrannic yoke of Hungary, and, in Bessarabia, the seizure of which by Russia in 1878 deprived her of over a million more. This Russian annexation threw Rumania into alliance with the Teutonic Powers, and Prince Carol, who became king in 1881,

himself a Hohenzollern, was for many years a sleeping partner in the Triple Alliance. There were Rumanians scattered throughout Macedonia, so that any combined attempt to win liberation from Turkey in that quarter was sure to enlist Rumanian sympathy. Any increase of Bulgarian power would run counter to the interests of Rumania. There was no love lost between Bulgaria and Rumania; the Dobrudja cession of 1878 still rankled with the former, while the latter felt that she had no definite frontier.

Still, the keynote of Rumania's policy must be sought in the desire to redeem her brethren from the hand of Hungary. That consideration, overriding the fear of German military prowess, transcending the strained relations with Russia, availed at length to bring Rumania to fight on the side of the Allies in the sacred cause of nationality.

Turkey

While each of the Balkan States had its own ambitions to satisfy, there could be no advance so long as the hand of Turkey still lay heavy over Macedonia, which, as we have seen, was the storm-centre of the Peninsula.

The year 1908, fraught with issues so critical for the future of the Balkans, is a tremendous landmark in the modern history of Turkey. And this, not because Turkey achieved the impossible and reformed herself, but because the dread of increased Turkish efficiency startled the Balkan States into the formation of what had seemed equally impossible—an armed united League. In July of this year there occurred in Constantinople what is known as the "Young Turk" Revolution. This was a renewal of the attempt made in 1876 to set up a constitutional representative Government in place of the despotism of the sultan. Backed by the majority of the army, the reformers carried all before them, and in April, 1909, were strong enough to depose Abdul Hamid and crush the Conservative party. Western Europe at first welcomed the movement as a genuine attempt to effect a root-and-branch reformation.

The "Young Turkish" Revolution, 1908.

Abdul Hamid deposed, 1909.

"From bias free of every kind,
This trial must be tried."[1]

But it soon became clear that power had been transferred to an unscrupulous clique supported by the army; the liberal ideas so freely vented were fortified by no instructed body of public opinion —a force which, indeed, in Turkey has never existed.

The leaders of the Young Turk party were for the most part young only in judgment, and they were not Turks. To the conundrum: "When is a Turk not a Turk?" it was fairly safe to reply, "When he is a Young Turk". Jews, infidels, aliens, adventurers—they were a scratch crew. They had plenty of ability, but it was all directed towards their own aggrandizement. Fraud and assassination were their chosen weapons. They gave out, of course, that the golden age had dawned. There should be no more pillaging, no more massacres, but Parliamentary government and equal justice for all. The test of their sincerity came very quickly in their attitude towards Christian provinces. Here they had a choice: they might grant Home Rule, or they might adopt more scientific oppression based on the models of their Prussian mentors. In any case, the Balkan States viewed the Young Turk revolution with the utmost suspicion and alarm. Any strengthening of Turkey was a menace to their own ambitions. An efficient Turkey would be quite intolerable. They dreaded the advent of a new Pharaoh who knew not Joseph. The new broom would doubtless make a clean sweep of the Macedonian arena, wherein they were wont to take their pastime. In the event of real reform they felt as men suddenly bereft of a long-cherished grievance, like Sinn Feiners who are granted a republic, or pacifists in an era of perpetual peace.

But it was soon quite clear that the Young Turks had pinned their faith to a policy of "Turkification", that is, the welding together of all the Christian areas of the empire under one central rule. As Slavs were "Magyarized"[1] and Germans "Prussianized", so should all the alien provincial elements be turned into Turks. Then might "Turkey a nation" rally the Moslem world and head a pan-Islamic movement to destroy the British Empire.

[1] These vile, new-fangled terms—turkification, russification, magyarization—mean, in each case, that one race or people is resolved to impose its will and its ways upon all peoples and places under its dominion. The process traces its spiritual ancestry back to Spanish methods in Mexico and Peru, or to Archbishop Laud's Church "uniformity". Nebuchadnezzar, too, pursued a like policy.

It was just because the revolution took this aspect that Germany was enabled to resume the calculated intimacy with the Turks, which had been broken for the moment by the deposition of Abdul Hamid, the Kaiser's friend. The revolution depended on the army, and reorganization of the army was the strongest German card. It was an easy matter to enlist the co-operation of the leaders, especially that of the able but utterly unscrupulous Enver Pasha.

The broken theme of the Abdul-William idyll was restored and repeated; it convinced the Balkan States that the end of Turkish tyranny could only be compassed by the blood and iron begotten of their own resolute and combined exertion. Local risings followed the revolution. Macedonia, as usual, was the scene of massacres. Crete was disturbed. Bulgaria suffered too. The Albanians were coerced. Arabia was uneasy. When Bosnian Mohammedans were deported to Macedonia to balance the Christian element, Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia began to draw closer together.

The time was favourable, for in 1911 the Turks were absorbed in the Italian War for Tripoli (pp. 130–1).

The Balkan War of 1912.

At the moment when the Turks showed signs of distress, Ferdinand of Bulgaria and Venezelos decided upon concerted action. By 8th October mobilization was complete, and Montenegro declared war. By 17th October Turkey had signed preliminaries of peace with Italy, and was looking forward to a speedy triumph over raw and irregular troops. She made the big mistake of underrating her enemies. The dramatic swiftness of her downfall was a complete surprise to herself, her German trainers, and the Powers who looked on.

There were three theatres of war, corresponding roughly to the aims of the several attacking States. From the north-west King Peter and his Serbians advanced towards the south. They met the western Turkish army at Kumanovo and gained a complete victory (23rd–24th October, 1912). Kosovo was avenged. A few days later Uskub, capital of the ancient Serbian kings, was occupied. Then after three weeks of stubborn fighting the Turks gave up Monastir. Meanwhile Serbs and Montenegrins

Serbian success.

Kumanovo, 23rd–24th October.

had overrun the Sandjak. These rapid successes allowed the dispatch of two divisions through Albania to the coast. A wonderful march across the mountains led to the fall of Durazzo at the end of November.

Serbia had played her part with astonishing success.

The main Turkish armies were concentrated in Thrace to confront the Bulgarian advance. In addition to their field forces, they had great confidence in the strength of their fortified places. These were Kirk Kilissi, Adrianople, Lule Burgas, and Demotika, which formed a quadrilateral in front of the tremendous lines of Chataldja which guarded Constantinople itself. Well might the Turks feel safe and confident. They looked forward to a victorious advance from their own strongholds against Philippopolis and Sofia. Here, as in Macedonia, they reckoned without the speed and secrecy of opponents who believed that in warfare the boldest measures are the safest. The Bulgarian armies made a converging attack from the west and north upon Adrianople and Kirk Kilissi. On 24th October the latter fortress was taken by storm and the Turks were forced southwards on to Lule Burgas. Round that centre over an area of nearly 20 miles the struggle raged for five days, till at last the Turks broke and sought shelter behind the Chataldja lines, where they were reinforced by fresh troops and heavy guns. The Bulgarians were in no condition to storm these lines: their brilliant victories had entailed heavy losses; cholera had broken out; the violent and continuous fighting led to exhaustion. They had every reason to be satisfied. Their enemy's field armies had been driven into a corner. Adrianople was closely invested.

Bulgarian victories at Kirk Kilissi and Lule Burgas.

In the third area of the war the collapse was equally decisive. The Greeks joined hands with the Serbians, laid siege to Janina, and occupied Salonika on 9th November. Their control of the Ægean enabled them to shut up the Turkish squadron in the Dardanelles and to occupy the islands at their leisure. Blockade was also established on the coast of Epirus.

Greek advance.

On 3rd December the Turks asked for an armistice, after which it was soon apparent that the League would not be allowed

a free hand in the division of its own spoils. A Peace Conference which was opened in London (17th December) sat for two months. The Turks were hoping, not without reason, for the intervention of the Triple Alliance in their favour, and a party of "Die-hards", led by Enver, upset the Cabinet, murdered Nazim Pasha, the Commander-in-Chief, and refused to admit their defeat as final.

Peace Conference, 17th December.

On 3rd February, 1913, war was renewed, and ended in the fall of Janina, Scutari, and Adrianople. The discomfiture of Turkey was complete. Then the broken conference of London was resumed, and decided that Turkey must cede to the Allies all land west of a line drawn from Midia on the Black Sea to Enos on the Ægean. Albania was to be an independent State, and the ownership of the islands was to be settled by the Powers. The clause which created an independent Albania was insisted upon by Austria and Italy, since it involved the exclusion of Serbia from the Adriatic.

Renewal of war, February, 1913. Defeat of Turkey.

As these Powers expected and hoped, the disputes which at once arose between Serbia and Greece on the one side and Bulgaria on the other, put an end to the short-lived unity of the Balkan League. As the condition of Macedonia had been the immediate *casus belli*, so the partition of that area proved to be the undoing of the alliance.

Dissensions of Balkan States.

Serbia and Bulgaria, it will be remembered, had agreed upon a definite partition of Macedonia, on the understanding that Serbia would attain her window opening on the Adriatic. Thwarted of this by the creation of Albania, Serbia could seek her outlet to the sea only by way of the Vardar valley, passing through a portion of territory which was by treaty already assigned to Bulgaria. The latter, though she had not expected any gains in Thrace, would abate no jot of her "treaty" claims. She was encouraged by support from Berlin and Vienna. In a public speech Count Tisza, the Hungarian Premier, incited the Bulgarians to action. Refusing a Russian offer of arbitration, in the early morning of 30th June Bulgaria fell suddenly upon her late allies in Macedonia.

The "second" Balkan War was very short. In a violent and obstinate struggle near the River Bregalnitza the Serbian army

was completely victorious. Greece sent help, and the Rumanians, seeking "compensation" and the maintenance of a balance of power, marched on Sofia. Turkey promptly seized this golden opportunity of slipping back into Adrianople, which the Bulgars had been forced to leave almost defenceless. If Austria had hoped for the triumph of Bulgaria, she was sorely disappointed. She had, nevertheless, got what she most wanted—the breaking up of the Balkan League, and she was now better prepared to assert herself effectively in the Peace Conference.

"Second" Balkan War. Defeat of Bulgaria.

The Treaty of Bukarest, which was signed on 10th August, 1913, was intended to settle all outstanding differences once and for all. In point of fact it proved to be merely a triumph for Austrian diplomacy, and as such it must be regarded as one of the causes of the present war. Like Bismarck's Convention of Gastein (p. 98), it did little more than "paper over the cracks".

Treaty of Bukarest.

Serbia kept the whole of north and central Macedonia, and carried her frontier down to that of Greece, thereby including genuine Bulgarian territories and population. By the creation of an independent Albania she was denied her access to the Adriatic. In punishment for her treacherous defection Bulgaria received only what was left of Macedonia, and surrendered a portion of Thrace to Turkey. On the Ægean, where she had looked confidently for the possession of Kavala, and even Salonika, she had to be satisfied with a small strip of coast and two inferior ports in Dedeagatch and Lagos. In the Dobrudja she gave up Silistria to Rumania, which made a further advance down the Black Sea coast. Bulgaria had met but scant success in her effort to become the "Prussia" of the Balkans.

Greece extended her frontier to the north in Epirus and to the east in Thrace, but the moderation of Venezelos was overruled by the forward policy of King Constantine, whose brother-in-law, the Kaiser, "fought like a lion" to secure Kavala for the Greeks.

The treaty was a disaster, for it settled nothing. It fomented the hatreds which had ever been the bane of the Balkan nationalities. It left the Turk in Europe. It hastened the day of reckoning between Austria and Serbia. Europe

Criticism of the treaty.

might congratulate herself that the area of war had been isolated, and optimists declared that this success made future war less probable, yet by most acute observers the question was asked not *if* but *when* the great war would come. Austria had quite made up her mind to "settle up" with Serbia; it was now, as in the striking of all shrewd blows, only a question of "timing".

Behind the unsettled Balkan questions, to which most Englishmen displayed an indifference begotten of portentous ignorance, there loomed still vaster issues—the future of the South Slavs in the dual monarchy, the "peaceful" penetration of the Near and Middle East by Germany, her open challenge to British naval and commercial supremacy, the Teuton fear of Russia, and, over all, the heavy and the weary weight of armaments.

IMPORTANT DATES

1882.	Serbia a Kingdom.
1885.	Battle of Slivnitza.
1887.	Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg becomes Prince of Bulgaria.
1895.	Fall of Stambulov.
1897.	War between Turkey and Greece.
1903.	Murder of Alexander of Serbia.
1908.	Austria annexes Bosnia-Hercegovina.
	Young Turk revolution.
	Bulgaria proclaims her independence.
1911.	War between Turkey and Italy.
1912, Oct.	First Balkan War.
1913, Feb.	Second Balkan War.
Aug.	Treaty of Bukarest.

For List of Books for Reference see Appendix I

CHAPTER XXIII

The Outbreak of the War

It is not yet possible to do more than set down a few undisputed facts and point to some general tendencies in the history of the months immediately preceding the war. Only of our own diplomacy and that of our Allies, so far as it has been divulged,

ARCTIC
ICELAND
ATLANTIC OCEAN
NORWAY
SWEDEN
G. of Bothnia
Christiania
Stockholm
Baltic Sea
Edinburgh
SCOTLAND
IRELAND
Dublin
WALES
ENGLAND
London
English Channel
North Sea
DENMARK
Kiel
Hamburg
R. Elbe
Berlin
R. Vistula
Warsaw
R. Oder
GERMANY
Brussels
R. Rhine
Paris
R. Seine
R. Loire
Bay of Biscay
FRANCE
R. Danube
Vienna
Berne
SWITZERLAND
AUSTRIA
Buda Pest
HUNGA
C. Finisterre
R. Rhone
R. Po
Belgrade
R. Save
SERBIA
MONTE NEGRO
ALBANIA
GREE
R. Douro
PORTUGAL
Madrid
R. Tagus
Lisbon
SPAIN
ITALY
Adriatic Sea
Rome
Corsica
Sardinia
Straits of Gibraltar
Mediterranean
Sicily
AFRICA
Malta

is it possible to write with any assurance of fullness and accuracy. The historian must work not with the rapid lens of the camera, but with the leisurely brush and palette in the studio. He must wait, for time alone can provide his truth of perspective and fullness of detail.

That Austria did not intend to keep the peace was at once evident. But for two facts the attack on Serbia would have come in 1913. Italy was unwilling to join in a war of aggression, and the preparations of Germany were incomplete. The new Army Bill of the spring of that year provided for a great increase in numbers and equipment. The work of deepening the Kiel Canal was not finished. The year 1914 was to see the German army and navy in a much stronger position, and the condition of the Western Powers appeared most favourable to the success of an aggressive move. In Russia there was a great strike affecting trams and general transport, which threatened to handicap a mobilization which was never rapid. Russian finances, it was thought, could not long support the strain of a great war. In France attention was riveted to scandalous party strife. The army was weak and its equipment defective. The Act ordaining three years' service provided for future but not for present security.

Condition of the Powers in the year 1914.

British intervention in a great European War was not expected; in any case, Britain appeared to be sufficiently absorbed in her own problems. Civil war seemed imminent in Ireland. British assistance in land operations was negligible. There was a strong belief on the Continent that our empire was a danger rather than a support. Moslem risings in India and Egypt, rebellion in South Africa, defensive weakness in Australasia and Canada would quickly prove that our Colossus had feet of clay. Our great naval strength was not disputed, but its power to deflect the rapid sweep of German arms in Europe was not so evident.

If Germany wanted war, conditions could never be more favourable to her. Delay, in fact, would bring increase of Russian strength and the reorganization of the French armies.

Behind all this was the growing conviction of the German military aristocracy that the health and wealth of the nation could only be preserved and promoted by war. A democracy founded

on wealth and the ever-increasing ranks of Socialism would challenge the Junker and military caste, and tarnish by disuse the brightness of warlike traditions.

The diplomatic intercourse of the last days of July, 1914, places the true intentions of Germany beyond all doubt. She refused every suggestion that might lead to the preservation of peace. Her lot was cast for war.

On 28th June, 1914, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the dual monarchy, with his consort, the Duchess of Hohenberg, was brutally murdered at Serajevo by two Bosnian Serbs. The archduke was known to be a man of independent mind, sympathetic to the aspirations of the Slavs, inclined to favour the foundation of a Triple State in which Germans, Magyars, and Slavs should receive equal privileges. These views made him unpopular with the German and Magyar elements, who would brook no interference with their predominance over the Slav peoples. On the other hand, the Serbian Slavs looked forward to a united Greater Serbia completely severed from the Hapsburg sway. For all his statesmanlike and liberal intentions Franz Ferdinand was regarded as dangerous.

Murder of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, 28th June.

It is certain that he was allowed to visit Bosnia—a disaffected province—with no adequate escort or police precautions.

The crime at Serajevo was made the occasion of the outbreak of a war, which, as we have seen, was bound to occur in the near future. Austria had now an excellent excuse for settling her differences with Serbia. All Europe sympathized with the aged emperor upon whose dynasty one more tragic blow had fallen.

This crime the occasion for the war.

It remained to fasten the guilt upon the true instigators of the deed, and to pronounce sentence.

For over three weeks Austria withheld her hand and made no sign. Then, on 23rd July, she presented an ultimatum to Serbia. Its contents denounced the whole attitude of the Serbian Government as provocative of rebellion among the Serbian Slavs of the empire. That Serbian Government officials were privy to the archduke's murder was taken for granted, though no evidence was produced.

Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, 23rd July.

Austro-Hungarian representatives were to proceed to Serbia to conduct police measures against anti-Austrian agitators, and to take part in the trial of Serbians implicated in the Serajevo murders. Certain Serbian officials—military and civilian—selected by Austria were to be dismissed. A satisfactory answer was demanded in forty-eight hours. There was no time to seek advice or modification, and Austria did not intend that there should be. If Serbia submitted unconditionally, she would surrender her right as an independent State to the control of her own affairs. Sir Edward Grey declared: "I have never before seen one State address to another independent State a document of so formidable a character". It was perfectly clear that Austria intended to swallow Serbia in one mouthful before any other Power stepped in to suggest a more merciful alternative.

Its terms.

The Serbian reply to the ultimatum was respectful and submissive. All clauses, with slight and reasonable modifications, were agreed to, with the exception of the demands for the intrusion of Austrian judges and police. And on the whole question Serbia pleaded for settlement by arbitration or by the Hague Conference.

Serbian reply.

Austria pronounced this reply to be unsatisfactory, and on 28th July declared war on Serbia.

Austria declares war on Serbia, 28th July.

No shred of evidence was vouchsafed to convict Serbia of bloodguiltiness. There was bald assertion—nothing else.

No one knew better than the Austrian Government that war with Serbia must lead to war with Russia. Russia must come to the rescue of the little people which was linked to her by tradition, sentiment, race, and religion. Were these claims insufficient, her own self-interest could not allow her tamely to stand by while Austria rode rough-shod through the Balkans. But Austria was sure of German support. The German Government states: "We permitted the Austrian Government a completely free hand in their action against Serbia". Germany therefore shares full responsibility for the dreadful consequences.[1] With regard to Russia, both Powers were under no illusion.

On her side, Russia could count on the assistance of France. We need only recall the circumstances under which the Franco-

[1] See note at end of chapter.

Russian Alliance was cemented in 1897. The interests of the two nations were identical; they stood or fell together.

So the Central Powers were ranged against France and Russia.

Let us turn to the attitude of Great Britain. From first to last our diplomacy aimed at preventing a great European War.

Attitude of Great Britain.

Sir Edward Grey laboured ceaselessly as a mediator. Up to the eleventh hour he put forward and sought suggestions for a peaceful solution. It is often stated that these efforts at mediation were continued too long, and that, by declaring her solidarity with France and Russia earlier in the crisis, Great Britain would have averted war.

The British Government did not feel justified in going to war over a Balkan crisis. When Russia called for our support, Sir Edward Grey said: "I do not consider *public opinion* ought to or would sanction our going to war over a Serbian quarrel". The Cabinet and country would have been divided; there could be no national enthusiasm for such a war. Having set himself to the task of mediation, Sir Edward Grey must keep his hands free as long as possible.

We have seen that the aim of British policy has always been to avoid entanglement in Continental affairs. It is true that, when the ambitions of a tyrant have threatened the liberties of Europe, Great Britain has joined coalitions; the wars of Louis XIV and Napoleon are illustrations to this effect. But in both these instances she was fighting for her own security. To the fate of the Netherlands she could never be indifferent. Strive as she might to avoid being drawn into European quarrels, Great Britain had no choice but to fight for the independence of Belgium. This is not a matter of sentiment or tradition, it is a matter of geographical necessity; and, as such, from the time of Edward III and Elizabeth, from Cromwell to the present day, we have fought to prevent the establishment of a base at Antwerp, to avert the "pistol pointed at the heart of England".

To what extent had our policy of exclusiveness been abandoned by the formation of this Triple Entente?

France and Britain, like France and Russia, had identical interests to defend. Both had great colonial empires; both desired to keep the peace. When these interests were threatened,

THE BOUNDARIES OF EU

it was necessary to discuss measures of defence in common. There was no formal treaty, but military experts discussed various plans for mutual support in case of an unprovoked attack by a third Power. France undertook to supply a squadron to relieve us in the Mediterranean, and to this extent we were in honour bound to assist her when the unprovoked attack should come. But we had pledged ourselves to no formal undertaking; our hands were free. France accepted this attitude.

Our position was entirely changed when Germany violated the neutrality of Belgium. (See Appendix, p. 336.) This outrage upon a neighbour whom we had sworn to defend, and upon whose integrity our own secure existence depended, left us no course but entry into the war.

Violation of Belgian neutrality.

Germany had refused our offer of mediation; this refusal was in itself strong evidence that she wanted war. She showed her hand still more clearly when, on 29th July, taking for granted our acquiescence in the breach of Belgian neutrality, she proposed that we should stand aside while she annexed French colonies and crushed French sea-power. Such a proposal offers excellent support to Prince von Bulow's dictum that his countrymen are political donkeys. She was asking us to desert the friendly Power whom we had engaged to support in her hour of need, whose interests and safety were identical with our own. This "infamous proposal" was promptly rejected: "It would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover".

How far Germany put pressure upon Austria in the interests of peace we do not know, since the Central Powers have furnished no documentary evidence.[1] This bid for our neutrality suggests that the pressure must have been slight.

The crisis was carried a stage further, when, on 31st July, Sir Edward Grey enquired of France and Germany whether they undertook to preserve Belgian neutrality. France at once returned full assurances that Belgium would be respected. Germany would give no such undertaking, on the ground that "any reply would disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign".

The German Government.

[1] But see note, end of chapter.

On 2nd August German troops marched into the neutral State of Luxembourg—the State which in 1867 Bismarck had guaranteed to protect.

On 3rd August Germany informed the Belgian Government that in self-defence she was obliged to send her armies into Belgium, that the French were on the point of doing so, and that it was vital for Germany to forestall them.

This flimsy pretext will not bear examination for a moment. The Germans had, indeed, done their best to entice the French to enter Belgian territory, but they had failed. Had France committed this insane act, the whole game would have been in Germany's hands. Great Britain would not have gone to war at all. Belgium would have welcomed the German armies.

On 4th August the King of the Belgians made a personal appeal for help to King George. Our protest to Berlin against "this flagrant violation of the law of nations" was at once dispatched in the form of an ultimatum.

Twelve hours later Britain and Germany were at war.[1]

*** In March, 1918, a pamphlet was published, entitled "My Mission to London". The author was Prince Lichnowsky, who from 1912 to 1914 was German Ambassador in London. Out of the mouth of her own emissary comes convincing proof that Germany forced on the war, while Great Britain strove to keep the peace. The prince shows how Austria was encouraged to attack Serbia, and how Austrian efforts to withdraw at the last moment were foiled by the hasty dispatch from Germany of an ultimatum to Russia.

For List of Books for Reference see Appendix I

CHAPTER XXIV

The United States

Although the United States were not directly concerned with the causes of the Great War, there is good reason to include some account of American history in these pages. Only by a study of their past history can the neutral attitude of the United States during the first three years of the war be fully understood, while ignorance of that history has been responsible for many ill-founded views and much narrow criticism. For over a century American history has been ignored in British schools, and British history

[1] See "Diary of the Great War" (Appendix G, p. 340).

grossly misrepresented in American. Rightly or wrongly, the claims of local, industrial, and imperial history have been pressed in our schools to the exclusion of a wider survey. American, like naval history, if considered at all, has been banished to the domains of "special subjects".

But if the Englishman has been taught too little, the American has learnt too much. Relations with Great Britain have been the subject of burning interest from the Declaration of Independence onwards. Nearly all the American textbooks prepared for the use of schools have presented the conduct of Great Britain in the worst possible light. The prejudices inherited from the days of George III and Lord North have been handed down unchanged, and modern America has been encouraged to believe that the British Government is still tainted with absolutism, and that the liberal and democratic trend of the nineteenth century is more apparent than real. Such distorted views of historical facts react powerfully on international relations. For over a century indifference on the one side and ill-informed prejudice on the other have conspired to raise a barrier between the two nations. And, now that comradeship in arms has already created a desire for a fairer reading of past events, it is true to assert that war begets a knowledge of history as well as of geography.

Need for the study of American history.

The present survey is limited mainly to the most important landmarks in the history of the United States—to the westward-moving frontier and the growth of a Republican Government on a Continental scale, to political relations with Great Britain, and to the policy of isolation that enabled the new democracy to make its great experiment unfettered by the alliances or antipathies of the Old World.

Scope of the chapter.

Assisted by their French allies, the United States gained their independence by force of arms in the war with Great Britain, which lasted from 1775 to 1783.

The early years of the new Republic were full of danger and difficulty. There was no central national Government; there was, especially in the smaller States, an intense prejudice against all authority unless derived from purely local sources. This was quite a natural

Dangers and difficulties of early Republic.

prejudice, when it is remembered that the old colonies had been accustomed to a remarkable degree of liberty, many of their charters conferring forms of self-government as yet unknown to the Mother Country. King George III was not unreasonably astonished to find that in Rhode Island he ruled over a colony whose people had in practice entire control of their own affairs. The thirteen original States had been united in a common purpose during the war against Great Britain; now that independence was won, there was a strong tendency to fall back upon the old colonial tradition of separate States. It was as if our County Councils or city corporations attempted to claim all governing power, independent of Crown and Parliament. The Americans had to learn that, as Fox declared, liberty was order, liberty was union, liberty was strength.

In 1783 peace was signed between Great Britain and the thirteen North American States. A frontier line was roughly drawn on the north between Canada and the new Republic, while the Mississippi formed the western boundary, beyond which lay the huge Spanish dominions—the Louisiana ceded by France in 1762. To the south lay Florida, now again in Spanish hands. The centre of population was still far to the eastward of these boundaries; the march westwards had not yet begun; the vast tracts of land bordering the Mississippi and the great north-western province stretching from the Ohio to the Great Lakes were as yet unoccupied. The rough-and-ready reckoning of frontier lines was the source of many disputes, not only with Great Britain and Spain, but between the States themselves.

When the war with Great Britain ended the States were independent but were not united. The years between the declaration of peace and the framing and acceptance of the Constitution were very critical. The country was exhausted, trade and commerce were at a standstill, the States weighed down by a heavy load of debt, and, worst of all, the disappearance of gold and silver, followed by reckless issues of paper currency, brought about confusion and total loss of credit and security. Nothing but a strong central authority could restore prosperity out of bankruptcy and mould the thirteen States into a united nation. Until an executive force was created, recognized and obeyed by the indi-

vidual States, the independence so dearly bought was nothing worth. This recognition the different States were most unwilling to accord. The whole tradition of the colonies favoured purely local government and non-interference from any external authority. As they had fought against the authority of the King of Britain, so now each State was prepared to resist the establishment of a supreme "national" Government overriding the State Legislatures. So long as this narrow spirit obtained there could be no real union, and therefore no national progress. There was a danger lest thirteen republics should prefer to strive against one another in jealous rivalry rather than sink their narrow interests for the good of the whole. So long as the vast majority of Americans valued local independence more than the ideal of a federal "nation State", the task of reconstruction seemed hopeless. There was so little foundation on which to build. During the stress of war there had indeed been a Continental Congress, and a rough Constitution framed by Articles of Confederation (1781) to serve as a league for war purposes. When peace returned these were insufficient instruments of Government, because they furnished no supreme governor nor any assembly with power to enforce obedience to its decrees. Beyond an appeal to patriotism, the Articles of Confederation could enforce neither the payment of taxes nor military service, nor the observance of general decrees essential for the prosperity of the whole nation. The States ignored the Congress, and seldom troubled to send their delegates regularly to attend it. As Washington wrote: "It is yet to be decided whether the revolution must ultimately be considered a blessing or a curse".

Steps towards a national Government.

Nothing short of continued distress, bankruptcy, and national disgrace could create a force of public opinion in favour of a supreme central Government. In one notable respect, during the troubled period from 1783–9, the States acted in concert after long dispute; the territories to the west and north-west, to which seven States laid claim, were surrendered by them to Congress to be disposed of as a national domain. In 1787 the famous North-West Ordinance was proclaimed, by which complete self-government was granted to the new settlers, and, when the population in any territory increased

to 60,000, a new State was to be formed and added to the Union. Thus, for the first time in modern history, were colonies placed on an equality with the Mother Country. By 1803 Vermont, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Ohio were admitted as new States. A more immediately important outcome of the Ordinance was its provision of public revenue (derived from the sale of these lands) to meet the debts incurred by the war.

Financial troubles.

The burden of debt, domestic and foreign, lay heavy on all classes. Sharp contention arose between the merchant classes, who pressed for immediate payment from their debtors, and the farmers, who clamoured for time and fresh issues of paper money. Gold and silver had been drained from the country to pay for foreign imports. An attempt to enforce the payment of debts led to a serious rising in Massachusetts, known as Shays' Rebellion (1786). Further confusion sprang out of the power of each State to impose import duties as it pleased, consulting its own interests exclusively in all questions of home or foreign trade. All the while, Congress was powerless to intervene, to impose uniform duties for all States, or to exact one cent by way of taxation. So serious grew the state of affairs that a Convention, meeting in 1786 to discuss the settlement of trading and commercial problems, decided that all resolutions for reform must be worthless until powers were conferred upon Congress to enforce them. It was decided that a federal Convention should be invited to meet and amend the Articles of Confederation.

Convention at Philadelphia, May, 1787. Draft of the Constitution.

In May, 1787, delegates from all States, except Rhode Island, met at Philadelphia under the presidency of George Washington. It was speedily found that to amend the old Constitution was a hopeless task, and within five months a new Constitution was drafted. This Constitution made the American people into a nation. A written document was produced to provide for the government of four million people scattered over a huge territory. This it succeeded in doing so well that it has remained to this day, as the instrument by which over a hundred million people are now governed within an area of more than three million square miles.

A federal Government in its simplest form consists in a league or union of two or more States for purposes of trade or defence.

C A N A D A
Lake of the Woods
From Gt. Britain 1818
Lake Superior
R. St. Lawrence
Frontier 1842
Lake Huron
L. Michigan
L. Ontario
L. Erie
New York
R. Mississippi
OREGON 1846
Frontier Line 1819
ROCKY Mountains
LOUISIANA
Bought from France 1803
UNITED
R. Ohio
Alleghany Ridges
Appalachian Mts
STATES
in 1783
Nevada
Utah
MEXICAN CESSION 1848
San Francisco
Arizona
Frontier 1819
Rio Grande
Gadsden Purchase 1853
TEXAS
annexed 1845
New Orleans
FLORIDA from Spain 1819
PACIFIC OCEAN
ATLANTIC OCEAN
GULF of MEXICO
MEXICO
R. Rio Grande
Expansion of UNITED STATES
0 100 200 300 Miles 500

It exists mainly for self-preservation. Apart from this, each separate State lives its own life and makes its own laws, subject to no outside interference. Examples of this loose union of small States are frequent in the history of ancient Greece. The modern type of federal State subjects its citizens to a dual control. In any given State there are two sets of governmental apparatus. The national Government receives definite powers which it exerts over every citizen in every State. Apart from these powers reserved to the central Government, each individual State is empowered to legislate locally in its own fashion for its own citizens.

The Federal Government.

The Constitution which created the Federal Republic of the United States established a central Government, with a President as its executive head; while the law-making power was vested in a Congress. This consisted of two Houses: a *Senate*, to which two members were elected from each State, and a *House of Representatives*, to which each State elected members in numbers proportionate to population. A Chief Justice assisted by eight judges appointed for life presided over a Supreme Court.

For local government, each State has a Constitution of its own, a Governor, two legislative Houses, and a supreme Court of Law.

In its national aspect the federal State deals, as a unit, with foreign powers, makes peace or war, enters upon alliances, maintains an army and navy, controls post offices, and raises taxes for these and similar "national" services. When we speak of the United States or Switzerland, we think of a single nation State, not of forty-eight States or twenty-two Cantons.

But to the American citizen his relation to his own particular State is far more important. "An American may, through a long life, never be reminded of the Federal Government, except when he votes at presidential and congressional elections, lodges a complaint against the post office, and opens his trunks for a custom-house officer on the pier at New York when he returns from a tour in Europe. His direct taxes are paid to officials acting under State laws. The State, or a local authority constituted by State statutes, registers his birth, appoints his guardian, pays for his schooling, gives him a share in the estate of his father deceased, licenses him when he enters a trade (if it be one needing a licence),

marries him, divorces him, entertains civil actions against him, declares him a bankrupt, hangs him for murder." (*Bryce.*)

This marvellous Constitution created a new form of government. Though it had no model on which to base its work, yet its success was due to its resolve to build upon the solid ground of experience, and not upon untried, high-flown theories. The makers were above all practical men, *business* men in the best sense—they desired a working instrument and not a Utopia. "They were not seduced by the French fallacy that a new system of government could be ordered like a new suit of clothes." Thus there was but little really new in its constituent parts. A written constitution was no novelty—it was as old as the first colonial charters. Many features, such as the President's veto, were drawn from State constitutions. Its framers did not take the British Constitution as their model. Rather, they regarded it as the best authorized version of free government, but endeavoured to produce a revised version purged of what they took to be the defects of the British system. If it were possible for George III to act the tyrant, as bitter late experience impelled them to believe, then it behoved them to adopt a President whose powers were strictly curbed.

Another reason for its success was its flexibility. It could never have been accepted by all the States but for its spirit of *compromise*. "Containing within itself a provision for its own amendment" the new Constitution, which came into force in 1789, at once adopted ten amendments, all framed in the interests of the individual citizen or State. Yet out of 1700 proposals for amendments made since 1789 only 17 have been adopted—striking testimony to the soundness of the original foundation.

The United States were now a Nation: "the thirteen clocks all struck together". By dint of compromise, the advocates of States' Rights had consented to the creation of a national Congress and President who had power to impose taxes, to control commerce and public lands, to make peace or war, and negotiate with foreign countries. It must not be supposed that the old local spirit died: there was long dispute over nearly every important clause in the Constitution, and two great parties arose whose leading principles were clearly marked.

The United States a Nation.

The first of these, the Federalists, held that the new nation could only prosper under a strong government. Their leader and master-spirit was Alexander Hamilton of New York, a man worthy to rank with Burke in political insight, and even with Napoleon in his power to restore order out of revolution. He was strongly conservative, and believed that law and order could only be secured by keeping the governing powers in the hands of the moneyed and propertied classes, among whom he found his main support.

The Federalists.

The second party, the Republicans (later Democrats), was led by Thomas Jefferson of Virginia, who had drafted the Declaration of Independence. It was bitterly opposed to all Hamilton's measures, which it denounced as monarchical, for it regarded individual liberty as far more important than order. The tradition of local State independence and hatred of outside interference lent great support to this party. Over the nomination of the first President there could be no difference of opinion. George Washington was unanimously elected as first President of the United States for two terms (1789–1797). His immense prestige and personal popularity went very far to inspire public confidence in the new Republic during these first critical years of life. Both Hamilton and Jefferson were members of his Cabinet, the former as Secretary of the Treasury, the latter as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Republicans.

George Washington, First President, 1789–97.

Now that the national Government was fairly launched, the United States was in a position to define its relations more clearly with foreign countries, and in particular with Great Britain, France, and Spain.

Foreign Relations.

It was natural that after the war a bitter feeling should remain for a time between Great Britain and the United States. The bitterness was intensified, because until the Constitution was created the old Congress failed signally to fulfil the terms of the Peace of Versailles. Contrary to the terms of the Treaty, the Loyalists were molested, and more than half the States repudiated the debts due to British merchants. On the other hand, the British troops broke their agreement on evacuation by carrying off numbers of freed slaves and by retaining frontier

With Great Britain.

posts along the North-western frontier. The mutual irritation due to what each side regarded as breaches of good faith was increased by the commercial policy of Great Britain, which prohibited all trade between the United States and British colonies. Upon this trade the Americans were almost wholly dependent, and prohibition spelt ruin to mercantile and shipping interests. Relations were thus strained when, in 1793, Great Britain declared war on the French Revolutionists. It seemed that breaking-point must come when Citizen Genêt, the Revolutionary ambassador, was received with wild enthusiasm in America. The American people were sympathetic to a Revolution furthered by their own example; they were grateful to the country whose support had ensured their own independence. But, on the question of lending armed support to the French, parties were sharply divided. Washington, backed by the Federalists, declared for neutrality (1793). The alliance had been made with Louis XVI and not with the Revolutionists, whose excesses and bloodshed were by now rapidly alienating American support. Yet only with the utmost difficulty was war averted with Great Britain, owing to the exercise by the latter power of the right of search at sea and the seizure of American cargoes as contraband of war. It will be seen that persistence in this policy led eventually to war in 1812. Meanwhile the tension was relieved for a time by an understanding known as Jay's Treaty (1795), which, though incomplete, settled several of the more serious disputes (e.g. the British withdrew from the North-west frontier posts), and compromised on the question of trade.

With Revolutionary France.

In 1797 Washington resigned the Presidency, and was succeeded by John Adams, another Federalist. In his farewell address he warned the nation against the danger of party discord, and against permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world. Public indignation was now turned against the French, who captured American merchantmen, and hinted that peace could only be maintained by money payments. This last insult led to open naval war, for the United States were prepared to spend "millions for defence, but not a cent for tribute". Fighting was brief, for Bonaparte, who had just overthrown the Directory (1799) and had his

hands full enough in the War of the Second Coalition, speedily arranged a compromise agreeable to the Americans.

But the United States did not succeed for long in exacting respect for their neutral trading rights. When, after Trafalgar, Napoleon launched his Continental System by which Great Britain was declared to be in a state of blockade and the ports of Europe closed to her vessels, the British Orders in Council retaliated by declaring all neutral ships trading with France or her allies to be lawful prize. A life-and-death struggle began between the power of the land and the power of the sea. Neither side could afford to make concessions, and between them the neutral carrying trade—now almost an American monopoly—bade fair to be utterly destroyed. Embargo and Non-Intercourse Acts, designed to force France and Great Britain to make terms, had no effect beyond increasing the distress of the New England traders. Though Napoleon's policy was utterly unscrupulous, and aimed solely at the appropriation of American ships and goods wherever he found them, it was with Great Britain that the Americans went to war in 1812.

Napoleon's Continental System.

The trade grievance was aggravated by the impressment of American seamen for British warships. Undoubtedly many naval deserters had escaped from British ships to American merchantmen, but, not content with recovering these men, the British officers seized able-bodied seamen without scrupulous inquiries as to nationality. They held that the end, self-preservation, justified the means. At all costs, the fleets which stood between Napoleon and the conquest of the world must be kept at full strength. The war spirit in America was increased by the conviction of the Western settlers that the Canadian authorities were in league with the Indians to prevent further expansion. In June, 1812, war for "Free Trade and Sailors' Rights" was declared. Too late to avoid hostilities the British Government withdrew the Orders in Council, as applied to the United States.

War between United States and Great Britain, 1812–14.

As a solution of outstanding grievances the war was quite useless; as a fomenter of continued ill-feeling it was a calamity. Neither side gained its objective. By land, the Americans, who confidently looked for the easy conquest of Canada, saw their

general forced to surrender his army near Detroit, much as Burgoyne had done at Saratoga. At sea, though they possessed no line-of-battle ships, they inflicted a series of humiliating defeats upon the British frigates in single-ship actions. The American vessels, though nominally of the same class, were larger and stouter, with heavier guns, which they used far more effectively than their opponents. They taught in fact the much-needed lesson that a series of unbroken victories over inferior enemies may lead to over-confidence and consequent slackness, undue dependence on routine, and decline of gunnery. Not until 1st June, 1813, were the tables turned, when Captain Broke in the *Shannon* fought the *Chesapeake* to a standstill within a quarter of an hour and towed her into Halifax. While on Lakes Erie and Champlain British flotillas were worsted, the Americans, in default of a regular navy, could not prevent the ravaging of their sea-coast. In August, 1814, Washington was taken and the government buildings and White House burnt. On the other hand, Pakenham in command of 10,000 Peninsular veterans failed, in the face of deadly gun-fire, to capture New Orleans, and was himself killed. This, the last action of the war, was fought in January, 1815, a fortnight after peace had been actually signed at Ghent.

The Shannon and the Chesapeake.

Peace of Ghent, December, 1814.

Neither side could claim a victory, and judging by the peace terms the war had settled nothing. The defeat of Napoleon put an end to the Orders in Council, impressment and commercial blockades—burning questions which were not even referred to in the treaty. To all appearance the war had been a useless expense of blood and money. And yet the year 1814 marks the beginning of a new epoch in the history of the United States. For the first thirty years of their existence, the fortunes of the people had been conditioned by European politics. They were caught up and whirled in the vortex of the Napoleonic wars: their prosperity in the main lay at the mercy of Great Britain or France. After 1814 a new era dawned. The attention of the nation was gradually concentrated upon internal expansion. The Westward march began, the limitless resources were slowly tapped. The conviction grew that the true policy of America

lay in the peopling of a Continent, and in concentration upon the domestic problems that arose therefrom. Clearly it was their duty and interest to abstain rigidly from European entanglements. Isolation was their goal, and, in so far as they steered clear of war with any European country for eighty-four years, they may claim to have attained it.

The United States now set out to make the most of their new possessions. To do this they needed peace and security from interference. They were determined that the days when the rivalries of European powers were fought out on American soil should never return. Simple geographical facts favoured the belief that the New World could be separated from the Old. Men felt with Washington that "our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course", and with Jefferson that their true policy was "honest friendship with all nations and entangling alliances with none". The time had arrived for a public statement of that policy. An excellent opportunity arose in 1823, at a time when the Holy Alliance was restoring the despotic King of Spain to his throne, and was preparing to suppress the newly-founded Republics of South America and force them back under the Spanish yoke. At the same time Russia, which held Alaska, was designing to plant fresh colonies on the Pacific coast. Assured of British support, President Monroe proclaimed the famous doctrine which, although its true author was J. Q. Adams, has since borne his name. It was a simple expression of American views, containing three main principles: that the American Continents were not to be considered subjects for colonization by European Powers; that the United States would brook no interference by a European Power with any independent American State, "nor the extension of their system to any portion of this hemisphere"; and lastly, that the United States themselves would refrain from interfering in the concerns of European Powers. The keynote of the doctrine was "self-defence". There was no suggestion of intervention on behalf of the South American Republics for their own sake, but because any attack on them would menace the peace and safety of the United States. In no sense a part of international law, it was a policy based on self-interest, and as such

The Monroe Doctrine.

it has generally been accepted by other Powers, just as spheres of influence are recognized in Africa and elsewhere. Its cardinal principle of "America for the Americans" still remains unchanged.

Yet it must not be supposed that because irritation and disputes with European powers no longer led to war, they had therefore ceased to exist. The geographical situation of the thirteen States immediately after 1783 gave no promise of the future westward march to the Pacific. Even development through a pathless wilderness between the Alleghenies and the Mississippi was slow and difficult. West of the great river lay the vast territory called Louisiana, which lay in foreign hands. In 1800 Spain was persuaded to cede it to France. The prospect of Napoleon's vigorous and aggressive administration, in place of the slack and nerveless rule of Spain, filled the Western Americans with dismay. Open access to the sea by way of New Orleans, on which their very existence depended, was imperilled while France held Louisiana and the Spaniards remained in West Florida. President Jefferson, fully alive to the danger, declared that if necessary "we must marry ourselves to the English fleet and nation". But, in the event, Napoleon himself, on the eve of a new war with Great Britain, and in no mind to encounter new foes, removed the danger by offering the whole of Louisiana, including the Mississippi mouth, to the United States for fifteen million dollars. Jefferson hastened to accept the offer, and by a stroke of the pen doubled the area of his country and ensured its ultimate advance through the Rocky Mountains to the Pacific. The importance of the Louisiana Purchase cannot be overrated. Although the basin of the Mississippi must in the long run have surely fallen to American occupants, without the purchase the settlement would have been delayed and would probably have involved war. Now from 1803 onwards pioneers poured into the new territory, and in 1805–6 the explorers Lewis and Clarke made their wonderful journey across the Rocky Mountains, and, passing down the Columbia River (so named by Gray of Boston, who first entered it from the sea in 1792), reached the Pacific Ocean and thus strengthened the claim on the Oregon territory. In 1819 the whole northern

Southern and Western Expansion.

The Louisiana Purchase, 1803.

shore of the Gulf of Mexico east of Texas was acquired by the purchase of Florida from Spain, which admitted, at the same time, the American claims to Oregon. Purchase of Florida, 1819.

Western expansion led to a fresh consideration of the Canadian boundary, which had not as yet been satisfactorily delimited. So carelessly had the treaty-makers of 1783 done their work that they did not trouble to mark out on their maps the lines agreed upon. The maps available were themselves inaccurate. The north-eastern frontier from Nova Scotia had been declared to begin at the St. Croix River. With the advent of settlers endless disputes arose. It is highly doubtful if such a river existed at all; both parties pressed the claims of rival streams. Under these circumstances it is not surprising that the north-eastern frontier line remained unsettled till 1842. The middle portion of the frontier, which ran along the 49th parallel from the Lake of the Woods westward to the Rocky Mountains, was settled more easily; but the last section westward to the sea proved almost as troublesome to divide as the eastern. The United States claimed the whole of Oregon, where many settlers had arrived, up to the line 54° 40′. "Fifty-four forty or fight" became a popular cry, and the obvious solution of extending the existing line along the 49th parallel as far as the sea was only found just in time to avert war. Even so, the dividing line between Vancouver Island and the mainland remained in dispute until 1871. The last boundary dispute, which arose out of the purchase of Alaska from Russia in 1867, was only settled in 1903. The right of seal-hunting in Behring Sea was confirmed by arbitration to Great Britain in 1893. The Northern Frontier.

These examples will suffice to show how American and British interests seemed fated to clash. There were still other grounds for bitterness, even more serious in American eyes, arising directly out of the domestic history of the United States. To grasp them clearly we must understand something of the events which led to the Civil War of 1861.

The vital fact in the fifty years of American history following the war of 1812 was the development of the western frontier. Out of this arose nearly every important issue of internal affairs. From 1816 a continuous stream of The Westward March.

emigrants poured along the highways to the west, impelled by the distress and trade depression which war had brought to the eastern sea-board States. The pioneers were at least assured of food and shelter. Their prosperity lay in the work of their own hands. Everywhere the first pioneer stages were the same. A slice of Government land (usually 160 acres) was bought and cleared and a log cabin built. The vacant territories filled rapidly, townships sprang up, and within six years after the war six new States were actually admitted to the Union. Progress would have been even more rapid but for the great distances to be covered. By 1825 a national road ran from Maryland to the Ohio. Steamboats had come into use, so that it became possible to take full advantage of the splendid river-systems, more especially that of the Mississippi, which gave easy access to the sea. In the same year the completion of a canal which joined Lake Erie to the Hudson River brought the grain of the north-west to the eastern States, and encouraged fresh streams of emigrants. The opening of the first railway in 1831 led to the construction of lines in every direction. By 1860 there was through communication between New York and the Mississippi. The centre of population moved westward with the railways. The wealth and enterprise, agricultural and industrial, of the north and western States now stood in sharp contrast to the stationary condition of the south.

The Railways.

We have seen that there had always been in the United States a strong prejudice in favour of "States' Rights" against a strong national government. The winning of the west and the steady admission of new States now forced to the front the question of slavery. Ever since the War of Independence its abolition had been urged, especially by the northern States, where, as slave labour was not needed, economic gain and humane sentiment did not clash. The Ordinance of 1787 had excluded slaves from the north-west territory. While it was hoped that "slavery was in course of ultimate extinction", the invention of Whitney's cotton-gin in 1793 altered the whole situation. Up to that date the production of raw cotton for export had been negligible owing to the slow and laborious process of separating the fibre from the seed. Whitney's machine increased

The Question of Slavery.

the output a thousandfold. Whereas in 1784 about 3000 lb. of cotton were exported, more than 40,000,000 lb. left the country in 1803. This was the period when the mechanical inventions of the Industrial Revolution made Great Britain eager to buy all the raw material she could get. Textile manufactures arose in the northern States. In effect, a vast industry was established, and, if the supply of cotton was to meet the demand, slave labour was indispensable. The whole economic system of the southern States depended upon it. It is important to realize how different were the conditions of social and economic life in the south from those in the north and west. The southern planter had no experience of the hand-to-hand struggle with nature, the privation and dangers encountered by the western pioneer and backwoodsman. Nor was he a "business" man like the northern merchant or shipper. He lived rather as a lord of the manor among his serfs, and he was often an aristocrat by birth as well as by position. He stood afar from the bustling methods of the north, upon which he depended for his supply of manufactured goods, and even for much of his food, since the southern soil was best suited for the growth of cotton and tobacco. This economic dependence made him a free trader, and explains his fierce resentment at the tariffs which protected northern trade. The white population of the south was less than half that of the north, and in possession of far less wealth. The profits of the planter were sunk in the purchase of fresh lands and slaves, for the cotton crops speedily exhausted the soil, and so long as new land was plentiful it was not worth while to fertilize the old. The capital swallowed up by large holdings worked by slave labour was not therefore available to compete with the free north, which, by commercial and industrial enterprise, the construction of railways, canals, and factories, was fast outstripping the south in wealth and population. While up to 1850 the slave States and the free were still numerically evenly divided, the birth of new States led to serious dissension on this question of slavery. The southern States were clear that slave labour was essential to their existence. Should a number of newly-admitted States declare for abolition, rather than be bullied into submission they were prepared to secede from the Union.

Economic Conditions of Southern States.

It was vainly hoped to avert this danger of disunion by compromises. Thus when, after the Louisiana purchase, the South, ever hungry for fresh land, sought to introduce slavery in the Missouri territory, it was agreed that Missouri should be reckoned a slave State, but that future States formed out of land to the north of 36° 30′ should count as "free". The admission of Maine as a free State kept the balance even between North and South. But in the north, agitation against slavery continued, numerous societies for emancipation were formed, and the breach with the South was widened by a revolt in South Carolina against protective tariffs.

The Missouri Compromise.

Northern Agitation against Slavery.

In 1845 the whole question was reopened by the annexation of Texas, which then belonged to Mexico. Here was land to which the Missouri compromise did not apply, and in which slaves were already employed, and its admission to the Union was a triumph for the South. War with Mexico followed this annexation, and complete victory for the United States brought the cession of New Mexico and California in 1848. As before, the new conquests involved fresh strife between "slave" and "free" States. In 1850 a critical situation was saved by the acceptance on both sides of an ingenious compromise suggested by Henry Clay. California came in as a free State, in other districts the people themselves were to decide, and fugitive slaves were to be given up to their owners. Clay's settlement shared the fate of all compromises that ignore the opposing principles on which a conflict is based. It applied a local anodyne—it provided no permanent cure. It kept the peace only for a very short time. The younger leaders on each side were eager to see the issue fought out to a finish. Bitterness was increased by the non-observance of the fugitive-slave clause, and by the publication of Mrs. Stowe's *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, which was accepted everywhere in the north, not as a caricature, but as a faithful description of the horrors perpetrated in a slave State. The North was further aroused by a ruling of Congress that the Kansas-Nebraska lands should have freedom to choose for or against slavery. In Kansas a state of civil war began in 1854. In 1856 a new Republican party was formed. The old

Annexation of Texas, 1845.

War with Mexico, 1848.

party of the name now corresponded roughly with the Democrats of the south, in so far as they pressed the doctrine of "States' Rights" against the national Government to the point of secession. War was brought still nearer in 1857 by a decision of the Supreme Court that the negro had no rights, and that the Missouri Compromise was illegal and therefore invalid. This ruling virtually implied that slavery was legal in any State.

In 1859, John Brown, a fanatical free State man, who attempted to raid Virginia with twenty followers in order to free the slaves, was taken and hanged at Charleston. Then in 1860 the Republican party, representing the ever-increasing wealth and population of the north-west territories that stood poles apart from the dwindling resources of the south, secured the election of Abraham Lincoln as President. The South was driven by this event to desperate measures. Conscious that political power was slipping from their control, smarting under the stigma fixed upon them by what they considered the malicious libels of the extreme abolitionists, seven Southern States seceded from the Union by February, 1861. They took the title of Confederate States, elected Jefferson Davis as their President, and adopted a new flag. Their justification lay in the deep-rooted belief that nothing should interfere with the right of every State to self-government, that there was no alternative but slave labour for the South, and that, so far from violating natural laws, the institution of slavery merely accepted the fact that the negro was inferior to the white man. Any tampering with the institution of slavery would endanger not only the property but the lives of the white inhabitants. Rather than submit, they would break the Union.

John Brown.

Abraham Lincoln, elected President, 1860.

On the preservation of the Union, Lincoln took his stand. For him the question went far deeper than any slavery dispute. If at will a minority were free to scout the decisions of a majority, the Constitution became waste paper and democratic principle must be degraded to anarchy. In his first address he roundly stated that he "had no purpose to interfere with slavery in the States where it exists . . . The Southerners should be the aggressors if there must be aggression." So it was that the Southern States made war inevitable by breaking the Union. The North, which

had no intention of fighting to abolish slavery, flew to arms to preserve a united nation and government.

Slavery, therefore, was a cause, not of the outbreak of the war, but of the great economic gulf fixed between the North, which stood for progress, and the South, which stood for stagnation. The refusal of the South to face the fact, that the real prosperity of the American people now lay in Northern and Western hands, the refusal to think *federally* and not merely in terms of individual States, made war inevitable.

The struggle began in 1861 and lasted for four years. At the outset the strength of the two sides seemed fairly equal, but in course of time, superior numbers and equipment told all in favour of the North. On the other hand, at the beginning the South was able to put all its white forces into the field, since its slave labour could produce food and other supplies. In a short war the South appeared to have a good chance, for it had been long preparing arms and munitions. For a long war, the North, with its manufacturing centres, its coal and iron, its engineering works, and its superior railway system, was far better equipped: it must obviously outweigh and outstay its opponent. It had another tremendous advantage in control of the sea and power to blockade the Southern ports.

The Civil War, 1861.

From the start the South stood on the defensive. For an offensive plan of invasion the North needed all its superiority in numbers. Fine generalship was shown on both sides: Grant and Sherman stood out among many able Northern leaders, as did Lee and "Stonewall" Jackson for the South. With superior numbers, finances and material resources at their disposal, the North slowly gained the upper hand. But so stubborn was the resistance that Lincoln determined at length to proclaim the emancipation of all slaves held by States at war against the Union. This he did as a *war measure*. "If I could save the Union," he wrote, "without freeing any slave, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that." The proclamation was issued on 1st January, 1863, the year which proved to be the turning-point of the war. A three days' battle at Gettysburg

Slave Emancipation proclaimed, 1st January, 1863.

(Pennsylvania, July 1–3) threw back Lee's northern advance, and a day later, the surrender of Vicksburg on the Mississippi opened that river to the Union armies. Later in the year the Confederate success at Chancellorsville, which saved their head-quarters at Richmond from attack, was dearly bought by the loss of "Stonewall" Jackson. In the last year of the war, a "hammering" campaign was undertaken by Grant and Sherman who moved simultaneously, the one against Lee's army round Richmond in the north-east, and the other against Johnston's forces in Georgia and the south-west. Sherman's march to the sea deprived the Confederates of their remaining ports, and Johnston surrendered in April, 1865. Grant had entered Richmond on 3rd April, and six days later, Lee surrendered the half-starved remainder of his army at Appomattox courthouse.

Defeat of the South, 1865.

Just before the final surrender of the South and the conclusion of peace, President Lincoln was assassinated by a fanatical secessionist. As Washington may fairly be called the creator of the United States, so may Lincoln be called their preserver. The war was not fought in vain, for at the cost of nearly a million lives and thousands of millions of dollars it saved the Union, and by the abolition of slavery ended once and for all the deadly feud which had divided the nation.

Assassination of Lincoln, 1865.

The Government had now to apply itself to the gigantic task of reconstruction. In spite of enormous losses, the reserve wealth of the Northern States was shown by actual increase of population and industry during the war. The South, on the contrary, was ruined and bankrupt. Only an enduring spirit of self-sacrifice had kept it at war so long. One great difficulty was the disposal of some four millions of emancipated slaves. Within four years, by three amendments to the Constitution, the negro received the full rights of citizenship (although in most of the Southern States he is still deprived of the right to vote). It should never be forgotten that the line which had separated the slave and the free States was purely artificial. There were no geographical barriers between north and south. Indeed, geography has favoured the United States in a unique degree. Barriers such as the Allegheny Mountains, dense forest tracts, run north and south, and were slowly

Revival of Prosperity after the War.

and painfully surmounted by the first generation of settlers. Now they were barriers no longer. The railways were overcoming immensity of space; there was nothing in nature to prevent the enjoyment of limitless and varied resources extending from the Atlantic to the Pacific. That these resources were now available to South as well as North is the best explanation of the rebirth of southern prosperity on a sound economic base. The enormous demand for cotton after the war likewise ensured rapid revival.

Renewed Ill-feeling towards Great Britain.

There arose directly out of the war a renewed feeling of intense bitterness towards Great Britain, whose alleged departure from strict neutrality was held to have assisted the South to prolong the war. At the outset of the war no naval operations were possible, since neither side possessed a fleet. Nor was it possible for the South to build one. It was clear that the South depended upon imports for war material of every kind, to pay for which she must export her cotton. The North at once proclaimed a close blockade of the 3000 miles of Southern coast, and proceeded to build the ships wherewith to enforce it. Though overshadowed by the dramatic events of the land campaigns, this pressure from the sea was a factor of equal importance in compassing the final defeat of the South. If the blockade remained unbroken, the South must be starved into surrender. Failing a fleet to break the blockade, the South sought to obtain fast commerce destroyers to prey upon the Northern traders and so divert ships from blockading duties.

The "Alabama" Claims.

Five of these vessels, of which the best known was the *Alabama*, were built in Great Britain. Although the blockade was ruining the cotton trade, and sympathies were divided, the British Government strove to maintain a strict neutrality. The search of the British liner *Trent* by a Northern warship, and the seizure of two Southern commissioners on their way to Great Britain, put the United States in the wrong. It was not surprising that the British Government exerted no great vigilance to prevent the departure of ships built to fight in Southern interests. International law laid down no clear ruling on the question. In the British view the sale of the ships to a belligerent was legitimate, provided that they were unarmed. The United States held that the ships should not have been allowed

under any circumstances to sail. The cruisers, notably the *Alabama*—the *Emden* of that war—played havoc among the Northern merchantmen, capturing no less than 261 ships, till on 11th June, 1864, the *Alabama* was sunk off Cherbourg by the United States' ship *Kearsarge*.

The damage done to American shipping was immense, but far more serious was the resulting outcry against Great Britain. The old wound was reopened; even the Southern States were resentful because British sympathy had not extended to active support. Not until 1871 did the disputants agree to submit the *Alabama* question to a court of arbitration at Geneva, which assigned damages against Great Britain to the amount of £3,100,000. Although after that date acute ill-feeling subsided, there was still no love lost between the two nations.

Immigration.

The rapid renewal of prosperity, and the development and expansion made possible by scientific inventions, for which the American has shown so marked an aptitude, had now for many years brought to the United States a flood of immigrants. In the early days a large percentage of these were Irish, who enlisted American sympathy for their grievances, and whose vote was valuable enough to keep alive an anti-British feeling. Foreign immigration, as will later appear, became more and more a factor to be reckoned with.

If, then, we pause at this point to take a view of the main current of American history, we are forced to mark in the fifty years that followed the war of 1812, beside internal events of supreme importance—the building of the west and the Civil War—the continued existence of animosity towards Great Britain. The first century of the nation's independent existence drew to a close on this note of mistrust and prejudice against Great Britain.

Opening of a new era.

The closing years of the nineteenth century opened a new era in American history. From absorption in purely American concerns and isolation from old-world politics, the United States abandoned their traditional policy and went to war with a European state.[1] It seemed that the Republic, not content with that form of colonization which filled unoccupied lands with a white population, was now to join in the competition

[1] The Americans had, of course, had long experience of *Indian* wars.

for overseas dependencies, and dominion over coloured races. In that sense she relinquished her attitude of aloofness, and stood forth to play her part as a world-power. It was natural to suppose that this total change of policy would embroil her still more hopelessly with Great Britain; but by what seems at first a strange paradox, at this very time, when America began to advance beyond her ocean limits, the century-long estrangement between the two nations began to abate. During the last twenty years a closer understanding has bred a mutual appreciation, a resolve to forgive and forget past enmities, and to recognize that the faults have not been only on one side.

The Venezuela Dispute.

In 1895, shortly before the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, which was to inaugurate the era of better feeling, the last grave dispute occurred, appropriately enough over the question of a boundary. Great Britain and Venezuela had been for many years unable to agree upon a definite frontier between that Republic and British Guiana. The area in dispute was some 50,000 square miles in extent. Arbitration offered on the part of Venezuela not proving acceptable to the British Government, the former applied to the United States for a decision. President Cleveland seized this opportunity for an extreme reassertion of the Monroe doctrine, by virtue of which he claimed the right to call a court of arbitration and to enforce its decision. Lord Salisbury would not admit the Monroe doctrine to be a part of international law, nor its application to the Venezuelan dispute. Surprised at the excited and truculent attitude of the Americans, the British Government arranged for a court of arbitration, by which a settlement was made on the whole in favour of Great Britain. At the same time it was recognized that the Monroe doctrine was far from being a dead letter, and that the interests of the United States in South American politics were just and reasonable.

Affairs of Cuba.

The war with Spain was due to an insurrection in Cuba. By its position, commanding the Gulf of Mexico and facing the Caribbean, Cuba had always been an object of interest to the United States. The Southern States had seen in it a rich recruiting ground for slaves, and several attempts had been made to buy it from Spain. Material

interest declined after the Civil War and emancipation of slaves. Then in 1868 came a native rebellion arising from the time-honoured incapacity of Spain to rule mercifully or justly. Order was not restored for ten years; much sympathy was felt in America for the Cubans; the disturbance to trade and loss of American capital was annoying. In 1895 a still more serious rising began; savage fighting took place; and by 1898 it was clear that nothing but intervention could save the island from utter ruin. Public opinion was further roused by the destruction of the United States battleship *Maine*, which blew up in Havana harbour under suspicious circumstances. An ultimatum was sent to Spain demanding that Cuba should be granted independence, and when this was refused the United States declared war.

The war with Spain, 1898.

The campaign, which was mainly naval, was short and decisive. In May, Commodore Dewey, who was sent to attack Manilla, the capital of the Philippines, met and destroyed the whole Spanish squadron off that port without the loss of a single man. In July, a squadron newly arrived from Spain was destroyed with equal ease outside Santiago (Cuba) by Sampson and Schley. Santiago was quickly taken, and a force sent to attack Porto Rico. Disheartened by their losses, the Spaniards sued for peace. Cuba became an independent republic; Guam (Ladrones), Porto Rico, and the Philippines were annexed to the United States. In addition to these cessions by Spain, Hawaii was occupied as an indispensable coaling station and naval base, and in 1899, by arrangement with Germany, some islands of the Samoan group were taken for the same purpose. By anything but peaceful means the "Pacific era", as Mr. Roosevelt called it, was begun.

Great Britain, unlike the rest of European States, wholeheartedly sympathized with the Americans, who were grateful for this moral support at a time when they were openly accused of self-seeking aggression. When, in the following year, the South African War broke out, American opinion, which might have been expected warmly to favour the Boer cause, refrained from unfriendly criticism, and lent no support to the European outcry against the "tyranny" of Great Britain.

As a direct consequence of her new position as a world power,

The Panama Canal.

the United States was now doubly interested in obtaining control of the Panama Canal. Since Spain had now no longer a single possession in the New World, the only rival to be feared was Great Britain, with her commanding strategical posts in the Bermudas, Bahamas, and Jamaica. That the difficult negotiations for the control and defence of the canal were so quietly arranged was a proof of the friendlier spirit now existing between the two Powers.

The design to cut a canal through or near the isthmus of Panama was not a new one. When American interests reached the Pacific coast, the need for a short and easy connection between Atlantic and Pacific became ever more apparent, and the United States lived in constant fear that British enterprise might anticipate them in the building of an isthmian canal. This fear, indeed, led to the signing of a treaty about the Panama Canal more than fifty years before that canal was constructed. The

Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, 1850.

arrangement known as the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, made in 1850, laid down that neither Power should control or fortify the future canal, which should be free and open to all nations. After this, interest in the scheme declined. The Americans were occupied by the Civil War and domestic reconstruction. A railway built across the isthmus and the completion of the Union Pacific line made the need for a canal less pressing. The opening of the Suez Canal transferred the interests of Great Britain mainly in that direction.

Interest revived when, after preliminary survey, a French company, under the presidency of de Lesseps, began excavations in 1882. Now that the canal seemed at last likely to be cut, the Americans began to regret their self-denying ordinance of 1850. They felt that the canal would be virtually part of the United States coast-line, and ought, therefore, to be directly under their control. The difficulties and expense of the undertaking—far greater than had been predicted—and the ravages of yellow fever led to the failure of the ill-managed French company.

The result of the Spanish war of 1898 left the United States unquestionably the leading Power in the Caribbean Sea, and an incident of that war, the voyage of the battleship *Oregon* from San Francisco to Santiago—a distance of over 13,000 miles—

confirmed the Americans in the belief that their naval power depended on their ability to concentrate their fleets rapidly and at will in Pacific or Atlantic waters. For such concentration sole possession of the canal was essential. Great Britain accepted this point of view, and by the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty in 1901 the United States was free to construct and defend the canal. The French company was bought out and negotiations were begun with Colombia for the cession of a portion of the Panama isthmus. Difficulties raised by the Colombian authorities were brushed aside in high-handed fashion, and a rebellion in the isthmus led to the formation of the Panama Republic, from which the United States bought a strip of land 5 miles in breadth on each side of the projected canal route. After about ten years' work the canal was opened for traffic in August, 1914. It is 50 miles long, and available for the largest ships. For Great Britain, it could not be said to rival the Suez Canal, which remains the shortest route to the Far East and Australia, although the Panama route shortens the voyage to New Zealand by 1100 miles. To Canada it brings many advantages. Its value for the United States needs no further demonstration.

Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, 1901.

Opening of Canal, August, 1914.

By the opening of the twentieth century the United States had abandoned their old ideal of isolation; they had acquired important overseas possessions and had built a great navy to protect them. This development of world-power coincided with the birth of more cordial relations with Great Britain, and no serious differences arose with any other European Power. The United States readily took part in the Hague Conference of 1899, which established a permanent Court of Arbitration. In 1900, American troops shared in the rescue of the Pekin Legations in the Boxer outbreak. In 1905, the mediation of President Roosevelt brought the Russo-Japanese War to a close. The only serious international disagreement has been with Japan, which saw in the United States a formidable commercial rival in the East, and resented the exclusion from the Pacific coast of Japanese immigrants.

The new "imperial" policy did not destroy the broad principles of the Monroe doctrine. It involved no interference

with the internal concerns of European States. The United States were at length able to draw upon their own resources for every want. In their self-sufficiency they stood alone as a Great Power. Why, then, as Washington had said, should they forgo this position? They were not impelled to take part in the scramble for Africa; they lacked not for a place in the sun. No burden of armaments or conscription oppressed them, for, with all their veneration for antiquities, "shining armour" seemed uncomfortable, and, in the twentieth century, a little ridiculous. They had no unwilling subject nationalities, nor were they tempted to rob their neighbours. They did not understand why successful business enterprise should lead a nation into war. They could afford to wear their world-power "with a difference".

Detachment of United States from the Great War.

It is easy, therefore, to understand why in 1914 the Americans felt themselves far separated, spiritually as well as physically, from the war which broke out in Europe. The very causes of that outbreak were not at first fully comprehended, so that public opinion was quite ready to endorse the President's declaration of neutrality. In judging the American standpoint, the nature of the population must be remembered. That population was fed by a continuous stream of immigrants, of whom about one and a quarter million arrived every year. Of the total population of over 100 millions, over 30 per cent are foreign born or of foreign parentage. Up till quite recently, far the largest proportion of these immigrants came from the British Isles and from Germany. The German flow of immigrants has lessened considerably of late, but something like 30 per cent of the foreign element is of German origin. Russia, Italy, Austria, and the south and east of Europe have supplied a larger proportion of recent years. While most of these immigrants have been assimilated rapidly and become "good Americans", appreciating the blessings of peace, liberty, and justice by which they flourish and prosper, they could hardly be expected to show pronounced enthusiasm for either side when the Great War began. Across the Atlantic, they felt, lay escape from the jealous competition, the tortuous diplomacy, and the conscript armies of old Europe. In this new war they were happy to have no part or lot. They were citizens of a

nation which stood for peace and non-intervention in European quarrels. Very few American citizens could foresee in 1914 that their country, sooner or later, would be forced to join in the struggle.

What, then, were the causes which led the United States to abandon their neutrality in 1917? This question may be broadly answered by a simple reference to the German conduct of the war. German action affected the U.S.A. in two ways: indirectly, by the breach of all the laws which attempt to mitigate the horrors of war and safeguard the lives of the weak and helpless, it outraged the American sense of humanity. Then, by direct attack on American lives and interests, it left no doubt in American minds that the cause of civilization demanded that the United States should take their share in crushing a Power which had become the enemy of all mankind.

Why the United States abandoned their Neutrality.

American opinion was soon convinced that Germany was responsible for the world war. The incomplete published records of Germany contrasted ill with the frank publication of the efforts to keep the peace made by both France and Great Britain. Evidence in abundance was forthcoming as to elaborate preparations for the invasion of Belgium. This shameless breach of international faith, on the ground that necessity knows no law, turned American sympathy towards the Entente Powers. Then the adoption of "Frightfulness" as a deliberate policy, and the first-hand evidence forthcoming from Americans themselves in Belgium made it still clearer that no scruple, humane or moral, would be allowed to weigh for one moment against the bid for world-conquest. Still, it seemed to most Americans that they could serve the interests of civilization best by remaining neutral and endeavouring, if opportunity offered, to mediate between the belligerents and restore peace. They did not yet realize how clear-cut was the issue between the irresponsible militarist State, claiming supremacy by the might of its sword, and the self-governing peoples, great or small, who claimed freedom to shape their own destinies.

The neutrality of the United States quickly gave rise to difficulties and disputes with both Great Britain and Germany. As

in the Napoleonic Wars, so in 1914, the United States had the lion's share of the neutral trade. Now, as then, the British fleet strove to prevent supplies from reaching the enemy. A blockade was established, foodstuffs were declared to be contraband, and American ships were subjected to search. On their side, the Germans declared the waters surrounding the British Isles to be a war area, and pinned their faith to submarine warfare as a sure means of starving Great Britain into surrender. The United States protested against the action of both Powers. Great Britain defended her old claim to the right of search, and quoted American acts during the Civil War as precedents for her own procedure. The legality of her policy is still disputed, and the whole question bristles with difficulties. It is sufficient to state that her case was a strong one in law.

The case against Germany was much simpler. The submarine campaign, which began in February, 1915, was an inhuman and barbarous form of warfare, in that it involved the indiscriminate sinking of merchantmen and liners, and made no adequate provision for the safety of their crews or passengers. There is a vast "difference between a prize court and a torpedo". On 7th May, 1915, the *Lusitania* was deliberately sunk, and 114 American lives were lost. Still President Wilson forbore to break off diplomatic relations with Germany. For nearly a year the conditions remained the same until the sinking of the *Sussex* in April, 1916. Then, in reply to the solemn protest and warning of the President, the German Government promised that "merchant ships should not be sunk without warning and without saving human lives, unless the ship attempted to escape or offer resistance". This promise was made conditional on the cessation of the British blockade. To this the United States Government replied that the pledge given could not be considered "in the slightest degree contingent upon the conduct of any other Government". The pledge was soon broken. On 31st January, 1917, the German Chancellor announced that "when the most ruthless methods are considered the best calculated to lead us to victory and to a swift victory they must be employed". Newer and more formidable submarines were now ready, and a note was despatched to the neutral States declaring that no restraint would

Sinking of the Lusitania, May, 1915.

henceforward be observed and that ships would be sunk without warning. Neutral nations must keep their vessels in home ports or submit to the wholesale murder of their citizens on the high seas. On 3rd February, 1917, by way of answer to this note, the United States broke off diplomatic relations with Germany, and a month later steps were taken to arm American ships against submarines. At about the same time, the exposure of the Zimmermann note showed the true worth of German professions of friendship, and furnished a first-hand example of the treacherous intrigues which German statesmen miscalled diplomacy. Zimmermann's intercepted dispatch revealed a proposal to ally with Mexico and Japan against the United States, if the unrestricted submarine warfare should lead to war between the latter power and Germany. Many other criminal or unfriendly acts committed on American soil could be traced to German instigation. Many attempts were made since the beginning of the European War to destroy ships, docks, workshops, and bridges. Hindus were incited to stir up revolts in India, plans were laid for blowing up factories in Canada. The whole community, not excepting Government offices, was beset with spies. The German embassy was privy to and abetted these underhand and criminal schemes in the territory of a neutral nation. All the accumulated evidence showed that peace was impossible with a Government which resorted to such methods. The patience of President and people was at last exhausted. On 2nd April, President Wilson, in a speech to Congress which will become historic, detailed the crimes committed by the German Government which made it no longer possible for America to remain neutral. He showed that the challenge was flung out to all mankind. "The existence of autocratic governments backed by organized force controlled wholly by their will was a menace to the peace of the world and the freedom of peoples." America accepted "the gage of battle with the natural foe of liberty—for the rights of nations, great and small, and the privilege of men everywhere to choose their way of life and obedience". The American people had no selfish ends to serve: they desired no conquests, no dominion. They were fighting that the world might be made safe for democracy.

On 6th April, 1917, war upon Germany was declared by a joint resolution passed by both Houses of Congress. The nation was unprepared for war, but by dint of gigantic efforts, brought its weight to bear in the struggle by land and sea at a very much earlier date than was at first thought possible.

Declaration of War on Germany, 6th April, 1917.

Comradeship in arms has drawn Great Britain and the United States into a closer sympathy and mutual appreciation. The ideal of a permanent League to maintain the peace of the world appears less fanciful in the light of a close partnership between the British Empire and the United States.

Meanwhile, let the noble words of Lincoln be remembered: "With malice towards none, with charity for all, with firmness in the right as God gives us to see the right, let us finish the work we are in—to bind up one another's wounds, to care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow and orphans; to do all which may achieve a just and lasting peace among ourselves and with all nations."

IMPORTANT DATES

1781. Articles of Confederation.
1783. Peace of Versailles.
1793. Invention of cotton-gin.
1803. Purchase of Louisiana.
1812–14. War with Great Britain.
1820. Missouri compromise.
1823. Monroe Doctrine.
1845. Texas annexed.
1861. Civil War.
1863. Battle of Gettysburg.
1865. Death of Lincoln.
1898. War with Spain.
1914. Panama Canal opened.
1917. War with Germany.

For List of Books for Reference see Appendix I

CHAPTER XXV

Spain and the Smaller States

The greater part of this book has dealt with the fortunes of the European Powers. It remains to sketch in broad outline the condition of those lesser States which have played a smaller part in international affairs. In their history is found the same striving for independent *national* existence, the same impulse towards democratic government.

Spain

By 1815 there was little left to Spain of her past glories. During the eighteenth century she had sunk to the position of a poor dependent of France, and as such had suffered grievous losses in her colonies which fell an easy prey to the sea power of Great Britain.

Upon Spain, as upon other parts of Europe, the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic era left a deep impression. The Peninsular War which began in 1808 proved that in spite of the selfish and incapable policy of their rulers the proud spirit of the Spanish people was yet far from extinct, and this spirit of a people in arms first shown in Spain encouraged that national resistance in Germany and elsewhere which Napoleon was powerless to overcome.

Effect of Peninsular War on Spain.

The bracing effect of this war of liberation was seen in another direction. In 1812 a Spanish Constitution was proclaimed abolishing the absolute power of the king. This constitution was not workable in practice, but it pointed the way for future reformers and showed that despots in Spain, as elsewhere, must not expect for long to exercise their power unchallenged.

In 1814 when Ferdinand VII was restored to his throne, he resolved to make short work of the reforming party. So oppressive was his rule that a general rising broke out in 1820. When called on to serve abroad against the rebellious colonies the troops revolted, so that the king was

Reactionary Policy of Ferdinand VII.

powerless. Then France stepped in to his rescue and King Ferdinand, backed by the principles of the Holy Alliance and by French bayonets, was able to reimpose his tyrannous yoke. The French intervention was keenly resented by Great Britain, which was determined that Spain should not be assisted to regain her lost possessions in America—an attitude clearly shown by Canning's declaration: "I called the New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old". The enunciation of the Monroe doctrine (1823) showed that the United States too would brook no interference with the newly won liberty of the late Spanish colonies.

Revolt of the American Colonies.

The revolt of his American colonies was the most important event of Ferdinand's discreditable reign. Spain had held sway over Mexico and over the greater part of South America (except Brazil). But the good government and welfare of her colonies did not interest her. She was only concerned to extort from them as much revenue as possible. All the worse features of the home government were reproduced in Latin America. Over the mixed populations, consisting of Creoles, and Indian and African half-breeds, the immigrants of pure Spanish blood had sole control. All native interests were sacrificed to those of Spain. It was the old colonial system at its worst. The War of Independence in North America had increased the spirit of unrest; as early as 1785 Spanish Americans had discussed with Washington the means of attaining liberty for South America, and in the first thirty years of the nineteenth century that liberty was gained. The example was set by Mexico, where a Federal Republic was established in 1824. In Central America the provinces declared for republican institutions. In South America the hero of the movement was Bolivar, a Venezuelan Creole. By his personal efforts five South American Republics were established, and he richly deserved the title of Liberator. He aimed at a federation of United States, but jealousies, the mixed nature of the population, and vast distances have prevented the attainment of his ideal.[1]

[1] Despite the fertility and natural resources of most of the South American Republics their progress has been disappointing. Political instability is their bane. Of all the States *Argentina* is by far the most prosperous. European capital has been attracted thither in vast amounts, and there is an enormous export trade of corn and wheat. Next in importance stands *Chile*, but in Venezuela, Ecuador, Colombia, and Peru, there has been but little

For Spain the loss of her colonial empire proved a blessing, since it concentrated the attention of her people on the neglected resources of their own country.

Before Spain could hope to recover any of her lost prestige it was necessary to rid herself of bad traditions. Public opinion was non-existent. The dynasty stood for absolute power. Ministers were hopelessly corrupt. The undue influence of the clerical party stood in the way of reform. The Spanish people were sunk in dire poverty.

From the time of Ferdinand VII (1813–1833) almost down to the accession of the present king, Spain was distracted by civil wars; disputed successions were combined with the desire of the Basque provinces and Catalonia for Home Rule.

On Ferdinand's death in 1833 the throne was left to his infant daughter, Isabel, whose mother, Cristina, was appointed Regent. Don Carlos, brother of the late king, now claimed the throne on the ground that the old Salic Law had never been legally annulled. So began the first of the Carlist wars. The Pretender stood for absolute monarchy and the suppression of all liberal ideas. He found his stoutest adherents in the clerical party and in the inhabitants of the northern provinces who never considered themselves subjects of the government at Madrid, and who were well prepared to resume the methods of guerrilla fighting learnt in the Peninsular War. The Queen Regent fell back upon the liberal and constitutional party which was itself split into two factions known as the Moderates and the Progressives. The Carlists found in Zumala-Carreguy a leader with a genius for guerrilla warfare, and while he lived they carried all before them. When he was killed in 1835, at the siege of Bilbao, the tide turned. The Cristinas now discovered a fine general, Espartero, and their cause was aided by a legion of British volunteers. The war was conducted with merciless savagery: prisoners were butchered and

The First Carlist War.

progress. *Brazil*, since her revolt from Portugal in 1889, has begun to develop. She too has vast natural wealth as yet untapped. German immigrants have flocked in hundreds of thousands into the southern territories.

Until 1917, when the United States entered the war against Germany, every State in America had remained neutral. Despite the strong German element in her population, Brazil was the first to break off relations with the Central Powers. Her lead was followed by most of the other republics, with the notable exceptions of Argentina and Chile, which considered their commercial and other interests best served by a neutral attitude.

non-combatants tortured and murdered. At length, in 1839, Don Carlos was driven into France, but the war was continued for over a year longer by the Carlist leader, Ramon Cabrera.

These years of civil war exhausted the land far more than the struggle against Napoleon had done, and no strong government was available to restore order. Cristina resigned the regency, and Espartero, who succeeded to that office, was driven out in 1843 by a military revolution led by Generals Prim and Narvaez. In the same year, Queen Isabel, though only thirteen years old, was declared to be of age. In 1846 she married her cousin, Francis of Asiź, while her sister Louisa married the Duc de Montpensier, second son of Louis Philippe. These marriages nearly led to a breach between France and Great Britain, since the French king was obviously designing to secure the succession in Spain for his younger son.

Revolution, 1843.

Accession of Isabel II (1843–1868).

"The Spanish Marriages."

The reign of Isabel saw no improvement in internal affairs. The queen scandalized her people by promoting unworthy favourites. No genuine concessions were made to democratic opinion; there was no united national party to insist upon honest administration. Some national enthusiasm was shown in 1860 on the success of a campaign to extend Spanish influence in Morocco, but by 1868 nearly all her subjects were tired of the queen and of court intrigues, and she was forced to abdicate.

Abdication of Isabel II.

It was difficult to find a new monarch.

The Hohenzollern candidate was withdrawn and Ferdinand of Portugal declined the offer. In November, 1870, the crown was accepted by Amadeo, second son of King Victor Emanuel. The new king was anxious to improve the condition of his adopted country, but his efforts were wasted and his position rendered impossible by intriguing party leaders. Aristocrat and Republican conspired to ignore him, so that in 1873 he resigned the crown.

King Amadeo, 1870–3.

A republic was then formed, but lasted little more than a year. In the north the grandson of Don Carlos reasserted the claims of Divine Right, while in the south an effort was made to set up a number of independent republics. From this appalling state of anarchy the country was saved by the army

Second Carlist War, 1872–4.

leaders, who proclaimed the young son of Isabel as King Alfonso XII. All moderate parties rallied to support him. By 1876 Don Carlos had retired to France, and the *fueros*, or local privileges of the Basque provinces, were abolished.

Accession of Alfonso XII.

Under Alfonso XII the condition of Spain improved. The king worked hard for his country, and was deservedly popular. He was assisted by an able Conservative minister named Canovas. At this time began the curious system by which Conservative and Liberal ministers have agreed to hold alternate spells of office. This political method quieted party strife to some extent, but bribery and dishonest finance still persisted.

In 1885 Alfonso XII died before the birth of his son and heir. For seventeen years the widowed Queen Maria Cristina acted as Regent. Her tact and ability enabled her to keep the peace, and continued peace brought increased prosperity. In external affairs the most important events were the rising in Cuba and the war with America in 1898, which ended in the loss of Cuba, the Philippines, and Porto Rico. From the loss of the "kingdoms" in Central and South America Spain had learnt no lesson in the art of colonial government. In 1899 the Spanish Colonial Office was abolished as no longer necessary. All that was left to Spain was a strip of coast in Morocco, coastal settlements in North-West and West Africa, and a few islands.

The Regency, 1885.

Cuban insurrection in 1895 and war with America, 1898.

In 1904 Alfonso XIII came of age. In 1906 friendly relations with Great Britain were increased by his marriage with Princess Ena of Battenberg. In 1909 a revolt in Morocco was with difficulty suppressed and many lives were lost. The war was unpopular, and led to a revolutionary outbreak in Barcelona, accompanied by fierce anti-clerical riots. These disturbances showed that the separatist spirit in the north was still strong.

Alfonso XIII (1904–).

Throughout the Great War (1914–8) Spain remained neutral. After the United States had entered the war she was the largest and most important non-combatant, and, being furthest removed from the main theatres of war, she has perhaps suffered the least.

She had no great volume of trade with the Central Powers, and had therefore less to lose.

On the other hand, the last few years have been a period of unrest in army, commercial, and democratic circles. Strikes have been frequent, especially in Catalonia, where the Government is faced with ever-increasing demands for Home Rule.

Portugal

On the French invasion of Portugal in 1807 the royal family had fled in British ships to Brazil. When the Peninsular War was ended a curious situation arose. Portugal had owed her salvation to Great Britain, and, pending the return of a native ruler, a regency was set up under the control of Marshal Beresford. Now the Portuguese king, John IV, was most unwilling to return; he desired to stay in Brazil, and make that country his seat of Government. The Portuguese resented the foreign regency and the intention of John to subordinate the interests of his motherland to those of a colony. A revolution broke out in 1820, and John reluctantly consented to return and resume his kingly office. On landing he pledged himself to abide by a democratic constitution. At the same time, owing largely to Canning's diplomacy, Brazil declared itself independent, and chose as emperor the king's elder son Pedro, who had been acting as viceroy.

Peninsular War.

British control.

Revolution, 1820.

On King John's death, a disputed succession arose between Pedro's daughter Maria and her uncle Miguel. A war, similar to the Carlist risings in Spain, ensued until, in 1836, Queen Maria was established on the throne.

Internal unrest.

The subsequent history of Portugal resembles that of Spain in so far as material progress has been very slow. Urgent social reforms were delayed, and the Government fell more and more into the hands of self-seeking politicians. Republican and Socialist parties rapidly gained strength as the dynasty failed to keep in touch with the people.[1]

[1] In 1889 the empire of Brazil fell and a republic was established. Emigrants returning from the new republic swelled the chorus of discontent with the existing monarchy.

In 1908 King Carlos and the Crown Prince were assassinated in Lisbon, and two years later Manuel, the late king's second son, was deposed. A republic was set up which was recognized by the Powers in 1911. Republic, 1910.

On the outbreak of war in 1914 Portugal at first remained neutral, but her traditional alliance with Great Britain, dating from 1703, was not forgotten. In March, 1916, a dispute with Germany over the seizure of ships in Portuguese harbours ended in the severance of diplomatic relations, and Portuguese troops joined their allies in the Western theatre of war.

The assassination of President Paes (December, 1918) proves that republican institutions have failed to produce a stable Government. Public opinion is not yet strong enough to check continual class and party warfare.

Holland

Before the final defeat of Napoleon, Holland had become a kingdom, the crown being given to William of Orange, son of the late stadtholder. To compensate Holland for the heavy losses incurred during the great wars, she received the Belgian Netherlands. By this means the Congress at Vienna thought to prevent future French aggression on the north-east. This disposal of Belgium was a good example of the manner in which the Congress proposed to remake the map of Europe. The union of Belgium and Holland was unnatural, for their peoples had nothing in common. They differed in race, language, religion, and occupation. The Belgians, who outnumbered the Dutch, felt that they were being brought under a foreign yoke. Since 1579 they had been accustomed to a separate though not an independent Government. It is doubtful whether the most tactful statesmanship could have reconciled the Belgians to the union. King William of Orange was neither tactful nor statesmanlike. He did all in his power to subordinate his new subjects to Dutch laws and Dutch officials. He discouraged the use of the French language, he muzzled the Press, and removed the schools from the control of the Catholics. Union of Holland and Belgium. William, King of the Netherlands.

In 1830 the Belgians revolted, and successfully resisted the Dutch troops. Both Great Britain and France sympathized with the rising. A conference, meeting in London in January, 1831, arranged the separation of the two States, and Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg was elected first King of the Belgians. Boundaries were fixed, the greater part of Luxembourg being left in Dutch hands.

Belgian revolt.

Belgian kingdom created, 1831.

William of Orange refused to accept this settlement as final, and tried to win back Belgium by force of arms. Great Britain and France united to assist King Leopold, and compelled William to withdraw. But not until 1838 did Holland finally acquiesce in the independence of Belgium. Throughout his reign (1815–40) William I held absolute power. Under William II (1840–49) a more Liberal Government was introduced, and ministers were made responsible to the States-General.

Recognized by Holland, 1838.

During the second half of the nineteenth century Holland had grown, through the energy of her people, into a wealthy State. Much land has been reclaimed from the sea, and fisheries flourish. Rich colonies, mainly in the East Indies, are still retained.

During the great European War Holland suffered from shortage of food supplies. She contented herself with a protest to Berlin against the new submarine warfare in 1917, and continued to preserve a strict neutrality.

Sweden and Norway

The union of Norway and Sweden was the work of the Congress of Vienna. Norway had previously belonged to Denmark. As a reward for services rendered to the Allies in the Wars of Liberation, and in compensation for her own surrender of Finland to Russia and Swedish Pomerania to Prussia, Sweden now received Norway.

Union of Sweden and Norway, 1815.

This forced union was typical of the Congress in its disregard for national sentiment. The Norwegians were most unwilling to accept the situation. Their social system was democratic, whereas in Sweden the king shared his power with the aristocratic

class which owned vast estates. While acknowledging the King of Sweden as their nominal ruler, the Norwegians were determined to manage their own internal affairs without Swedish interference.

In 1818 Bernadotte became king under the name of Charles XIV. Though his rule was absolute he did much to develop his possessions, and a flourishing export trade in iron and wheat grew up. In 1844, his son Oscar I succeeded to both Kingdoms. Relations were improved by the grant to Norway of a national flag and coat-of-arms, and by a policy of non-interference with her laws and customs.

Charles XIV, 1818.

Oscar I, 1844.

The year 1848 passed without disturbances. During the reign of Charles XV (1859–72), the Constitution was reformed by the establishment of two Houses of Parliament in place of the old system of four Estates—Nobles, Clergy, Citizens, and Peasants. In the affair of Slesvig-Holstein Sweden sympathized warmly with Denmark, but was not prepared to go to war.

Charles XV, 1859.

Peace and prosperity continued under Oscar II (1872–1907), but Norway chafed more and more under the enforced union. Though she drew but little wealth from the soil, Norway had developed an important mercantile marine. It was galling to national pride to see Norwegian interests abroad represented by Swedish officials. By 1899 the movement towards independence had been strengthened enormously by the abolition of the office of *Stadtholder* (the King's Lieutenant in Norway). The symbol of the Union was now struck out of the Norwegian flag, and Norway had obtained independence in all but name. In 1905, the Norwegian Parliament declared the union dissolved. All possible concessions were offered by Sweden and were steadfastly refused. Feeling rose so high that war was only narrowly averted. Fortunately, however, an agreement was arrived at satisfactory to both countries. A neutral zone was established and Norway undertook to dismantle the forts recently constructed along the Swedish frontier.

Oscar II, 1872.

Union dissolved, 1905.

The monarchy was preserved in Norway, the Crown being

accepted by Prince Charles of Denmark who had married Princess Maud, youngest daughter of King Edward VII. The new king assumed the name of Haakon VII.

Haakon VII, King of Norway.

Geographical position made it impossible for the Scandinavian Kingdoms to remain unaffected by the Great War of 1914. In Sweden the Court party and most of the upper classes were in sympathy with the Central powers. Throughout the country there was a violent dislike for Russia. On the other hand the Democratic party hoped for the success of the Entente. In September, 1917, the United States Government discovered that the German minister at Buenos Aires had been sending messages by way of the Swedish Foreign Office to inform his Government as to the movements of ships. The Swedish Government disclaimed knowledge of these proceedings, but sent a protest to Berlin.

Of all the neutral countries Norway suffered most severely from the submarine warfare. Up to the middle of April, 1917, 450 Norwegian ships were sunk, and 350 lives were lost. Throughout the country anti German feeling grew very strong.

Denmark

At the end of the Napoleonic Wars Denmark was almost ruined. She was condemned to pay heavily for her adherence to the French. The Continental system had killed her trade. She was deeply in debt. In 1815 the Congress of Vienna deprived her of Norway. Her sole acquisition was the small Duchy of Lauenburg.

Loss of Norway, 1815.

Despite these heavy handicaps the little kingdom recovered rapidly. Up to 1848 most of the governing power remained in the king's hands. In 1849 a more Liberal Constitution was granted. At the same time grave difficulties arose over the relations between the Duchies of Slesvig and Holstein and the Danish Crown. The population in the Duchies was very largely German, and when King Christian VIII of Denmark died in 1848, leaving no heir, they claimed that the connection with Denmark was ended, and that they should

Slesvig-Holstein.

henceforward belong solely to the German Confederation. This attitude led to war; and, although a peace was arranged in 1852 which left the Duchies in the hands of the new Danish King, Frederick VII, fresh troubles soon arose. The king was determined not to relinquish the Duchies, and soon declared Slesvig annexed to Denmark. The quarrel grew fiercer than ever, only to end in the annexation by Prussia of both Duchies (see p. 100). The surrender involved the loss to Denmark of some 200,000 Danes in North Slesvig, who now came under Prussian rule.

War with Prussia, 1864.

The Duchies annexed by Prussia, 1866.

Since 1864 there has been a wonderful development. In agriculture, stock-farming, and manufactures, the country has prospered exceedingly. In art, literature, and science, achievement has been high. Economic conditions were inevitably affected by the European War. If the blockade of Germany was to be effective, restriction of imports was necessary. The shortage of food-stuffs raised much outcry among the farmers.

The future of Denmark is largely bound up with that of her Scandinavian neighbour-States, with which she now lives on cordial terms.

In November, 1917, the Kings of Denmark, Norway and Sweden met in conference at Christiania. The meeting proved that past enmities have been forgotten, and that real unity now exists among the Scandinavian peoples.

Switzerland

Switzerland assumed her present form at the Congress of Vienna. Her neutrality and independence of all foreign influence were formally acknowledged and guaranteed by the Great Powers. In the time of Napoleon the cantons had been reorganized and their number increased from thirteen to nineteen. The new cantons introduced French and Italian-speaking communities into the Republic, which had before contained only German-speaking subjects. By the Congress, the cantons of Valais, Neuchâtel, and Geneva, which had been annexed to France, were restored to the Confederation.

Neutrality and Independence guaranteed, 1815.

Since Napoleon, no external invader has ventured to violate Swiss independence, and the main interest of Swiss history has lain in constitutional development. Switzerland has afforded to the world a model of Federal Government (see p. 287), which if minute in scale has proved eminently workable.

Up to 1830, the head Cantons, Berne, Zurich, and Lucerne had most influence, but the revolutionary movements of that year were felt in Switzerland, and the desire for a more democratic constitution was apparent. Religious differences became acute in 1846, when seven Catholic Cantons formed a League called the Sonderbund. This League which threatened to wreck the federation was crushed in 1847 by the Federal Government, who acted on the advice of Lord Palmerston "to strike quick and strike hard". On the dissolution of the Sonderbund the Jesuits were banished from the country.

The Sonderbund.

In 1848 the Constitution was revised, and further democratic measures have since been adopted. More power has been given to the Federal Assembly, matters which affect the whole State being decided by a Referendum or direct vote of all the citizens. Each canton manages its own local affairs, either by direct vote if the canton is small, or, in larger cantons, by representative assemblies.

Switzerland affords a fine example of the successful fusion of three races—German, French, and Italian—to form a nation. Swiss patriotism is very real. The adoption of universal military service proved that the Swiss held their independent nationality worth fighting for.

In 1914 Swiss sympathies were sharply divided. Like other neutrals, Switzerland protested against the ruthless submarine warfare. Her central position brought her close to the seats of war, so that trade was dislocated and food supplies, being mainly imported in time of peace, ran very short.

By October, 1918, nineteen States were at war with the Central Powers, and eight other countries had severed relations with Germany. With the exception of Greece, no European country entered the war later than 1916. Up to 17th February, 1917

—the date on which unrestricted submarine warfare was begun —every State in the western hemisphere had remained neutral. After that date no less than thirteen States in the New World declared war on, or severed diplomatic relations with, Germany [1]

[1] The following States were at war with Germany:—

1914—Great Britain.	1917—United States.
France.	Greece.
Russia.	China.
Belgium.	Cuba.
Serbia.	Panama.
Montenegro.	Brazil.
Japan.	San Salvador
1915—Italy.	Siam.
1916—Portugal.	Liberia
Rumania.	

In 1917 the following States broke off diplomatic relations with Germany:—

Bolivia.	Costa Rica.
Nicaragua.	Guatemala.
Honduras.	Haiti.
Peru.	Ecuador
Uruguay.	

For List of Books for Reference see Appendix I

British Dominions, Colonies, and mandated areas are to be coloured red by the
name should be underlined. In every



In the case of islands and where the territory is too small for colouring the
es of acquisition should be inserted.

APPENDIX A

China and the Western Powers

Throughout the nineteenth century China has been the Sick Man of the Far East. It has always been her pride and ambition to keep herself apart from all other nations. The Western nations have forced themselves upon China with a view to enriching themselves by opening and developing markets and commerce. Unlike the Turks, the Chinese only asked to be left undisturbed. They are essentially a pacific people. Superiority gained by force of arms is not regarded by them as a true superiority.

China affords the classical example of a country which has attained a high degree of culture at a very early date, but has known no continuous progress. This is explained in part by the fact that foreign influences have made little or no impression on *the masses of her people.* Her religion and her ideals point to the preservation of all that is past—never towards changes of law and custom, nor towards the assimilation of foreign ideas.

Down to the seventeenth century the notable general feature of Chinese history was the series of invasions coming always from the north. The invaders were kindred in race, and always became, sooner or later, assimilated to the mode of life of the conquered people. Then they are overthrown by a native revolt, and a native dynasty is restored to power. Thus it was that Kublai Khan founded a Tartar dynasty (*c.* 1275), which lasted till 1368, when it was driven out by the strong native Ming dynasty. After Kublai's conquest, intercourse began between Europe and China. The Polo family were the first visitors, and their accounts of the wondrous riches of Cathay aroused the desire of Western merchants. Although a new way was sought by Columbus and the Cabots, no definite attempts were made to settle in China until, in 1517, the Portuguese arrived in Canton. From this date the modern history of China may be said to begin. The Portuguese were followed by the Spanish and Dutch, and all three aroused intense resentment by their contemptuous and brutal treatment of the natives.

English traders, representing the East India Company, arrived in 1635, the Russians and French a few years later. In 1644 China was subjected to another invasion from the north—that of the Manchus, who imposed their yoke until 1912, when the Republic was proclaimed. The native Chinese were forced to adopt Manchu dress and to wear the pigtail.

Although a treaty was made with Russia in 1769, the Chinese continued to regard all "foreign devils" as inferior beings, tributary to their own Emperor. This was shown clearly by the reception given to two British ambassadors, Lord Macartney in 1792 and Lord Amherst in 1816. China did not want our trade and had a profound contempt for our civilization. On our side the object was simply to secure markets and safety for our merchants: no effort was made to appreciate the viewpoint or allay the prejudices of the Chinese.

In 1839 China forbade the import of opium, and in 1840 came the so-called Opium War with Britain. The opium traffic was the occasion rather than the cause of a rupture which anti-foreign feeling made inevitable. By the Treaty of Nanking, which ended the war, five ports were opened to foreign trade (*Canton*, *Amoy*, *Foochow*, *Ningpo*, and *Shanghai*). *Hong Kong* was ceded to Great Britain and a large indemnity paid. This war was a turning-point in Far Eastern affairs, as it showed the real weakness of China. Other European powers hastened to secure concessions by treaty. Rights of residence in special quarters were now conceded to foreigners, who were to be independent of Chinese law.

During this period (*c.* 1850) the country was distracted by a big rebellion—that of the Taipings—which aimed at the downfall of the Manchu dynasty, now rapidly declining in power and prestige. The rebels, who took Nanking and other important places, were not subdued until Major Charles Gordon took command of the Imperialist troops in 1863–4.

During this rebellion a second foreign war broke out (1857–60) owing to Chinese disregard of the recent treaty and to continued attacks upon traders and missionaries. Great Britain and France, acting together, took Peking and destroyed the Summer Palace. The new peace treaty provided that a British minister should

reside at Peking, and that *Kowloon*, opposite to Hong Kong, should be ceded to Great Britain. The Manchus now tried to regain popularity by an anti-foreign policy. From 1875 the Empress Dowager Tzu-Hsi held despotic and sinister sway until her death in 1908. She set her face rigidly against foreign intercourse, and no one, not excepting the shrewd statesman Li-Hung-Chang, was strong enough to oppose her will. She showed considerable skill in exploiting the mutual jealousies of Western states.

By 1890 the rising power of Japan added another competitor for the heritage of the Sick Man, and it was left for Japan to expose his utter weakness. For centuries she had looked on Korea as her legitimate prey. She now denied the Chinese claim of suzerainty, and in the war of 1894–5 totally defeated the Chinese forces by land and sea. The sequel to this war and the forced surrender of her spoils by Japan have already been described (pp. 144–5). A new chapter was opened in the story of Chinese relations with the Western world. It appeared that China was now doomed to partition into "spheres of influence" by the European powers. The only alternative seemed to be root-and-branch reform and consolidation under the ægis of Japan in the interests of the Yellow Race.

We have seen in Chapter XII how far Japan succeeded in her aim by her defeat of Russia. We are now concerned with the internal condition of China.

By the end of the nineteenth century a small body of enlightened men arose urging programmes of reform in government, army, law, and education, together with freedom of the press and of discussion. Like most enthusiasts, they wished to go too fast. The Empress Dowager was too strong for them, and she was backed by the most conservative people in the world. Again, she tried to strengthen her own position by lending support to the Boxer movement (pp. 144–5).

After the Russo-Japanese War hatred of the Manchu dynasty grew still more violent. A body of extreme reformers arose in the South, which was always the home of revolution. This body was led by Dr. Sun-Yat-Sen (*d.* 1925), who desired to set up a republic. It was ardently desirous that China should reform

herself, free from the leading-strings of Europe or Japan. When, in 1908, the Empress Dowager died, revolution had already broken out. The Court party proved insincere in its professed desire for parliamentary government, and rebellions arose in many provinces (1911). In the new year, 1912, Sun-Yat-Sen became president of the Chinese Republic—an office which he held for two years. With the passing of the 26th (the Manchu) dynasty, the rule of the Emperors was ended.

The difficulty of restoring order out of chaos, and of creating a nation, has so far proved insuperable. No Napoleon has arisen. The mere proclamation of a republic was no solution for a state of anarchy.

Roughly speaking, North China is the more conservative, South China the more republican, in sentiment. Since the proclamation of the republic there has been a continual state of civil war, the empire being actually restored for a short period.

Opinions were sharply divided on the question of entering the Great War, and, as Sun-Yat-Sen predicted, that entry only increased internal dissensions. The country has now lain for some ten years at the mercy of military chieftains (Tuchuns) whose private armies ravage the land, and who are concerned not for the common weal but for their own aggrandizement.

Japan was quick to profit by the chaos in China, whom she forced to consent to demands which made her (Japan) the paramount power with the right of succession to German territory in Shantung and with the control over all important industries. Intense distrust and hatred of Japan followed, which was not lessened at the Versailles Conference, which virtually confirmed the claims of Japan.

As a Pacific power, the United States of America was watching Far Eastern affairs with anxiety, and in 1921–2 a congress met at Washington to discuss the relations of China with Japan and other interested powers. The Anglo-Japanese alliance now terminated, and by the Four-Power Pact Britain, France, Japan, and the United States of America undertook to find a peaceful adjustment of their various claims and interests.

But the conference has done nothing to remedy the internal anarchy of China. Recent events (1925) have shown that dislike

of foreigners is still acute and is likely to persist, in the absence of a strong central government. Serious anti-foreign riots, partly incited by Bolshevik doctrines, have recently arisen. There is a strong feeling against the special privileges secured to foreigners by the treaties and against foreign control of customs and tariffs. Yet history makes it clear that China cannot, like Japan, transform herself into a united nation within a short period of time. China is a civilization; she is not a nation. She possesses a population of over 400,000,000, but her people have no patriotism or sense of nationality. Apart from a tiny minority in the great cities, they are quietly living their own lives—i.e. those of their distant ancestors—unmoved and but little disturbed by the civil strife and the international problems. Politics do not interest them; they only ask to be let alone.

Unfortunately, the outer world, having forced open the door and entered China, cannot now afford to leave her. Concerted action on the part of the powers is *now* essential. The present position is very difficult and very dangerous. The prolonged delay in facing it is adding to the danger.

APPENDIX B

A Note on the Republics of Central and South America

The existence of twenty republics in Central and South America is due to the influence of two great movements discussed in this volume—the American War of Independence and the French Revolution. Their successful struggle for freedom from the yoke of Spain with the recent rapid development of their marvellous natural resources is an all-important feature of the *world-history* of the nineteenth century. The New World is now indeed "redressing the balance of the Old".

With stable government and sound finance such states as Brazil and the Argentine Republic are rapidly becoming great

powers. The main events in the story of their foundation are tabulated here:—

1581. *All* European colonies belonged to Spain, which conquered Portugal at this date. They made no progress under the ruinous colonial system of Spain.

1807. Portuguese royal family, driven out by Napoleon, arrived in *Brazil*, which had been for 300 years subject to Portugal. A Liberal government established.

1808. King of Spain forced by Napoleon to abdicate. This gave the vice-royalties of Central and South America the opportunity to free themselves.

1811. *Venezuela* declared for independence. Career of Simon Bolivar, "the Liberator", opens.

1814. King of Spain restored. He had learned nothing and forgotten nothing. No concessions to colonies. Three main centres of rebellion: Mexico, Venezuela, Argentine.

1812–8. Bolivar aided by 6000 British veterans.

1816. *United States of La Plata* formed, excluding Monte Video and Paraguay. *Brazil* declared a separate kingdom.

1818. *Chile* proclaimed independence. Work of Cochrane with Navy.

1819. Battle of Boyaca freed New Granada, which joined Venezuela to form Republic of *Colombia*. Bolivar became president.

1821. Battle of Carabobo freed Caracas. *Quito* and *Guayaquil* (later *Ecuador*) freed from Spain. King of Portugal returned to Europe, leaving his son Dom Pedro regent in *Brazil*.

1822. Dom Pedro declared *Brazil* independent and became emperor. In *Mexico* Iturbide founded empire for two years.

1824. Independence of *Brazil* recognized by Portugal (partly through British mediation). The Battle of Ayacucho—the Waterloo of Spain. Result: Independence of *Peru*. Federal republic of *Mexico* formed.

1889. Brazil proclaimed republic during absence of emperor.

Up to about 1876 the condition of nearly all the states was confused and restless. Rival dictators fought for supreme political power. Since that date they have grown more stable, population

has increased, and foreign enterprise and capital have been attracted. Only Mexico of late years has suffered from serious disorders, which date from the downfall in 1911 of President Porfirio Diaz, whose rigid but benevolent despotism had built up a rich united state.

N.B.—The success of the rising against Spain was due to: (*a*) The declaration by the United States of the Monroe Doctrine, 1823 (see p. 293). (*b*) The sympathy, diplomatic aid, and unofficial military support of Great Britain. (*c*) The genius and devotion of Bolivar, himself directly responsible for the liberation of Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, and Bolivia, and largely for that of Peru.

The twenty republics which now exist are:

Mexico ...	1821	Peru	1821
Guatemala ...	1821	Bolivia	1825
Salvador ...	1821	Brazil	1889
Honduras ...	1821	Paraguay	1811
Nicaragua ...	1821	Uruguay	1828
Costa Rica ...	1821	Chile	1818
Panama ...	1903	Argentine	1816
Colombia ...	1813	Haiti	1804
Venezuela ...	1811	Cuba	1898
Ecuador ...	1811	Dominican Republic	1821

APPENDIX C

Treaty of Versailles

As in 1815 at Vienna, so in 1918–19 at Versailles, the victors of the Great War met to reconstruct the map of Europe, and to exact what was possible by way of reparation for the ruin wrought by the Germanic powers.

Unlike the Vienna Conference, the vast assembly at Versailles was representative not merely of European powers and interests, but of all the 27 states which had declared war on Germany. It was a World Conference, although the ultimate decision of all important business lay in the hands of Great Britain, France,

Italy, the United States, and Japan. The enemy states were not represented. Broadly, the treaty with Germany, as drafted at the Conference, agreed in principle with the Fourteen Points enunciated by President Wilson (see App. F).

The last of his Points was the first to be established, viz. the creation of a *League of Nations*. The machinery was now devised for the peaceful settlement of all international disputes. The Head-quarters of the League were fixed at Geneva.

Although by much useful work the League has already very fully justified its existence, the United States has as yet declined to join it, while under the Treaty of Locarno, 1925, European peace has been guaranteed.

While the Armistice of November 11, 1918, put an end to fighting, the final terms of peace were not actually signed at Versailles until June, 1919.

In order to grasp the territorial changes made by the Peace of Versailles it is best to look at the map (facing p. 280), and observe carefully the new boundaries, remembering that before the end of the war, Poland had been recreated, and Czecho-Slovakia had appeared for the first time.

By the Treaty of 1919—

1. Alsace and Lorraine were restored to France.

2. West Prussia and Posen were ceded to the new republic of Poland.

3. The coal mines in the Saar basin were handed over to France by way of compensation, and the district was to be governed for 15 years by a Commission of the League of Nations.

4. A large part of North Slesvig returned (by plebiscite) to Denmark.

5. Belgium, now no longer a neutral state, received Moresnet and Malmédy.

The whole of the German colonies were distributed among the Allies as mandatories of the League of Nations:—

German South-west Africa was thus handed over to the Union of South Africa.

Togoland and the Cameroons were divided between Britain and France, and German East Africa between Britain and Belgium.

Kiao-Chau, with other German Pacific possessions, went to Japan.

Samoa went to New Zealand, and Kaiser Wilhelmsland to Australia with the remaining German possessions south of the Equator.

By a separate section of the Treaty the German army was reduced to 100,000, and the Great General Staff abolished.

The navy was limited to 6 battleships, 6 light cruisers, 12 destroyers, and 12 torpedo boats. Both air force and submarines were abolished.

The other parts of the Treaty dealt with the thorny problem of reparations, the trial of war-criminals, communications (by air, river, and rail), and with guarantees for the fulfilment of its provisions, i.e. the occupation of German territory by allied troops for 15 years.

Many other parts of Europe required readjustment. It was therefore necessary, as it had been in 1815, to conclude a series of additional treaties.

(*a*) Sept., 1919, at *St. Germain*: Austria, now a republic, became one of the smallest states in Europe, since she was shorn of all her alien territories. She has now no access to the sea.

(*b*) June, 1920, at the *Trianon*: Hungary, another new republic, was also greatly reduced in size, surrendering the Banat of Temesvar to Yugo-Slavia and Transylvania to Rumania.

(*c*) Nov., 1919, at *Neuilly*: Bulgaria surrendered her Ægean coast to Greece.

(*d*) Aug., 1920, by the *Treaty of Sèvres*, Turkey lost all her lands in Europe save Constantinople and Gallipoli; Mesopotamia and Palestine were mandated to Great Britain, and Syria to France.

Smyrna was given to Greece.

The Bosphorus and Dardanelles were to be free.

This settlement was never accepted by Turkey, who revived her military power in an extraordinary fashion (1919–22), reoccupied Smyrna, and advanced to the Dardanelles.

A final settlement in the Near East was not secured until July, 1923, when, by the *Treaty of Lausanne*, Turkey regained ground in Europe as far as the Maritza River including Adrianople. She kept possession of Smyrna.

Since 1917 *Russia*, under the Bolshevik Government, can hardly claim to form a part of Europe. She has witnessed a reign of terror marked by the entire absence of political liberty and the presence of pestilence and famine. Reference to the map will show the creation of four independent republics: Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

APPENDIX D

Belgium

A debatable land between French and Germans.

On the downfall of the Roman Empire, "Gallia Belgica" passed to the rule of the Franks, and later formed a part of the Middle Kingdom built up by Charles the Bold (*d.* 1477). The marriage of Mary, daughter of Charles, to the Emperor Maximilian I, brought the Netherlands under Hapsburg sway. On the death of Charles V, grandson of Maximilian and Mary, his son, Philip II, held the *Spanish Netherlands*, which corresponded roughly to the modern Belgium, while the Northern provinces broke away from him and became the Dutch Republic.

By the Peace of Utrecht, 1713, the Spanish Netherlands were transferred to *Austria.*

In 1794 the Netherlands were conquered by the French Revolutionists and *became a part of France.* After the fall of Napoleon (1815), the Southern Netherlands were united to Holland for fifteen years and ruled by a Dutch king.

In 1831, after a revolution, Belgian independence was achieved, and finally recognized by the five Great Powers in a treaty signed at London (April, 1839). Under this treaty "Belgium was formed an independent and perpetually neutral State; it shall be bound to observe neutrality towards all other States".

In 1870 Germany and France gave a formal undertaking that Belgian neutrality should be strictly respected.

APPENDIX E

Alsace-Lorraine

A debatable land for a thousand years.

Up to the fifth century A.D., Alsace-Lorraine formed part of the Roman province of Gaul. From the fifth to the ninth century the territory belonged to the Kingdom of the Franks. After Charlemagne's time (*d.* 814) it became a bone of contention between the Eastern and Western Franks. During the Middle Ages both provinces belonged to the loosely-knit parcel of territories known as the Holy Roman Empire.

In the sixteenth century, France, unlike the Germanic "Empire", had awoken to a sense of national unity and the need of more definite frontiers. In 1552 she occupied Metz, Toul, and Verdun.

By the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) this hold on Lorraine was confirmed, with the addition of Austrian Alsace.

In 1681, Louis XIV took possession of the rest of Alsace and seized the free city of Strasburg.

In 1766 the whole Duchy of Lorraine was ceded to France.

At the Congress of Vienna, 1815, by strenuous exertions on the part of Wellington and Castlereagh, both provinces were retained by France.

In 1871, Alsace-Lorraine was annexed to the new German Empire, despite the strong protests of its inhabitants, who were unanimous in their wish to remain French. Strategic considerations mainly dictated the annexation of 1871. Since then, the immense mineral wealth of Alsace-Lorraine has been tapped and developed. Petroleum and other oils have been found in Alsace, and there is a wealth of potash.

The value of the Lorraine iron-fields is seen by the fact that of 28 millions of tons produced in the German Empire, about 21 millions are supplied from Lorraine.

Quite apart from the factors of race and language, both of which might strengthen the German claim, the *sentiment* of the two provinces remained overwhelmingly French. As an Alsatian

patriot declared: "the first act of an Alsatian Republic would be to declare war on France. France would then be forced to annex us."

APPENDIX F

President Wilson's Fourteen Points

In a speech delivered on 8th January, 1918, President Wilson outlined what he declared to be "the programme of the world's peace":—

I. Open covenants of peace openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.

II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas outside territorial waters alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for enforcement of international covenants.[1]

III. The removal, as far as possible, of all economic barriers, and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.

IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.

V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon the strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the Government whose title is to be determined.

[1] The "freedom of the seas" is a glib phrase the exact meaning of which is hard to determine. The seas are always free in time of peace, now that piracy has been almost entirely suppresssed. Discussion of the "freedom of the seas" *in time of war* appears to be irrelevant in a series of proposals which assume the formation of a League of Nations *to prevent war*.

But if it be granted that the time is not yet at hand when wars shall cease, it is only just that continental armies should be subject to the same restrictions as imperial fleets. If "freedom of the seas" be insisted on, "freedom of the lands" must in common justice be added to the programme. You cannot reasonably deprive a sea-power of the means of reducing its enemy while those means continue to be regarded as legitimate for a continental military state to employ.

VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory, and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest co-operation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy, and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.

VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the government of their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of international law is for ever impaired.

VIII. All French territory should be freed, and the invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all.

IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.

X. The peoples of Austro-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the first opportunity of autonomous development.

XI. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated, occupied territories restored, Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea, and the relations of the several Balkan States to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality, and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan States should be entered into.

XII. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened

as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.

XIII. An independent Polish State should be created, which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.

XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small States alike.

The President's programme affords a fair summary of the work which the Peace Congress was called to perform.

The twin claims of nationality and democracy, which the Congress of Vienna failed to satisfy, were not ignored in the new settlement.

There is nothing new in the idea of a League to preserve peace. Such a league was the Holy Alliance, but it expressed the will of the princes and not the will of the people. Groups of nations have been leagued against one another to preserve a balance of *power*. Those who believe in the progress of moral ideals look for a League of Nations which shall ensure that the "*will to peace*" shall replace the "*will to power*". It is difficult to believe that such a League will prove impossible of attainment.

APPENDIX G

Diary of the Great War

1914

June 28. Assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife at Serajevo.

The ostensible cause of the war. The Archduke was the heir to the Austrian throne, and his visit to Serajevo, capital of the Balkan province of Bosnia—once part of the ancient king-

dom of Serbia—coincided with one of the national Slav commemorations. He was murdered by a Bosnian student, but Austria held Serbia responsible for the crime.

July 23. Austro-Hungarian Note to Serbia.

The terms of the Note, or rather ultimatum, were so harsh that Sir Edward Grey declared that he had never known one State address to another independent State a document of so formidable a character. There is no doubt that more was intended by it than the mere humiliation of Serbia and suppression of anti-Austrian intrigue in that kingdom. Allied diplomatists were convinced that it was largely inspired by Germany, who saw in the assassination of the Archduke sufficient excuse for putting her mighty military machine and world-wide plans to the supreme test of war.

July 28. Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia.

It was of no avail that Serbia, acting on the pacific advice of Russia, the traditional protector of the Slavs, conceded every demand made by the Austrians, with two reservations safeguarding her very independence, offering to submit these last to the judgment of the Hague Tribunal. Germany, as her ambassador in Vienna said to the British representative at the time, "knew very well what she was about in backing up Austria-Hungary in this matter".

July 30. Partial mobilization of Russian army. War Council in Berlin. Bombardment of Belgrade.

Events now rushed to their inevitable end. Russia, in readiness to save Serbian independence, if necessary, from utter destruction, mobilized her southern armies. Germany, having failed on the 29th to persuade Britain to bargain away her honour by promising to stand aside while France was beaten—in which case only the French colonies were to be taken—sent an ultimatum to Russia threatening instant mobilization unless notified within twelve hours that Russia had stopped every measure of war.

July 31. General mobilization of Russian army. State of war declared in Germany.

Russia's reply to Germany's ultimatum was that it was technically impossible to carry out in the time what was demanded.

Germany and Austria, as well as Russia, now issued orders for general mobilization.

August 1. Germany declared war on Russia. Luxemburg invaded by German army.

Britain, meantime, had been striving her utmost to preserve peace. On this day King George made his personal appeal to the Tsar to "remove the apprehensions" existing in Germany regarding the Russian mobilization, and offering to do "everything in His Majesty's power to re-open the interrupted negotiations". "I would gladly have accepted your proposals," replied the Tsar, "had not the German ambassador this afternoon presented a note to my Government declaring war."

August 2. German Note to Belgium demanding safe passage for German armies through Belgian territory. German troops penetrated French territory at various points, the French having withdrawn all troops ten miles from the frontier in order to make it clear who was the aggressor.

The neutrality and independence of Belgium had been guaranteed by the Treaty of 1839, signed by Prussia, as well as by Great Britain, France, Russia, and Austria. This was the Treaty which Bethmann-Hollweg, the German Chancellor, now designated a mere "scrap of paper".

August 3. Germany declared war on France. Belgian Government refused German demands and appealed to Britain for assistance.

August 4. Great Britain demanded an assurance from Germany that the neutrality of Belgium should be respected. Germans attacked Liége. British army mobilized. War declared by Great Britain on Germany at 11 p.m. Admiral Sir John Jellicoe appointed to command the Grand Fleet.

August 5. Lord Kitchener appointed Secretary of State for War, and called for the First Hundred Thousand to form a new army.

August 8. French troops advanced into Alsace.

August 9. French troops occupied Mülhausen. German submarine sunk by cruiser *Birmingham*.

August 10. Germans in town of Liége; forts holding out. In-

vasion of Cape Colony by Germans announced. France declared war on Austria-Hungary.

August 12. Great Britain declared war on Austria-Hungary. Sale announced of German war-ships *Goeben* and *Breslau* to Turkey.

August 15. Fall of Liége after five days of heroic resistance.

August 16. British Expeditionary Force landed in France.

August 20. Brussels occupied by the Germans.

August 22. German attack on Namur. Levy of £8,000,000 on Brussels. Battle of Charleroi terminated. French army compelled to withdraw by overwhelming numbers.

August 23. British retreat from Mons begun. Japan declared war on Germany, and bombarded Tsingtau.

August 24. Fall of Namur.

August 25. Louvain sacked by the Germans.

August 26. Conquest of Togoland by the Allies announced. Victorious Russian advance in East Prussia.

August 28. British victory in the Heligoland Bight; loss of German cruisers *Maintz*, *Köln*, and *Ariadne*.

August 29. New Zealand troops captured Samoa.

September 2. Austrians defeated by Russians at Lemberg.

September 3. French Government transferred from Paris to Bordeaux.

September 5. Retreat from Mons ended.

September 6. First Battle of the Marne begun.

September 7. Turn of the tide in France.

The Franco-British armies, having halted and reformed according to Joffre's pre-arranged plan, now drove the Germans back across the Marne.

September 11. Australians occupied Bismarck Archipelago and German New Guinea.

September 15. First Battle of the Aisne begun.

The enemy retreated to strong positions on the Aisne, and inaugurated the prolonged period of trench warfare.

September 16. Russians under General Rennenkampf defeated in East Prussia.

The dazzling advance of the Russians in East Prussia, though it helped to relieve pressure on the Western Front, ended in

crushing disaster in the Battle of Tannenburg, won by General von Hindenburg.

September 22. British cruisers *Aboukir*, *Hogue*, and *Cressy* sunk by a German submarine in the North Sea.

September 23. British raid on the Zeppelin air-ship sheds at Düsseldorf.

October 9. Antwerp occupied by the Germans.

October 20. First Battle of Ypres begun.

The British army, under General French, had now been transferred to Flanders to stem the flood of Germans poured out on the enemy's right flank to break a way through to the Channel Ports. The British line held, though at enormous sacrifice, the flower of the old regular army, that had survived the retreat from Mons, falling before the Germans abandoned the attempt, about the middle of the following month.

October 30. Resignation of Prince Louis of Battenberg as First Sea Lord, and succession of Lord Fisher.

November 1. Naval battle off Coronel—Admiral Cradock's squadron destroyed by Germans.

November 5. Great Britain declared war on Turkey.

Turkey, under the unscrupulous Enver Pasha and other Young Turks, had been a willing tool in the hands of Germany since the beginning of the war, and with the purchase of the German warships, *Goeben* and *Breslau*, revealed her designs more and more plainly; but it was not until November 5 that Great Britain formally declared war on her, and annexed Cyprus.

November 7. Anglo-Japanese Expeditionary Forces captured Tsingtau.

November 9. *Emden* sunk by H.M.A.S. *Sydney*.

November 21. Occupation of Basra by British troops—the first stage in the Mesopotamian Campaign.

December 2. Belgrade captured by the Austrians.

December 7. Collapse of South African rebellion.

December 8. British naval victory off the Falklands—destruction by Admiral Sturdee of German fleet which had destroyed Admiral Cradock's squadron.

December 14. Belgrade retaken by the Serbians.

December 16. West Hartlepool, Scarborough, and Whitby bombarded by Germans from the sea.
December 17. Egypt declared a British Protectorate.
December 18. Prince Hussein Kamel proclaimed Sultan of Egypt.
December 24. First air raid on Great Britain by Germans.

1915

January 3. Russian victory at Ardahan in the Caucasus.
January 14. Swakopmund, in German South-West Africa, occupied by South Africans.
January 24. Naval action off the Dogger Bank—Destruction of the German battle-cruiser *Blücher*.
February 2. Turks routed in attack on Suez Canal.
February 18. Germany proclaimed submarine "blockade" of British Isles.
February 25. Dardanelles Forts bombarded by Allied fleets.
March 10. Battle of Neuve Chapelle.

A costly victory, won by British and Indian troops. The total British losses were about 12,000, those of the enemy being estimated at between 17,000 and 18,000.

March 22. Przemysl captured by Russians.
March 28. British liner *Falaba* torpedoed by a German submarine off Milford, with loss of 112 lives.
April 17. Hill 60, near Ypres, mined and captured by the British; but lost again in German counter-attack.
April 22. Second Battle of Ypres begun.

The first asphyxiating gas attack, launched by the Germans after two days' bombardment. A critical gap was made in the line of French colonial troops on the British left, surprised and overwhelmed by the poisonous clouds of gas, but the situation was saved after several days desperate fighting, the Canadians greatly distinguishing themselves on this occasion.

April 25. Landing of Allied forces in Gallipoli.
May 3. Defeat of Russian southern armies in Western Galicia.
May 6. Krithia Battle, Gallipoli.
May 7. Cunard liner *Lusitania* torpedoed by a German submarine off the Old Head of Kinsale.

The *Lusitania* was submarined without warning, with the consequent loss of 1198 lives. Of these 100 were Americans, and, though President Wilson declared that "there was such a thing as a nation being too proud to fight", the entry of the United States into the war was now only a question of time.

May 11. Germans defeated in renewed attack on Ypres.

May 12. British South African forces under General Botha occupied Windhuk, the capital of German South-West Africa.

May 16. Russians forced to retire to the line of the San and from the Carpathian passes.

May 23. Italy declared war on Austria.

May 25. Coalition Cabinet formed under Mr. Asquith's premiership.

June 2. Italians crossed Isonzo.

June 3. Przemysl recaptured by German and Austrian forces. Amara, on the Tigris, taken by the British.

June 7. Zeppelin destroyed between Ghent and Brussels by Flight Sub-Lieut. Warneford, R.N.

June 22. Lemberg recaptured by the Second Austrian Army.

July 2. German cruiser *Pommern* sunk by British submarine in the Baltic.

July 9. Completion of conquest of German South-West Africa.

July 24. Capture of Nasiriyeh on the Euphrates.

August 4. Warsaw captured by the Germans.

August 5. Fall of Ivangorod.

August 6. British landing at Suvla Bay.

August 8. Advance by General Birdwood at Anzac.

August 9. British advance north and west of Hooge.

August 15. National registration in Great Britain.

August 17. Kovno captured by the Germans.

August 18. Russian naval victory in Riga Gulf.

August 25. Brest-Litovsk captured by the Germans.

September 5. The Tsar succeeded to supreme command of the Russian armies.

September 18. Vilna taken by the Germans.

September 21. End of Russian retreat.

September 25. Franco-British advance at Loos and in Champagne.

September 28. Turks defeated at Kut-el-Amara.
October 4. Russian ultimatum to Bulgaria.
October 5. Landing of Allied forces at Salonika.
October 6. Invasion of Serbia by Austro-German forces.
October 9. Belgrade occupied by Austro-Germans.
October 11. Bulgarians crossed the Serbian frontier.
October 19. Lord Derby's recruiting scheme announced.
October 22. Bulgarians captured Uskub.
November 5. Nish taken by Bulgarians.
November 22. Battle of Ctesiphon.
December 2. Fall of Monastir.
December 3. General Townshend reached Kut-el-Amara in his retreat from Ctesiphon.
December 9. Allied retreat to Macedonia.
December 15. Sir John French succeeded by Sir Douglas Haig in command of the British army in France and Flanders.
December 19. Anzac and Suvla Bay evacuated.

1916

January 1. Occupation of Yaunde, capital of German Cameroon.
January 5. First Military Service Bill introduced.
January 8. Gallipoli finally evacuated.
January 10. Sir Percy Lake succeeded Sir John Nixon in Mesopotamia.
January 13. Fall of Cettinge.
February 9. General Smuts appointed to command in East Africa.
February 16. Capture of Erzerum by the Grand Duke Nicholas. Conquest of German Cameroon completed.
February 21. Battle of Verdun begun.
February 26. Germans captured Fort Douaumont.
March 10. Germany declared war on Portugal.
March 16. Admiral von Tirpitz succeeded by Admiral von Capelle.
April 17. Trebizond captured by the Grand Duke Nicholas.
April 25. German battle-cruiser squadron bombarded Lowestoft.
April 29. Fall of Kut.

May 3. Military Service Bill introduced extending compulsory principle to married men.

May 31. Battle of Jutland.

After heavy losses on both sides, the German High Seas Fleet was driven back, and did not again venture out to test the might of the British navy.

June 2. Renewed German attack on Ypres salient.

June 4. Russian offensive begun under General Brusiloff.

June 5. Lord Kitchener lost in H.M.S. *Hampshire*, while on his way to Russia.

The *Hampshire* was mined off the Orkney coast.

June 17. Czernovitz captured by Russians under General Lechitsky.

June 21. Mecca captured from the Turks by the Grand Sherif of Mecca.

June 25. Italian advance in the Trentino.

June 26. Italians reoccupy Asiero and Posino Line.

July 1. Battle of the Somme begun.

The First Battle of the Somme continued with varying intensity until the following November, by which time the Germans had been forced out of a wide stretch of powerfully-fortified territory, about 30 miles on a front of 100 miles. The relief thus afforded to the French at Verdun had also enabled our Allies to undertake successful counter-assaults, which rendered that place secure.

July 25. Erzinjan captured by General Yudenitch.

July 28. Brody captured by the Russians.

August 6. Italian offensive on the Isonzo.

August 9. Gorizia captured by the Italians, with 12,000 prisoners.

August 10. Stanislau captured by General Lechitsky.

August 27. Rumania declared war on Austria-Hungary. Italy declared war on Germany.

August 28. Germany declared war on Rumania.

August 29. Rumanian advance. Hindenburg appointed Chief of Staff of the German army.

August 30. Turkey declared war on Rumania.

September 3. Zeppelin destroyed at Cuffley by Lieut. Robinson, V.C.

September 4. Capture of Dar-es-Salaam, German East Africa.

September 15. Début of the "Tanks" in the renewed British advance on the Somme. Flers, Courcelette, and Martinpuich captured, with 4000 prisoners.

September 26. Combles and Thiépval captured in the Somme Battle.

October 10. Italian victory on the Carso. Allied ultimatum to Greece.

October 17. Allied troops landed in Athens.

October 24. Douaumont fort and village recaptured by the French in the renewed Verdun Battle; 6000 German prisoners and many guns taken.

November 1. Italian advance renewed on the Carso; 8000 prisoners taken.

November 2. Fort Vaux (Verdun) evacuated by the Germans.

November 13. British advance on the Ancre; Beaumont-Hamel captured.

November 18. Capture of Monastir.

November 21. Fall of Craiova.

November 26. German naval raid on Lowestoft.

November 29. Sir John Jellicoe succeeded Sir Henry Jackson as First Sea Lord, and Sir David Beatty appointed Commander-in-Chief of Grand Fleet.

December 1. Greek attack on Allied troops in Athens.

December 5. Resignation of Mr. Asquith.

December 6. Bucharest captured by the Germans.

December 7. Mr. Lloyd George became Prime Minister.

December 11. Coalition War Cabinet of five formed, consisting of Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Bonar Law, Lord Curzon, Lord Milner, and Mr. Henderson (Labour).

December 14. Allied ultimatum to Greece.

December 15. Great French advance at Verdun; Hardaumont recovered, with 11,000 prisoners.

December 19. Marshal Joffre succeeded by General Nivelle as Commander-in-Chief of French armies in the field.

December 31. Sir Douglas Haig created a Field-Marshal.

1917

February 1. Germany began "unrestricted" U-boat war.
February 3. Diplomatic relations severed between United States and Germany.
February 7. Grandcourt captured in the operations on the Ancre.
February 24. Kut-el-Amara recaptured by Sir Stanley Maude.
February 25. Further German retreat on the Ancre.
March 11. Bagdad captured by Sir Stanley Maude.
March 12. Revolution in Russia.
March 14. China severed relations with Germany.
March 15. Abdication of the Tsar.
March 17. Bapaume captured by the British.
March 18. Péronne taken by the British.
March 21. First Imperial War Council.
March 27. Defeat of the Turks south of Gaza.
April 5. United States at war with Germany.
April 7. Cuba at war with Germany.
April 8. Panama at war with Germany.
April 9. Battle of Vimy Ridge.
April 16. French offensive between Soissons and Reims.
April 17. British advance in Palestine.
April 18. General Maude's victory near Samara.
April 20. French across Chemin-des-Dames. German destroyers' raid on Dover—three torpedoed or rammed by British destroyers *Swift* and *Broke* of the Dover Patrol.
April 23. British advance along the Scarpe.
April 26. German naval raid on Ramsgate.
April 30. General Maude's victory over 13th Turkish Army Corps.
May 3. Fresh British advance east of Arras.
May 16. Coalition Government formed in Russia under Prince Lvoff. General Pétain succeeded General Nivelle as French Commander-in-Chief, with General Foch as his Chief of Staff.
May 17. Capture of Bullecourt, on the Hindenburg Switch Line.
May 23. Italian advance on the Southern Carso.
June 2. Brazil at war with Germany.

June 4. General Brusiloff succeeded General Alexieff as Russian Commander-in-Chief.

June 7. British victory at Messines.

The Messines-Wytschaete positions, powerfully fortified, and dominating the Ypres salient on the south, were captured as a preliminary to the battle for the Flanders Ridges, planned to begin on July 31. In the course of this preparatory triumph all the enemy positions were captured, together with 7257 prisoners and 67 guns.

June 12. Abdication of King Constantine.

June 26. Arrival of first American contingents in France.

July 1. Brusiloff's advance in last Russian attack before the Bolshevist regime.

July 10. Fall of Halicz.

July 14. Dismissal of Bethmann-Hollweg, German Chancellor.

July 31. Third Battle of Ypres begun.

The chief British offensive of 1917. It lasted, with various intervals, until the middle of November, and though it secured for us 11 miles of the main ridge east of Ypres, including the village of Passchendaele, and helped our Allies elsewhere, the cost, owing to the stubborn defence and the abnormal rainfalls which transformed the battle-field into liquid mud, was out of all proportion to the territorial gains.

August 3. Fall of Czernovitz.

August 11. Rumanian Royal Family leave Jassy.

August 14. Peace proposals by the Pope.

Rendered unavailing largely because Germany declined to state her intentions regarding Belgium and other conditions of peace.

August 15. British attack in Lens sector; capture of southern suburbs and Hill 70.

August 16. New Battle of Ypres resumed.

August 19. Italian attack from the Isonzo to the sea.

August 20. French victory at Verdun; Mort Homme recaptured.

September 3. Fall of Riga.

September 8. General Korniloff dismissed by M. Kerensky.

September 11. M. Kerensky assumed position of Generalissimo in Russia.

September 15. Russia proclaimed a Republic.
September 28. British victory at Ramadieh on the Euphrates.
October 24. Italian defeat at Caporetto.
October 29. Fall of Udine.
October 30. Dismissal of the German Chancellor Michaelis.
October 31. Beersheba captured by General Allenby in the Palestine advance.
November 1. German retreat on the Chemin-des-Dames. Count Hertling succeeded Michaelis as German Chancellor.
November 6. Passchendaele captured by the Canadians.
November 7. Gaza captured by General Allenby.
November 8. Bolshevist *coup d'état* in Russia.
November 9. General Diaz succeeded Cadorna as Italian Generalissimo.
November 18. Death of Sir Stanley Maude.
November 20. British victory at Cambrai.

General Byng's surprise attack with Tanks, breaking through the Hindenburg Line, and capturing 11,000 prisoners and 138 guns.

November 30. German counter-attack at Cambrai.

General Byng's victory constituted a serious threat to the German lines north of his new positions. By a sudden assault the enemy, who had secretly concentrated a large force for the purpose, now broke through our new line for a considerable distance. We remained in possession of over 6 miles of his recently captured defences, but lost 9000 prisoners and 166 guns.

December 1. German East Africa clear of the enemy.
December 7. United States at war with Austria-Hungary.
December 9. Jerusalem captured by General Allenby.
December 22. Peace negotiations opened at Brest-Litovsk between Russia and the Central Powers.
December 26. Sir Rosslyn Wemyss appointed First Sea Lord in place of Sir John Jellicoe.

1918

January 8. President Wilson's message to Congress, formulating his programme of "Fourteen Points" for a World's Peace.

January 14. Yarmouth bombarded by German destroyers.

January 20. Naval action off Imbros.

February 1. Ukraine Republic recognized by the Central Powers.

February 9. First Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.

February 17. Soviet delegates decline to sign Treaty with Central Powers. Germany resumed hostilities against Russia.

February 21. Jericho captured by General Allenby.

February 24. Turks recaptured Trebizond.

February 25. Fall of Reval.

March 3. Second Treaty of Brest-Litovsk signed.

The prolonged negotiations at Brest-Litovsk—in which the Bolshevik Government of revolutionary Russia betrayed the Allies, and especially Rumania, which had entered the war at Russia's instigation—were terminated on this date by the signing of the Peace Treaty by the Bolsheviks, the Germans having meantime continued their threatening advance towards Petrograd and the south. The Treaty was ratified by a Congress of Soviets at Moscow on March 17, but was subsequently nullified by the Allies' Treaty of Peace with Germany at Versailles.

March 9. General Marshall, successor to Sir Stanley Maude in Mesopotamia, occupied Hit.

March 11. Turks recaptured Erzerum.

March 13. Germans occupied Odessa.

March 21. Great German offensive begun in the West—between the Scarpe and the Oise.

March 23. Paris bombarded by long-range gun.

March 24. Fall of Bapaume and Péronne.

April 5. Allied landing at Vladivostok.

April 9. German offensive in the West extended towards Ypres. New Military Service Bill introduced in the House of Commons.

April 11. Fall of Armentières.

April 12. Sir Douglas Haig's Order of the Day to the British troops:

". . . Every position must be held to the last man; there must be no retirement. With our backs to the wall, and believing in the justice of our cause, each one of us must fight on to the end."

April 14. General Foch appointed Allied Generalissimo.

April 15. Loss of Bailleul.

April 18. Lord Milner appointed War Secretary.

April 22. British naval attack on Zeebrugge and Ostend.

April 26. Loss of Kemmel Hill, commanding Ypres from the south-west.

April 27. Turks recaptured Kars.

May 1. Sebastopol occupied by the Germans.

May 7. Peace signed between Rumania and the Central Powers.

May 9. Second British naval raid on Ostend. Failure of last German onslaught against Ypres.

May 27. Second German offensive in the West—towards the Marne.

May 29. Fall of Soissons.

May 31. Germans reach the Marne.

June 9. German offensive between Montdidier and Noyon.

June 15. Austrian offensive begun in Italy.

June 22. Italians regained the initiative and drove the Austrians back across the Piave.

July 15. Third German offensive, beginning Second Battle of the Marne.

July 16. Ex-Tsar reported shot.

July 18. Marshal Foch's counter-attack on the Marne.

August 2. Soissons recaptured.

August 8. British victory at Amiens.

August 29. Bapaume and Noyon recovered.

September 1. Péronne recaptured.

September 2. Drocourt-Quéant line breached.

September 12. American victory at St. Mihiel.

September 15. Peace Note from Austria.

Inviting all the belligerents, including her own ally Germany, to a discussion of peace terms on neutral territory. "A cynical

attempt", in Mr. Balfour's words, "to divide the Allies"; and unsuccessful.

September 17. Allied offensive in Macedonia; first phase of Bulgaria's collapse.

September 19. Renewed British advance in Palestine.

September 27. Hindenburg Line broken.

September 29. Bulgaria out of the war.

September 30. Damascus captured. Resignation of Chancellor Hertling, and appointment of Prince Max of Baden in his stead.

October 1. St. Quentin recovered.

October 4. Abdication of King Ferdinand of Bulgaria.

October 9. Cambrai captured.

October 10. Le Cateau victory.

October 13. Laon captured.

October 17. Ostend, Lille, and Douai captured.

October 19. Bruges captured.

October 20. Belgian coast cleared of the Germans.

October 25. Resignation of General Ludendorff.

October 26. Fall of Aleppo.

October 28. Piave crossed by the Italians.

Italy's decisive offensive opened on October 24, with the co-operation of British and French divisions, and its success was overwhelming.

October 29. Danube reached by the Serbians.

October 30. Turkey out of the war.

November 2. British entered Valenciennes.

November 3. Italians entered Trent and Trieste, and Austria-Hungary surrendered.

November 5. Mr. Wilson's last Note to Germany.

November 6. Sedan reached by Americans.

November 7. Bavarian Republic proclaimed.

November 9. German envoys received by Foch. Abdication of the Kaiser. Resignation of Chancellor Prince Max. Revolution in Berlin.

November 10. British back at Mons. Herr Ebert, a Majority Socialist, appointed German Chancellor.

November 11. Armistice terms accepted by Germans.

November 21. German fleet surrendered.
December 1. British and Allied troops entered German territory.

1919

June 21. German fleet scuttled at Scapa Flow.
June 28. Germany signed Peace terms at Versailles.

The Peace Treaty—signed on June 28, 1919, in the historic room at Versailles in which the German Empire was proclaimed in 1871—involved Germany's unconditional acceptance of all the Allies' terms. On her western frontier, Alsace and Lorraine were returned to France; Eupen, Malmédy, and part of Moresnet were assigned to Belgium; Luxemburg was detached from the German Union; and the Saar Basin was to be administered by the League of Nations for fifteen years, whilst its rich coal-mines were exploited by France as part payment for the destruction of her own coal-mines, the inhabitants having the right at the end of that period to indicate the sovereignty under which they desired to be placed. The eastern frontier of Germany was to be modified in order to re-establish the Polish nation in the independence of which it had been unjustly deprived more than 100 years before, with Danzig as a Free City and territory astride the delta of the Vistula. Slesvig, on the frontier of Germany and Denmark, was to choose by plebiscite under which sovereignty it wished to be governed, the same fate being reserved for wide areas of the old provinces of East and West Prussia and Silesia.

Germany also renounced in favour of the principal Allied and Associated Powers all her rights and titles over her overseas possessions; agreed to the demands for restitution and indemnities to the utmost of her power; and for the public arraignment of Wilhelm II, the ex-Kaiser, "for a supreme offence against international morality, and the sanctity of Treaties"; besides admitting the right of the Allies to bring before military tribunals any of her subjects accused of having violated the laws and customs of war.

The German army, among the other humiliating items in the

Treaty, was to be reduced within three months to a maximum of 200,000 men, and by the end of March, 1920, to 100,000 men. The strength of the German navy was to be reduced to that of a third-rate Power; all remaining submarines, as well as all air-craft—naval and military alike—were to be surrendered or destroyed; and the fortifications of Heligoland were to be demolished and never reconstructed.

As guarantee for the due execution of the Treaty of Peace, the German territory situated to the west of the Rhine, together with the Rhine bridge-heads, was to be occupied by Allied and Associated troops for a period of fifteen years, the cost of the occupation to be borne by Germany.

APPENDIX H

Ireland—Eighteenth-Nineteenth Century

The Legacy of Cromwell's rule—James II—Capitulation of Limerick, 1691—Penal Laws—Economic Condition—Results of American War—Henry Grattan—Repeal of Poyning's Act, 1782—Revolution period—Wolfe Tone and United Irishmen—Position of Roman Catholics—Rebellion of 1798—The Union of 1800—Catholic Emancipation, 1829—Daniel O'Connell—The Great Famine, 1846—Unrest—Evictions—Emigration—The Fenians—The "Manchester Martyrs"—Era of Conciliation—Land Act, 1870—Parnell, 1879—The Land League—Phœnix Park Murders, 1882—Gladstone and Home Rule, 1886—Unionist Policy, 1886–1905—Local Government Act, 1898—Parnell Case, 1889–9—Co-operation Movement—Gaelic League—Division of Irish Parties—Home Rule, 1914—Position of Ulster—The Great War—Geographical Situation of Ireland—Rise of Sinn Fein—Establishment of Free State.

Canada

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New Zealand

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
Frederick William, Great Elector, 1640–88.
Frederick, Elector to 1701, Frederick I, King 1701–13.
Frederick William I, 1713–40.
Frederick the Great, 1740–86.
Augustus William.
Frederick William II, 1786–97.
Frederick William III, 1797–1840.
Frederick William IV, 1840–61.
William I, [Emperor 1871], 1861–88.
Frederick III, 1888.
William II, 1888–1918.

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

FRENCH DYNASTIES.—II. BONAPARTE


Joseph, King of Spain, 1808.
Napoleon I, died 1821.
"Napoleon II", Duke of Reichstadt, died 1832.
Lucien.
Louis, King of Holland, 1806–10.
(Louis) Napoleon III, Emperor 1852–71.
Napoleon Louis, died Zulu War, 1879.
Jerome, King of Westphalia, 1807–14.
Napoleon, Joseph Charles died 1891.
= Clotilde daughter of Victor Emanuel.
Napoleon Victor.
Louis Napoleon.

SERBIA

I. HOUSE OF OBRENOVITCH



II. HOUSE OF KARAGEORGEVITCH



RUMANIA

HOUSE OF HOHENZOLLERN-SIGMARINGEN



GREECE

[1833–62, Otto of Bavaria, King]

HOUSE OF SLESVIG-HOLSTEIN



RUSSIA

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

BULGARIA

HOUSE OF SAXE-COBURG AND GOTHA

Augustus of Saxe-Coburg = Clementina, daughter of King Louis Philippe of France.

Ferdinand I, Prince 1887, King 1908, abd. 1918.

Boris.

(1879–1886, Prince Alexander of Battenberg.)

SWEDEN

HOUSE OF BERNADOTTE

Charles XIV, 1818–44.

Oscar, 1844–59.

Charles XV, 1859–72.

Oscar II, 1872–1907.

Gustavus V, 1907–

NORWAY

Louisa of Sweden = Frederick VIII, King of Denmark.

Haakon VII = Maud, daughter of Edward VII of England.

Olaf.

SPAIN

HOUSE OF BOURBON



PORTUGAL

HOUSE OF BRAGANZA



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